FN Clarivate Analytics Web of Science VR 1.0 PT J AU Chuang, SH AF Chuang, Shih-Hsien TI Aviation taxation and tax incidence SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Early Access DE Tax incidence; pass-through; airline industry; tax salience AB This paper investigates tax incidence resulting from the 'combined unit tax' levied on domestic air travel. Using a panel dataset and estimating with first-differences, I find that domestic aviation taxes are over-shifted to passengers by 30-70 cents per dollar tax. A potential nonlinear relationship between tax and fare changes is detected. The results are essential to future studies on tax salience. Seasonal effects are the most pronounced in periods with high demand. I extend the literature by providing fresh evidence of tax incidence in the airline industry and complementing the over-shifting results found in other industries. C1 [Chuang, Shih-Hsien] Northwest Missouri State Univ, Maryville, MO 64468 USA. RP Chuang, SH (corresponding author), Northwest Missouri State Univ, Maryville, MO 64468 USA. 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Econ. DI 10.1080/00036846.2020.1808179 EA DEC 2020 PG 15 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA PB9NH UT WOS:000596638500001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Dinterman, R Katchova, AL AF Dinterman, Robert Katchova, Ani L. TI Property Tax Incidence on Cropland Cash Rent SO APPLIED ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY LA English DT Article DE Agricultural land; Current Agricultural Use Value Program; tax incidence; rental rates ID AGRICULTURAL SUBSIDIES; FARMLAND; RATES; RELIEF AB We estimate the property tax incidence on rented cropland, defined as the extent to which landowners can increase cash rental rates to shift the tax burden of property tax to renters. Using Ohio's Current Agricultural Use Value (CAUV) Program, we are able to avoid issues where the market value of farmland determines the property tax as CAUV assesses farmland in Ohio based on a use-value formula with historical and state-wide prices, yields, and costs of corn, soybeans, and wheat. Our results indicate that cash rental rates in Ohio from 2008 through 2017 increased between $0.31 to $0.40 for each additional dollar of property tax levied on cropland in the short run. Further specifications taking into account lagged effects of property tax indicates a higher incidence of $0.61 higher cash rent for each additional dollar of property tax, although this is dispersed over a 3-year time period. C1 [Dinterman, Robert] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Farm Income Enhancement Team, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. [Katchova, Ani L.] Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. RP Katchova, AL (corresponding author), Ohio State Univ, Dept Agr Environm & Dev Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA. 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Econ. Perspect. Policy PD DEC PY 2020 VL 42 IS 4 BP 739 EP 758 DI 10.1093/aepp/ppz004 PG 20 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA OS0DS UT WOS:000589835200007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Blumkin, T Pinhas, H Zultan, R AF Blumkin, Tomer Pinhas, Haim Zultan, Ro'i TI Wage Subsidies and Fair Wages SO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Wage subsidies; Welfare; Gift exchange; Tax incidence; Laboratory experiment ID GIFT-EXCHANGE; REAL-EFFORT; TAX; TRUST; FIELD; RECIPROCITY; INCOME; EQUIVALENCE; TAXATION; INCENTIVES AB Wage subsidies can be provided directly to the worker, or indirectly by subsidizing the employer; with reduced cost of labor, employers offer higher wages. The standard literature stipulates that this statutory incidence bears no implications for the economic incidence. We propose and test a mechanism by which indirect subsidies lead to higher social welfare. Studies show that workers reciprocate higher wages with higher effort. Indirect subsidies are shifted to the workers as higher wages, leading workers to reciprocate with higher effort and productivity. A controlled laboratory experiment supports our behavioral hypotheses and confirms the behavioral and welfare implications. (C) 2020 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Blumkin, Tomer; Pinhas, Haim; Zultan, Ro'i] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel. RP Zultan, R (corresponding author), Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Beer Sheva, Israel. EM tomerblu@bgu.ac.il; haimpin@gmail.com; zultan@bgu.ac.il RI ; Zultan, Ro'i/C-8353-2012 OI Blumkin, Tomer/0000-0002-9215-6816; Zultan, Ro'i/0000-0002-4256-8601 FU ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATIONIsrael Science Foundation [552/14] FX We thank Gary Charness, Raj Chetty, Dirk Krueger, David Laibson, Omer Moav, Andreas Peichl, Arno Riedl, Yona Rubinstein, Rupert Sausgruber, JeanRobert Tyran, two anonymous referees, seminar participants at Bar-Ilan University, the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Technical University of Munich, University of Vienna, Bank of Israel, and conference participants at the Economic Science Association International Meeting, Jerusalem, CESifo Behavioral Economics Area conference, the Incentives and Behavior change conference, Tel-Aviv, CESifo Employment and Social Protection Area conference, and the European Economic Association meeting in Cologne for useful comments and discussion. This research was supported by the ISRAEL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (grant No. 552/14). 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Econ. Rev. PD AUG PY 2020 VL 127 AR 103497 DI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103497 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA MP2HS UT WOS:000552030900029 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Reanos, MAT AF Reanos, Miguel A. Tovar TI Initial incidence of carbon taxes and environmental liability. A vehicle ownership approach SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Transport policies; Distributional effects; CO2 emissions ID DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS; FUEL; EMISSIONS; POLLUTION; DEMAND AB A German panel data of vehicle and owner characteristics is used to analyse the incidence of additional carbon taxes. It is shown that an additional carbon tax on fuel used for private transportation is regressive when there is no allocation of tax revenue. When smoothing consumption across time in the face of additional carbon taxes, low income households can reduce the tax burden. When the cost of air pollution is included in the metric for the tax incidence, the tax burden decreases considerably. It is also found that in order to charge drivers for the attributed emissions, carbon taxes need to be set at least at (sic)30 per tonne of CO2 emissions. Moreover, the estimated own price elasticities suggest that an additional carbon tax may fail to induce owners of vehicles with an intense usage to reduce energy consumption. Consequently, carbon taxes need to be designed jointly with other taxes to target heavy polluters. C1 [Reanos, Miguel A. Tovar] Econ & Social Res Inst, Sir John Rogersons Quay, Dublin, Ireland. [Reanos, Miguel A. Tovar] Trinity Coll Dublin, Dublin, Ireland. RP Reanos, MAT (corresponding author), Econ & Social Res Inst, Sir John Rogersons Quay, Dublin, Ireland. EM miguel.angeltovar@esri.ie FU ESRI's Energy Policy Research Centre, Ireland; German Federal Ministry of Education and ResearchFederal Ministry of Education & Research (BMBF) [FKZ 01UT1411A] FX I acknowledge funding from the ESRI's Energy Policy Research Centre, Ireland. I started this work while I was a postdoctoral researcher at the Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) under support of the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (FKZ 01UT1411A). 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Evidence from broadening the VAT base SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article; Early Access DE Commodity taxation; Tax burden; Tax incidence; Pass through; Tax harmonization ID CIGARETTE TAXES; SALES TAXES; AD-VALOREM; PRICE; TAXATION; STATE; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY AB We exploit the introduction of a 5% VAT on very essential food products (like fresh milk, coffee, yogurt, cheese) that occurred when an EU member state had to harmonize its VAT legislation with the EU VAT legislation. Preceding this reform, there was a removal of the zero VAT rate and imposition of 5% VAT rate on other food items that were considered less essential (juices, bottled water). We adopt a difference-in-difference approach as the price data support the common trends identifying assumption. On average, the tax was shifted fully to the consumer within the first month after the reform. However, there are differences even across seemingly related goods as some of them experienced overshifting of the pass through effect. The prices of goods in the control group did not change. These estimates are robust to alternative specifications and can be useful to other countries considering to broaden their VAT base by taxing basic groceries. C1 [Lyssiotou, Panayiota] Univ Cyprus, Dept Econ, POB 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. [Savva, Elena] Univ Cyprus, POB 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. RP Lyssiotou, P (corresponding author), Univ Cyprus, Dept Econ, POB 20537, CY-1678 Nicosia, Cyprus. EM p.lyssiotou@ucy.ac.cy FU University of Cyprus FX We are very grateful to the Editor-in-Chief and two anonymous referees for their very useful comments and suggestions. Also, we would like to thank Theofanis Mamuneas, Federico Perali, Nikos Theodoropoulos and Panos Tsakloglou for helpful comments and suggestions. We also would like to thank the University of Cyprus for financial support. 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Tax Public Financ. DI 10.1007/s10797-020-09605-6 EA JUN 2020 PG 36 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA MB7NS UT WOS:000542786800001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Mace, C Patel, E Seegert, N AF Mace, Christopher Patel, Elena Seegert, Nathan TI MARIJUANA TAXATION AND IMPERFECT COMPETITION SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE marijuana; deadweight loss; state taxation ID AD-VALOREM; CORPORATE-FINANCE; TAX INCIDENCE; CANNABIS USE; UNIT TAXES; LAWS; ALCOHOL; OLIGOPOLY; IMPACT; CIGARETTES AB We investigate the tax implications of the new recreational marijuana industry in the United States, which reached $9 billion in 2017. We exploit administrative data from Washington State to evaluate market conduct, and we estimate the elasticity of supply to be 1.46. In addition, we conduct a survey of marijuana producers and retailers in Colorado, Oregon, and Washington, calculating the elasticity of demand to be -1.84. We use these estimates to determine how much of the tax burden is borne by consumers. The answer depends on market conduct. In perfectly competitive markets, producers pay slightly more of the tax than consumers, but, in a monopoly market, consumers would pay most of the tax. Additionally, we calculate that the change in deadweight loss due to the tax is $63 million per year, or 48 percent of total marijuana tax revenues in 2015. This calculation, however, depends critically on estimates of consumption externalities. C1 [Mace, Christopher; Patel, Elena; Seegert, Nathan] Univ Utah, David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA. RP Mace, C (corresponding author), Univ Utah, David Eccles Sch Business, Salt Lake City, UT 84112 USA. 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Tax J. PD JUN PY 2020 VL 73 IS 2 BP 545 EP 591 DI 10.17310/ntj.2020.2.08 PG 47 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA NJ2YA UT WOS:000565913000008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kim, H Lee, D AF Kim, Hyunchul Lee, Dongwon TI Racial demographics and cigarette tax shifting: evidence from scanner data SO EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Early Access DE Tax shifting; Cigarette excise tax; Tax incidence; Racial and ethnic minorities; Scanner data ID EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; PRICES; TAXATION; COMPETITION; IMPACT; CONSUMPTION; INCREASES; SMOKERS; TOBACCO; STATE AB This paper examines the association between racial demographics and the shifting of cigarette excise taxes to consumer prices. Using scanner data on cigarette sales from 1687 stores across 53 American cities, 2009-2011, we found that cigarette taxes are shifted significantly less to consumer prices in cities with large minority (black and Hispanic) populations. The potential for price search behavior implies that our estimates understate the magnitude of the true relationship between local racial composition and cigarette tax shifting. Our finding suggests that increasing cigarette taxes may not be an effective means of reducing cigarette consumption in high-minority areas. C1 [Kim, Hyunchul; Lee, Dongwon] Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul 110745, South Korea. RP Lee, D (corresponding author), Sungkyunkwan Univ, Dept Econ, Seoul 110745, South Korea. EM hchkim@skku.edu; danlee200@skku.cdu OI Lee, Dongwon/0000-0003-4568-5982 FU Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea; National Research Foundation of KoreaNational Research Foundation of Korea [NRF-2017S1A5A2A02068347] FX We wish to thank an anonymous reviewer, editor Subal C. Kumbhakar, Minsoo Park, seminar participants at Korea University and Sungkyunkwan University (SKKU), and participants at the 2016 meetings of the Korea International Economic Association for valuable comments and suggestions. 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Econ. DI 10.1007/s00181-020-01876-6 EA MAY 2020 PG 27 WC Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods SC Business & Economics; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences GA LN6VM UT WOS:000533072400001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bajo-Buenestado, R AF Bajo-Buenestado, Raul TI Market prices, spatial distribution of consumers and firms' optimal locations in a linear city SO EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Early Access DE Demand estimation; Linear-city model; Distribution of consumers; Spatial analysis; Regulated location; Spatial price competition ID RECREATION DEMAND; TAX INCIDENCE; GASOLINE; COMPETITION; SEARCH; DISPERSION; STABILITY; STRATEGY; COSTS; MODEL AB We study a game of spatial competition in prices. In particular, we focus on the linear-city duopoly model to see what we can learn about the distribution of consumers, which is not required to be uniform-as in the original Hotelling model. Using variation in firms' prices and costs, we identify points of the distribution of consumers. Based on these points, we estimate the spatial distribution of consumers along the linear city. We apply our methodology to a dataset of prices of two gas stations on a straight highway. By estimating the distribution of consumers, we are able to find the optimal location of an entrant gas station. Using our estimated distribution of consumers and the entrant's optimal point, we simulate welfare gains under counterfactual locations of an entrant. C1 [Bajo-Buenestado, Raul] Univ Navarra, Dept Econ, Edificio Amigos, Pamplona 31009, Navarra, Spain. [Bajo-Buenestado, Raul] Rice Univ, Baker Inst Publ Policy, Houston, TX 77005 USA. RP Bajo-Buenestado, R (corresponding author), Univ Navarra, Dept Econ, Edificio Amigos, Pamplona 31009, Navarra, Spain.; Bajo-Buenestado, R (corresponding author), Rice Univ, Baker Inst Publ Policy, Houston, TX 77005 USA. EM rbajo@unav.es RI Bajo-Buenestado, Raul/S-7068-2017 OI Bajo-Buenestado, Raul/0000-0002-6997-2217 FU Social Sciences Research Institute at Rice University; Fundacion Ramon Areces [CISP16A4779] FX I acknowledge helpful comments and suggestions by Marcus Berliant, Dodge Cahan, Gilles Duranton, Hulya Eraslan, Nicholas Frazier, Peter Hartley, Jeffrey Lin, Kenneth Medlock, Shaun McRae, Xun Tang, and two anonymous referees, and seminar participants at the X EGSC Conference at Washington University in St. Louis and at the XXX Spanish Economic Association meeting. Thanks also to Maria Garcia, who kindly helped me with the data. I gratefully acknowledge financial support from the Social Sciences Research Institute at Rice University and Fundacion Ramon Areces (Grant Number CISP16A4779). The remaining errors are solely mine. The dataset and the MATLAB and R codes are available upon request from the author. 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Econ. DI 10.1007/s00181-020-01871-x EA MAY 2020 PG 25 WC Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods SC Business & Economics; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences GA LL4JT UT WOS:000531523000001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Douenne, T AF Douenne, Thomas TI The Vertical and Horizontal Distributive Effects of Energy Taxes: A Case Study of a French Policy SO ENERGY JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE Energy taxes; Carbon tax; Distributional effects; Demand system; Micro-simulation ID CARBON TAX; DEMAND SYSTEM; IMPACTS; REFORMS; PRICE; PAYS AB This paper proposes a micro-simulation assessment of the distributional impacts of the French carbon tax. It shows that the policy is regressive, but could be made progressive by redistributing the revenue through flat-recycling. However, it would still generate large horizontal distributive effects and harm a significant share of low-income households. The determinants of the tax incidence are characterized precisely, and alternative targeted transfers are simulated on this basis. The paper shows that given the importance of unobserved heterogeneity in the determinants of energy consumption, horizontal distributive effects are much more difficult to tackle than vertical ones. C1 [Douenne, Thomas] Univ Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, Paris Sch Econ, Paris, France. RP Douenne, T (corresponding author), Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. 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M, 2019, 25831 NAT BUR EC RES, DOI [10.3386/w25831, DOI 10.3386/W25831] West SE, 2004, J ENVIRON ECON MANAG, V47, P535, DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.11.004 Williams RC, 2015, NATL TAX J, V68, P195, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2015.1.09 NR 36 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 6 U2 8 PU INT ASSOC ENERGY ECONOMICS PI CLEVELAND PA 28790 CHAGRIN BLVD, STE 210, CLEVELAND, OH 44122 USA SN 0195-6574 EI 1944-9089 J9 ENERG J JI Energy J. PD MAY PY 2020 VL 41 IS 3 BP 231 EP 253 DI 10.5547/01956574.41.3.tdou PG 23 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA LG6FZ UT WOS:000528195700010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Fox, E AF Fox, Edward TI Does Capital Bear the US Corporate Tax After All? New Evidence from Corporate Tax Returns SO JOURNAL OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUDIES LA English DT Article ID EXCESS RETURNS; INCOME TAX; PURE RENT; TAXATION; POLICY; COMPETITION AB This article uses U.S. corporate tax return data to assess how government revenue would have changed if, over the period 1957-2013, corporations had been subject to a hypothetical corporate cash flow tax-that is, a tax allowing for the immediate deduction of investments in long-lived assets like equipment and structures-rather than the corporate tax regime actually in effect. Holding taxpayer behavior fixed, the data indicate actual corporate tax revenue over the most recent period (1995-2013) differed little from that under the hypothetical cash flow tax. This result has three important implications. First, capital owners appear to bear a large fraction of the corporate tax today. This is because economic theory holds that corporate cash flow taxes are largely borne by capital owners and my result implies that the actual tax behaves in practice much like a cash flow tax. This theory is embodied in the Treasury's most recent model of corporate tax incidence. Applying the model to my results implies that only a small portion (2-10 percent) of the U.S. corporate tax was borne by labor in the years before the 2017 Act and thus capital providers are the primary beneficiaries of the Act's large corporate rate cut. Second, the results suggest that the United States could switch fully over to a cash flow tax, which is likely to be administratively simpler for both the government and corporations, at relatively low revenue cost. Third, the impact of fully switching to a cash flow tax on the operations of the real economy and its efficiency are likely to be fairly small. This is precisely because the corporate tax has already evolved to largely mimic a cash flow tax, and the article explores the reasons underlying this evolution using a novel dataset. C1 [Fox, Edward] Univ Michigan, Law Sch, Law, 625 S State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA. RP Fox, E (corresponding author), Univ Michigan, Law Sch, Law, 625 S State St, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA. EM edfox@umich.edu CR Alder S., 2017, WORKING PAPER Auerbach A., 2010, MODERN CORPORATE TAX AUERBACH AJ, 1983, J ECON LIT, V21, P905 Auerbach AJ, 2006, TAX POL EC, V20, P1 Auerbach AJ, 2018, J ECON PERSPECT, V32, P97, DOI 10.1257/jep.32.4.97 Avi-Yonah RS, 2000, HARVARD LAW REV, V113, P1573, DOI 10.2307/1342445 Ayres I, 2019, TEX LAW REV, V97, P445 Brown E. 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Empir Leg. Stud PD MAR PY 2020 VL 17 IS 1 BP 71 EP 115 DI 10.1111/jels.12243 PG 45 WC Law SC Government & Law GA KL8PL UT WOS:000513680300003 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Khan, MS Thompson, PN Tremblay, VJ AF Khan, Muhammad Salar Thompson, Paul N. Tremblay, Victor J. TI Marijuana tax incidence, stockpiling, and cross-border substitution SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Marijuana; Taxes; Stockpiling; Cross-border substitution ID CIGARETTE TAXES; PRICES; IMPACT; DEMAND; SALES; CANNABIS; TOBACCO AB While the number of legalized recreational marijuana markets continues to grow in the USA, state and local governments are still determining how best to levy taxes on marijuana receipts in the face of consumer behavioral responses, such as stockpiling behavior and cross-border purchasing. Using the introduction of a 25% tax on marijuana in Oregon as a natural experiment, we conduct difference-in-differences, regression discontinuity, and event study analyses to identify the effect of the tax increase on marijuana prices and quantities, consumer stockpiling, and cross-border purchasing. Our results are consistent with the theoretical predictions of tax incidence-finding that consumer marijuana prices rise and the quantity of marijuana sold falls as a result of the tax. We also observe evidence of short-term stockpiling of marijuana in anticipation of the tax and find that the tax led to increased cross-border substitution, most notably, at the Washington State border. Based on our results, we also determine that supply is relatively elastic in this market, and demand becomes more elastic over time as consumers gain greater information on prices of substitutes. C1 [Khan, Muhammad Salar] George Mason Univ, Schar Sch Policy & Govt, Arlington, VA 22201 USA. [Thompson, Paul N.; Tremblay, Victor J.] Oregon State Univ, Dept Econ, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA. RP Thompson, PN (corresponding author), Oregon State Univ, Dept Econ, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA. EM mkhan63@gmu.edu; paul.thompson@oregonstate.edu; victor.tremblay@oregonstate.edu OI Khan, Muhammad Salar/0000-0001-9280-5014 CR Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Berardi N, 2016, APPL ECON, V48, P3976, DOI 10.1080/00036846.2016.1150946 Bergman U. 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Tax Public Financ. PD FEB PY 2020 VL 27 IS 1 BP 103 EP 127 DI 10.1007/s10797-019-09556-7 PG 25 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA KJ4IM UT WOS:000512021700005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Caro, JC Valizadeh, P Correa, A Silva, A Ng, SW AF Caro, Juan Carlos Valizadeh, Pourya Correa, Alejandrina Silva, Andres Ng, Shu Wen TI Combined fiscal policies to promote healthier diets: Effects on purchases and consumer welfare SO PLOS ONE LA English DT Article ID SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGES; PRICE ELASTICITY; DEMAND SYSTEMS; PUBLIC-HEALTH; FOOD TAXES; JUNK-FOOD; FAT-TAX; OBESITY; CONSUMPTION; IMPACT AB Taxes on unhealthy foods and sweetened beverages, as well as subsidies to healthy foods, have become increasingly popular strategies to curb obesity and related non-communicable diseases. The existing evidence on the welfare effects of such fiscal policies is mixed and almost uniquely focused on tax schemes. Using the 2016-2017 Chilean Household Budget Survey, we estimate a censored Exact Affine Stone Index (EASI) incomplete demand system and simulate changes in purchases, tax incidence, and consumer welfare of three different policy scenarios: (1) a 5 percentage point additional tax on sweetened beverages (currently taxed at 18%) and a new 18% tax on sweets and snacks, (2) a healthy subsidy by zero-rating fruits and vegetables from the current 19% value-added tax, and (3) a combined (tax plus subsidy) policy. Under full pass-through of these policies, the combined scheme captures the incentives to switch purchases from both single-policy alternatives, resulting in a net welfare gain and subsidy transfer for the average Chilean household. In terms of welfare, low-income households strictly benefit from a combined policy, while high-income households experience a small consumer welfare loss, resulting in re-distributional effects. C1 [Caro, Juan Carlos] Univ N Carolina, Dept Hlth Policy & Management, Gillings Sch Global Publ Hlth, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA. [Valizadeh, Pourya; Ng, Shu Wen] Univ N Carolina, Carolina Populat Ctr, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA. [Correa, Alejandrina] Univ Chile, Dept Econ, Santiago, Chile. [Silva, Andres] Univ Cent Chile, Dept Econ Govt & Commun, Santiago, Chile. [Ng, Shu Wen] Univ N Carolina, Dept Nutr, Gillings Sch Global Publ Hlth, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA. RP Caro, JC (corresponding author), Univ N Carolina, Dept Hlth Policy & Management, Gillings Sch Global Publ Hlth, Chapel Hill, NC 27515 USA. EM juancaro@live.unc.edu OI Ng, Shu Wen/0000-0003-0582-110X; Caro, Juan C/0000-0002-1124-2617 FU Bloomberg Philanthropies; Chile's Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT)Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT); CPC NIH grant [P2C HD050924]; CPC [P2C HD050924]; CONICYT PAI/INDUSTRIA [79090016] FX Funding for this research comes predominantly from Bloomberg Philanthropies with added funding for JCC from Chile's Comision Nacional de Investigacion Cientifica y Tecnologica (CONICYT) and CPC NIH grant P2C HD050924. The funders had no role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.; We thank the Bloomberg Philanthropies, and CPC P2C HD050924 for financial support. This work was also funded by the CONICYT PAI/INDUSTRIA 79090016. None of the authors have conflict of interests of any type with respect to this manuscript. Any errors and shortcomings are our own. 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Sharova, T. TI PROBLEMS AND PRINCIPLES OF OPTIMIZING THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC EFFECT OF THE PERSONAL INCOME TAX IN UKRAINE SO FINANCIAL AND CREDIT ACTIVITY-PROBLEMS OF THEORY AND PRACTICE LA English DT Article DE tax system; personal income taxing; tax burden; tax incidence; progressive taxation AB This article is devoted to estimating and explaining the extent of social priority implementation in fiscal policy in Ukraine and defining the reserves, caused by placing the personal income tax in Ukrainian tax system, which would be used to improve taxing impact on social welfare. The comparative analysis was used as key method for estimate the actual tax pressure level and its structure deviation from desired, based on OECD countries experience, indicators of aggregate tax burden on economy and its structure. Based on the results conducted comparative analysis, the vision of the disadvantages, inherent to Ukrainian current tax system was defined. First, a rather high level of tax pressure (Ukraine is positioned above the trend line expressing dependence "GDP per capita - the share of taxes in GDP"), our country combines with the unfavorable tax structure to ensure the "targeting" of the tax burden distribution. As a result, the governability of the tax pressure distribution is reduced and the government loses the ability to implement social priorities in fiscal regulation. Second, there are two parameters, which are the determining factors for the distribution of tax burdens between groups of taxpayers on personal income in Ukraine: the minimum amount of non-taxable income and the absence of rising tax rates for incomes far higher than average in economy. Their effect causes that even income in the size of the subsistence minimum is liable for significant taxation, but for income much higher average size tax burden remains very low compared to European countries. In Ukraine, to compensate for the underutilization of the fiscal potential of high-income recipients, the tax burden is shifted to broad sections of wage earners in the formal sector of the economy (who have minimal opportunities to evade income tax and social security contributions). This, in turn, exacerbates the negative impact of taxation on the growth rate of wages and the conditions for the reproduction of economic activity of the general population. We tend to consider the only possible means to overcome these two disadvantage of Ukrainian tax system is to increase the differentiation of tax pressure (in particular, by introducing additional differentiation of income tax rates for various taxpayers groups), which should ensure that the actual tax pressure is brought into line with the solvency (fiscal potential) of taxpayers. C1 [Verkhovod, I; Hurbyk, Yu; Sharova, T.] Bohdan Khmelnitsky Melitopol State Pedag Univ, Econ & Hotel & Restaurant Business, Melitopol, Ukraine. [Voronina, Yu] Dmytro Motornyi Tavria State Agrotechnol Univ, Dept Publ Adm Adm & Law, Melitopol, Ukraine. [Izbash, S.] Natl Acad Natl Guard Ukraine, Pedag & Pedag Skills, Kiev, Ukraine. RP Verkhovod, I (corresponding author), Bohdan Khmelnitsky Melitopol State Pedag Univ, Econ & Hotel & Restaurant Business, Melitopol, Ukraine. EM verkhovod_ira@mdpu.org.ua; uugurblk@ukr.net; juliavoronina81@ukr.net; izbashs@gmail.com; sharova_t@mdpu.org.ua CR [Anonymous], 2014, TAX REFORM EU MEMBER [Anonymous], 2008, TOP MARG PERS INC TA ATKINSON AB, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V6, P55, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(76)90041-4 Cordes J. j., 2012, OXFORD HDB STATE LOC Derzhavna sluzhba starystyky Ukrainy, OF SAIT HARBERGER AC, 1962, J POLIT ECON, V70, P215, DOI 10.1086/258636 Kotsupatryi M. M., 2012, AKTUALNI PROBLEMY EK, V10, P183 Musgave R. A., 1967, CLASSICS TEORIE PUBL OECD, STAT INF Pechman A., 1987, WHO PAID TAXES 1966 Pokataieva O. V., 2012, EC BUSINESS, V3, p235 241 Rechtsinformations system des Bundes, 1988, NEW MAX TAX RAT 2016, P33 STERN NH, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V6, P123, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(76)90044-X Stiglitz J. E., 1998, EKONOMIKA DERZHAVNOH STIGLITZ JE, 1982, J PUBLIC ECON, V17, P213, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(82)90020-2 Yefymenko T. I., 2013, DYNAMIKA PODATKOVOHO Zakharova N. I., 2012, VISNYK DDFA EKOBONIC, V2, P162 NR 17 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU BANKING UNIV PI LVIV PA ST SICHEVYKH STREITSOV, 11, LVIV, UKRAINE SN 2306-4994 EI 2310-8770 J9 FINANC CREDIT ACT JI Financ. Credit Act. PY 2020 VL 3 IS 34 BP 402 EP 412 PG 11 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA OP9OL UT WOS:000588420200040 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Nelson, JP Moran, JR AF Nelson, Jon P. Moran, John R. TI Effects of Alcohol Taxation on Prices: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis of Pass-Through Rates SO B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY LA English DT Review DE tax incidence; excise taxes; optimal taxation; alcohol beverages; meta-analysis ID EXCISE TAXES; RETAIL-PRICES; BEER; DEMAND; STATE; CONSUMPTION; ELASTICITY; HETEROGENEITY; AFFORDABILITY; COMPETITION AB This paper conducts the first review and meta-analysis for estimates of alcohol excise tax pass-through rates. A total of 30 empirical studies are examined. Several widely cited studies indicate substantial overshifting, suggesting imperfectly-competitive markets for alcohol. The narrative review provides insights for data coverage by country; econometric models; and results for under- or overshifting by beverage. Weighted-averages calculated for two samples show that beer taxes are overshifted and wine-spirits taxes are fully shifted. Meta-regressions corrected for publication bias indicate, however, that full-shifting cannot be rejected for any beverage. Results are useful for alcohol tax policy and future research on optimal taxation and incidence. C1 [Nelson, Jon P.] Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, 642 Glenn Rd, State Coll, PA 16803 USA. [Moran, John R.] Penn State Univ, Dept Hlth Policy & Adm, University Pk, PA 16802 USA. RP Nelson, JP (corresponding author), Penn State Univ, Dept Econ, 642 Glenn Rd, State Coll, PA 16803 USA. 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Econ. Anal. Policy PD JAN PY 2020 VL 20 IS 1 AR 20190134 DI 10.1515/bejeap-2019-0134 PG 21 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA KA1ZQ UT WOS:000505598000003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bergman, UM Hansen, NL AF Bergman, U. Michael Hansen, Niels Lynggard TI Are Excise Taxes on Beverages Fully Passed Through to Prices? The Danish Evidence SO FINANZARCHIV LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; excise tax; alcoholic beverages; nonalcoholic beverages ID SUGAR-SWEETENED BEVERAGES; CIGARETTE TAXES; RETAIL-PRICES; SALES TAXES; BERKELEY; TAXATION; IMPACT; STATE; COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY AB This paper studies tax shifting of excise taxes on alcoholic and nonalcoholic beverages in Denmark. We use a unique data set collected by Statistics Denmark focusing on six episodes of tax changes: three tax cuts and three tax hikes. We find that excise taxes on beer and soda are overshifted but those on liquor are undershifted. We also find that the pass-through is inversely related to the size of the tax change and that there are asymmetric effects of tax changes on soda. Finally, the tax pass-through on beer and soda is an increasing function of the distance to the German border. C1 [Bergman, U. Michael] Univ Copenhagen, Oster Farimagsgade 5,Bldg 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark. [Hansen, Niels Lynggard] Copenhagen Business Sch, Porcelaenshaven 16A, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark. RP Bergman, UM (corresponding author), Univ Copenhagen, Oster Farimagsgade 5,Bldg 26, DK-1353 Copenhagen, Denmark. EM Michael.Bergman@econ.ku.dk; nlh.eco@cbs.dk FU EPRN FX The viewpoints and conclusions stated are the responsibility of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of institutions we are affiliated to. We thank Bo William Hansen and Jakob Egholt Sogaard for excellent research assistance. We also thank two anonymous referees, Klaus Kristensen, Birgitte Sloth, Peter Birch Sorensen, and seminar participants at the University of Copenhagen and at the Danish Economic Society Conference in Kolding for helpful comments and suggestions. 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TI How Should Business Profit Be Taxed? Some Thoughts on Conceptual Developments During the Lifetime of the IFS* SO FISCAL STUDIES LA English DT Article DE profit taxation; tax incidence; destination-based tax; cash flow tax; F23; H21; H25; H32 ID INTERNATIONAL TAX; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; OPTIMAL TAXATION; FOREIGN PROFITS; CORPORATE; INVESTMENT; POLICY; INCOME; INCENTIVES; DESIGN AB This paper reviews developments since the 1970s in economic thinking about the design of taxes on business profit. It charts developments from proposals for a cash flow tax from the Meade Committee, to refinements of this in the form of an 'Allowance for Corporate Equity' and the levying of the cash flow tax in the country of destination. It describes how the development of international trade and investment has led to ever-increasing problems in the international tax system with respect to economic efficiency, profit shifting, complexity and tax competition. 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Stud. PD DEC PY 2019 VL 40 IS 4 BP 591 EP 619 DI 10.1111/1475-5890.12205 PG 29 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA KL9TW UT WOS:000513759700007 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU An, ZY AF An, Zhiyong TI Two General Lessons from the 2019 Personal Income Tax Reform of China SO ECONOMISTS VOICE LA English DT Article DE China; tax compliance; tax evasion; tax incidence; third-party reporting ID ECONOMICS AB We have identified two general lessons, suggested from the 2019 personal income tax reform of China, regarding third-party reporting, tax compliance, and tax incidence. First, third-party reporting is an effective mechanism to enforce tax compliance. Second, tax evasion can affect tax incidence. We argue that these two general lessons are important for both academic researchers and policymakers. C1 [An, Zhiyong] Enterprise Modeling & Analyt, Washington, DC 20005 USA. RP An, ZY (corresponding author), Enterprise Modeling & Analyt, Washington, DC 20005 USA. 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Voice PD DEC PY 2019 VL 16 IS 1 SI SI AR 20190003 DI 10.1515/ev-2019-0003 PG 5 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA JW4DO UT WOS:000503004100016 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gandullia, L Leporatti, L AF Gandullia, Luca Leporatti, Lucia TI Distributional effects of gambling taxes: empirical evidence from Italy SO JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC INEQUALITY LA English DT Article DE Gambling taxes; Regressivity; Tax incidence; Two-part model; H22; C50; D12 ID LOTTERY EXPENDITURES; PARTICIPATION; DETERMINANTS; REGRESSIVITY; DEMAND AB Deep changes have taken place in the regulation of Italy's gambling market during the last decade, making it by far the largest in Europe. Tax revenues from the gambling sector raised by the State have grown sharply, reaching more than Euro 10 billion, corresponding to more than 2% of total tax revenues. Concurrently with these developments, concerns have arisen over the distributional effects of taxes applied to gambling, given that it is internationally recognized that poorer individuals are more attracted to gambling. At present very little is known in Italy about the economic effects of gambling taxes and about their potential regressivity also in comparison with other sin taxes. The aim of this study is to increase our understanding of the incidence of these taxes, comparing the results with those obtained for a selection of other sin and consumption goods. After thoroughly investigating the gambling taxation scheme applied in Italy, we exploit two-part models to study the relationship between gambling tax paid by households and their socio-economic status, measured, alternatively, in terms of income and expenditure. The analysis shows that gambling taxes are highly regressive and opens important questions on possible reforms of the current system. Despite its focus on the Italian context, the analysis offers new insights also for those European countries that in last years have been involved in a process of progressive deregulation of the gambling sector. C1 [Gandullia, Luca] Univ Genoa, Dept Polit Sci, Genoa, Italy. [Leporatti, Lucia] Univ Genoa, Dept Econ, Via Vivaldi 5, I-16126 Genoa, Italy. RP Leporatti, L (corresponding author), Univ Genoa, Dept Econ, Via Vivaldi 5, I-16126 Genoa, Italy. EM luca.gandullia@unige.it; lucia.leporatti@unige.it OI LEPORATTI, LUCIA/0000-0003-4186-908X; GANDULLIA, Luca/0000-0003-2545-9742 CR AAMS-Agenzia delle Dogane e dei Monopoli, 2017, ORG ATTIVITA STAT Angrist JD, 2009, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICISTS COMPANION, P1 Atkinson AB, 1995, SOCIAL POLICY STUDIE, V18 BAUMOL WJ, 1972, AM ECON REV, V62, P307 Beckert J, 2009, EUR SOCIOL REV, V25, P475, DOI 10.1093/esr/jcn063 Belotti F, 2015, STATA J, V15, P3, DOI 10.1177/1536867X1501500102 BORG MO, 1990, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V18, P291, DOI 10.1177/109114219001800303 BORG MO, 1991, AM J ECON SOCIOL, V50, P323, DOI 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1991.tb02299.x Brewer M, 2012, ISER WORKING PAPER S Clotfelter C., 2005, THEORY PRACTICE EXCI, P84, DOI [10.1093/0199278598.003.0004, DOI 10.1093/0199278598.003.0004] Clotfelter C. 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Econ. Inequal. PD DEC PY 2019 VL 17 IS 4 BP 565 EP 590 DI 10.1007/s10888-019-09423-9 PG 26 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA JN0EY UT WOS:000496578700006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Benedek, D De Mooij, RA Keen, M Wingender, P AF Benedek, Dora De Mooij, Ruud A. Keen, Michael Wingender, Philippe TI Varieties of VAT pass through SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Value-added tax; Tax incidence; Price effect; Pass through ID SALES TAXES; AD-VALOREM; TAXATION; PRICES; STATE AB This paper exploits a unique dataset (monthly observations on consumer prices and VAT rates for around 70 commodity groups in 17 Eurozone countries over 1999-2013) to identify the extent of pass through for several types of VAT change-including (a key concern, previously unaddressed) in the standard VAT rate. The impact on consumer prices proves to vary systematically and sharply across these different types of VAT reform. 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Tax Public Financ. PD AUG PY 2020 VL 27 IS 4 BP 890 EP 930 DI 10.1007/s10797-019-09566-5 EA NOV 2019 PG 41 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA MD5OA UT WOS:000496221600001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Carruthers, CK Smith, KD AF Carruthers, Celeste K. Smith, Kara D. TI Are "Education Lotteries" Less Regressive? Evidence from Texas SO SOUTHERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; PUBLIC-GOODS; DEMAND; INCOME; DONATIONS; PRODUCTS AB With little exception, research has shown that state-sponsored lotteries are regressive in the aggregate, in that lottery sales do not increase proportionately with area income. We test whether the purpose of lottery revenues mitigates this spatial regressivity. In August of 1997, the statutory earmark for Texas Lottery proceeds moved from the General Fund to the Foundation School Fund, which supports K-12 education. Beginning in 2000, the lottery was increasingly marketed as a funding stream for public schools. Drawing on a content analysis of lottery commission press releases from 1993 to 2006, we find that Instant game sales were modestly responsive to education messaging, in that sales became noticeably less regressive in the wake of more intense reminders of the education component of the state lottery. It is likely that unobserved heterogeneity in local sales factors played a much bigger role than education marketing. C1 [Carruthers, Celeste K.] Univ Tennessee, Haslam Coll Business, 709 Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA. [Smith, Kara D.] Belmont Univ, Massey Coll Business, 1900 Belmont Blvd, Nashville, TN 37212 USA. RP Carruthers, CK (corresponding author), Univ Tennessee, Haslam Coll Business, 709 Stokely Management Ctr, Knoxville, TN 37996 USA. EM carruthers@utk.edu; kara.smith@belmont.edu OI Carruthers, Celeste/0000-0002-5112-3364 FU University of Tennessee Department of Economics and Center for Business and Economic Research FX The authors are grateful for comments and suggestions from Donald Bruce, William Fox, Seth Gershenson, Nicholas Nagle, William Neilson, James Cowan, Michael Price, participants of the 2013 Southern Economic Association and 2016 Association for Education Finance and Policy meetings, and three anonymous reviewers. Data were provided by the Texas Lottery Commission, with funding graciously provided by the University of Tennessee Department of Economics and Center for Business and Economic Research. We thank John Richmond, Mary Elizabeth Glenn, and Bilal Celik for outstanding research assistance. Opinions and findings discussed here do not reflect those of the Texas Lottery Commission. All errors are our own. CR ANDREONI J, 1990, ECON J, V100, P464, DOI 10.2307/2234133 Belch G. 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Econ. J. PD JAN PY 2020 VL 86 IS 3 BP 1019 EP 1040 DI 10.1002/soej.12413 EA NOV 2019 PG 22 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA KD7CB UT WOS:000495639600001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Adetutu, MO Weyman-Jones, TG AF Adetutu, Morakinyo O. Weyman-Jones, Thomas G. TI Fuel Subsidies Versus Market Power: Is There a Countervailing Second-Best Optimum? SO ENVIRONMENTAL & RESOURCE ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Gasoline; Fuel subsidies; Market power; Pass-through; Second-best; Developing countries; JEL Classification; C3; L1; L2; Q4 ID TAX INCIDENCE; PASS-THROUGH; GASOLINE; PRICE; COMPETITION; EFFICIENCY; COST AB Fuel subsidies distort end-use prices below cost, resulting in overconsumption and huge environmental cost. On the other hand, the mark-up over cost due to the exercise of market power results in the social loss of consumer surplus. 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PD DEC PY 2019 VL 74 IS 4 BP 1619 EP 1646 DI 10.1007/s10640-019-00382-3 EA NOV 2019 PG 28 WC Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA KC9OH UT WOS:000493928400001 OA Other Gold, Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Dwenger, N Rattenhuber, P Steiner, V AF Dwenger, Nadja Rattenhuber, Pia Steiner, Viktor TI Sharing the Burden? Empirical Evidence on Corporate Tax Incidence SO GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; wage determination; corporate income taxation; tax return data ID INSTRUMENT RELEVANCE; INCOME; ELASTICITY; MODELS AB This study investigates the direct incidence of the corporate income tax (CIT) through wage bargaining, using an industry-region level panel dataset on all corporations in Germany over the period 1998-2006. For the first time we account for employment effects which result from tax-induced wage changes. 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TI Addressing climate change through price and non-price interventions SO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Climate change; Carbon pricing; Instrument choice; Tax incidence; Innovation ID OPTIMAL TIME PATH; OPTIMAL TAXATION; PUBLIC-GOODS; MENU COSTS; CARBON; TAXES; INCENTIVES; COMMODITY; ENERGY; MODEL AB Recognizing the importance of the second-best nature of economies, the Stern-Stiglitz report on carbon pricing departed from the recommendation of a single carbon price for all uses at all places and times. This paper provides some of the analytics behind these recommendations. First, I analyze the circumstances in which distributional concerns make desirable a tax or regulation inducing significant reductions in carbon usage in a carbon intensive sector for which consumers are disproportionately rich. Such policies allow lower carbon prices elsewhere without exceeding carbon emission targets. The cost of the resulting production inefficiency may, under the identified circumstances, be less than the distributional benefits. The paper considers the circumstances in which such differential policies may be best implemented through regulation vs. differential pricing, as well as differential effects on political economy and norm setting. Second, I consider the effect of carbon price trajectories on induced innovation, providing general conditions under which the optimal carbon path should, at least eventually, be falling over time. Finally, I revisit the price-versus-quantity debate and highlight important aspects of the dynamic nature of the problem. (C) 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V. C1 [Stiglitz, Joseph E.] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA. RP Stiglitz, JE (corresponding author), Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA. EM jes322@columbia.edu FU INET FX I am deeply indebted to Linus Mattauch, Cameron Hepburn, and Naman Garg, and two very helpful anonymous referees for their detailed and helpful comments. I am also indebted to Nick Stern for long conversations about the subjects covered here, and the members of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices for their insights and debates over the issues discussed here. I am also indebted to Andrea Gurwitt for her editorial assistance. Financial support was provided by INET. 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Econ. Rev. PD OCT PY 2019 VL 119 BP 594 EP 612 DI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2019.05.007 PG 19 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA JF8FI UT WOS:000491620000031 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Pless, J van Benthem, AA AF Pless, Jacquelyn van Benthem, Arthur A. TI Pass-Through as a Test for Market Power: An Application to Solar Subsidies SO AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; PRICES; INCENTIVES; SUPPORT; SYSTEMS; DEMAND; COST; CASH AB We formalize pass-through over-shifting as a simple yet underutilized test for market power. We apply this test in the market for solar energy. Specifically, we estimate the pass-through of solar subsidies to solar system prices using rich micro-level transaction and subsidy data from California. Buyers of solar systems capture nearly the full subsidy, while there is more-than-complete pass-through to lessees. We conclude that solar markets are imperfectly competitive by ruling out alternative explanations for over-shifting and reinforce this conclusion with a test of solar demand curvature. This procedure can serve to detect market power beyond the solar market. C1 [Pless, Jacquelyn] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 100 Main St, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. [van Benthem, Arthur A.] Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, 1354 Steinberg Hall Dietrich Hall, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA. [van Benthem, Arthur A.] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Pless, J (corresponding author), MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 100 Main St, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. EM jpless@mit.edu; arthurv@wharton.upenn.edu FU Wharton Dean's Research Fund FX Pless: MIT Sloan School of Management, 100 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 (email: jpless@mit.edu); Van Benthem: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1354 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104, and NBER (email: arthurv@wharton.upenn.edu).Dave Donaldson was coeditor for this article. A prior version of this paper was circulated under the title "The Surprising Pass-Through of Solar Subsidies." We thank Edward Balistreri, Chrystie Burr, Harrison Fell, Ken Gillingham, Cameron Hepburn, Jean-Francois Houde, Jonathan Hughes, Koichiro Ito, Daniel Kane, Ian Lange, Peter Maniloff, Alex Teytelboym, Tsvetan Tsvetanov, Eugene Vorobeychik, and seminar participants at the 2016 AERE Summer Conference, 2017 National Tax Association Conference, 2017 Northeast Workshop on Energy Policy and Environmental Economics, 2018 AEA/ASSA Conference, 2018 Royal Economic Society Conference, Colorado School of Mines, Harvard University, UC Berkeley, University of Cambridge, University of Colorado Boulder, University of Manchester, University of Oxford, and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments and suggestions. We especially thank Ruben Lobel for comments during the early stage of this research. We thank the National Renewable Energy Laboratory (NREL) and the Center for Sustainable Energy for helpful institutional insights. Pless thanks the Oxford Martin Programme on Integrating Renewable Energy at the Oxford Martin School, University of Oxford. Van Benthem thanks the Wharton Dean's Research Fund. 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These costs are passed on to consumers in the form of the EEG levy as a component of the electricity price. However, some households benefit from owning photovoltaic (PV) systems because they receive the corresponding feed-in tariffs. In order to investigate how the benefits (and burdens) of this subsidization scheme are distributed, we use micro-data from SOEP for private households during the period of 2010-2017, and we employ three different inequality metrics - the Gini coefficient, the Theil index and the Atkinson index. We conclude that subsidy costs are almost evenly distributed among the population and are therefore regressive. At the same time, feed-in tariffs are increasingly flowing into higher-income households because PV systems are more prevalent in these households. We estimate the overall impact of this subsidization scheme on several measures of (income) inequality at 1.0-2.4%, most of which is due to the EEG levy. 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SO AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE excise tax; obesity; selective tax; sweeteners; tax policy; D6; H2; I1 ID SOFT DRINK TAXES; FOOD-CONSUMPTION; SUGAR; WELFARE; HEALTH; BEVERAGES; OBESITY; DEMAND; IMPACT; FAT AB Obesity is a public health problem in the United States that has been linked to excess sweetener consumption. The American Heart Association (AHA) recommends no more than 6-9 teaspoons/capita/day, while the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) recommends 200 calories/capita/day of caloric sweetener consumption. Both recommendations are well below the reported 2016 sweetener consumption levels. We quantify the input tax rates needed to reduce the current excess sweetener consumption level to the AHA and FDA recommended standards. We calculate the joint tax in the United States on two major sweeteners, sugar and High Fructose Corn Syrup (HFCS), to be 31 and 24 cents per pound, respectively, based on the AHA standard, and 19 and 17 cents per pound, respectively, using the FDA standard. These taxes would be roughly the magnitude of the existing sugar and HFCS prices. In both cases, the tax incidence on producers is much smaller than on consumers. Our focus is very different from past studies in that it deals with the effect of taxes on inputs to meet the recommended target rather than a selective tax (sugar-sweetened beverage tax). If a sweetener tax were implemented, U.S. sugar and HFCS producers would lose US$398-US$489 and US$683-US$844 million per year, respectively. C1 [Lakkakula, Prithviraj] North Dakota State Univ, Dept Agribusiness & Appl Econ, 811 2nd Ave N,Richard H Barry Hall 500, Fargo, ND 58102 USA. [Schmitz, Andrew] Univ Florida, Dept Food & Resource Econ, Gainesville, FL 32611 USA. RP Lakkakula, P (corresponding author), North Dakota State Univ, Dept Agribusiness & Appl Econ, 811 2nd Ave N,Richard H Barry Hall 500, Fargo, ND 58102 USA. 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PD SEP PY 2019 VL 50 IS 5 BP 543 EP 554 DI 10.1111/agec.12508 EA AUG 2019 PG 12 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA IW5CF UT WOS:000480798000001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kogler, M AF Kogler, Michael TI On the incidence of bank levies: theory and evidence SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Bank levy; Taxation of banks; Tax incidence; Pigovian taxes ID TAXATION; INCOME; TAXES AB In the aftermath of the financial crisis, several European countries have introduced levies on bank liabilities. The aim is to compensate taxpayers for the provision of bailouts and guarantees and to internalize the fiscal costs of future banking crises. This paper studies the tax incidence: Building on the Monti-Klein model, we predict that banks shift the tax mainly to borrowers by raising lending rates and that deposit rates may increase because deposits are partly exempt. Bank-level evidence from 23 EU countries (2007-2013) shows that the levy indeed increases the lending and the deposit rate as well as the net interest margin. Banks adjust differently to this tax depending on the composition of their balance sheets: In line with theory, especially those banks with a high loan-to-deposit ratio raise the interest rates. Market concentration and the capital structure influence the magnitude of the pass-through, which is stronger in concentrated markets and weaker in case of banks with a high regulatory capital ratio. C1 [Kogler, Michael] Univ St Gallen, Inst Econ FGN HSG, Varnbuelstr 19, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland. RP Kogler, M (corresponding author), Univ St Gallen, Inst Econ FGN HSG, Varnbuelstr 19, CH-9000 St Gallen, Switzerland. EM michael.kogler@unisg.ch OI Kogler, Michael/0000-0001-5878-1098 FU Swiss National Science FoundationSwiss National Science Foundation (SNSF) [100018_146685/1, P2SGP1_171927] FX I thank Michael Devereux, Christian Keuschnigg, Stefan Legge, Gyongyi Loranth, Martin Simmler, seminar participants at University of St. Gallen, and participants at the RGS Doctoral Conference in Economics 2015 in Essen, the Doctoral Meeting at Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation, the Royal Economic Society 2016 Annual Conference, and the Public Economics Research Seminar at Ifo Institute in Munich for helpful discussions and suggestions. I am very grateful for comments from two anonymous referees. Financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (Projects no. 100018_146685/1 and no. P2SGP1_171927) is gratefully acknowledged. 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PD AUG PY 2019 VL 26 IS 4 BP 677 EP 718 DI 10.1007/s10797-018-9526-z PG 42 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA IF2JG UT WOS:000472902900001 OA Green Accepted DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU dos Santos, DS Blois, HD AF dos Santos, Diogo Soares Blois, Henrique Dias TI Increasing Soybean Market Competitiveness: Prospective Scenarios Applied IN Soy Lo-gistics SO TEORIA E PRATICA EM ADMINISTRACAO-TPA LA Portuguese DT Article DE Prospective scenarios; Strategic planning; Logistics; Soybean AB This study proposes a reduction of future variables as a form of analysis of risks, through logistics scenarios of soybean in Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. Therefore, it uses the prospective scenarios method, proposed by Marcial and Grumbach (2012), which identifies strengths and opportunities which may be maximized by seeking the best yield for the commercialization of soybeans, as well as protecting yourself from weaknesses and threats. Consultations with experts have been carried out and prospective scenarios were created, evaluating events that significantly impact in the logistics chain of soybean, measuring their pertinence, probability and correlations. These events were measured at a matrix of crossed impacts for later creation and analysis of scenarios. The initial results demonstrate a higher incidence of negative macroeconomic impacts in the logistics chain of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil. The greatest difficulties to be faced by the logistics chain are in the occurrence of the events "diesel price increase", "labor costs increase", "higher tax incidence in the logistics chain of Rio Grande do Sul" and "trade disagreements between China and United States", which form the gap between the most likely scenario and the ideal scenario, pointed by experts as necessary for regional economic growth. C1 [dos Santos, Diogo Soares; Blois, Henrique Dias] Univ Passo Fundo, Passo Fundo, Brazil. RP dos Santos, DS (corresponding author), Univ Passo Fundo, Passo Fundo, Brazil. EM 126635@upf.br; blois@upf.br CR ASSOCIACAO BRASILEIRA DA INDUSTRIA DE OLEOS VEGETAIS [ABIOVE], 2018, AN MENS SOJ Bangsund D. A., 2011, EC CONTRIBUTION SOYB Baroni D. G., 2017, REV THEMA, V14, P55, DOI [10.15535-thema. 14.2017.55-64.452, DOI 10.15536/THEMA.14.2017.55-64.452] Berwick M. D., 2001, N DAKOTA STRATEGIC F Bitencourt M. B., 2010, ANAIS 48 SOBER, P01 COMPANHIA NACIONAL DE ABASTECIMENTO [CONAB], 2018, AN MENS SOJ ABR 2018 de Lima DP, 2018, J COMMOD MARK, V9, P55, DOI 10.1016/j.jcomm.2017.11.001 Denicoff M. R., 2014, SOYBEAN TRANSPORTATI, DOI [10.9752/TS203.10-2014, DOI 10.9752/TS203.10-2014, 10. 9752/TS203. 10-2014] Empresa Brasileira de Pesquisa Agropecuaria-EMBRAPA, 2018, SOJ NUM SAFR 2017 20 FEDERACAO DAS INDUSTRIAS DO ESTADO DE SAO PAULO [FIESP], 2018, SAFR MUND SOJ 2017 1 Friend JD, 2011, TRANSPORT RES REC, P61, DOI 10.3141/2238-08 Frittelli J. 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M., 2016, MONOGRAFIA Wetzstein B., 2016, AGR APPL EC ASS ANN NR 27 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 3 PU UNIV FEDERAL PARAIBA PI JOAO PESSOA PA CIDADE UNIV, JOAO PESSOA, PB 58059-900, BRAZIL SN 2238-104X J9 TEOR PRAT ADM-TPA JI Teor. Pract. Adm.-TPA PD JUL-DEC PY 2019 VL 9 IS 2 BP 93 EP 105 DI 10.21714/2238-104X2019v9i2-43610 PG 13 WC Management SC Business & Economics GA IU0HH UT WOS:000483258800009 OA DOAJ Gold, Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Linn, J AF Linn, Joshua TI Interactions between Climate and Local Air Pollution Policies: The Case of European Passenger Cars SO JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS LA English DT Article DE fuel taxes; vehicle taxes; carbon dioxide; nitrogen oxides; particulate matter; greenhouse gases; local air quality; passenger cars ID FUEL-ECONOMY STANDARDS; TAX INCIDENCE; EMISSIONS; GASOLINE; PRICES AB Many European countries have adopted carbon dioxide-based (CO2-based) vehicle taxes to help reduce transportation sector emissions. The literature has shown that these policies reduce CO2 emissions but has not considered whether they affect emissions that harm local air quality. This paper analyzes whether CO2-based taxes have an unintended consequence of raising emissions of nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulates, which harm local air quality. Using highly detailed data on European new vehicle registrations from 2002 through 2010, I estimate the effects of fuel costs and vehicle taxes on consumer vehicle choices. The CO2-based vehicle taxes reduce CO2 emissions but increase NOx and particulates emissions. The environmental harms from the NOx and particulates emissions roughly offset the benefits of the lower CO2 emissions. Because of the estimated substitution patterns, fuel-based CO2 taxes introduce milder trade-offs than do vehicle taxes. C1 [Linn, Joshua] Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA. RP Linn, J (corresponding author), Univ Maryland, College Pk, MD 20742 USA. EM linn@rff.org FU MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research; Swedish Energy AgencySwedish Energy Agency FX Joshua Linn is at the University of Maryland and Resources for the Future (linn@rff.org). I thank the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research and the Swedish Energy Agency for supporting this research. Jessica Chu provided excellent research assistance. 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Pass-through entity activities show tax elasticities of -0.2 to -0.4 with respect to personal tax rates and are invariant with respect to corporate tax rates. Capital shows similar patterns. Reallocation of productive resources to other states drives around half the effect. The responses are strongest for firms in tradable and footloose industries. C1 [Giroud, Xavier] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA. [Giroud, Xavier; Rauh, Joshua] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. [Giroud, Xavier] Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England. [Rauh, Joshua] Stanford Univ, Stanford, CA 94305 USA. [Rauh, Joshua] Hoover Inst War Revolut & Peace, Stanford, CA 94305 USA. [Rauh, Joshua] Stanford Inst Econ Policy Res, Stanford, CA USA. RP Giroud, X (corresponding author), Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA.; Giroud, X (corresponding author), NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA.; Giroud, X (corresponding author), Ctr Econ Policy Res, London, England. 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Polit. Econ. PD JUN 1 PY 2019 VL 127 IS 3 BP 1262 EP 1316 DI 10.1086/701357 PG 55 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA IB0QQ UT WOS:000469966300008 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Saelim, S AF Saelim, Supawan TI Carbon tax incidence on household consumption: Heterogeneity across socio-economic factors in Thailand SO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY LA English DT Article DE Carbon tax; Distributional effects; Microsimulation; Input-output model; Multivariate regression ID DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACTS; TAXATION; WELFARE AB This paper examines the short-run welfare effects of a hypothetical carbon tax on households in Thailand. In particular, it sheds light on the association between welfare effects and socio-economic factors other than income. The study first estimates the average welfare effects of the carbon tax across household groups using a microsimulation model, based on input-output data and Thai household survey data. It then empirically examines the relationship between per capita welfare losses and a range of socio-economic factors, using multivariate regression analysis. The results indicate that the incidence of the carbon tax is mildly progressive in Thailand. Even after controlling for income, socio-economic factors, such as geographic region, labor market status, household structure and education, are significantly associated with individual welfare losses across energy and non-energy consumption types. (C) 2019 Economic Society of Australia, Queensland. Published by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Saelim, Supawan] Sch Dev Econ, Natl Inst Dev Adm, 118 Serithai Rd, Bangkok 10240, Thailand. RP Saelim, S (corresponding author), Sch Dev Econ, Natl Inst Dev Adm, 118 Serithai Rd, Bangkok 10240, Thailand. EM namesws@gmail.com OI Saelim, Supawan/0000-0001-6637-8784 FU "Climate Change Mitigation and Poverty Reduction (CliMiP) - Trade-Offs or Win-Win. Situations?'' project - VolkswagenStiftung, Germany FX This study was conducted during my PhD internship at the United Nations University World Institute for Development (UNU-WIDER). I also gratefully acknowledge the support from the "Climate Change Mitigation and Poverty Reduction (CliMiP) - Trade-Offs or Win-Win. Situations?'' project sponsored by VolkswagenStiftung, Germany. 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Kuo, Chun-Yan TI Taxing mobile capital in free trade zones to the detriment of workers* SO ASIA-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE WTO; tax incidence; free trade zones; corporate income taxation; income inequality; Dominican Republic ID INCOME; TAXATION; RULES AB Many countries have exempted the income of firms operating in their free trade or export processing zones from corporate income taxation. This paper examines the long-term economic effects of removing this exemption in the Dominican Republic. The results suggest that removal of the corporate income tax exemption could inflict a burden on relatively low-waged workers of about ten times the amount of additional tax revenue collected. The analysis also measures the consequential impacts on prices of goods and services in the economy. It indicates that wealthier groups in society will gain substantially in real income. C1 [Jenkins, Glenn P.; Kuo, Chun-Yan] Queens Univ, Dept Econ, Kingston, ON, Canada. [Jenkins, Glenn P.] Eastern Mediterranean Univ, Gazimagusa, North Cyprus, Turkey. RP Jenkins, GP (corresponding author), Queens Univ, Dept Econ, Kingston, ON, Canada.; Jenkins, GP (corresponding author), Eastern Mediterranean Univ, Gazimagusa, North Cyprus, Turkey. 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J. Account. Econ. PD MAY 4 PY 2019 VL 26 IS 3 BP 207 EP 222 DI 10.1080/16081625.2017.1392878 PG 16 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA HU2MH UT WOS:000465104700002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lade, GE Bushnell, J AF Lade, Gabriel E. Bushnell, James TI Fuel Subsidy Pass-Through and Market Structure: Evidence from the Renewable Fuel Standard SO JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS LA English DT Article DE retail fuel markets; E85; renewable fuel standard; subsidy pass-through ID EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; TAX INCIDENCE; GASOLINE; COMPETITION; PRINCIPLES; MANDATES; POLICIES; DEMAND; PRICES; COSTS AB The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is among the largest renewable energy mandates in the world. The policy is enforced using tradeable credits that implicitly subsidize biofuels and tax fossil fuels. 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RP Lade, GE (corresponding author), Iowa State Univ, Dept Econ, Ames, IA 50011 USA.; Lade, GE (corresponding author), Iowa State Univ, Ctr Agr & Rural Dev, Ames, IA 50011 USA. 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Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. PD MAY 1 PY 2019 VL 6 IS 3 BP 563 EP 592 DI 10.1086/702878 PG 30 WC Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA HQ0EZ UT WOS:000462067300001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Combs, KL Spry, JA AF Combs, Kathryn L. Spry, John A. TI THE EFFECTS OF LOTTO GAME CHANGES AND LARGE JACKPOTS ON INCOME ELASTICITIES AND SALES SO CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; DEMAND; LOTTERIES; TICKETS AB Using daily lottery data from Washington State by zip code from January 2011 through mid-March 2016, we estimate that Powerball income elasticities range from -0.16 to 0.16 as the Powerball jackpot increases from its minimum to $1.5 billion, while Mega Millions income elasticities range from -0.08 to 0.03 as the Mega Millions jackpot increases from its minimum to $640 million. Controlling for jackpot size, each of three major game changes during this time period has a significant effect on own-game and cross-game sales. Despite these significant game changes, however, these lotto games are a highly regressive source of revenue for Washington State. (JEL H22, H71, L83) C1 [Combs, Kathryn L.; Spry, John A.] Univ St Thomas, Dept Finance, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. RP Combs, KL (corresponding author), Univ St Thomas, Dept Finance, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. EM klcombs@stthomas.edu; jaspry@stthomas.edu CR Baker R, 2016, PAP REG SCI, V95, pS127, DOI 10.1111/pirs.12118 Combs KL, 2012, APPL ECON, V44, P889, DOI 10.1080/00036846.2010.524634 Forrest D, 2002, ECON INQ, V40, P485, DOI 10.1093/ei/40.3.485 Garrett T. 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Policy PD APR PY 2019 VL 37 IS 2 BP 261 EP 273 DI 10.1111/coep.12393 PG 13 WC Economics; Public Administration SC Business & Economics; Public Administration GA HM2PE UT WOS:000459308500004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Adam, S Phillips, D Roantree, B AF Adam, Stuart Phillips, David Roantree, Barra TI 35 years of reforms: A panel analysis of the incidence of, and employee and employer responses to, social security contributions in the UK SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Trans-Atlantic Public Economics Seminar CY JUN 13-15, 2016 CL Mannheim, GERMANY SP Natl Bur Econ Res, Ctr European Econ Res DE Social security contributions; Tax incidence; Labor supply; Labor demand; Taxable income elasticities ID MARGINAL TAX RATES; TAXABLE INCOME; ELASTICITY; TAXATION; UNEMPLOYMENT; WAGES AB We examine the effects of employee and employer social security contributions (SSCs) on labor cost, hours of work, and labor cost per hour, using a long running panel dataset that allows us to exploit 35 years of policy reforms in the United Kingdom. We find that reductions in marginal rates of employee - but not employer - SSCs have positive effects on labor cost that operate through hours of work, while labor cost falls much more when average employer SSCs rates are reduced than when average employee SSCs rates are reduced, with most of this differential effect coming through reductions in hourly labor cost. We interpret this as evidence that employees change their hours in response to SSCs, but that in the short- to medium-run at least, the formal incidence of SSCs can matter for their behavioral impacts and economic incidence. (C) 2018 Institute for Fiscal Studies. Published by Elsevier B.V. C1 [Adam, Stuart; Phillips, David; Roantree, Barra] Inst Fiscal Studies, 7 Ridgmt St, London WC1E 7AE, England. [Roantree, Barra] UCL, Dept Econ, London WC1H 0AX, England. RP Phillips, D (corresponding author), Inst Fiscal Studies, 7 Ridgmt St, London WC1E 7AE, England. EM david_p@ifs.org.uk FU Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) via the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies [ES/M010147/1]; Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) via Open Research Area programme [ES/K006185/1] FX This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) via the Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (grant number ES/M010147/1) and via the Open Research Area programme (grant number ES/K006185/1). CR Adam Stuart, 2017, W1714 IFS Anderson P.M., 2000, J PUB EC, V78, P119 Anderson PM, 1997, J PUBLIC ECON, V65, P119, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01624-6 Arpaia A., 2004, 216 EUR COMM Atkinson A. B., 1982, 32 SOC SCI RES COUNC Atkinson A. 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Public Econ. PD MAR PY 2019 VL 171 SI SI BP 29 EP 50 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.05.010 PG 22 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA HV8RX UT WOS:000466252200003 OA Green Published, Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Cronin, JA Fullerton, D Sexton, S AF Cronin, Julie Anne Fullerton, Don Sexton, Steven TI Vertical and Horizontal Redistributions from a Carbon Tax and Rebate SO JOURNAL OF THE ASSOCIATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND RESOURCE ECONOMISTS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; climate policy; revenue-neutral; tax reform; energy expenditures ID LIFETIME; IMPACTS; BURDEN; POLICY; PAYS AB Are carbon taxes regressive? To calculate effects of a carbon tax on each family's expenditures, plus distributional effects of three revenue-recycling mechanisms, we employ the US Treasury Distribution Model. It includes 322,000 tax returns, matched social security information, imputations from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, and an input-output matrix to calculate output prices. Accounting for statutory indexing of federal transfer programs, the calculated carbon tax burden as a fraction of consumption is progressive. Rebate of revenues via transfers makes it even more progressive. Within each decile, we find large variation in energy demands such as for heat in winter and cooling in summer. As a result, commonly ignored horizontal redistributions within deciles are shown to exceed vertical redistributions between deciles. Rebates via transfers widen horizontal redistributions. Some reforms deliver net income gains to the poorest families on average, even as a majority of those poor families incur losses. C1 [Cronin, Julie Anne] US Treasury Dept, Washington, DC USA. [Fullerton, Don] Univ Illinois, Chicago, IL 60680 USA. [Fullerton, Don] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. [Sexton, Steven] Duke Univ, Durham, NC 27706 USA. RP Fullerton, D (corresponding author), Univ Illinois, Chicago, IL 60680 USA.; Fullerton, D (corresponding author), Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. EM dfullert@illinois.edu FU Sloan FoundationAlfred P. Sloan Foundation; National Bureau of Economic Research FX Julie Anne Cronin is at the US Treasury Department. Don Fullerton is at the University of Illinois and the National Bureau of Economic Research (dfullert@illinois.edu).Steven Sexton is at Duke University. For helpful suggestions, we thank Aparna Mathur, Janet McCubbin, Gilbert Metcalf, Adele Morris, Ian Parry, Dan Phaneuf, David Weisbach, anonymous referees, and participants at two NBER workshops. The Sloan Foundation and National Bureau of Economic Research provided financial support of the research conducted for this project by Don Fullerton and Steven Sexton, and the US Department of the Treasury provided use of tax return data by Treasury employees, including Julie Anne Cronin, to calculate summary statistics shown in the paper. These confidential tax return data cannot be disclosed. Neither Fullerton nor Sexton had access to any individual tax return data. Views contained herein are ours and do not necessarily reflect the views or positions of the Sloan Foundation, the NBER, or the US Department of the Treasury. 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Assoc. Environ. Resour. Econ. PD MAR PY 2019 VL 6 SU 1 BP S169 EP S208 DI 10.1086/701191 PG 40 WC Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA HP3DI UT WOS:000461555800007 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gallagher, RM AF Gallagher, Ryan M. TI RESTRICTIVE ZONING'S DELETERIOUS IMPACT ON THE LOCAL EDUCATION PROPERTY TAX BASE: EVIDENCE FROM ZONING DISTRICT BOUNDARIES AND MUNICIPAL FINANCES SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE fiscal zoning; restrictive zoning; property tax; property tax incidence; small homes; public education finance ID LAND-USE REGULATION; PUBLIC-SCHOOLS; CAPITALIZATION; DETERMINANTS; REGULATIONS; TAXATION AB This paper employs a boundary-discontinuity research design to estimate land-use regulations 'causal impact on residential value per student within Massachusetts municipalities. Zoning restrictions hostile toward small dwellings are found to actually reduce residential value per student. This is because small dwellings, although valued less than larger dwellings, house disproportionally fewer school aged residents than larger dwellings do. It is then shown that restrictive zoning policies, through their mitigating effect on the local stock of smaller dwellings, force municipalities to rely on higher effective property tax rates to self-fund a particular level of per-student education expenditure, holding all else equal. C1 [Gallagher, Ryan M.] NE Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60625 USA. RP Gallagher, RM (corresponding author), NE Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60625 USA. EM r-gallagher1@neiu.edu FU Lincoln Institute of Land Policy; Northeastern Illinois University's Committee for Organized Research; David C. Lincoln Fellowship Symposium FX Support for this research was generously provided by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy and Northeastern Illinois University's Committee for Organized Research. I am also grateful for the valuable comments received at the 2016 and 2017 meetings of the Urban Economics Association and National Tax Association, as well as the useful feedback provided by participants of the 2016 David C. Lincoln Fellowship Symposium, hosted by the Lincoln Institute of Land Policy. Joseph Persky, David Merriman, and Justin Ross also provided helpful comments on earlier drafts. Andreea Vasi and Javier Robles provided excellent research assistance throughout the course of this project. 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Tax J. PD MAR PY 2019 VL 72 IS 1 BP 11 EP 44 DI 10.17310/ntj.2019.1.01 PG 34 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA HN7LD UT WOS:000460370000001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Chernick, H Reimers, C AF Chernick, Howard Reimers, Cordelia TI Consumption Taxes, Income Taxes, and Revenue Sensitivity: States and the Great Recession SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax volatility; income distributions; state tax incidence; great recession; consumption taxes; income taxes; revenue stability AB This article uses an income-distributional approach to state tax sensitivity to examine the assumption that consumption taxes are more stable than income taxes. We estimate the 2007 to 2009 change in tax revenues as a function of state income distributions and tax burdens by income class. We estimate tax burdens as a function of income tax shares and consumption tax shares. We then simulate the change in tax revenues with tax shares at the national average. If high-income-tax states were to lower their reliance on this tax, the revenue decline during the recession would have been greater. For high consumption tax states, the revenue decline under higher income tax shares would have been smaller. Had they shifted toward consumption taxes, income tax reliant states would not have reduced the cyclical sensitivity of tax revenues during the Great Recession. The interaction between tax burdens and recession shocks by income class is key to these results. C1 [Chernick, Howard; Reimers, Cordelia] CUNY Hunter Coll, Dept Econ, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA. [Chernick, Howard; Reimers, Cordelia] CUNY, Grad Ctr, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA. RP Chernick, H (corresponding author), CUNY Hunter Coll, Dept Econ, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA.; Chernick, H (corresponding author), CUNY, Grad Ctr, 695 Pk Ave, New York, NY 10065 USA. EM howard.chernick@hunter.cuny.edu FU Russell Sage Foundation FX The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: The Russell Sage Foundation provided financial support for this research, as part of their initiative on The Social and Economic Effects of the Great Recession. 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Rev. PD MAR PY 2019 VL 47 IS 2 BP 349 EP 381 DI 10.1177/1091142117741669 PG 33 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA HK7WB UT WOS:000458199300004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kaufmann, RK AF Kaufmann, Robert K. TI Pass-through of motor gasoline taxes: Efficiency and efficacy of environmental taxes SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Environmental taxes; Environmental policy; Motor gasoline prices; Oil supply chain ID PRICE AB To investigate the efficacy and efficiency of environmental taxes, I analyze the rate at which taxes on motor gasoline are passed to consumers by estimating two cointegrating vector autoregression models for each of six states. For state models that specify the retail price of motor gasoline without taxes, exclusion tests suggest that taxes on motor gasoline are not passed to consumers on a one-for-one basis. For state models that specify the retail price of motor gasoline including taxes, results indicate that taxes are passed to wholesale prices in Florida and Massachusetts on a one-for-one basis and are passed to retail prices with a 'mark-up' in Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and Ohio, and are not fully passed through in Washington. State-specific rates of pass through differ from results suggested by theory and fixed effects estimators, which may be biased by the presence of nonstationary data and the assumption that the rate of pass through is the same across states. Rates of pass through greater than one transfer $12.2 billion from consumers to retailers in FL, $2.3 billion in MA, and $19.2 billion in NY during the sample period, which represent 10.7%, 6.0%, and 23.9% of total expenditures on regular motor gasoline. C1 [Kaufmann, Robert K.] Boston Univ, Dept Earth & Environm, Boston, MA 02215 USA. RP Kaufmann, RK (corresponding author), Boston Univ, Dept Earth & Environm, Boston, MA 02215 USA. EM Kaufmann@bu.edu CR Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Bello A, 2012, ENERG POLICY, V48, P439, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2012.05.069 Bertrand M, 2004, Q J ECON, V119, P249, DOI 10.1162/003355304772839588 Chouinard H, 2004, ECON LETT, V83, P55, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.004 DENNIS JG, 2005, CATS RATS VERSION 2 Doyle JJ, 2008, J PUBLIC ECON, V92, P869, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.011 Hsiao C., 1986, ANAL PANEL DATA Johansen S., 1996, ADV TEXTS ECONOMETRI Juselius K., 2006, ADV TEXTS ECONOMETRI Kao C, 1999, J ECONOMETRICS, V90, P1, DOI 10.1016/S0304-4076(98)00023-2 Kaufmann RK, 2005, ENERG POLICY, V33, P1587, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2004.01.013 Kopczuk W, 2016, AM ECON J-ECON POLIC, V8, P251, DOI 10.1257/pol.20140271 Labandiera X. J. M. Labeaga, 2015, META ANALAYSIS PRICE Li SJ, 2014, AM ECON J-ECON POLIC, V6, P302, DOI 10.1257/pol.6.4.302 Marion J, 2011, J PUBLIC ECON, V95, P1202, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.003 PESARAN MH, 1995, J ECONOMETRICS, V68, P79, DOI 10.1016/0304-4076(94)01644-F RBB Economics, 2014, COST PASS THROUGH TH ROBERTSON D, 1992, J APPL ECONOM, V7, P175, DOI 10.1002/jae.3950070206 Silvia L, 2014, 324 BUR EC FED TRAD Stolper Samuel, 2016, HARV ENV EC PROGRAM, P16 SWAMY PAVB, 1970, ECONOMETRICA, V38, P311, DOI 10.2307/1913012 NR 21 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 9 PU ELSEVIER SCI LTD PI OXFORD PA THE BOULEVARD, LANGFORD LANE, KIDLINGTON, OXFORD OX5 1GB, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0301-4215 EI 1873-6777 J9 ENERG POLICY JI Energy Policy PD FEB PY 2019 VL 125 BP 207 EP 215 DI 10.1016/j.enpol.2018.10.045 PG 9 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA HI9ER UT WOS:000456758600020 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Neves, IF AF Neves, Isadora Ferreira TI SOME APPOINTMENTS RELATED TO THE EVOLUTION OF STRUCTURAL ELEMENTS OF THE FACT ASSUMPTION (TAXABLE EVENT OR HYPOTHESIS OF THE TAX INCIDENCE) ON BRAZILIAN TAX LAW. SO QUAESTIO IURIS LA Portuguese DT Article DE Taxable Event; Hypothesis of the tax incidence; Incidence Matrix Rule; Tax Legal Norm; Legal Requirements AB The present study seeks to perform a panoramic analysis of the doctrinal evolution concerning the gradual recognition of the structure of the tax norm, focusing its components (elements, aspects or criteria) through a historical-evolutionary methodological strategy, starting from the first theoretical compositions related to the Tatbestand (pressupposto di fatto or fattispecie). Thus, the present investigation begins with analysis of the theoretical background, especially in the field of Public Economy (Public Finances), Criminal Law and Administrative Law. Then, the controversy of the identification of the criteria is crossed through the notion of cause, element or presupposition of the tax obligation, a recurring theme in the first decades of the 20th century in European literature. In addition, it seeks to understand, from a legal perspective, the different doctrinal positions (European and Latin American, especially) on the structure (and its components) in the period of "glorification of the tax event". After observing the previous doctrinal and legislative experience, it is sought to investigate the Brazilian doctrinal and legislative evolution on the problematic, which was gradually strengthened from the 1940s onwards, but which still remains constant today. C1 [Neves, Isadora Ferreira] Univ Vale Rio dos Sinos, Direito Publ, Sao Leopoldo, Brazil. 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L., 2013, CURSO DIREITO FINANC TROTABAS Louis, 1975, DROIT FISCAL VANONI Ezio, 1962, OPERE GIURIDICHE ELE VEIGA Didimo Agapito da, 1927, ENSAIOS SCI FINANCAS VIEIRA Jose Roberto, 1993, REGRA MATRIZ INCIDEN VILANOVA Lourival, 1977, ESTRUTURAS LOGICAS S VILANOVA Lourival, 1976, LOGICA JURIDICA VILLEGAS Hector, 1980, CURSO DIREITO TRIBUT WAGNER Adolph, 1909, THEORIE TAXES THEORI ZILVETI Fernando Aurelio, 2009, OBRIGACAO TRIBUTARIA NR 82 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU UNIV ESTADO RIO JANEIRO PI RIO DE JANEIRO RJ PA RUA SAO FRANCISCO XAVIER, 524-BLOCO F, RIO DE JANEIRO RJ, 20559-900, BRAZIL SN 1807-8389 EI 1516-0351 J9 QUAESTIO IURIS JI Quaestio Iuris PY 2019 VL 12 IS 4 BP 718 EP 753 DI 10.12957/rqi.2020.40176 PG 36 WC Law SC Government & Law GA LR9QE UT WOS:000536028900027 OA DOAJ Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Zimmermannova, J Krajnak, M Siroky, J Jilkova, E AF Zimmermannova, Jarmila Krajnak, Michal Siroky, Jan Jilkova, Eva TI Does Cigarette Taxation Have an Impact on Reducing Their Consumption? SO EKONOMICKY CASOPIS LA English DT Article DE cigarette taxation; tax incidence; negative stimulation effect ID TAXES AB This paper presents the evaluation of the impact of cigarette taxation in the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, and Poland. Firstly, the authors focus on the issue of cigarette taxation and the European legislation and then they provide an overview of the international scientific research in this area. The main objective of the research is to evaluate the impact of cigarette taxation on cigarette consumption, observing the effect of negative stimulation of this taxation. The authors use the methods of correlation and regression analyses and create three regression models. Focusing on the stimulation effect of cigarette taxation, the results show that cigarette taxation has a negative influence on cigarette consumption, however, the extent of the impact is not the same in all the analyzed countries. C1 [Zimmermannova, Jarmila; Jilkova, Eva] Moravian Business Coll Olomouc, Dept Econ, Tr Kosmonautu 1, Olomouc 77900, Czech Republic. [Krajnak, Michal; Siroky, Jan] VSB Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Accounting & Taxes, 17 Listopadu 2172-15, Ostrava 70800, Czech Republic. RP Zimmermannova, J (corresponding author), Moravian Business Coll Olomouc, Dept Econ, Tr Kosmonautu 1, Olomouc 77900, Czech Republic. EM jarmila.zimmermannova@mvso.cz; michal.krajnak@vsb.cz; jan.siroky@vsb.cz; eva.jilkova@mvso.cz RI Krajnak, Michal/T-5741-2017 OI Krajnak, Michal/0000-0003-4924-3583 FU European UnionEuropean Union (EU) [2019-1-CZ01-KA203-061374]; SGS [SP 2018/62] FX The paper is processed as an output of the following research project: Spationomy 2.0 project (2019-1-CZ01-KA203-061374) funded by the European Union and the SGS under the registration number SP 2018/62. 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PY 2019 VL 67 IS 10 BP 1035 EP 1054 PG 20 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA KG4PE UT WOS:000509927200002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Castello, MG AF Castello, Melissa Guimaraes TI IS BITCOIN CURRENCY? THE CLASSIFICATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES FOR TAX LAW SO REVISTA DIREITO GV LA Portuguese DT Article DE Bitcoin; tax law; virtual coins; tax incidence AB The article analyzes the legal classification of virtual currencies, in order to define how taxation should be carried out over transactions with these currencies. To do so, the study begins looking at the concept of currency for the Brazilian legal system, in order to determine if it is feasible to classify virtual currencies as currency. To assist in this classification, a brief analysis of the treatment given by Comparative Law, in particular the European Union regulations, is carried out. The study of the European experience is especially interesting since the European Court of Justice has already had the opportunity to decide, in Case C-264/14 - Hedqvist, on the legal classification of bitcoin, determining whether it should be charged a value added tax (VAT) on bitcoin purchases and sales. Based on the European experience and on the Brazilian legal concept of currency, one concludes that it is possible to consider, for purposes of tax incidence, that financial transactions with virtual currencies are similar to operations with foreign currency. The present study focuses on the classification of bitcoin and congeners for tax law, not aiming to study the regulatory impacts that may arise from this classification. C1 [Castello, Melissa Guimaraes] Escola Super Propaganda Mkt Campus ESPM Sul, Curso Relacoes Int, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil. [Castello, Melissa Guimaraes] Procuradoria Geral Estado Rio Grande Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil. RP Castello, MG (corresponding author), Escola Super Propaganda Mkt Campus ESPM Sul, Curso Relacoes Int, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil.; Castello, MG (corresponding author), Procuradoria Geral Estado Rio Grande Sul, Porto Alegre, RS, Brazil. EM melicastello@hotmail.com OI Castello, Melissa/0000-0002-0183-8564 CR ALTHAUSER Joshua, 2017, JAPANESE FINANCIAL R AVILA Humberto Bergmann, 2012, SISTEMA CONSTITUCION BAJPAI Prableen, 2017, INVESTOPEDIA ACAD BEDICKS Leonardo Baracat, 2015, REV TRIBUNAIS, V953 CAMPOS Carlos Alexandre de Azevedo, 2018, LEITURAS CLASSICAS D CNBC, 2017, PRACT IS IT LIV BITC CORTEZ Tiago Machado, 2004, THESIS DURAN Camila Villard, 2010, DIREITO MOEDA CONTRO EPOCA NEGOCIOS, 2017, EPOCA NEGOCIOS European Banking Authority, 2014, EBA OP VIRT CURR FOBE Nicole Julie, 2016, THESIS GARCIA Marco Aurelio Fernandes, 2016, REV FORUM DIREITO FI GRAHAM Luke, CHINA CRACKS JAPAN I HERTIG Alyssa, WHAT IS DAO INFOMONEY, 5 MOT QUE FAR BITC M KEIRNS Garett, JAPANS BITCOIN LAW G QUIROGA MOSQUERA Roberto, 2006, DIREITO MONETARIO TR RECEITA FEDERAL DO BRASIL, 2017, IMPOSTO RENDA PESSOA RIBEIRO Cinthya Imano Vicente, 2017, REV DIREITO BANCARIO, V78 ROMA Bruno Marques Bensal, 2016, REV DIREITO EMPRESAR, V20 SILVEIRA Renato de Mello Jorge, 2016, REV DIREITO BANCARIO, V71 Swan M., 2015, BLOCKCHAIN BLUEPRINT Tapscott D., 2016, BLOCKCHAIN REVOLUTIO TEIXEIRA Demetrius Barreto, 2017, SOBERANIA ORDEM EC V van der LAAN Cesar, 2014, TEXTO DISCUSSAO VERCOSA Haroldo Malheiros Duclerc, 2016, REV DIREITO EMPRESAR, V4 NR 26 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU FUNDACAO GETULIO VARGAS, ESCOLA DIREITO PI SAO PAULO SP PA RUA ROCHA, 23 11 ANDAR, SAO PAULO SP, 01330-0000, BRAZIL SN 1808-2432 EI 2317-6172 J9 REV DIREITO GV JI Rev. Direito GV PY 2019 VL 15 IS 3 AR e1931 DI 10.1590/2317-6172201931 PG 20 WC Law SC Government & Law GA KA6TY UT WOS:000505930700006 OA DOAJ Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT S AU Petre, B Rodica, G Vizoli, M AF Petre, Brezeanu Rodica, Ghiur Vizoli, Mariana GP Bucharest Univ Econ Studies TI The 4 quick solutions - First step towards a definitive VAT system/to reduce the VAT gap across the EU SO PROCEEDINGS OF THE 14TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ACCOUNTING AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS (AMIS IAAER 2019) SE Proceedings of the International Conference Accounting and Management Information Systems LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 14th International Conference on Accounting and Management Information Systems (AMIS IAAER) CY JUN 05-06, 2019 CL Bucharest Univ Econ Studies, Fac Accounting & Management Informat Syst, Bucharest, ROMANIA SP ACCA, KPMG, CIMA, CECCAR, ANEVAR, Domeniile Samburesti, Deloitte, V & TM, Boromir, TUV Austria, Alintrans HO Bucharest Univ Econ Studies, Fac Accounting & Management Informat Syst DE Statistical analysis; cluster analysis; tax incidence; VAT; directives AB Through this study, we have tried to show the 4 "quick solutions" that have been implemented and will be applied in the period before the introduction of the definitive VAT system, what involve the new provisions involve, which is the legal framework regulates them. Since the 4 "quick solutions" cannot be mathematically quantified neither for the past nor as a result in the future, we have tried in this study a classification of the Member States by three variables: the share of total VAT revenues in GDP (Gross Domestic Product), the share of the VAT gap and the corruption perceptions index. The taxonomy/typology of these Member States was achieved using cluster analysis, where Member States were grouped into 2 clusters. Since the first "quick solutions" was for Member States applying simplification measures within the structure generically named call-off stocks, we identified through this study that within the cluster with the most countries that applying simplification measures there can also be found the countries with a high VAT gap, with a low VAT rate in GDP and a low corruption perceptions index. However, we have not been able to establish an exact typology of countries based on the simplification regime applied, with reference to the three variables subject to this analysis, because each cluster comprises both countries implementing simplification measures and countries that do not apply simplification measures. However, we considered that the desire of the EU Council and of the European Commission to put in place these solutions is timely, in order to avoid different approaches, which if not conducive to fraud could lead to damage legal certainty. C1 [Petre, Brezeanu; Rodica, Ghiur] Bucharest Univ Econ Studies, 6 Piata Romana,1st Dist, Bucharest 010374, Romania. [Vizoli, Mariana] Chamber Tax Consultants, Bucharest, Romania. RP Rodica, G (corresponding author), Bucharest Univ Econ Studies, 6 Piata Romana,1st Dist, Bucharest 010374, Romania. CR [Anonymous], 2016, VAT ACT PLAN COMM PR [Anonymous], 2017, COM2017566 Babucea A.G., 2009, ANN CONSTANTIN BRANC Babucea A.G., 2007, USING CLUSTER ANAL T Barbalata M., 2018, COLLECTION WORKING P, V5 Council of the European Union, 2018, 380ECOFIN849 FISC CO Cumatrenco A., 2007, EC MAGAZINE, V3 Hampu M., 2014, VAT TREATMENT CALL O Poniatowski G., 2016, STUDY REPORTS VAT GA Sarnowski J, 2019, REDUCING VAT GAP LES Vizoli M., 2019, VAT COURSE NEED RELA Zidkova A., 2014, PRAGUE EC PAPERS, V23 Zidkova H, 2016, EKONOMICKY CASOPIS NR 13 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU EDITURA ASE PI BUCURESTI PA PIATA ROMANA NR 6, SECTOR 1, BUCURESTI, 701631, ROMANIA SN 2247-6245 J9 PROC INT C ACC PY 2019 BP 270 EP 285 PG 16 WC Business; Business, Finance; Management SC Business & Economics GA BO0SW UT WOS:000493279900020 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Hou, YL AF Hou, Yilin BA Hou, Y BF Hou, Y TI Simulation of Tax Incidence and Redistribution Effects of the Tax Proposal SO DEVELOPMENT, GOVERNANCE, AND REAL PROPERTY TAX IN CHINA SE Politics and Development of Contemporary China LA English DT Article; Book Chapter ID WILLINGNESS-TO-PAY; PROPERTY-VALUES; ABILITY; TAXATION; REAL; CAPITALIZATION; INEQUITY C1 [Hou, Yilin] Syracuse Univ, Maxwell Sch, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA. 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H., 2014, J YUNNAN U FINANCE E, V2014, P50 NR 92 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU PALGRAVE PI BASINGSTOKE PA HOUNDMILLS, BASINGSTOKE RG21 6XS, ENGLAND BN 978-3-319-95528-5; 978-3-319-95527-8 J9 POL DEVEL CONTEMP CH PY 2019 BP 135 EP 191 DI 10.1007/978-3-319-95528-5_8 D2 10.1007/978-3-319-95528-5 PG 57 WC Business, Finance; Development Studies; Political Science SC Business & Economics; Development Studies; Government & Law GA BL8KW UT WOS:000456565600009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kalkuhl, M Milan, BF Schwerhoff, G Jakob, M Hahnen, M Creutzig, F AF Kalkuhl, Matthias Milan, Blanca Fernandez Schwerhoff, Gregor Jakob, Michael Hahnen, Maren Creutzig, Felix TI Can land taxes foster sustainable development? An assessment of fiscal, distributional and implementation issues SO LAND USE POLICY LA English DT Article DE Fiscal policy; Public economics; Optimal taxes; Tax incidence; Land use ID DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; PROPERTY-TAX; RESIDENTIAL LAND; MARGINAL COST; UNITED-STATES; PUBLIC FUNDS; INCOME-TAX; US CITIES; DEFORESTATION; TAXATION AB Economists argue that land rent taxation is an ideal form of taxation as it causes no deadweight losses. Nevertheless, pure land rent taxation is rarely applied. This paper revisits the case of land taxation for developing countries. We first provide an up-to-date review on land taxation in development countries, including feasibility and implementation challenges. We then simulate land tax reforms for Rwanda, Peru, Nicaragua and Indonesia, based on household surveys. We find that (i) land taxes provide a substantial untapped potential for tax revenues at minimal deadweight losses; that (ii) linear land value taxes tend to put a high relative burden on poor households as land ownership is pervasive; (iii) non-linear tax schemes could avoid adverse effects on the poor; and that (iv) with technological advances, administrative costs of land taxes have reduced substantially and are outweighed by tax revenues and co-benefits of formalized land tenure. Enforcement and compliance remain, however, a key challenge. C1 [Kalkuhl, Matthias; Milan, Blanca Fernandez; Schwerhoff, Gregor; Jakob, Michael; Hahnen, Maren; Creutzig, Felix] Mercator Res Inst Global Commons & Climate Change, Torgauer Str 12-15, D-10829 Berlin, Germany. [Kalkuhl, Matthias] Univ Potsdam, Fac Econ & Social Sci, Potsdam, Germany. [Creutzig, Felix] Tech Univ Berlin, Sustainabil Econ Human Settlements, Berlin, Germany. RP Kalkuhl, M (corresponding author), Mercator Res Inst Global Commons & Climate Change, Torgauer Str 12-15, D-10829 Berlin, Germany. EM kalkuhl@mcc-berlin.net; bfmilan@gmail.com; schwerhoff@mcc-berlin.net; jakob@mcc-berlin.net; maren.hahnen@posteo.de; creutzig@mcc-berlin.net RI Schwerhoff, Gregor/L-2365-2019; Jakob, Michael/I-7320-2015; Creutzig, Felix/B-8691-2016 OI Schwerhoff, Gregor/0000-0003-3644-3447; Jakob, Michael/0000-0001-5005-3563; Kalkuhl, Matthias/0000-0003-4797-6628; Creutzig, Felix/0000-0002-5710-3348 FU PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency; Mercator Foundation FX We acknowledge funding from PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the Mercator Foundation. We thank Jetske Bouma, Stefan van der Esch, Ildephonse Musafiri, Deden Dinar, Sabine Fuss, Joan Youngman and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier versionsof this paper. 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PD NOV PY 2018 VL 78 BP 338 EP 352 DI 10.1016/j.landusepol.2018.07.008 PG 15 WC Environmental Studies SC Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA GZ5GT UT WOS:000449447900033 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Cox, JC Rider, M Sen, A AF Cox, James C. Rider, Mark Sen, Astha TI Tax Incidence: Do Institutions Matter? An Experimental Study SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; market institutions; experiment ID LIABILITY-SIDE EQUIVALENCE; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; AUCTION MARKETS; POSTED-OFFER; TAXATION; SALIENCE AB According to economic theory, the incidence of a unit tax is independent of the statutory assignment of the liability to pay the tax. However, the theory is silent on the possible effects of market institutions on tax incidence. We report data from an experiment designed to address two questions. Is tax incidence independent of the assignment of the liability to pay tax to sellers or to buyers? Is tax incidence independent of market institutions? We conduct laboratory experiments with double auction (DA) and posted offer (PO) markets. Based on the results of nonparametric and parametric tests of prices generated by laboratory markets, we conclude that the answer to both questions is "no." We report that observed differences from liability-side equivalence are statistically significant and economically meaningful. We also report that the incidence of the same tax differs between DA and PO markets with the same demand and supply schedules. C1 [Cox, James C.; Rider, Mark] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Dept Econ, Expt Econ Ctr, 14 Marietta St NW, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. [Sen, Astha] Sonoma State Univ, Sch Business & Econ, Rohnert Pk, CA 94928 USA. RP Cox, JC (corresponding author), Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Dept Econ, Expt Econ Ctr, 14 Marietta St NW, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. EM jccox@gsu.edu FU National Science FoundationNational Science Foundation (NSF) [SES-0849590] FX The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: The National Science Foundation (grant number SES-0849590) provided partial financial support. 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PD NOV PY 2018 VL 46 IS 6 BP 899 EP 925 DI 10.1177/1091142117700720 PG 27 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA GW4EK UT WOS:000446863500001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Harju, J Kosonen, T Skans, ON AF Harju, Jarkko Kosonen, Tuomas Skans, Oskar Nordstrom TI Firm types, price-setting strategies, and consumption-tax incidence SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Firm types; VAT incidence; Price setting; Restaurants ID FAST-FOOD INDUSTRY; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; PASS-THROUGH; MENU COSTS; MANAGEMENT; ENTREPRENEURSHIP; EFFICIENCY; OWNERSHIP; SALIENCE; TAXATION AB We analyze price responses to large restaurant VAT rate reductions in two different European countries. Our results show that responses in the short and medium run were clustered around two focal points of zero pass-through and full pass-through. Differences between independent restaurants and chains is the key explanation for this pattern. While nearly all independent restaurants effectively ignored the tax reductions and left consumer prices unchanged, a substantial fraction of restaurants belonging to chains chose a rapid and complete pass-through. In the longer run, prices converged, but primarily through a price reversion among chain restaurants. The stark difference in price responses does not appear to arise because of different market characteristics such as location, initial price levels, meal types and restaurant segment. (C) 2018 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 VATT Inst Econ Res, Helsinki, Finland. [Harju, Jarkko; Kosonen, Tuomas] CESifo, Helsinki, Finland. [Kosonen, Tuomas] Acad Finland, Labour Inst Econ Res, Helsinki, Finland. [Skans, Oskar Nordstrom] Uppsala Univ, Uppsala, Sweden. [Skans, Oskar Nordstrom] IFAU, Uppsala, Sweden. RP Kosonen, T (corresponding author), CESifo, Helsinki, Finland.; Kosonen, T (corresponding author), Acad Finland, Labour Inst Econ Res, Helsinki, Finland. EM jarkko.harju@vatt.fi; tuomas.kosonen@labour.fi; oskar.nordstrom_skans@nek.uu.se FU Academy of FinlandAcademy of Finland FX We are grateful for comments by Alan Auerbach, Raj Chetty, Helmuth Cremer, Glenn Ellison, Xavier Gabaix, Bengt Holmstrom, Jim Hines, Jim Poterba, Emmanuel Saez, Hakan Selin, Joel Slemrod, Jean Tirole, Juuso Toikka, Juuso Valimaki, and Heidi Williams as well as participants at the NBER Summer Institute, ASSA, NTA, IIPF, EEA and CESifo conferences and at various other seminars, in particular at MIT and University of Michigan. We thank our teams of price collectors in Sweden, Finland and Estonia for providing excellent assistance. We are grateful for a partial funding of this project by the Academy of Finland and separately by IFAU in Sweden. 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Tax J. PD SEP PY 2018 VL 71 IS 3 BP 427 EP 450 DI 10.17310/ntj.2018.3.01 PG 24 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA GU8LR UT WOS:000445591100001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Barrios, S Nicodeme, G Fuentes, AJS AF Barrios, Salvador Nicodeme, Gaetan Sanchez Fuentes, A. Jesus TI Multi-Factor Effective Corporate Taxation, Firms' Mark-Ups and Tax Incidence: Evidence from OECD Countries SO FISCAL STUDIES LA English DT Article DE taxation; tax incidence; effective taxation; mark-ups ID PAYROLL-TAX; INCOME-TAX; CAPITAL STRUCTURE; SHARE; WAGES; INVESTMENT; PROGRAM AB This paper provides novel evidence on the multi-factor effective marginal tax rates (EMTRs) for a sample of 17 OECD countries and 11 manufacturing sectors. We use a single framework encompassing capital, labour and energy taxes. Our cross-country/cross-sector approach allows us to analyse the contributions of these input factors to the effective tax borne by firms, taking explicitly into account their degree of substitution, their tax incidence and the role of mark-ups. We find that the labour tax plays a particularly important role in the overall level of the EMTR and that the presence of mark-ups can significantly alter the levels of the multi-factor EMTR, although without significantly altering the ranking of countries. We also find that the bulk of the variation in EMTRs is across countries, rather than across sectors (within countries). C1 [Barrios, Salvador] European Commiss, Joint Res Ctr, Luxembourg, Luxembourg. [Nicodeme, Gaetan] European Commiss, Brussels, Belgium. [Nicodeme, Gaetan] Univ Libre Bruxelles, Brussels, Belgium. [Nicodeme, Gaetan] CESifo, Munich, Germany. [Nicodeme, Gaetan] CEPR, Washington, DC USA. [Sanchez Fuentes, A. Jesus] Univ Complutense Madrid, Madrid, Spain. [Sanchez Fuentes, A. Jesus] ICEI, Madrid, Spain. [Sanchez Fuentes, A. Jesus] Governance & Econ Res Network GEN, Orense, Spain. RP Barrios, S (corresponding author), European Commiss, Joint Res Ctr, Luxembourg, Luxembourg. EM salvador.barrios@ec.europa.eu; gaetan.nicodeme@ec.europa.eu; ajsanchezfuentes@ucm.es RI SANCHEZ-FUENTES, A. JESUS/F-9667-2017 OI SANCHEZ-FUENTES, A. JESUS/0000-0002-8018-2830 FU European CommissionEuropean CommissionEuropean Commission Joint Research Centre [153464-2013-A08-ES]; Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [ECO2012-37572]; Regional Government of AndalusiaJunta de Andalucia [SEJ 1512] FX The authors thank Nadja Dwenger, Helen Miller, Maria Santana Gallego, Jose Luis Torres, two anonymous referees and the participants at the 2014 CESifo Public Sector Economics conference, the 2015 conference of the Spanish Association of International Economics and Finance, and the Economics Department seminar at the University of Malaga for their valuable comments. Sanchez Fuentes acknowledges the financial support of the European Commission (contract 153464-2013-A08-ES), the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (project ECO2012-37572) and the Regional Government of Andalusia (project SEJ 1512). The views expressed in this study are those of the authors and shall not be attributed to the European Commission. Errors and omissions are those of the authors only. A working paper version of this paper has been published under the title 'Effective corporate taxation, tax incidence and tax reforms: evidence from OECD countries'. 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PD SEP PY 2018 VL 39 IS 3 BP 417 EP 453 DI 10.1111/j.1475-5890.2017.12153 PG 37 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA GS8EC UT WOS:000443939600002 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Adam, C Bevan, D Gollin, D AF Adam, Christopher Bevan, David Gollin, Douglas TI Rural-Urban Linkages, Public Investment and Transport Costs: The Case of Tanzania SO WORLD DEVELOPMENT LA English DT Article DE structural transformation; Africa; Tanzania; applied general equilibrium; public investment; public finance ID PRODUCTIVITY; BENEFITS; ROADS; GAP AB The economy of Tanzania, like those of many other sub-Saharan African countries, displays strong geographic and locational disparities. We develop a three-location spatial applied general equilibrium model calibrated to the 2001 Tanzanian Social Accounting Matrix to examine the impact of various public investment programs on household welfare across this diverse geography in which production and consumption are locationally specific and transport costs support equilibrium price differences across locations. We examine how different public investment packages combined with reforms in the transport sector alter the equilibrium structure and location of economic activity. The choice of financing arrangement matters for welfare, since tax incidence, relative price, and real exchange rate movements are non neutral. We show that the distributional consequences of alternative investment programs may matter more in terms of household welfare than the direct consequences of targeting investment to particular sectors or locations. For instance, under some financing scenarios, interventions that aid agriculture may lead to decreases in the welfare of the rural unskilled labor force, because the financing mechanisms create distortions that effectively skew the terms of trade sufficiently powerfully against the rural unskilled as to outweigh the direct welfare-enhancing effects of the public investment. We also note that welfare gains are generated by the movement of rural workers out of quasi-subsistence agriculture into higher productivity jobs in other sectors and locations. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. C1 [Adam, Christopher; Bevan, David; Gollin, Douglas] Univ Oxford, Oxford, England. RP Adam, C (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Oxford, England. FU International Growth Centre FX We thank the International Growth Centre for research support, Radhika Goyal for excellent research assistance and we gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Beatrice Mkenda for sharing her valuable research on transportation costs in Tanzania. CR Adam C, 2014, 1473 IMF Adam CS, 2006, WORLD BANK ECON REV, V20, P261, DOI 10.1093/wber/lhj011 Africa Infrastructure Country Diagnostic (AICD), 2010, TANZ INFR CONT PERSP Atkin David, 2015, NBER WORKING PAPERS, V21439 Banerjee A., 2012, NBER WORKING PAPERS, V17897 Baum-Snow N., 2015, ROADS RAILROAD UNPUB Beegle K, 2011, REV ECON STAT, V93, P1010, DOI 10.1162/REST_a_00105 Buffie E. F., 2012, 12144 IMF Carleton T. 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PD SEP PY 2018 VL 109 BP 497 EP 510 DI 10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.08.013 PG 14 WC Development Studies; Economics SC Development Studies; Business & Economics GA GL2AP UT WOS:000436915700038 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Morone, A Nemore, F Nuzzo, S AF Morone, Andrea Nemore, Francesco Nuzzo, Simone TI Experimental evidence on tax salience and tax incidence SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY LA English DT Article ID LIABILITY-SIDE EQUIVALENCE; POSTED-OFFER; TAXATION; MARKETS; INSTITUTIONS; ECONOMICS AB Although a basic theoretical principle in public economics assumes that individuals optimize fully with respect to the introduction of a tax, a growing body of research is proving that several heuristics are in place when people take decisions. We re-examine the well known liability side equivalence principle in the light of the concept of salience. While these two topics have been extensively investigated in isolation, this paper innovates on the previous literature in that it focuses on their joint effects. Is tax incidence dependent on whether the subjects face a salient rather than a nonsalient tax? Does the salience of a tax exert a different effect depending on who is legally committed to bear the tax burden? We address these questions through a laboratory experiment in which one unit of a fictitious good is being traded through a double-auction market institution. Based on a panel data analysis, our contribution shows that point of collection matters and determines the economic incidence of tax. Additionally, we find that the joint effect of salience and statutory incidence does not alter the informative efficiency, but has a positive effect on buyers' allocational efficiency when the tax is levied on sellers. C1 [Morone, Andrea; Nemore, Francesco; Nuzzo, Simone] Univ Bari Aldo Moro, Bari, Italy. 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TI Public Interest in Veterans' Lottery Tickets: Evidence From Consumer and Voter Behavior SO ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY LA English DT Article DE lottery; public opinion; veterans; voting; ballot initiatives ID MILITARY SERVICE; STATE LOTTERIES; TAX INCIDENCE; US VETERANS; EDUCATION; REGRESSIVITY; EXPENDITURES; ATTITUDES; EARNINGS; OPINION AB While many states earmark lottery proceeds for education programs, a few states have started allocating portions of lottery revenues toward state-provided services for military veterans. The decision to shift funds toward veterans' services and away from other programs creates an opportunity to study society's willingness to help veterans when faced with real trade-offs. Using county-level data from three states, I examined public interest in veterans' lottery tickets by analyzing consumer and voter behaviors. 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PD JUL PY 2018 VL 44 IS 3 BP 408 EP 435 DI 10.1177/0095327X17708561 PG 28 WC Political Science; Sociology SC Government & Law; Sociology GA GH8HN UT WOS:000433909000002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lee, D AF Lee, Daeyong TI Impact of the excise tax on firm R&D and performance in the medical device industry: Evidence from the Affordable Care Act SO RESEARCH POLICY LA English DT Article DE Medical device tax; Research and development (R&D); Firm performance; Market strategy; Affordable Care Act ID DEVELOPMENT INVESTMENT; PHARMACEUTICAL-INDUSTRY; PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH; MARKET-STRUCTURE; CIGARETTE TAXES; BUSINESS CYCLES; INNOVATION; COMPETITION; CYCLICALITY; BEHAVIOR AB This article examines how the excise tax affects firms' R&D investment, performance, and market strategy in the US medical device industry. The Affordable Care Act imposed a 2.3% excise tax on medical devices beginning in January 2013, and thus this study compares the medical device firms with other high-tech firms before and after the tax incidence. Using COMPUSTAT data from 2006 to 2015, the author finds that the excise tax reduced R&D investment, sales revenue, gross margins, and earnings for medical device firms. In addition, the excise tax increased their global market sales intensity, global market diversification, and customer diversification in the US domestic market. C1 [Lee, Daeyong] Iowa State Univ, Human Dev & Family Studies, 1325 Palmer,2222 Osborn Dr, Ames, IA 50011 USA. RP Lee, D (corresponding author), Iowa State Univ, Human Dev & Family Studies, 1325 Palmer,2222 Osborn Dr, Ames, IA 50011 USA. 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The effect of direct payments on land rental prices SO EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE agricultural subsidies; land rental markets; spatial competition ID SINGLE FARM PAYMENT; EU MEMBER STATES; AGRICULTURAL LAND; SPATIAL COMPETITION; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; LEVEL DATA; MARKET IMPERFECTIONS; PROGRAM PAYMENTS; MICRO EVIDENCE; TAX INCIDENCE AB Decoupled direct payments are a major tool of agricultural policy to support farm income. Since these subsidies are tied to land, the question arises as to who benefits from them when farmers are not the landowners. While theoretical models commonly predict that most of the payments transfer to land prices, empirical findings show that this incidence is low instead. Approaching the issue from the perspective of spatial competition, this paper produces results consistent with empirical evidence. 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F. M, 2014, APPL ECON PERSPECT P, V37, P1 Swinnen JFM, 2009, AGR ECON-BLACKWELL, V40, P719, DOI 10.1111/j.1574-0862.2009.00410.x Van Herck K, 2013, EURASIAN GEOGR ECON, V54, P423, DOI 10.1080/15387216.2013.878230 von Thunen JH, 1826, ISOLIERTE STAAT BEZI Weber JG, 2012, AM J AGR ECON, V94, P52, DOI 10.1093/ajae/aar134 Weyl EG, 2013, J POLIT ECON, V121, P528, DOI 10.1086/670401 Zhang MX, 2001, J IND ECON, V49, P197 NR 81 TC 5 Z9 5 U1 0 U2 15 PU OXFORD UNIV PRESS PI OXFORD PA GREAT CLARENDON ST, OXFORD OX2 6DP, ENGLAND SN 0165-1587 EI 1464-3618 J9 EUR REV AGRIC ECON JI Eur. Rev. Agric. Econ. PD APR PY 2018 VL 45 IS 2 BP 143 EP 171 DI 10.1093/erae/jbx027 PG 29 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA GB4ND UT WOS:000429036000001 OA Bronze DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Haddow, R AF Haddow, Rodney TI Are Canadian Provincial Tax Systems Becoming More Regressive? If So, in What Respects and Why? SO CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY-ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES LA English DT Article DE taxation; regressivity; Canadian provinces; globalization; partisanship ID CAPITAL TAXATION; GLOBALIZATION; DEMOCRACIES; POLITICS; POLICY; NEOLIBERALISM; COMPETITION; DIFFUSION; COUNTRIES; WELFARE AB There is an extensive literature on the evolution of tax progressivity and the forces shaping it in Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development nations, but not in Canada. This article addresses these topics for the provinces since 1980. Provincial taxes have become more regressive, but unevenly across tax types and over time. Moreover, among the many commonly cited influences on tax incidence, only interprovincial trade has a strong and broad negative association with tax progressivity. Domestic trade's impact also varies considerably over time and often is the inverse of that discussed in the literature, with receding trade levels associated with rising progressivity. Many domestic influences on incidence are stronger than most transboundary ones. C1 [Haddow, Rodney] Univ Toronto, Dept Polit Sci, Toronto, ON, Canada. RP Haddow, R (corresponding author), Univ Toronto, Dept Polit Sci, Toronto, ON, Canada. 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Public Policy-Anal. Polit. PD MAR PY 2018 VL 44 IS 1 BP 25 EP 40 DI 10.3138/cpp.2017-019 PG 16 WC Economics; Public Administration SC Business & Economics; Public Administration GA GD8BE UT WOS:000430736400003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Slemrod, J Boning, WC AF Slemrod, Joel Boning, William C. TI Real Firms in Tax Systems SO FINANZARCHIV LA English DT Article DE tax systems; heterogeneous firms; tax incidence ID VALUE-ADDED TAX; EFFICIENCY; TAXATION AB Economic analysis of taxation often assumes a homogeneous, usually perfectly competitive production sector in which individual firms are immaterial. This paper discusses some recent developments bringing key characteristics of real firms into the analysis of tax systems, which include enforcement rules and remittance regimes alongside tax rates and bases. 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First, we consider nondiscriminating taxes. We show that specific taxes are entirely passed to the agents on the side on which they are levied; other agents and platforms are left unaffected. Transaction taxes hurt agents on both sides and benefit platforms. Ad valorem taxes are the only tax instrument that allows the tax authority to capture part of the platforms' profits. Second, regarding asymmetric taxes, we show that agents on the untaxed side benefit from the tax. At least one platform, possibly the taxed one, benefits from the tax. C1 [Belleflamme, Paul] Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium. [Belleflamme, Paul] Catholic Univ Louvain, Louvain Sch Management, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium. [Toulemonde, Eric] Univ Namur, Dept Econ, 8 Rempart Vierge, B-5000 Namur, Belgium. [Toulemonde, Eric] Univ Namur, CERPE, 8 Rempart Vierge, B-5000 Namur, Belgium. RP Belleflamme, P (corresponding author), Catholic Univ Louvain, CORE, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium.; Belleflamme, P (corresponding author), Catholic Univ Louvain, Louvain Sch Management, 34 Voie du Roman Pays, B-1348 Louvain, Belgium. EM Paul.Belleflamme@uclouvain.be; Eric.Toulemonde@unamur.be CR Alexandrov A., 2011, ASYMMETRIC DEMAND EF Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 Armstrong M, 2006, RAND J ECON, V37, P668, DOI 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00037.x Armstrong Mark, 2016, MULTIPRODUCT PRICING Belleflamme P., 2015, IND ORG MARKETS STRA Bloch F, 2018, J PUBLIC ECON THEORY, V20, P52, DOI 10.1111/jpet.12243 Bourreau M, 2018, J PUBLIC ECON THEORY, V20, P40, DOI 10.1111/jpet.12255 Caillaud B, 2003, RAND J ECON, V34, P309, DOI 10.2307/1593720 FUDENBERG D, 1984, AM ECON REV, V74, P361 Hindriks J., 2006, INTERMEDIATE PUBLIC Kind HJ, 2008, J PUBLIC ECON, V92, P1531, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.12.010 Kind HJ, 2013, ECONOMICA, V80, P131, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0335.2012.00938.x Kind HJ, 2010, OXFORD ECON PAP, V62, P764, DOI 10.1093/oep/gpq008 Kind HJ, 2009, ECON LETT, V104, P86, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.04.010 Kotsogiannis C, 2010, J PUBLIC ECON THEORY, V12, P281, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2009.01439.x Moorthy S, 2005, MARKET SCI, V24, P110, DOI 10.1287/mksc.1030.0053 Myles G., 1996, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V3, P29 Reisinger M, 2014, EUR ECON REV, V68, P168, DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2014.03.005 Rochet JC, 2006, RAND J ECON, V37, P645, DOI 10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x Rochet JC, 2003, J EUR ECON ASSOC, V1, DOI 10.1162/154247603322493212 Tremblay M. J., 2016, TAXATION 2 SID UNPUB Weyl EG, 2010, AM ECON REV, V100, P1642, DOI 10.1257/aer.100.4.1642 NR 22 TC 6 Z9 6 U1 1 U2 6 PU WILEY PI HOBOKEN PA 111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA SN 1097-3923 EI 1467-9779 J9 J PUBLIC ECON THEORY JI J. Public. Econ. Theory. PD FEB PY 2018 VL 20 IS 1 SI SI BP 9 EP 21 DI 10.1111/jpet.12275 PG 13 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA FX1TK UT WOS:000425834500002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Van, B Olah, D AF Van, Balint Olah, Daniel TI Does VAT Cut Appear on the Menu? The Consumer Price Impact of Hungarian VAT Decreases of 2016-2017 SO PUBLIC FINANCE QUARTERLY-HUNGARY LA English DT Article DE VAT; passthrough; synthetic control; regression ID TAX INCIDENCE; SALES TAXES; ADJUSTMENTS; MARKET AB To understand the economic impacts of VAT changes, the passthrough to consumer prices should be analysed. The main objective of the study is to examine passthrough with the rarely used method of synthetic controls for Hungarian VAT changes in 2016-2017. Synthetic price indices are created from the price indices of the same consumer expenditure categories of different European countries. The study finds almost full passthrough in case of pork and chicken, while the passthrough is only partial for fresh milk and eggs. The primarily analysed Hungarian VAT changes of 2016-2017 have not been reflected in the consumer prices of the restaurant sector at all. The price impacts for food items are in line with the experiences of the Romanian decrease of VAT in 2015. Analysing the earlier Hungarian and international passthrough rates of the restaurant sector with the synthetic control method, we can state that this sector is characterized by strong asymmetric passthrough. VAT increases are fully transferred to consumer prices while this is not the case for VAT decreases.(1) EM balint.van@pm.gov.hu; olh.daniel@gmail.com CR Abadie A, 2003, AM ECON REV, V93, P113, DOI 10.1257/000282803321455188 Abadie A, 2011, SYNTH R PACKAGE SYNT Ally AK, 2014, ADDICTION, V109, P1994, DOI 10.1111/add.12590 Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Barbone L., 2015, MUCH CHANGES VAT AFF Benedek D., 2015, IMF WORKING PAPER Benkovskis K., 2013, WORKING PAPERS, V2013 Benzarti Y., 2017, 23849 NBER Benzarti Y., 2017, 23848 NBER Berezvai Z., 2018, MTA KRTK KOZGAZDASAG, P93 Buettner T., 2017, SALES PRICE EFFECTS Bundesbank, 2008, PRIC VOL EFF VAT INC Carbonnier C., 2005, WP200509 Carbonnier C, 2007, J PUBLIC ECON, V91, P1219, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.004 Chirakijja J., 2009, NTA NAT TAX ASS ANN Chouinhard H. H., 2015, WORKING PAPER SERIES, V2015-14 Copenhagen Economics, 2007, STUD RED VAT APPL GO Cserhati I., 2017, KEDVEZMENYES AFAKULC Danninger S., 2008, IMF WORKING PAPERS I, V08 Delipalla S, 2001, INT J IND ORGAN, V19, P885, DOI 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00057-0 Falkenhall B., 2015, IMPACT VAT REFORM SW Gaarder I., 2016, INCIDENCE DISTRIBUTI, DOI 10.2139/ssrn.2784559 Gabriel P., 2006, MNB B Giday A., 2017, PENZUGYI SZEMLE, V62, P131 Green, 2013, EFFECT RISING FOOD P Harju J., 2014, INEFFICIENCY REDUCED Jonker F., 2004, WORKING PAPER SERIES, V0413 Karadi P., 2016, LENYELIK E AZ ELADOK Kosonen T., 2013, GOVT I EC RES VATT W, V49 Melioris L., 2015, MUCH ADO NOTHING YES Mellens M., 2014, ROBUST ESTIMATION VA Menezes T. A., 2011, APPL ECON, V40, P2557 Parragh B., 2018, PENZUGYI SZEMLE, V63, P201 Pike R., 2009, MEASURING CONSUMER P Politi RB, 2011, CAN J ECON, V44, P1438, DOI 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01680.x Poterba JM, 1996, NATL TAX J, V49, P165 Torres M. J., 2015, WORKING PAPERS VIREN M., 2009, CZECH EC REV, V3, P123 Yang HX, 2008, RAND J ECON, V39, P547, DOI 10.1111/j.0741-6261.2008.00027.x NR 39 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU STATE AUDIT OFFICE HUNGARY PI BUDAPEST PA BECSI U 5, BUDAPEST, 1052, HUNGARY SN 0031-496X J9 PUBLIC FINANC Q-HUNG JI Public Financ. Q.-Hung. PY 2018 VL 63 IS 3 BP 355 EP 375 PG 21 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA GZ5TA UT WOS:000449489700006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bernal, A AF Bernal, Arkadiusz TI The Value Added Tax Incidence - the Case of the Book Market in CEE Countries SO FINANCE A UVER-CZECH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; value added tax; book market ID SALES TAXES; REFORMS AB Conducting effective economic policy requires understanding of how taxes are shifted. The value added tax rates on books in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in 2003 - 2012 differed much and changed several times, hence it was a good case for exploring the tax incidence. The main objective of the article is to answer the question to whom (consumers, capital, labour) and to what extent the burden of the value added tax on books was shifted. Although the tax is often classified as a consumption tax, the tax on books wasn't shifted to consumers at least within five months after a tax rate change. The research suggests that the tax is shifted to capital and labour. According to the econometric models, an increase of the value added tax rate on books of 1 percentage point leads to a decrease of the return on equity of book publishers between 0,43 and 0,76 percentage point. It suggests that the value added tax on books was partly shifted to capital. Although wages are rigid, employees bear, to some extent, the burden of the value added tax. The regressions allow concluding that an increase of the value added tax rate of 1 percentage point leads to a reduction in the average wage in book publisher companies in the range 0,84% - 0,92%. C1 [Bernal, Arkadiusz] Poznan Univ Econ & Business, Poznan, Poland. RP Bernal, A (corresponding author), Poznan Univ Econ & Business, Poznan, Poland. EM arkadiusz.bernal@ue.poznan.pl FU Polish National Science Centre [2014/13/B/HS4/00215] FX The research was financed by the Polish National Science Centre (Grant No. 2014/13/B/HS4/00215). 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Uver PY 2018 VL 68 IS 2 BP 144 EP 164 PG 21 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA GG2ZA UT WOS:000432560200003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bernal, A AF Bernal, Arkadiusz TI Do Small Value-Added Tax Rate Decreases on Groceries Imply Lower Prices for Consumers? SO EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE behavioral economics; consumption; tax incidence; value-added tax ID LOSS AVERSION; PASS-THROUGH; SALES TAXES; COMPETITION; ELASTICITY; REFORMS AB In the vast majority of countries where a value-added tax (VAT) is in force, basic groceries are taxed at reduced rates. The reduced tax rates are intended to ensure the lowest possible prices for those products for consumers, but this does not always happen. The objective of this article is to determine whether the small reduction in the VAT rate on groceries, from 7% to 5%, which took place in January 2011 in Poland, resulted in lower prices for consumers, and the research does not support the conclusion that the government's reduction of the VAT on basic foodstuffs had that effect. Behavioral economics and psychology can explain the absence of price reductions. The conclusions drawn have important implications for tax policy. C1 [Bernal, Arkadiusz] Poznan Univ Econ & Business, Corp Finance Dept, Poznan, Poland. RP Bernal, A (corresponding author), Al Niepodleglosci 10, PL-61875 Poznan, Poland. EM arkadiusz.bernal@ue.poznan.pl FU Narodowe Centrum NaukiNational Science Center, PolandNational Science Centre, Poland [2014/13/B/HS4/00215] FX This work was supported by the Narodowe Centrum Nauki [Grant No. 2014/13/B/HS4/00215]. 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Eur. Econ. PY 2018 VL 56 IS 1 BP 81 EP 98 DI 10.1080/00128775.2017.1412265 PG 18 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA FW9XF UT WOS:000425690800004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Santoni, M AF Santoni, Michele TI Protective Excise Taxation SO JOURNAL OF INDUSTRY COMPETITION & TRADE LA English DT Article DE Excise taxation; Protectionism; Unionised international oligopoly; Lobbying ID IMPERFECT COMPETITION; TAX INCIDENCE; ASYMMETRIC OLIGOPOLY; EUROPEAN-UNION; PASS-THROUGH; EU COUNTRIES; TRADE-POLICY; AD-VALOREM; ALCOHOL; MARKET AB In a small open economy composed of unionised international Cournot-Nash duopolies, a self-interested government has unilateral incentives to set higher specific domestic excise duties under the destination principle when the typical foreign firm is dominant and the import-competing sector is small. 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Ind. Compet. Trade PD DEC PY 2017 VL 17 IS 4 BP 421 EP 445 DI 10.1007/s10842-017-0244-5 PG 25 WC Business SC Business & Economics GA FV8YL UT WOS:000424873800004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Neumann, M AF Neumann, M. TI Earnings responses to social security contributions SO LABOUR ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Social security contributions; Tax incidence; Labour supply elasticities; Labour demand elasticities; Bunching ID PAYROLL-TAX; LABOR; EMPLOYMENT; INCOME; UNEMPLOYMENT; TAXATION; PANEL AB This paper utilises the discontinuities induced by earnings caps for social security contributions (SSC) in Germany to analyse the effect of SSC on gross labour earnings. Economic incidence is identified by exploiting an increase of a regional earnings cap of health and long-term care insurance as a natural experiment. Based on administrative data, difference-in-differences models are estimated. I find the burden of SSC is shared equally between employers and employees. An auxiliary analysis studies employment responses to SSC at the intensive margin by a modified bunching approach that is applied to the earnings caps of health and long-term care insurance. Finding employment responses to be negligible supports crucial identifying assumptions of the main analysis. Both results are robust and consistent with a standard partial-equilibrium labour market model. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Neumann, M.] DIW Berlin, German Inst Econ Res, Mohrenstr 58, D-10117 Berlin, Germany. RP Neumann, M (corresponding author), DIW Berlin, German Inst Econ Res, Mohrenstr 58, D-10117 Berlin, Germany. EM micn@gmx.de FU Deutsche ForschungsgemeinschaftGerman Research Foundation (DFG) [HA5526/3-1] FX This paper was written as a part of the project, 'The Impact of Social Security Contributions on Earnings: Evidence from administrative data in France, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK,' sponsored by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (project number HA5526/3-1). 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PD DEC PY 2017 VL 49 BP 55 EP 73 DI 10.1016/j.labeco.2017.10.001 PG 19 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA FR9TL UT WOS:000419415900005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Alexandrov, A Spulber, DF AF Alexandrov, Alexei Spulber, Daniel F. TI Sufficient Decisions in Multi-Sided and Multiproduct Markets SO JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article ID 2-SIDED MARKETS; PRODUCT VARIETY; PASS-THROUGH; COMPETITION; MONOPOLY; PRICE; GAMES; COMPLEMENTARITIES; PLATFORMS; OLIGOPOLY AB We show that in many models where firms make multiple decisions, analysis can be made more tractable by re-formulating the model into one in which each firm makes a single choice, which we call a sufficient decision. The transformation allows application of standard techniques in these settings, including pass-through for tax incidence and upward pricing pressure for merger analysis. The transformation works because the assumption of profit maximization links the firms' decisions together. Examples include models of monopoly and oligopoly in two-sided markets, where a natural sufficient decision may be the number of transactions that the firm facilitates, and multiproduct markets. C1 [Spulber, Daniel F.] Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA. RP Spulber, DF (corresponding author), Northwestern Univ, Kellogg Sch Management, Evanston, IL 60208 USA. EM alexei01@gmail.com; JEMS@kellogg.northwestern.edu RI Spulber, Daniel F./A-8722-2009 FU Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation; Qualcomm; Kellogg School of Management FX We thank the participants of the International Industrial Organization Conference (and Jeff Prince for his discussion), of the European School of Management and Technology's seminar, of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau's internal seminar, of the CRES Foundations of Business Strategy Conference (and Gary Biglaiser for his discussion), of the DCIO Conference (and Dan Vincent for his discussion), and of the American Law and Economics Association Conference (and Pablo Spiller for his discussion). We also thank the Editor and three anonymous referees for their comments. Spulber is grateful to the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, Qualcomm and the Kellogg School of Management for research support. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of past or current employers. 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Indust. Econ. PD DEC PY 2017 VL 65 IS 4 BP 739 EP 766 DI 10.1111/joie.12159 PG 28 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA FQ3GJ UT WOS:000418244900003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Batchelder, LL AF Batchelder, Lily L. TI THE SHAKY CASE FOR A BUSINESS CASH-FLOW TAX OVER A BUSINESS INCOME TAX SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE tax reform; business taxation; corporate income tax; cash-flow tax; expensing; depreciation; cost recovery; tax incidence ID CORPORATE-TAX; DECISIONS; POLICY; WAGES AB Traditional economic theory holds that a business cash-flow tax is superior to a business income tax because it is more efficient and progressive. But much of the literature espousing this view does not explicitly specify, the full range of assumptions underlying these claims, let alone explore and empirically justify them. 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PD DEC PY 2017 VL 70 IS 4 BP 901 EP 935 DI 10.17310/ntj.2017.4.10 PG 35 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA FO6VJ UT WOS:000417006500010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Tremblay, MJ Tremblay, VJ AF Tremblay, Mark J. Tremblay, Victor J. TI Tax Incidence and Demand Convexity in Cournot, Bertrand, and Cournot-Bertrand Models SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; excise tax; Cournot model; Bertrand model; Cournot-Bertrand model ID QUANTITY COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; PRICES; TAXATION AB We investigate the price effect of an excise tax in a duopoly setting. Previous studies have considered the Cournot and Bertrand models but ignore the Cournot-Bertrand model in which one firm competes in output and the other firm competes in price. This omission is important because Cournot-Bertrand behavior is observed in the real world, and the Cournot-Bertrand model provides dramatically different results. 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Rev. PD NOV PY 2017 VL 45 IS 6 BP 748 EP 770 DI 10.1177/1091142116666671 PG 23 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA GS2BP UT WOS:000443345300002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gulati, S McAusland, C Sallee, JM AF Gulati, Sumeet McAusland, Carol Sallee, James M. TI Tax incidence with endogenous quality and costly bargaining: Theory and evidence from hybrid vehicle subsidies SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Incidence; Bargaining; Green subsidies; Energy efficient technologies; Hybrid electric vehicles; Automobiles ID GREEN; PRICES; EFFICIENCY; MARKET; IMPACT AB Endogenous quality and bargaining are important features of many markets but are typically omitted from studies of incidence. We develop a model with product upgrades and costly bargaining and find that tax rate pass-through only partially characterizes the welfare impact of taxation; consumers may respond to a tax or subsidy by changing product quality or by changing their bargaining effort. We apply the insights of our theory to the study of subsidies for green goods, specifically hybrid electric vehicles in Canada. We utilize highly detailed transaction data and leverage panel variation in subsidies across provinces for identification. Our baseline estimate finds that prices rises by $570 for every $1000 increase in the subsidy. But, this pass through estimate substantially underestimates consumer gains because a majority of this price increase ($459-approximate to 80%) is due to increased product quality in the form of additional options and features. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Gulati, Sumeet; McAusland, Carol] Univ British Columbia, Food & Resource Econ, Vancouver, BC, Canada. [Sallee, James M.] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. RP Gulati, S (corresponding author), Univ British Columbia, Food & Resource Econ, Vancouver, BC, Canada. 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Public Econ. PD NOV PY 2017 VL 155 BP 93 EP 107 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2017.09.003 PG 15 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA FN7KC UT WOS:000416196100008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Reyes, M Teruel, G Lopez, M AF Reyes, Miguel Teruel, Graciela Lopez, Miguel TI Measuring True Income Inequality in Mexico SO LATIN AMERICAN POLICY LA English DT Article DE inequality; inequality underestimation; household income; Mexico AB Recent literature on income distribution in Mexico has found evidence of underestimation in inequality. There is a growing consensus that household surveys in Mexico do not capture total household income, but there is no consensus on a methodological proposal to estimate a more-realistic distribution. This article offers a proposal for adjusting household income, crossing information from household surveys, national accounts, economic censuses, and tax incidence from the Tax Administration System. It shows evidence of a high, persistent income-distribution inequality, with emphasis on factorial and intracompany inequality. The usual adjustment implies that entire average income increases, but this article identifies the main cause of underestimation in distribution, focusing on noncaptured capital income in the wealthiest households surveyed. C1 [Reyes, Miguel] Univ Iberoamer, Observ Salarios, Puebla Campus, Mexico City, DF, Mexico. [Teruel, Graciela] Univ Iberoamer, Inst Desarrollo Con Equidad EQUIDE, Mexico City Campus, Mexico City, DF, Mexico. [Lopez, Miguel] Univ Iberoamer, Undergrad Econ Program, Puebla Campus, Mexico City, DF, Mexico. RP Reyes, M (corresponding author), Univ Iberoamer, Observ Salarios, Puebla Campus, Mexico City, DF, Mexico. 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Policy PD JUN PY 2017 VL 8 IS 1 BP 127 EP 148 DI 10.1111/lamp.12111 PG 22 WC Political Science SC Government & Law GA FB6CV UT WOS:000406229800008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Alvaredo, F Breda, T Roantree, B Saez, E AF Alvaredo, Facundo Breda, Thomas Roantree, Barra Saez, Emmanuel TI Contribution Ceilings and the Incidence of Payroll Taxes SO ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS LA English DT Article DE Public Economics; Tax Incidence; Social Security Contributions ID KINK POINTS AB Social security contributions (SSCs) are typically formally split between employers and employees as payroll taxes, levied on earnings at a constant tax rate that applies only up to a ceiling, above which the marginal tax rate falls to a reduced rate, often 0. Such contribution ceilings create a concave kink point in the budget set of workers and hence should generate a dip in the distribution of earnings around the ceiling through labour supply responses (the reverse of bunching expected at convex kink points) but such a dip is not observed empirically. This paper sets out a new approach to infer the incidence of SSCs that exploits the absence of this dip and the fact that (mechanically) the distributions of labour cost (earnings inclusive of all payroll taxes), gross earnings (net of employer payroll taxes) and net earnings (net of both employer and employee payroll taxes) cannot all be smooth around a kink. The other papers in this special issue apply the method to data for Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK and all find that distribution of gross earnings is smooth around kinks (implying that the distributions of labour costs and net-of-tax earnings are not) even though the concept of gross earnings is irrelevant in the standard static model of labour supply and demand that dominates the public economics literature. This suggests that other features of the labour market, such as wage bargaining based on the gross earnings concept, are relevant for determining the incidence of SSCs. C1 [Alvaredo, Facundo; Breda, Thomas] Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. [Alvaredo, Facundo] INET Oxford, Oxford, England. [Alvaredo, Facundo] Consejo Nacl Invest Cient & Tecn, Buenos Aires, DF, Argentina. [Roantree, Barra] Inst Fiscal Studies, London WC1E 7AE, England. [Saez, Emmanuel] Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Econ, 530 Evans Hall 3880, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. RP Roantree, B (corresponding author), Inst Fiscal Studies, London WC1E 7AE, England. EM alvaredo@pse.ens.fr; thomas.breda@ens.fr; barra_r@ifs.org.uk; saez@econ.berkeley.edu OI Roantree, Barra/0000-0002-8738-8225 FU European Research CouncilEuropean Research Council (ERC) [ERC-2010-AdG-269440-WSCWTBDS]; ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies [ES/M010147/1]; ESRCEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/K006185/1]; NSFNational Science Foundation (NSF) [SES-0134946]; Foundation Gould; French national agency for research (ANR)French National Research Agency (ANR); Economic and Social Research CouncilEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/M010147/1, ES/K006185/1] Funding Source: researchfish FX We thank Casper van Ewijk, Stuart Adam, Nicole Bosch, Antoine Bozio, David Card, Raj Chetty, Julien Grenet, Peter Haan, Luke Haywood, Michael Neumann and David Phillips, for helpful comments and discussions. The authors gratefully acknowledge funding from the European Research Council (reference ERC-2010-AdG-269440-WSCWTBDS), the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (ES/M010147/1), ESRC Research Grant ES/K006185/1, NSF Grant SES-0134946, the Foundation Gould and the French national agency for research (ANR). CR Adam S, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P181, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9295-6 Bastani S, 2014, J PUBLIC ECON, V109, P36, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.09.010 Bosch N, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P205, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9296-5 Bozio A, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P141, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9297-4 Cheng MY, 1997, ANN STAT, V25, P1691 Chetty R, 2011, Q J ECON, V126, P749, DOI 10.1093/qje/qjr013 Fullerton D., 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4, P1787, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80005-2 Gruber J., 1997, J LABOUR EC, V15, P1997 Hamermesh D., 1993, LABOR DEMAND HAMERMESH DS, 1979, SOUTHERN ECON J, V45, P1208, DOI 10.2307/1056965 HOLMLUND B, 1983, SCAND J ECON, V85, P1, DOI 10.2307/3439907 Kai-Uwe M., 2017, ECONOMIST, DOI [10.1007/s10645-017-9298-3, DOI 10.1007/S10645-017-9298-3] Lang K., 2003, W9537 NAT BUR EC RES Liang X., 2004, TECHNICAL REPORT Liebman JB, 2009, J PUBLIC ECON, V93, P1208, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.07.006 McCrary J, 2008, J ECONOMETRICS, V142, P698, DOI 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 Neubig Thomas S., 1981, P NATL TAX ASS, V1981, P196 POTERBA JM, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P659 Saez E, 2012, Q J ECON, V127, P493, DOI 10.1093/qje/qjr052 Saez E, 2010, AM ECON J-ECON POLIC, V2, P180, DOI 10.1257/pol.2.3.180 NR 20 TC 3 Z9 3 U1 0 U2 11 PU SPRINGER PI DORDRECHT PA VAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS SN 0013-063X EI 1572-9982 J9 ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND JI Economist-Netherlands PD JUN PY 2017 VL 165 IS 2 SI SI BP 129 EP 140 DI 10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7 PG 12 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA ES9OW UT WOS:000399889700001 OA Other Gold, Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Adam, S Roantree, B Phillips, D AF Adam, Stuart Roantree, Barra Phillips, David TI The Incidence of Social Security Contributions in the United Kingdom: Evidence from Discontinuities at Contribution Ceilings SO ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS LA English DT Article DE Public economics; Tax incidence; Social security contributions AB This paper investigates the incidence of National Insurance contributions (NICs) in the UK, exploiting the ceiling that applied to employee and employer contributions between 1975 and 1985 and to employee contributions only between 1986 and 2007. Using data from the New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset, a mandatory survey of British employers' payroll records, we show there was no dip in the earnings density at the ceiling in either period, suggesting that the earnings of those near the ceiling were unresponsive to the change in tax rates. The absence of such a dip allows us to test which of labour cost, gross earnings or net earnings are smooth around the threshold. As shown by Alvaredo et al. (De Econ, 2017. doi:10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7 Address="10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7" TargetType="DOI"), this is informative about the incidence of the change in tax rates at the threshold on those located nearby. We cannot reject the hypothesis that it is gross earnings that are smooth around the threshold, which may reflect a substantive role for statutory incidence in determining economic incidence. However, a lack of statistical power means that, while in some cases we can reject the hypotheses that the full economic incidence of NICs are borne by one side of the market, our results taken alone are also consistent with a wide range of less extreme incidence shares. C1 [Adam, Stuart; Roantree, Barra; Phillips, David] Inst Fiscal Studies, London, England. [Roantree, Barra] UCL, London, England. RP Roantree, B (corresponding author), Inst Fiscal Studies, London, England.; Roantree, B (corresponding author), UCL, London, England. EM barra_r@ifs.org.uk OI Roantree, Barra/0000-0002-8738-8225 FU European Research CouncilEuropean Research Council (ERC) [ERC-2010-AdG-269440-WSCWTBDS]; ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies [ES/M010147/1]; ESRCEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/K006185/1]; Economic and Social Research CouncilEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/M010147/1, ES/K006185/1] Funding Source: researchfish FX The authors are grateful to Casper van Ewijk for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and to colleagues at DIW Berlin, CPB Netherlands and IPP Paris School of Economics, working with us on the broader project on 'The impact of social security contributions on earnings' of which this paper is a part, for many helpful discussions throughout the course of the project. All errors and omissions are the responsibility of the authors. We gratefully acknowledge funding from the European Research Council (reference ERC-2010-AdG-269440-WSCWTBDS), the ESRC Centre for the Microeconomic Analysis of Public Policy based at the Institute for Fiscal Studies (ES/M010147/1) and ESRC Research Grant ES/K006185/1. The New Earnings Survey Panel Dataset is Crown copyright material and reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. Access to this data (SN 6706 http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-6706-6) was provided by the UK Data Service. CR Adam S., 2007, INTEGRATING INCOME T Adam S., 2017, 35 YEARS REFOR UNPUB Alvaredo F, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P129, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7 Cheng MY, 1997, ANN STAT, V25, P1691 Hood A., 2016, SURVEY GB BENEFIT SY Hood A, 2014, SOCIAL SECURITY SYST Kleven HJ, 2013, Q J ECON, V128, P669, DOI 10.1093/qje/qjt004 Kleven HJ, 2016, ANNU REV ECON, V8, P435, DOI 10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015234 McCrary J, 2008, J ECONOMETRICS, V142, P698, DOI 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 Saez E, 2010, AM ECON J-ECON POLIC, V2, P180, DOI 10.1257/pol.2.3.180 SUMMERS LH, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P177 NR 11 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 1 U2 5 PU SPRINGER PI DORDRECHT PA VAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS SN 0013-063X EI 1572-9982 J9 ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND JI Economist-Netherlands PD JUN PY 2017 VL 165 IS 2 SI SI BP 181 EP 203 DI 10.1007/s10645-017-9295-6 PG 23 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA ES9OW UT WOS:000399889700004 OA Other Gold, Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Mikesell, JL Ross, JM AF Mikesell, John L. Ross, Justin M. TI THE LABOR INCIDENCE OF CAPITAL TAXATION: NEW EVIDENCE FROM THE RETAIL SALES TAXATION OF MANUFACTURING MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE sales tax; capital income tax; tax incidence ID BUSINESS LOCATION DECISIONS; CORPORATE-INCOME TAX; GROWING ECONOMY; UNITED-STATES; START-UPS; DETERMINANTS; CONSUMERS; BORDERS AB This paper seeks to produce evidence on the labor incidence of the taxation of machinery and equipment purchases by manufacturers under the state general sales tax. For the identification strategy, we exploit tax policy discontinuities among adjacent counties along state borders. The main results demonstrate that, on average, there are no significant losses or gains to manufacturing labor from adjusting this tax. The main results are robust to specifications of controls and state specific time trends. 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Tax J. PD JUN PY 2017 VL 70 IS 2 BP 257 EP 293 DI 10.17310/ntj.2017.2.02 PG 37 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA EW9PN UT WOS:000402851800002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bozio, A Breda, T Grenet, J AF Bozio, Antoine Breda, Thomas Grenet, Julien TI Incidence and Behavioural Response to Social Security Contributions: An Analysis of Kink Points in France SO ECONOMIST-NETHERLANDS LA English DT Article DE Social security contributions; Payroll tax; Tax incidence AB We study the incidence of social security contributions (SSCs) in France relying on the strategy developed by Alvaredo et al. (De Econ, 2017. doi:10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7 RefTarget Address="10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7" TargetType="DOI"). This strategy infers the incidence of SSCSs from the discontinuities in earnings distributions created by kink points in the SSC schedule. Using administrative data on earnings for the period 1976-2010, we study approximately 200 such kink points and do not find that they systematically induce a discontinuity in the distribution of gross earnings. This allows us to reject the hypothesis that SSCs are incident on workers, at least locally around kinks. Additionally, we exploit the large variations in SSC rates across kinks and years to estimate the local incidence of both employer and employee SSCs around these thresholds. We find that employer SSCs are shifted to employers while employee SSCs are shifted to employees. These findings are consistent with the economic incidence of SSCs being aligned with their statutory incidence, locally around kink points. C1 [Bozio, Antoine; Breda, Thomas; Grenet, Julien] Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. [Bozio, Antoine] EHESS, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. [Breda, Thomas; Grenet, Julien] CNRS, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. RP Bozio, A (corresponding author), Paris Sch Econ, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France.; Bozio, A (corresponding author), EHESS, 48 Blvd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. EM antoine.bozio@ipp.eu; thomas.breda@ens.fr; julien.grenet@psemail.eu OI Bozio, Antoine/0000-0003-0201-6148 FU Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR)French National Research Agency (ANR) [ANR-12-ORAR-0004] FX We thank participants of the Open research area (ORA) consortium from CPB, DIW, IFS and PSE. We acknowledge financial support from Agence nationale de la recherche (ANR) under the Grant Number ANR-12-ORAR-0004 under the ORA call. CR Alvaredo F, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P129, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9294-7 Bosch N, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P205, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9296-5 Bozio A., 2017, WORKING PAPER McCrary J, 2008, J ECONOMETRICS, V142, P698, DOI 10.1016/j.jeconom.2007.05.005 Muller KU, 2017, ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND, V165, P165, DOI 10.1007/s10645-017-9298-3 Neumann M., 2015, 1489 DIW NR 6 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 8 PU SPRINGER PI DORDRECHT PA VAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS SN 0013-063X EI 1572-9982 J9 ECONOMIST-NETHERLAND JI Economist-Netherlands PD JUN PY 2017 VL 165 IS 2 SI SI BP 141 EP 163 DI 10.1007/s10645-017-9297-4 PG 23 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA ES9OW UT WOS:000399889700002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Yilmazkuday, H AF Yilmazkuday, Hakan TI Asymmetric incidence of sales taxes: A short-run investigation of gasoline prices SO JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND BUSINESS LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Gasoline prices; Gas-station level analysis ID COMPETITION; STATE AB This paper investigates the shifting of sales taxes to consumers through retail prices in the short run. Retail data on gasoline prices are used at the station level within the U.S., including observations from all fifty states and the District of Columbia. A difference-in-differences approach is employed to identify the short-run effects of the changes in state taxes as of January 1st, 2015, when five states have increased their gasoline sales taxes, while five other states have decreased theirs. States experiencing such changes in sales taxes (between December 31st, 2014 and January 1st, 2015) are analyzed as the treatment group of a natural policy experiment, where the control group consists of states with no changes in their sales taxes. The results show that both sales-tax increases and decreases are under-shifted to consumer prices, although the under-shifting of sales-tax decreases is much higher (i.e., the asymmetric incidence of sales taxes). The pass-through measures also differ significantly across states, showing the importance of having a nationwide analysis. The results are robust to the consideration of retailer characteristics, wholesale prices, retail brand effects and hourly price changes within each day. (C) 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. C1 [Yilmazkuday, Hakan] Florida Int Univ, Dept Econ, Miami, FL 33199 USA. RP Yilmazkuday, H (corresponding author), Florida Int Univ, Dept Econ, Miami, FL 33199 USA. EM hyilmazk@fiu.edu OI YILMAZKUDAY, HAKAN/0000-0002-8629-6230 CR Abrantes-Metz RM, 2006, INT J IND ORGAN, V24, P467, DOI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.10.003 Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Amiti M, 2014, AM ECON REV, V104, P1942, DOI 10.1257/aer.104.7.1942 Bachmeier LJ, 2003, REV ECON STAT, V85, P772, DOI 10.1162/003465303322369902 BALKE NS, 1998, EC FINANC POLICY R Q, V1, P2 Besley TJ, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P157 Carow K. 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Econ. Bus. PD MAY-JUN PY 2017 VL 91 BP 16 EP 23 DI 10.1016/j.jeconbus.2017.01.001 PG 8 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA FB0HP UT WOS:000405826300002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Capelle-Blancard, G Havrylchyk, O AF Capelle-Blancard, Gunther Havrylchyk, Olena TI Incidence of Bank Levy and Bank Market Power SO REVIEW OF FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Banks; Bank levy; Tax incidence; Market power ID TAXATION; PROFITABILITY; FINANCE AB We study the impact of banks' market power on the incidence of a bank levy that is imposed on balance sheets. Within the framework of an oligopolistic version of the Monti-Klein model, the pass-through of a bank tax levied on loans is stronger when elasticity of credit demand is low. To test this hypothesis, we investigate the incidence of the Hungarian bank tax that was introduced in 2010 on banks' assets. This case is well suited for our analysis because the tax rate is much higher for large banks than for small banks, which allows relying on difference-in-difference methodology. In line with model predictions, our estimations show that the tax is likely to be shifted to customers with the smallest demand elasticity, such as households. This result depends on the common trends assumption that is discussed at length. C1 [Capelle-Blancard, Gunther] Univ Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, Labex ReFi Financial Regulat Lab, Ctr Econ Sorbonne, Paris, France. [Capelle-Blancard, Gunther] Paris Sch Business, Paris, France. [Havrylchyk, Olena] Univ Lille, CEPII, Lille Econ Management, Econ, Lille, France. RP Capelle-Blancard, G (corresponding author), Univ Paris 1 Pantheon Sorbonne, Labex ReFi Financial Regulat Lab, Ctr Econ Sorbonne, Paris, France.; Capelle-Blancard, G (corresponding author), Paris Sch Business, Paris, France. 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Financ. PD MAY PY 2017 VL 21 IS 3 BP 1023 EP 1046 DI 10.1093/rof/rfw069 PG 24 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA EY6ZD UT WOS:000404132900003 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Fullerton, D Ta, CL AF Fullerton, Don Ta, Chi L. TI PUBLIC FINANCE IN A NUTSHELL: A COBB DOUGLAS TEACHING TOOL FOR GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM TAX INCIDENCE AND EXCESS BURDEN SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE computable general equilibrium; economic efficiency; distribution of burdens; sources side; uses side; equivalent variation AB To help first- or second-year graduate students in economics apply their theoretical training, this paper shows how to solve a simple and intuitive computable general equilibrium (CGE) model using a calculator Because this simplified Harberger model uses Cobb Douglas functional forms for utility and production, one can solve for all input and ottqm prices and quantities with no taxes and then solve for exact measures of output with a large tax change (not using derivatives). We then show how to solve simultaneously for capital and labor prices (incidence on the sources side ofincome), for both output prices (incidence on the uses side), for exact measures of overall welfare loss such as the equivalent variation, for excess burden and marginal excess burden, and for the effects on revenue in the form of a Laffer Curve. C1 [Fullerton, Don] Univ Illinois, Dept Finance, Urbana, IL 61801 USA. [Fullerton, Don] Univ Illinois, IGPA, Urbana, IL 61801 USA. [Ta, Chi L.] Univ Illinois, Dept Agr & Consumer Econ, Urbana, IL USA. RP Fullerton, D (corresponding author), Univ Illinois, Dept Finance, Urbana, IL 61801 USA.; Fullerton, D (corresponding author), Univ Illinois, IGPA, Urbana, IL 61801 USA. 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Tax J. PD MAR PY 2017 VL 70 IS 1 BP 155 EP 170 DI 10.17310/ntj.2017.1.06 PG 16 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA EL6JE UT WOS:000394727200007 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lloyd, T AF Lloyd, Tim TI Forty Years of Price Transmission Research in the Food Industry: Insights, Challenges and Prospects SO JOURNAL OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Food industry; food inflation; market power; price transmission ID PASS-THROUGH; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; MARKET POWER; COMMODITY PRICES; TAX INCIDENCE; NONLINEARITIES; OUTPUT; ADJUSTMENT; DEMAND; SECTOR AB Price transmission refers to a process via which information is transmitted between participants in a market. Focusing on vertical markets such as the food chain, this Address considers developments in theory, methods and data that help economists understand how information is conveyed between food consumers and agricultural producers. Central to this understanding is the increasingly important role played by the food industry (retailing, manufacturing and processing) in price transmission. Not only is the food industry a major source of the price changes that producers and consumers face but it also mediates price signals originating in other parts of the food chain in increasingly nuanced ways, as revealed by highly detailed retail (scanner') data that is becoming progressively available to researchers. While the speed, magnitude and asymmetry of price transmission are valuable descriptors of price adjustment in vertical markets, we should be wary of inferring too much about the competitive setting on the basis of prices alone. Theory-consistent empirical models are a step in the right direction and represent a useful complement to the approaches developed in the New Empirical Industrial Organisation literature which address the issue of market power directly. 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PD FEB PY 2017 VL 68 IS 1 BP 3 EP 21 DI 10.1111/1477-9552.12205 PG 19 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA EK3GQ UT WOS:000393814900001 OA Green Accepted DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Rodriguez, JA Mahecha, JA AF Rodriguez, Jorge Armando Avila Mahecha, Javier TI The tax burden on labor and capital income in Colombia: The case of the income tax and the VAT SO CUADERNOS DE ECONOMIA LA Spanish DT Article DE National taxation; factor income; income tax; VAT; tax incidence; effective tax rates; national accounts AB This paper estimates the national tax burden on workers and owners of capital in Colombia during the period 2000-2014 by using an effective tax rates approach. For the aggregate of the income tax and the value added tax (VAT), the results indicate that, for most of the period, labor income had a higher effective rate than capital income, although the gap has tended to close. C1 [Rodriguez, Jorge Armando] Univ Nacl Colombia, Fac Ciencias Econ, Bogota, Colombia. [Avila Mahecha, Javier] DIAN, Bogota, Colombia. RP Rodriguez, JA (corresponding author), Univ Nacl Colombia, Fac Ciencias Econ, Bogota, Colombia. EM jarodri-gueza@unal.edu.co; javilam@dian.gov.co CR Atkinson AB, 2009, OXFORD REV ECON POL, V25, P3, DOI 10.1093/oxrep/grp007 Avila J., 2011, CUADERNOS TRABAJO DI BARTHOLD TA, 1993, NATL TAX J, V46, P291 CAREY D, 2002, OECD EC STUDIES, V35, P129 COFFEE JC, 1981, MICH LAW REV, V79, P386, DOI 10.2307/1288201 Comision de Expertos Tributarios, 2015, INF FIN PRES MIN HAC Cronin J. 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A CAMA approach to modelling residential energy in housing in Northern Ireland SO JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN REAL ESTATE RESEARCH LA English DT Article DE Housing policy; Mass appraisal; Energy efficiency; Energy performance; CAMA; Property taxation ID MARKET CAPITALIZATION; REAL-ESTATE; BUILDINGS; PROPERTY; GREEN; PRICES; CHOICE AB Purpose - Buildings contribute significantly to CO2 production. They are also subject to considerable taxation based on value. Analysis shows that while similar attributes contribute to both value and CO2 production, there is only a loose relationship between the two. If we wish to use taxation to affect policy change ( drive energy efficiency behaviour), we are unlikely to achieve this using only the current tax base (value), or by increasing the tax take off this current tax base (unlike extra taxation of cigarettes to discourage smoking, for example). Taxation of buildings on the basis of energy efficiency is hampered by the lack of current evidence of performance. This paper aims to model the now-obligatory (at sale or letting) energy performance certificate (EPC) data to derive an acceptable appraisal model (marked to market, being the EPC scores) and deploys this to the entire population of properties. This provides an alternative tax base with which to model the effects of a tax base switch to energy efficiency and to understand the tax incidence effects of such a policy. Design/methodology/approach - The research uses a multiplicative hedonic approach to model energy efficiency utilising EPC holding properties in a UK jurisdiction [Northern Ireland (NI)] as the sample. This model is then used to estimate discrete energy assessments for each property in the wider population, using attributes held in the domestic rating (property tax) database for NI (700,000+ properties). This produces a robust estimate of the EPC for every property in its current condition and its cost-effective improved condition. This energy assessment based tax base is further used to estimate a new millage rate and property tax bill (green property tax) which is compared against the existing property tax based on value to allow tax incidence changes to be analysed. Findings - The findings show that such a policy would significantly redistribute the tax burden and would have a variety of expected and some unexpected effects. The results indicate that while assessing the energy performance of houses can be a complex process involving many parameters, much of the explanatory power can be achieved via a relatively small number of input variables, often already held by property tax jurisdictions. This offers the opportunity for useful housing stock modelling - such as the savings possible from power switching. The research also identifies that whilst urban areas display the expected "heat island" effect in terms of energy consumption, urban properties are on average more efficient than suburban/rural properties. This facilitates spatial targeting of policy messages and initiatives. Research limitations/implications - Analogous with other studies, data deficiencies introduce the risk of omitted variable bias. Modelling of the energy efficiency in the sample is limited to property attributes that are available for the wider population of properties. While this limits the modelling exercise, it is a perennial issue facing mass appraisal worldwide (where knowledge of the transacted sample attributes generally exceeds knowledge of the unsold properties). That said, the research demonstrates the benefits of sharing data and improving knowledge of the housing stock, as taxation databases would be stronger, augmented with EPC-derived property attributes for example. Originality/value - The EPC lead in time for wide residential coverage is likely to be considerable. The paper contributes to emerging literature and policy debate surrounding the effect, performance measurement and implementation of energy efficiency certification, through a greater understanding of the sectorial and geographical dispersion of energy efficiency. It provides high level research to help guide policy and decision-making, identifying key locales where there is more of a physical problem and locations where there is more to gain in terms of targeting energy improvement and/or encouraging behavioural change. The paper also allows a glimpse of the implications of a change towards a taxation regime based on energy efficiency, which contributes to the debate surrounding the "greening" of property based taxes. C1 [Davis, Peadar; Haran, Martin] Ulster Univ, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. [McCord, Michael J.] Ulster Univ, Sch Built Environm, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. [McCord, John] Ulster Univ, Sch Law, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. [McCluskey, William] Univ Pretoria, Pretoria, South Africa. RP Davis, P (corresponding author), Ulster Univ, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. 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PY 2017 VL 10 IS 2 BP 124 EP 148 DI 10.1108/JERER-06-2016-0023 PG 25 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA FD3OU UT WOS:000407443100003 OA Green Accepted DA 2021-01-05 ER PT S AU Hamplova, E Jedlicka, P Kovarnik, J AF Hamplova, Eva Jedlicka, Pavel Kovarnik, Jaroslav BE Bilgin, MH Danis, H Demir, E Can, U TI The Price Elasticity of the Demand on Selected Types of Commodities and Its Influence on the Value Added Tax Collection SO COUNTRY EXPERIENCES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, MANAGEMENT AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP SE Eurasian Studies in Business and Economics LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 17th Conference of the Eurasia-Business-and-Economics-Society (EBES) CY OCT 15-17, 2015 CL Venice, ITALY SP Eurasia Business & Econ Soc, Istanbul Econ Res Assoc DE Direct tax; Indirect tax; Tax system; Value added tax AB Taxes are on one side the burden of both companies and individuals, so called tax payers, while on the other hand are also important source for every public budget. This article is focused on analysis of price elasticity of selected commodities, or more precisely, on the analysis where the opinions of the respondents of the questionnaire on the price changes of selected commodities are to find. Analyzed issue is part of broader context which is solved within the project of specific research of team from Department of Economics, University of Hradec Kralove. The aim of this project is to identify the key factors of tax incidence and their scope according the different groups of inhabitants. The main aim of this particular article is to verify the basic hypothesis that the decrease of VAT rates will eventually lead into the increase of VAT collection, and vice versa. However, the results of obtained questionnaires show that this hypothesis has to be denied. More information can be found within the text of this article. C1 [Hamplova, Eva; Jedlicka, Pavel; Kovarnik, Jaroslav] Univ Hradec Kralove, Dept Econ, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. RP Kovarnik, J (corresponding author), Univ Hradec Kralove, Dept Econ, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. EM eva.hamplova@uhk.cz; pavel.jedlicka@uhk.cz; jaroslav.kovarnik@uhk.cz RI Hamplova, Eva/N-8218-2017 OI Hamplova, Eva/0000-0002-4314-873X FU Czech Republic Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport [2104/2014] FX This paper is written with financial support from specific university research funds of the Czech Republic Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport allocated to the University of Hradec Kralove, Faculty of Informatics and Management, project no. 2104/2014. 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Vann, 1971, ORIGINS NEW S 1877 1 Yin George K, 1996, TAXING AM, P297 NR 351 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU ROUTLEDGE PI ABINGDON PA 2 PARK SQ, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXFORD, ENGLAND BN 978-1-315-86980-3; 978-0-415-71764-9 J9 ROUTL ADV SOCIOL PY 2017 VL 180 BP 1 EP 198 PG 198 WC Sociology SC Sociology GA BH2HR UT WOS:000398949100013 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Caron, J Metcalf, GE Reilly, J AF Caron, Justin Metcalf, Gilbert E. Reilly, John TI The CO2 Content of Consumption Across US Regions: A Multi-Regional Input-Output (MRIO) Approach SO ENERGY JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE CO2 emissions; Emissions accounting; CO2 content of consumption; Carbon tax incidence; Indirect emissions; Embodied emissions; United States AB Using a multi-regional input-output (MRIO) framework, we estimate the direct and indirect carbon dioxide (CO2) content of consumption across regions of the United States. We improve on existing estimates by accounting for emissions attributable to domestically and internationally imported goods using data describing bilateral trade between U.S. states and with international countries and regions. This paper presents two major findings. First, attributing emissions to states on a consumption basis leads to very different state-level emissions responsibilities than when attributed on a production basis; for example, California's emissions are over 25 percent higher. Second, heterogeneity of emissions across trading partners significantly affects the indirect emissions intensity of consumption (kg of carbon per $ of consumption), so regional differences in intensity across the U.S. go well beyond direct energy consumption. These findings have implications for evaluating the distributional impacts of national climate policies and for understanding differing incentives to implement state-level policies. C1 [Caron, Justin; Metcalf, Gilbert E.; Reilly, John] MIT, Joint Program Sci & Policy Global Change, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA. [Caron, Justin] HEC Montreal, Montreal, PQ, Canada. [Metcalf, Gilbert E.] Tufts Univ, Dept Econ, Medford, MA USA. [Metcalf, Gilbert E.] Natl Bur Econ Res, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Caron, J (corresponding author), 3000 Chemin Cote St Catherine, Montreal, PQ H3T 2A7, Canada. EM justin.caron@hec.ca FU U.S. Department of Energy, Office of ScienceUnited States Department of Energy (DOE) [DE-FG02-94ER61937]; U.S. Environmental Protection AgencyUnited States Environmental Protection Agency [XA-83600001-1]; Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change FX We gratefully acknowledge the financial support for this work from the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Science under DE-FG02-94ER61937, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under XA-83600001-1 and other government, industry, and foundation sponsors of the Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change. For a complete list of sponsors, please visit http://globalchange.mit.edu/sponsors/all. CR Caron J., 2013, TECHNICAL NOTES MIT Davis SJ, 2010, P NATL ACAD SCI USA, V107, P5687, DOI 10.1073/pnas.0906974107 Dinan T, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P199, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.2.01 Hassett KA, 2009, ENERG J, V30, P155 ISO, 2006, ENV MAN LIF CYCL ASS, P2006 Jones CM, 2011, ENVIRON SCI TECHNOL, V45, P4088, DOI 10.1021/es102221h Liamsanguan C., 2009, J ENV MANAGMENT, V87, P132 Mathur Aparna, 2012, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFEC Metcalf GE, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P655 Narayanan G. 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PD JAN PY 2017 VL 38 IS 1 BP 1 EP 22 DI 10.5547/01956574.38.1.jcar PG 22 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA EF8XK UT WOS:000390615100001 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Dutkowsky, DH Sullivan, RS AF Dutkowsky, Donald H. Sullivan, Ryan S. TI Excise taxes, over-shifting, cross-elasticity, and tax revenue SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; excise tax; over-shifting; tax revenue; cross-elasticity; H22; H32; H71 ID PRICES AB This article examines cross-elasticity effects in excise taxation for markets characterized by monopolistic competition and over-shifting. Extending the constant elasticity demand model to consider cross-elasticity leads to notably different results regarding tax revenue maximization. With nonzero but weak cross-elasticity effects relative to the price elasticity, we derive a higher optimal tax-price ratio compared to prior research. With strong cross-elasticity, revenue can continually be increased by raising the excise tax. Overall, the study offers government greater incentive to use excise taxes to obtain revenue. C1 [Dutkowsky, Donald H.] Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA. [Sullivan, Ryan S.] Naval Postgrad Sch, Def Resources Management Inst, Monterey, CA USA. RP Sullivan, RS (corresponding author), Naval Postgrad Sch, Dept Econ, 231 Halligan Hall, Monterey, CA 93943 USA. EM rssulliv@nps.edu CR Dutkowsky DH, 2014, PUBLIC BUDG FINANC, V34, P111, DOI 10.1111/pbaf.12044 Fullerton D., 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4, P1787, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80005-2 Kenkel DS, 2005, AM ECON REV, V95, P273, DOI 10.1257/000282805774670284 Young DJ, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P57, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.1.04 NR 4 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 12 PU ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD PI ABINGDON PA 2-4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND SN 1350-4851 EI 1466-4291 J9 APPL ECON LETT JI Appl. Econ. Lett. PY 2017 VL 24 IS 2 BP 113 EP 116 DI 10.1080/13504851.2016.1167821 PG 4 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA EB3US UT WOS:000387294700010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kaul, A Pfeifer, G Witte, S AF Kaul, Ashok Pfeifer, Gregor Witte, Stefan TI The incidence of Cash for Clunkers: Evidence from the 2009 car scrappage scheme in Germany SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Cash for Clunkers; Scrappage scheme; Incidence; Subsidy; Pricing ID TAX INCIDENCE; OLIGOPOLY; BEHAVIOR; TAXATION; PROGRAM; MARKET; SALES AB This paper investigates the German car scrappage program, focusing on the incidence of the premium. We ask how much of the a,not sign2500 ($3500) buyer subsidy is actually captured by the demand side. More precisely, we analyze the program's impact on different car segments, allowing for heterogeneity in incidence at different points in the vehicle price distribution. Using a unique microtransaction data set, we find that the incidence of the subsidy strongly and significantly varies across price segments. Subsidized buyers of cheap cars paid a little more than comparable buyers who did not receive the subsidy, indicating incidence amounts slightly below 100 %. For more expensive vehicles, subsidized buyers were granted large extra discounts on top of the government premium, translating into incidence amounts considerably greater than 100 %. Taken together, this results in an aggregate incidence amount of up to plus a,not sign350 million, suggesting that the positive effect for expensive cars overcompensates the negative effect for small cars. C1 [Kaul, Ashok] Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, Wilfriedstr 6, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland. [Kaul, Ashok] Univ Saarland, Dept Econ, Campus Bldg C3-1, D-66123 Saarbrucken, Germany. [Pfeifer, Gregor] Univ Hohenheim, Dept Econ, 520B, D-70593 Stuttgart, Germany. [Kaul, Ashok; Witte, Stefan] Colosseo, IPE Inst Policy Evaluat, Walther von Cronberg Pl 6, D-60594 Frankfurt, Germany. RP Kaul, A (corresponding author), Univ Zurich, Dept Econ, Wilfriedstr 6, CH-8032 Zurich, Switzerland.; Kaul, A (corresponding author), Univ Saarland, Dept Econ, Campus Bldg C3-1, D-66123 Saarbrucken, Germany.; Kaul, A (corresponding author), Colosseo, IPE Inst Policy Evaluat, Walther von Cronberg Pl 6, D-60594 Frankfurt, Germany. 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Tax Public Financ. PD DEC PY 2016 VL 23 IS 6 BP 1093 EP 1125 DI 10.1007/s10797-016-9396-1 PG 33 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA EB4QS UT WOS:000387358500005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Laffer, AB AF Laffer, Arthur B. TI Handbook of Tobacco Taxation: Theory and Practice (Economic Theory of Taxation) SO EKONOMICHESKAYA POLITIKA LA Russian DT Article DE taxation; excise duties; tobacco products; the elasticity of demand ID NICOTINE; TAR; ADDICTION; SMOKERS; PRICES; TAXES AB Excise taxes are consumption taxes applied to a specific good, such as alcohol, gasoline, or tobacco, for example. Such taxes may be a mechanism to generate revenues for the overall government budget, be intended to curb consumption (e.g., "sin" taxes on alcohol and tobacco), act as an "earmarked tax" to fund a public good (e.g., gasoline taxes often fund road maintenance and repair), or correct for a negative externality of consumption (e.g., fat taxes on fatty foods) - or any combination of the four. Adam Smith laid the groundwork for taxing consumable goods, with an excise tax on such goods seen as the most market-neutral tax - guaranteeing government revenue without increasing the natural wage rate of laborers. The premise of this assertion is that if goods like tobacco, rum, or sugar become too expensive, then consumers can simply cut them out of their budget, as they are not necessities. Over the subsequent centuries, a number of economists have expanded upon Smith's theories. The additional research, along with years of practical experience, has cemented tobacco as one of the most frequent targets of tax increases, on both public health and public finance grounds. While the levying of excise taxes is theoretically substantiated for generating government tax revenues with minimum market distortions, as well as correcting for externalities, there are numerous theoretical and practical issues to consider when introducing or increasing excise taxes. Given recent discussions on international tobacco taxation, it remains of interest to find a way to objectively compare tax levels across countries. Broadly three approaches exist: comparing tax incidence, expressing taxes as a percentage of the retail consumer price; comparing monetary tax levels, in a common currency per pack of cigarettes; or comparing tax levels taking into account domestic income levels. Our study shows that this last approach, which takes into account the domestic affordability of tobacco products, is the most sensible for public policy benchmarking purposes. In general, governments levy excise taxes on tobacco to achieve fiscal and public health objectives. In order to evaluate both objectives, it is first necessary to review the elasticity of tobacco demand. From there, fiscal revenue and public health goals are discussed in context of the Laffer Curve (fiscal) and the Bhagwati Theorems (public health). Other theoretical concerns, such as affordability, regressivity, illicit trade, and the excise tax structure are also considered in this book. Of course, no analysis would be complete without an overview of the practical aspects of excise taxation - each of these topics are highlighted below. C1 [Laffer, Arthur B.] Pacific Res Inst, Laffer Ctr, 101 Montgomery Str,Suite 1300, San Francisco, CA 94104 USA. RP Laffer, AB (corresponding author), Pacific Res Inst, Laffer Ctr, 101 Montgomery Str,Suite 1300, San Francisco, CA 94104 USA. 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PD OCT PY 2016 VL 11 IS 5 BP 50 EP 67 DI 10.18288/1994-5124-2016-5-03 PG 18 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA EF3VN UT WOS:000390253100003 OA Bronze DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Cao, J Hu, WH AF Cao, Jing Hu, Wenhao TI A microsimulation of property tax policy in China SO JOURNAL OF HOUSING ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT 4th International Workshop on Regional, Urban, and Spatial Economics in China CY JUN, 2015 CL Tsinghua Univ, Beijing, PEOPLES R CHINA SP Tsinghua Univ, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Journal Housing Econ HO Tsinghua Univ DE Property tax reform; Distributional effects; Incidence; Welfare analysis; China ID CAPITALIZATION; TAXATION; TIEBOUT; REFORM AB China is exploring possible property tax reform to stabilize the booming housing market as well as providing sustainable revenue for the local government. In this paper we develop a theoretical model of property tax reform to decompose potential impacts of property tax reform in China. Then we used the China Family Panel Survey (CFPS) data to conduct a microsimulation model to examine potential impacts and incidences of alternative property tax designs in China. Our analyses suggest that a uniform property tax policy would bring substantially heterogeneous impacts across different income groups as well as different regions, mainly due to the differences in income distribution, housing prices and the degree of the Housing Demolition program. In terms of property tax incidence, our simulation suggests that utilizing tax revenue on the poor's public housing subsidy may mitigate the regressivity; in some case may even increase the overall social welfare. Finally, we use the cross-sectional information in the Chinese Family Panel Survey (CFPS) data to simulate for optimal tax scenarios for each region. Our microsimulation results provide some initial quantitative analysis in the literature and may shed some light on understanding the impacts of future property tax reform in China. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. C1 [Cao, Jing; Hu, Wenhao] Tsinghua Univ, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China. RP Cao, J (corresponding author), Tsinghua Univ, Hang Lung Ctr Real Estate, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China. EM caojing@sem.tsinghua.edu.cn OI HU, Wenhao/0000-0001-5141-9731 FU National Science Foundation of ChinaNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [71422013, 71173130]; Hang lung Center for Real Estate; Tsinghua University Research Center for Green Economy and Sustainable Development; Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program FX This project is supported by National Science Foundation of China (Project codes: 71422013 and 71173130), Hang lung Center for Real Estate, Tsinghua University Research Center for Green Economy and Sustainable Development, and Tsinghua University Initiative Scientific Research Program. 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Hous. Econ. PD SEP PY 2016 VL 33 SI SI BP 128 EP 142 DI 10.1016/j.jhe.2016.05.004 PG 15 WC Economics; Urban Studies SC Business & Economics; Urban Studies GA DX9IT UT WOS:000384707500011 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Berardi, N Sevestre, P Tepaut, M Vigneron, A AF Berardi, Nicoletta Sevestre, Patrick Tepaut, Marine Vigneron, Alexandre TI The impact of a 'soda tax' on prices: evidence from French micro data SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Soda tax; pass-through; tax incidence; excise tax; E31; D40 ID CIGARETTE TAXES; SOFT; CONSUMPTION AB Based on an original data set of more than 500,000 non-alcoholic beverage price records, we evaluate the impact on consumer prices of the soda tax', an excise on drinks with added sugar or sweetener, introduced in France in January 2012. We adopt a difference in differences approach and find that the tax was gradually passed through to the prices of the taxed beverages. 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TI Gasoline and Diesel Tax Incidence: The 2003 Washington State Nickel Funding Package SO B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; petroleum industry; difference in difference ID MARKET AB This paper considers a previously unexamined increase in excise taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel that were part of Washington State's Nickel Funding Package of 2003. We fail to reject full pass-through of the amount of the tax increase to retail prices in both products. We find no significant sensitivity of retail pass-through to station locations relative to state borders or to retail competitive conditions as measured by local station density. The expansion of hypermarkets in Washington State during the period was a confounding factor in estimating tax pass-through effects. C1 [Silvia, Louis; Taylor, Christopher T.] Fed Trade Commiss, Bur Econ, 600 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20580 USA. RP Taylor, CT (corresponding author), Fed Trade Commiss, Bur Econ, 600 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20580 USA. 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Econ. Anal. Policy PD JUL PY 2016 VL 16 IS 3 BP 1539 EP 1562 DI 10.1515/bejeap-2015-0070 PG 24 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA EB1PB UT WOS:000387124500011 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Garrett, TA AF Garrett, Thomas A. TI THE (AGGREGATE) DEMAND FOR STATE-LOTTERY TICKETS: WHAT HAVE WE REALLY LEARNED? SO CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC POLICY LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; ELASTICITY; GAMES; UK AB Lottery-demand models using aggregate data are often used to make inferences regarding individual behavior, the most important being the distributional burden of lottery-ticket expenditures. It is shown here that estimates for the income elasticity and the cross-price elasticity will only be representative of individual behavior under extremely restrictive assumptions. In fact, estimation of aggregate-demand models presupposes that the income elasticity is equal to one. Cross-sectional analyses using microlevel data face similar restrictions on consumer behavior. 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Policy PD JUL PY 2016 VL 34 IS 3 BP 475 EP 482 DI 10.1111/coep.12155 PG 8 WC Economics; Public Administration SC Business & Economics; Public Administration GA DW0YC UT WOS:000383368200010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Jinkins, D AF Jinkins, David TI Conspicuous consumption in the United States and China SO JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION LA English DT Article DE Conspicuous consumption; Demand system estimation; Tax incidence AB How do differences in the motive for conspicuous consumption in the United States and China affect the incidence of taxes in those countries? In this paper I develop a model of conspicuous consumption in which a consumer cares not only about the direct utility she receives from consumption, but also about the way her consumption pattern affects her peer group's belief about her well-being. Estimating the model on American and Chinese data, I find that a Chinese consumer cares 20% more than an American consumer about peer beliefs. I use the estimated model in several experiments related to tax incidence. I find that the 1990-2002 American luxury tax on automobiles led to widespread but small welfare gains, and that the stronger Chinese motive for conspicuous consumption leads to fewer households harmed and larger median welfare gains from a 10% tobacco excise tax. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Jinkins, David] Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Econ, Copenhagen, Denmark. RP Jinkins, D (corresponding author), Copenhagen Business Sch, Dept Econ, Copenhagen, Denmark. EM david.jinkins@gmail.com FU National Science Foundation EAPSI programNational Science Foundation (NSF) FX I wish to acknowledge the National Science Foundation EAPSI program for generous support of this project. Several anonymous referees made suggestions which greatly improved the quality of the paper. I would also like to thank Jonathan Eaton, Ed Green, Jim Tybout, Venky Venkateswaran, Yaohui Zhao, and the participants in the Penn State I/O and Trade reading groups for their comments. Remaining errors are my own. 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Econ. Behav. Organ. PD JUL PY 2016 VL 127 BP 115 EP 132 DI 10.1016/j.jebo.2016.03.018 PG 18 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DQ1HN UT WOS:000378952200009 OA Bronze DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU van der Ploeg, F AF van der Ploeg, Frederick TI Second-best carbon taxation in the global economy: The Green Paradox and carbon leakage revisited SO JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND MANAGEMENT LA English DT Article DE Unilateral carbon taxes; Intertemporal terms of trade; Tax incidence; Green Paradox; Asset tax; Carbon leakage; Second best; Global altruism; Unburnt fossil fuel ID TRADE; COST; EMISSIONS; PRICE AB Acceleration of global warming resulting from a future carbon tax is large if the price elasticities of oil demand are large and that of oil supply is small. The fall in the world interest rate weakens this weak Green Paradox effect, especially if intertemporal substitution is weak. Still, social damages from greenhouse gases drop if the fall in oil supply and cumulative emissions is strong enough. If the current carbon tax is set too low, the second-best future carbon tax is set below the first best too to mitigate adverse Green Paradox effects. Unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes exceed the first-best taxes due to an import tariff component. The intertemporal terms of trade effects of the future carbon tax increase current and future tariffs and those of the current tax lower the current tariff. Finally, carbon leakage and globally altruistic and unilateral second-best optimal carbon taxes if non-Kyoto oil importers price carbon too low are analysed in a three-country model of the global economy. (C) 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. C1 [van der Ploeg, Frederick] Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Manor Rd Bldg, Oxford OX1 3UQ, England. [van der Ploeg, Frederick] St Petersburg State Univ, Lab Econ Performance & Environm, St Petersburg 199034, Russia. [van der Ploeg, Frederick] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands. RP van der Ploeg, F (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Dept Econ, Manor Rd Bldg, Oxford OX1 3UQ, England. EM rick.vanderploeg@economics.ox.ac.uk FU BP; European Research CouncilEuropean Research Council (ERC) [269788] FX Support from the BP funded OxCARRE and from the European Research Council (FP7-IDEAS-ERC Grant no. 269788) are gratefully acknowledged. I thank Niko Jaakkola, Gerard van der Meijden, Till Requate and two anonymous referees for their detailed and very helpful comments on earlier versions and thank Peter Neary, Rudiger Pethig, Armon Rezai, Partha Sen, Tony Venables, Sweder van Wijnbergen and Cees Withagen for helpful discussions on general equilibrium effects of carbon taxes. 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TI Household heterogeneity, aggregation, and the distributional impacts of environmental taxes SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Environmental tax incidence; Heterogeneous households; General equilibrium; Aggregation bias; Distributional impacts ID CARBON TAX; LIFETIME; PAYS AB This paper examines how the general equilibrium incidence of an environmental tax depends on the effect of different incomes and preferences of heterogeneous households on aggregate outcomes. We develop a Harberger-type model with general forms of preferences and substitution between capital, labor, and pollution in production that captures the impact of household heterogeneity and interactions with production characteristics on the general equilibrium. We theoretically show that failing to incorporate household heterogeneity can qualitatively affect incidence. 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Public Econ. PD JUN PY 2016 VL 138 BP 43 EP 57 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.04.004 PG 15 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DQ9WY UT WOS:000379561200004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU England, RW AF England, Richard W. TI TAX INCIDENCE AND RENTAL HOUSING: A SURVEY AND CRITIQUE OF RESEARCH SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; property taxation; rental housing ID DIFFERENTIAL PROPERTY TAXES; NATURAL VACANCY RATE; TENURE CHOICE; URBAN LAND; PURE RENT; MODEL; TAXATION; MARKETS; VIEW AB A longstanding question in economic research has been the incidence of taxes on land and on developed parcels of real estate. In the case of agricultural land, is it the landlord or the tenant farmer who ultimately pays a land tax? In the case of urban rental housing, is it the apartment owner or the renter who pays the property tax? This paper surveys the modern economic literature that has addressed these questions. 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PD JUN PY 2016 VL 69 IS 2 BP 435 EP 460 DI 10.17310/ntj.2016.2.07 PG 26 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA DN1PD UT WOS:000376837000008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Nikodinoska, D Schroder, C AF Nikodinoska, Dragana Schroeder, Carsten TI On the emissions-inequality and emissions-welfare trade-offs in energy taxation: Evidence on the German car fuels tax SO RESOURCE AND ENERGY ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Energy taxes; Environmental taxes; Energy demand; Emissions; Tax incidence; Redistribution; Inequality ID DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS; DEMAND SYSTEM; CONSUMER; CONSUMPTION; PRICES; IMPACT; COSTS AB By-using estimates from a Demographically-Scaled Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (DQUAIDS), we investigate how the German car fuels tax changes the private households' CO2 emissions, living standards, and post-tax income distribution. 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Energy Econ. PD MAY PY 2016 VL 44 BP 206 EP 233 DI 10.1016/j.reseneeco.2016.03.001 PG 28 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA DL7GH UT WOS:000375808500011 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Conesa, JC Garriga, C AF Conesa, Juan Carlos Garriga, Carlos TI Intergenerational policy and the measurement of tax incidence SO EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Generational accounts; Optimal reforms; Overlapping generations ID SOCIAL-SECURITY; UNITED-STATES AB We evaluate the ability of generational accounting to assess the potential welfare implications of policy reforms. In an intergenerational context policy reforms usually have redistributive, efficiency, and general equilibrium implications. Our analysis shows that when the policy reform implies changes in economic efficiency, generational accounts can be misleading not only about the magnitude of welfare changes, but also about the identity of who wins and who losses. In contrast, the generational accounts correctly identify welfare changes when the policy reform has only a pure intergenerational redistribution component. We illustrate and quantify this issue in the context of widely considered policy reforms (substitution of consumption for labor taxation, and the increase of retirement age) and in a more general context of optimal policy. Published by Elsevier B.V. C1 [Conesa, Juan Carlos] SUNY Stony Brook, Stony Brook, NY USA. [Garriga, Carlos] Fed Reserve Bank St Louis, POB 442, St Louis, MO 63166 USA. RP Garriga, C (corresponding author), Fed Reserve Bank St Louis, POB 442, St Louis, MO 63166 USA. 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Econ. Rev. PD APR PY 2016 VL 83 BP 1 EP 18 DI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.10.009 PG 18 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DI5OD UT WOS:000373547600001 OA Green Accepted DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lawson, RA Stephenson, EF AF Lawson, Robert A. Stephenson, E. Frank TI Why Statutory Incidence Matters SO JOURNAL OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE LA English DT Article DE statutory incidence; economic incidence; gross receipts tax; Affordable Care Act AB Economists teach that tax incidence is invariant to statutory incidence. We offer two examples in which statutory incidence affected tax policy and argue that statutory incidence matters because politicians enact statutes and courts interpret them. C1 [Lawson, Robert A.] Southern Methodist Univ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA. [Stephenson, E. Frank] Berry Coll, Mt Berry, GA USA. RP Lawson, RA (corresponding author), Southern Methodist Univ, Dallas, TX 75275 USA. CR Malm Liz, 2014, TAX POLICY BLOG 1028 Ohio Department of Taxation, 2008, 2008 BUS TAX GUID Rosen H., 2014, PUBLIC FINANCE, V10th Slemrod J, 2008, NATL TAX J, V61, P251, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2008.2.05 Smith Adam, 1776, INQUIRY NATURE CAUSE Sobel RS, 1996, NATL TAX J, V49, P535 Tapper Jake, 2014, CNN 1114 NR 7 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU ASSOC PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EDUCATION PI CHATTANOOGA PA 313 FLETCHER HALL, DEPT 6106, 615 MCCALLIE AVE, CHATTANOOGA, TN 37403 USA SN 0890-913X J9 J PRIV ENTERP JI J. Priv. Enterp. PD SPR PY 2016 VL 31 IS 1 BP 37 EP 43 PG 7 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DX2XD UT WOS:000384235700003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Cullenward, D Wilkerson, JT Wara, M Weyant, JP AF Cullenward, Danny Wilkerson, Jordan T. Wara, Michael Weyant, John P. TI Dynamically estimating the distributional impacts of US climate policy with NEMS: A case study of the Climate Protection Act of 2013 SO ENERGY ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Climate policy; NEMS; Fee and dividend; Carbon tax incidence ID CARBON TAX AB We present a new method that enables users of the federal government's flagship energy policy model (NEMS) to dynamically estimate the direct energy expenditure impacts of climate policy across U.S. household incomes and census regions. Our approach combines NEMS output with detailed household expenditure data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, improving on static methods that assess policy impacts by assuming household energy demand remains unchanged under emissions pricing scenarios. To illustrate our method, we evaluate a recent carbon fee-and-dividend proposal introduced in the U.S. Senate, the Climate Protection Act of 2013 (S. 332). Our analysis indicates this bill, if enacted, would have cut CO2 emissions from energy by 17% below 2005 levels by 2020 at a gross cost of less than 0.5% of GDP, while offering rebates sufficient to offset increased direct energy expenditures for typical households making less than $120,000 per year and average households in all regions of the United States. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Cullenward, Danny; Wilkerson, Jordan T.; Wara, Michael; Weyant, John P.] Stanford Univ, Stanford Energy Policy Lab, Stanford, CA 94305 USA. [Cullenward, Danny; Wara, Michael] Stanford Law Sch, Stanford, CA USA. [Wilkerson, Jordan T.; Weyant, John P.] Stanford Univ, Dept Management Sci & Engn, Stanford, CA 94305 USA. RP Cullenward, D (corresponding author), 452 Sutardja Dai Hall, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. EM dcullenward@berkeley.edu OI Cullenward, Danny/0000-0002-6803-9572; Wilkerson, Jordan/0000-0003-1447-9465 FU Stanford UniversityStanford University; Precourt Institute for Energy; Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance; Energy Modeling Forum; School of Earth Sciences FX We thank the following Stanford University groups for their financial support: the Precourt Institute for Energy, the Steyer-Taylor Center for Energy Policy and Finance, the Energy Modeling Forum, and the School of Earth Sciences. Thanks also to two anonymous reviewers for their detailed and constructive feedback. CR BIS, 2013, 1042 BLS Blanford G. J., 2014, ENERGY J, V35, P137 Blonz J., 2011, DO COSTS CLIMATE POL Brown MA, 2001, ENERG POLICY, V29, P1179, DOI 10.1016/S0301-4215(01)00066-0 Brown MA, 2010, ENERG POLICY, V38, P7665, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2010.07.057 Carbone J. 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T., 2014, THESIS STANFORD U PA Wilkerson JT, 2013, ENERG ECON, V40, P773, DOI 10.1016/j.eneco.2013.09.023 Williams R. C. I., 2014, 1425 RES FUT Williams RC, 2015, NATL TAX J, V68, P195, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2015.1.09 NR 51 TC 9 Z9 9 U1 0 U2 8 PU ELSEVIER PI AMSTERDAM PA RADARWEG 29, 1043 NX AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0140-9883 EI 1873-6181 J9 ENERG ECON JI Energy Econ. PD MAR PY 2016 VL 55 BP 303 EP 318 DI 10.1016/j.eneco.2016.02.021 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DL0YI UT WOS:000375358100028 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT S AU Vlachy, J AF Vlachy, Jan BE Jedlicka, P TI A MONTE CARLO BASED ANALYSIS OF TAX SYSTEMS: POLAND VERSUS CZECH REPUBLIC SO HRADEC ECONOMIC DAYS, VOL 6, ISSUE 1 SE Hradec Economic Days LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 14th International Scientific Conference on Hradec Economic Days CY FEB 02-03, 2016 CL Univ Hradec Kralove, Fac Informat & Management, Dept Econ, Hradec Kralove, CZECH REPUBLIC SP Univ Hradec Kralove, Fac Informat & Management, Univ Hradec Kralove, Fac Informat & Management, Dept Management HO Univ Hradec Kralove, Fac Informat & Management, Dept Econ DE lifelong tax burden; statistical simulation; personal income tax ID PERSONAL INCOME AB This paper applies the parametric statistical simulation (Monte Carlo) method to characterize and compare the Polish and Czech systems of personal income taxation, on the lifelong tax burden basis, combined with factors of inter-temporal taxable income dynamics. It is shown that the current Polish system is markedly superior to the Czech one, both in terms of stability, and progression characteristics. Opportunities for further tax-incidence research using this method are suggested. C1 [Vlachy, Jan] Czech Tech Univ, Prague, Czech Republic. RP Vlachy, J (corresponding author), Czech Tech Univ, Prague, Czech Republic. EM jan.vlachy@cvut.cz CR Breton M., 2005, NUMERICAL METHODS FI CASPERSEN E, 1994, NATL TAX J, V47, P731 Fullerton Don, 1993, WHO BEARS LIFETIME T GOS, 2015, ZATR WYN GOSP NAR Herzog T. N., 2002, APPL MONTE CARLO MET KANBUR SM, 1981, J PUBLIC ECON, V15, P163, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90031-1 Klazar S, 2012, PRAGUE ECON PAP, V21, P309, DOI 10.18267/j.pep.426 Majd S., 1985, 1553 NBER MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V38, P175, DOI 10.2307/2296779 MPSV, 2015, INF SYST PRUM VYD Nicodeme G., 2007, FRONTIERS FINANCE EC, V4, P102 PWC, 2015, WORLDW TAX SUMM Seidl C., 2013, TAX PROGRESSION OECD Siroky J., 2013, DANE EVROPSKE UNII 6 TANNING L, 2012, INT J BUSINESS SOCIA, P65 Vermaeten F., 1994, REV FISCALE CANADIEN, V42, P348 Vlachy J., 2015, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL A, V10, P19 Vlachy J, 2008, E M EKON MANAG, V11, P85 Vlachy J, 2007, POLIT EKON, V55, P625, DOI 10.18267/j.polek.616 Vlachy J, 2008, EKON CAS, V56, P649 NR 20 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU UNIV HRADEC KRALOVE PI HRADEC KRALOVE 3 PA ROKITANSKEHO 62, HRADEC KRALOVE 3, 500 03, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 2464-6059 EI 2464-6067 BN 978-80-7435-636-0 J9 HRADEC ECON DAYS PY 2016 VL 6 BP 1167 EP 1172 PG 6 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BP1JI UT WOS:000539487200143 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Hadakova, J AF Hadakova, Jarmila BE Stefko, R Frankovsky, M Fedorko, R TI Incidence of Local Development Fee: Theory and Evidence SO MANAGEMENT 2016: INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND MANAGEMENT, DOMESTIC PARTICULARITIES AND EMERGING MARKETS IN THE LIGHT OF RESEARCH LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 6th International Scientific Conference on International Business and Management, Domestic Particularities and Emerging Markets in the Light of Research CY SEP 29-OCT 02, 2016 CL SLOVAKIA SP Univ Presov Presov, Fac Management, Minist Educ Sci Res & Sport Slovak Republ, Dubnica Technol Inst, Czestochowa Univ Technol, Univ Business Prague, Old Polish Univ Kielce, Coll Hotel Management, Int Res Ctr Higher Educ & Cooperat DE Local Development Fee; Tax incidence; Local Government; Local policy; Infrastructure financing ID IMPACT FEES AB With the advent of tax and expenditure limitations, state and local governments have been searching for new sources of revenue to maintain or expand public services. The need for new sources of revenue has been particularly acute in localities that have experienced rapid growth. The new act number 447 of 20 November 2015 on Local Development Fee was approved in Slovakia. The Act comes into force on 1 November 2016. The paper points out possible problems associated with the introduction of the Local Development Fee abroad and discribe situation in Slovakia. C1 [Hadakova, Jarmila] Constantine Philospehr Univ Nitra, Fac Nat Sci, Nitra, Slovakia. RP Hadakova, J (corresponding author), Constantine Philospehr Univ Nitra, Fac Nat Sci, Inst Ecnom & Management, Tr Andreja Hlinku 1, Nitra, Slovakia. EM jhudakova@ukf.sk RI Hudakova, Jarmila/D-6563-2019 OI Hudakova, Jarmila/0000-0003-0725-4989 CR Altshuler A.A., 1993, REGULATION REVENUE P Bunnell G., 1994, PROS CONS PAYING GRO DELANEY CJ, 1989, GROWTH CHANGE, V20, P1, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2257.1989.tb00499.x DELANEY CJ, 1989, AREUEA J, V17, P41 Downing Paul B., 1987, DEV EXACTIONS, P42 HUFFMAN FE, 1988, J AM PLANN ASSOC, V54, P49, DOI 10.1080/01944368808977152 Ihlanfeldt KR, 2004, REG SCI URBAN ECON, V34, P639, DOI 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2003.11.002 SINGELL LD, 1990, LAND ECON, V66, P82, DOI 10.2307/3146685 SNYDER TP, 1986, PAYING GROWTH USING Yinger J, 1998, NATL TAX J, V51, P23 Yinger J., 1998, LOCAL GOVT TAX LAND NR 11 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU BOOKMAN, S R O PI PRESOV PA PUSTA DOLINA 14/13497,, PRESOV, 080 01, SLOVAKIA BN 978-80-8165-155-7 PY 2016 BP 241 EP 245 PG 5 WC Business; Management SC Business & Economics GA BJ6KT UT WOS:000426796500034 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Aemkulwat, C AF Aemkulwat, Chairat TI Tax Incidence and Inequality of Thai General Government Taxation System SO APPLIED ECONOMICS JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE Tax Incidence; Size Distribution of Income; Inequality; Gini Coefficient AB Indirect Taxes comprise 47.9 percent of tax revenues of the Thai general government whereas direct taxes comprise 40.7 percent in 2014. In terms of national income, the revenue of the Thai general government is 25.71 percent - central government contributing 22.79 percent and local government contributing 2.92 percent. It can also be divided into direct tax share of 10.92 percent, indirect tax share of 11.62 percent, and non-tax share of 3.17 percent. Direct taxes except land maintenance tax - personal income tax, corporation income tax, petroleum income tax, building and land tax, land registration fee, motor vehicle tax, and signboard tax - increase progressivity and decrease inequality. Indirect taxes except custom duties - value added tax, excise tax, and other local indirect taxes - decrease progressivity and increase inequality. In the base case, the poorest 10 percent bears 21.57 percent while the richest 10 percent bears 26.55 percent, contributing to a decrease of the ratio of income of richest 10 (20) percent to that of poorest 10 (20) percent to 19.25 (10.77) times, compared to 20.70 (11.50) in the case of before-tax income. In the case of elastic demand and supply, decile 1 bears 17.67 percent while decile 10 bears 26.92 percent, contributing to a decrease of the ratio of income of the richest 10 (20) percent to that of the poorest 10 (20) percent to 18.36 (10.32) times. Finally, Gini coefficient may rise or fall after tax. It increases to 0.501, a jump of 2.2 percent in the base case but falls to 0.461, a drop of 5.9 percent in the case of elastic demand and supply. C1 [Aemkulwat, Chairat] Chulalongkorn Univ, Fac Econ, Bangkok 10330, Thailand. RP Aemkulwat, C (corresponding author), Chulalongkorn Univ, Fac Econ, Bangkok 10330, Thailand. EM Chairat.a@chula.ac.th FU Chulalongkorn Economics Research Center, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University FX The content of this article is part of the research of the author titled, "Tax Incidence and Inequality in Thailand: 1988-2009", financially supported by the Chulalongkorn Economics Research Center, Faculty of Economics, Chulalongkorn University. This paper has been presented at the Eight National Conference of Economists on "Changing Thailand under the context of Changing World Economy" at Mahitaladhibesra Building, Chulalongkorn University on October 22, 2013. 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A., 1974, WHO BEARS TAX BURDEN Poapongsakorn N., 2011, EC REFORMS SOCIAL JU Sarntisart I., 2011, INCOME DISTRIBUTIONA Satitchaijaroen S., 2011, IMPACT VALUE ADDED T Sussangkarn C., 1999, PATTERN EXPENDITURE Tinakorn P., 2002, THAMMASAT EC J, V20, P141 Wannajitjaroon L., 2009, THESIS Yasadatt W., 2012, THESIS NR 21 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 1 U2 7 PU KASERSART UNIV, FAC ECONOMICS PI BANGKOK PA CENTER APPLIED ECONOMICS RESEARCH, 50 PHAHON YOTHIN RD, JATUJAK, BANGKOK, 10900, THAILAND SN 2586-9124 EI 2586-9132 J9 APPL ECON J JI Appl. Econ. J. PD DEC PY 2015 VL 22 IS 2 BP 25 EP 53 PG 29 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DH0FY UT WOS:000372459300003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Martorano, B AF Martorano, Bruno TI Is It Possible to Adjust 'With a Human Face'? Differences in Fiscal Consolidation Strategies between Hungary and Iceland SO COMPARATIVE ECONOMIC STUDIES LA English DT Article DE crisis; fiscal adjustment; tax reform; tax incidence; inequality AB Although Hungary and Iceland suffered a similar fall in GDP, their respective governments decided to follow different strategies of adjustment. Each country cut spending according to different priorities. Moreover, the Hungarian government implemented a flat tax reform, while the Icelandic government replaced the previous flat tax system with a progressive structure. As a result, Iceland met the objectives of the IMF program, while worsening economic conditions forced Hungary to ask for additional external help. In terms of income distribution, social transfers contributed to reducing inequality in Iceland but not in Hungary, while the different tax strategies operated in contrary ways. C1 [Martorano, Bruno] Univ Sussex, Inst Dev Studies, Lib Rd, Brighton BN1 9RE, E Sussex, England. 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PD DEC PY 2015 VL 57 IS 4 BP 623 EP 654 DI 10.1057/ces.2015.22 PG 32 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA DE0BU UT WOS:000370290500003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Donohoe, MP Lisowsky, P Mayberry, MA AF Donohoe, Michael P. Lisowsky, Petro Mayberry, Michael A. TI WHO BENEFITS FROM THE TAX ADVANTAGES OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORM CHOICE? SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; organizational form; S corporation; C corporation; banks ID CORPORATE-INCOME TAX; PRICE AB We investigate whether and the extent to which four stakeholders of a firm - customers, suppliers, employees, and owners - benefit from the savings under Subchapter S relative to Subchapter C. Using a balanced sample of US. commercial banks from 2001-2005, we find that S corporation banks pay 2 percent more in wages and 38 percent more in dividends than C corporation banks, but pay lower interest rates on deposits and charge similar rates on loans. Further, after the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief and Reconciliation Act of 2003 attenuated the relative tax advantage of Subchapter S, we find that S corporation banks increased wages and dividends to a lesser extent than C corporation banks. These results suggest that employees and owners, but not suppliers or customers, benefit from the tax advantages of the Subchapter S organizational form. Overall, our study provides economic insight into which parties ultimately bear - and do not bear - the incidence of corporate taxation. C1 [Donohoe, Michael P.; Lisowsky, Petro] Univ Illinois, Champaign, IL 61801 USA. [Lisowsky, Petro] MIT, Cambridge, MA 02139 USA. [Lisowsky, Petro] Norwegian Ctr Taxat, Bergen, Norway. [Mayberry, Michael A.] Univ Florida, Gainesville, FL USA. RP Donohoe, MP (corresponding author), Univ Illinois, Champaign, IL 61801 USA. EM mdonohoe@illinois.edu; lisowsky@illinois.edu; michael.mayberry@warrington.ufl.edu FU PricewaterhouseCoopers Faculty Fellowship at University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign FX We appreciate helpful comments from Paul Demere, George Plesko, and John Robinson (discussant). Special thanks to George Plesko for organizing the ATPI session held in Washington, DC as part of the NTA Spring Symposium on May 15, 2015, at which this paper was presented. Michael Donohoe and Petro Lisowsky gratefully acknowledge support from the PricewaterhouseCoopers Faculty Fellowship at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. 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PD DEC PY 2015 VL 68 IS 4 BP 975 EP 998 DI 10.17310/ntj.2015.4.04 PG 24 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA CX9DN UT WOS:000366005300005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kosonen, T AF Kosonen, Tuomas TI More and cheaper haircuts after VAT cut? On the efficiency and incidence of service sector consumption taxes SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE VAT reform; Efficiency; Tax incidence ID SALES TAXES; OPTIMAL TAXATION; COMPETITION; DEMAND AB Consumption tax rates targeted at specific sectors are often reformed without any empirical knowledge about the efficiency of these policies. This paper sheds light on tax incidence as well as the efficiency issue, the potential for welfare improving reform, by studying the impact of value added taxes (VAT) on prices and quantities of labor intensive services. I utilize a VAT reform targeted at a specific service sector, which creates a natural experiment set up. The VAT for hairdressing services in Finland was reduced from 22% to 8%, and the previous tax treatment still applied to other labor intensive services. The choice of the treatment and control groups was exogenous to circumstances in Finland, since these groups were selected from a wider European setting. The results suggest that hairdressers cut their prices only by half of what a complete pass-through would have implied, and that there was hardly any adjustment in equilibrium quantity due to the reform. Hairdressers were able to increase their profits significantly. There is important heterogeneity in the results according to firm size. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Kosonen, Tuomas] VATT Inst Econ Res, Helsinki, Finland. RP Kosonen, T (corresponding author), VATT Inst Econ Res, Helsinki, Finland. FU Nordic Tax Research Council FX I am grateful to the helpful comments from the editor Henrik Kleven and two anonymous referees. I want to thank Essi Eerola, Wojciech Kopczuk, Eva Mork and Jukka Pirttila as well as those of many conference audiences for helpful comments that provided many insights to this article. These insights provided much needed fuel for thought, although all the commentators do not necessarily share all the views in the final article. I am also grateful to the financial support of the Nordic Tax Research Council for this study and the cooperation of the Finnish Hairdressers' Association, in addition to the Finnish Competition and Consumer Authority in obtaining the data for this study. 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Public Econ. PD NOV PY 2015 VL 131 BP 87 EP 100 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.09.006 PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CW5SJ UT WOS:000365056600008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Agostini, CA Jimenez, J AF Agostini, Claudio A. Jimenez, Johanna TI The distributional incidence of the gasoline tax in Chile SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Tax on fuels; Suits Index ID POLITICAL-ECONOMY; STANDARDS; COUNTRIES; LIFETIME; MOBILITY; TAXATION; PRICE AB This paper analyzes the distributional incidence of the excise tax on gasoline in Chile using Household Budget Surveys. The incidence is calculated with respect to both income and expenditure distributions in order to consider the potential differences between transitory and permanent income. The Suits Index is estimated as a measure of the degree of progressivity of the tax, and confidence intervals are calculated using a bootstrap methodology to statistically compare changes in the incidence given changes in the tax. The results show that the tax, contrary to the evidence for several developed countries, is slightly or moderately progressive, with a lower degree of progressivity observed in the calculations based on income than those based on expenditure. The simulation of the 25% reduction in the tax rate implemented in 2008 shows that, in terms of incidence, its effect is to reduce the progressivity of the gasoline tax, which is the opposite of what was sought by the government with this policy. (C) 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. C1 [Agostini, Claudio A.] Univ Adolfo lbanez, Sch Govt, Santiago, Chile. [Jimenez, Johanna] ILADES Georgetown Univ, Santiago, Chile. RP Agostini, CA (corresponding author), Univ Adolfo lbanez, Sch Govt, Santiago, Chile. 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According to standard incidence analysis, social security contributions affect employment negatively, but it is irrelevant how they are divided between employers and employees. This paper considers the possibility that (i) workers perceive a linkage between current contributions and future benefits, and (ii) they value employer's contributions less than own contributions, as the former are less "salient." Under these assumptions, I find that employers' contributions have a stronger (negative) effect on employment than employees' contributions. Furthermore, a change in how contributions are divided, which reduces the share of employers, is beneficial for employment. Finally, making employers' contributions more visible to workers also has a positive effect on employment. C1 Univ Alicante, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, Alicante 03071, Spain. RP Iturbe-Ormaetxe, I (corresponding author), Univ Alicante, Dept Fundamentos Anal Econ, Alicante 03071, Spain. EM iturbe@ua.es RI Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo/H-4674-2015 OI Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Inigo/0000-0002-2385-2471 FU Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas, Generalitat Valenciana [Prometeo/2013/037]; Ministerio de Economia y CompetitividadSpanish Government [ECO2012-34928] FX I would like to thank Juan Jose Dolado, Miguel-Angel Lopez Garcia, Adam Sanjurjo, the editor Eckhard Janeba and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Economicas, Generalitat Valenciana (Prometeo/2013/037) and Ministerio de Economia y Competitividad (ECO2012-34928) are gratefully acknowledged. 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PD OCT PY 2015 VL 22 IS 5 BP 741 EP 759 DI 10.1007/s10797-014-9322-3 PG 19 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CS2KX UT WOS:000361900600004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Di Giacomo, M Piacenza, M Scervini, F Turati, G AF Di Giacomo, Marina Piacenza, Massimiliano Scervini, Francesco Turati, Gilberto TI Should we resurrect 'TIPP flottante' if oil price booms again? Specific taxes as fuel consumer price stabilizers SO ENERGY ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Fuel market; Tax incidence; Excise pass-through; Price stabilization; Oil price ID MARKET POWER; AD-VALOREM; TAXATION; OLIGOPOLY AB As an answer to soaring oil prices, stabilization mechanisms based on specific taxes, such as the French 'TIPP flottante', have been discussed and introduced in some countries in early 2000s, but then soon abandoned. Our contribution aims at analyzing the excise pass-through and the cost shifting in a comprehensive European context to understand whether such a mechanism could actually reach its target, Our results show that, on average, fuel tax reductions are effective in stabilize consumer price, but the measure is particularly costly for public budgets. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Di Giacomo, Marina; Piacenza, Massimiliano; Scervini, Francesco; Turati, Gilberto] Univ Turin, ESOMAS, Corso Unione Soviet, I-10134 Turin, Italy. [Piacenza, Massimiliano] Italian Natl Res Council, IRCrES, I-10024 Moncalieri, TO, Italy. RP Piacenza, M (corresponding author), Univ Turin, ESOMAS, Corso Unione Soviet, 218Bis, I-10134 Turin, Italy. EM marina.digiacomo@unito.it; massimiliano.piacenza@unito.it; francesco.scervini@unipv.it; gilberto.turati@unito.it RI Di Giacomo, Marina/I-5585-2016; PIACENZA, MASSIMILIANO/ABF-1996-2020 OI Di Giacomo, Marina/0000-0002-7158-7545; Piacenza, Massimiliano/0000-0003-2437-8254; SCERVINI, Francesco/0000-0001-6403-5876 FU University of Torino; foundation 'Compagnia di San Paolo' FX We thank the editor in chief prof. Richard S.J. Tol and two anonymous referees for their insightful comments. We also thank Massimo Filippini for the suggestions and the participants to the 70th annual congress of the International Institute of Public Finance, to the XXVI annual meeting of the Italian Association of Public Economics, and to the 7th NERI Workshop, University of Turin, 2015. This project was funded by a research grant jointly sponsored by the University of Torino and the foundation 'Compagnia di San Paolo' (Call 1 2012 - Junior PI Grant). The views expressed herein are those of the authors. 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PD SEP PY 2015 VL 51 BP 544 EP 552 DI 10.1016/j.eneco.2015.08.004 PG 9 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CV7GD UT WOS:000364439500049 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Li, CJ Lin, SL AF Li, Chengjian Lin, Shuanglin TI Tax progressivity and tax incidence of the rich and the poor SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE Labor income tax progressivity; Tax incidence; Overlapping generations model ID TAXATION AB With the labor supply being flexible, a revenue-neutral increase in the tax progressivity decreases the tax incidence of the rich and increases the tax incidence of the poor if the tax scheme is highly progressive. (C) 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Li, Chengjian] Dev Res Ctr State Council, Beijing 100010, Peoples R China. [Li, Chengjian] Peking Univ, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China. [Lin, Shuanglin] Peking Univ, Natl Sch Dev, China Ctr Publ Finance, Beijing 100871, Peoples R China. [Lin, Shuanglin] Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Omaha, NE 68182 USA. RP Lin, SL (corresponding author), Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Omaha, NE 68182 USA. EM jcli@pku.edu.cn; slin@unomaha.edu CR Altig D, 2001, AM ECON REV, V91, P574, DOI 10.1257/aer.91.3.574 Koyuncu M, 2011, J ECON DYN CONTROL, V35, P1474, DOI 10.1016/j.jedc.2011.04.011 PECHMAN JA, 1986, RICH POOR TAXES THEY PRESCOTT EC, 2004, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, V28, P2 Sarte PDG, 1997, J PUBLIC ECON, V66, P145, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00026-1 STIGLITZ J. E., 2000, EC PUBLIC SECTOR NR 6 TC 0 Z9 1 U1 1 U2 12 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 EI 1873-7374 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD SEP PY 2015 VL 134 BP 148 EP 151 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.07.003 PG 4 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CR3UA UT WOS:000361257400038 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Sajeewani, D Siriwardana, M Mcneill, J AF Sajeewani, Disna Siriwardana, Mahinda Mcneill, Judith TI HOUSEHOLD DISTRIBUTIONAL AND REVENUE RECYCLING EFFECTS OF THE CARBON PRICE IN AUSTRALIA SO CLIMATE CHANGE ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Australia; general equilibrium model; carbon price; household; revenue recycling ID CLIMATE-CHANGE; TAXATION; POLICY; IMPACTS; TAX AB The Australian Government introduced a carbon tax from 1 July 2012. The then opposition party leader, now Prime Minister, introduced legislation to repeal the tax. Amongst the many issues being debated is that of the incidence of the tax. In this study, we explore household consumption and income changes arising from a A$23 carbon price employing a computable general equilibrium model (entitled A3E-G). The model has been calibrated using a social accounting matrix database of Australia with 10 household income groups. This carbon price generates A$6.39 billion revenue while reducing Australia's carbon emissions by 11%. The empirical evidence suggests household level impacts range from proportional to mildly progressive tax incidence. In this study, we propose four revenue recycling options to overcome any undesirable distributional effects from the carbon price. Results indicate that revenue recycling through income tax reductions and uniform lump sum transfers improves post tax income levels and welfare towards middle and high income groups. A nonuniform lump sum transferring option favors low income households. Uniform reductions in commodity tax rates are not found to be welfare improving but we find positive impacts on export competitiveness from this option. C1 [Sajeewani, Disna] Univ Wollongong, Sch Econ, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. [Siriwardana, Mahinda] Univ New England, UNE Business Sch, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia. [Mcneill, Judith] Univ New England, BCSS, Inst Rural Futures, Armidale, NSW 2351, Australia. RP Sajeewani, D (corresponding author), Univ Wollongong, Sch Econ, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. EM disna@uow.edu.au; asiriwar@une.edu.au; jmcneill@une.edu.au FU Australian Research CouncilAustralian Research Council [DP0986306] FX The authors would like to acknowledge funding from the Australian Research Council under Discovery project DP0986306. 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PD AUG PY 2015 VL 6 IS 3 AR 1550012 DI 10.1142/S2010007815500128 PG 23 WC Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA CX5TW UT WOS:000365766400003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lu, CH Chen, BL AF Lu, Chia-Hui Chen, Been-Lon TI OPTIMAL CAPITAL TAXATION IN A NEOCLASSICAL GROWTH MODEL SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMIC THEORY LA English DT Article ID ENDOGENOUS GROWTH; LIFE-CYCLE; INCOME; ACCUMULATION; INFLATION; WELFARE; POLICY AB This paper studies the optimal factor tax incidence in a neoclassical growth model with a given share of government expenditure in output. In the Ramsey planner's optimization, the effect of next period's capital on government expenditure equals the given share of the marginal product of capital. Capital accumulation reduces the discounted net marginal product of next period's capital by way of increasing government expenditure. In order to internalize the distortion, it is optimal to tax capital income in the long run. 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Public. Econ. Theory. PD APR PY 2015 VL 17 IS 2 BP 257 EP 269 DI 10.1111/jpet.12100 PG 13 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CE0TL UT WOS:000351519300005 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Mabugu, RE Fofana, I Chitiga-Mabugu, MR AF Mabugu, Ramos E. Fofana, Ismael Chitiga-Mabugu, Margaret R. TI Pro-Poor Tax Policy Changes in South Africa: Potential and Limitations SO JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT African-Economic-Research-Consortium (AERC) Biannual Research Workshop CY JUN 01-05, 2014 CL Accra, GHANA SP African Econ Res Consortium DE growth; inequality; poverty; taxation; economy-wide modeling; microsimulation ID GENERAL-EQUILIBRIUM-MODELS; UNITED-STATES; UNEMPLOYMENT; POVERTY; REFORM AB Since 1994, the South African government has committed to increasing economic growth and reducing poverty and inequality. Tax policy has been the most important instrument at its disposal to meet these objectives. A dynamic computable general equilibrium model, with endogenous labour supply, is constructed and linked to a microsimulation model in order to assess the poverty and inequality implications of interventions associated with tax changes. Tax change scenarios are experimented with under a fiscally consolidated framework, i.e., full recovery of tax reductions and exemptions. Three main conclusions are reached. First, higher direct tax progression is unlikely, but there is room for changes in the tax mix towards indirect taxation to achieve greater efficiency, poverty and inequality reduction. Second, the implication for economic growth from tax policy changes is limited. Third, raising VAT and redistributing the proceeds back to poor and extremely poor households generates pro-poor outcomes. 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EM ramosm@ffc.co.za OI Chitiga-Mabugu, Margaret/0000-0001-9894-0452 FU African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) FX The authors are grateful to the African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) for providing financial support for the preparation and presentation of this article. CR Aaberge R., 2005, 0501004 ECONWPA LAB AARON HJ, 1999, S AFRICAN TAX SYSTEM African Development Bank, 2007, AFR DEV REP Arntz M, 2008, ECON MODEL, V25, P422, DOI 10.1016/j.econmod.2007.07.001 BALLARD CL, 1985, AM ECON REV, V75, P128 Black P, 2003, PUBLIC EC S AFRICAN Black P. 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SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE computable general equilibrium model; pre-existing tax distortions; energy taxation; tax incidence; double dividend; tax interaction and revenue recycling effects AB This paper compares the effects of using revenues from a carbon tax to either reduce the national debt or reduce federal personal or corporate income tax rates. It differs from other analyses by looking at a carbon tax as a purely revenue raising measure, not as an optimal Pigouvian tax or as an instrument to achieve a predetermined reduction in emissions. Thus it addresses the question of whether a carbon tax would be part of an optimal tax policy even if there were no damages to the United States from CO2 emissions. We use a computable general equilibrium model (NERA's N(ew)ERA model) that consists of a top-down macro model of the U.S. economy and a detailed bottom-up model of the North American electricity sector: The N(ew)ERA model is an integrated energy and economic model that includes a detailed plant-level representation of the electricity sector with an aggregate level representation of the rest of the economy. The analysis shows that using revenues for either debt or tax rate reduction can reduce the welfare losses from a carbon tax; however, the savings from reducing either federal debt or the marginal rates of other distorting taxes are still less than the economic costs imposed by the narrowly based tax on CO2 emissions. The higher the carbon tax, the greater the disparity becomes. C1 [Tuladhar, Sugandha D.; Montgomery, W. David] NERA Econ Consultin, Washington, DC 20037 USA. [Kaufman, Noah] NERA Econ Consulting, Boston, MA USA. RP Tuladhar, SD (corresponding author), NERA Econ Consultin, Washington, DC 20037 USA. EM Sugandha.Tuladhar@nera.com; W.David.Montgomery@nera.com; Noah.Kaufman@nera.com CR Bohringer C, 2008, ENERG ECON, V30, P574, DOI 10.1016/j.eneco.2007.03.004 BOVENBERG L, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P1085 Bovenberg Lans, 1996, AM ECON REV, V86, P985 Congressional Budget Office, 2012, 2012 LONG TERM BUDG Engen EM, 2005, NBER MACROEC ANN-SER, V19, P83 FEENBERG D, 1993, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V12, P189, DOI 10.2307/3325474 Gale W., 2003, 8 URB BROOK TAX POL Harrison David, 2012, EC IMPLICATIONS RECE IMPLAN, 2010, IMPLAN SYST DAT SOFT Lanz B, 2011, ENERG ECON, V33, P1035, DOI 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.06.003 Parry Ian, 1995, J ENVIRON ECON MANAG, V29, pS64 Rutherford T. 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TI The Relation between Business Property Values and Local Property Taxes SO JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN TAXATION ASSOCIATION LA English DT Article DE property taxes; property values; business property AB This study examines the relation between commercial and industrial property values and local property taxes using 1999 to 2009 data for the state of Georgia. Results show a negative relation between commercial values and property taxes, consistent with the new view of capital tax prediction that these taxes are borne, at least in part, by property owners. Incidence estimates show very high to full capitalization. There is little evidence of a relation between industrial property values and property taxes, contrary to prior research. This study is the first to provide empirical evidence of differences in commercial and industrial property tax incidence. The study contributes to the understanding of the capitalization of business taxes, which has been the subject of very little prior research. The results can inform policymakers who consider trade-offs in tax revenue needs, economic development, and issues of fairness in their localities. C1 [Key, Kimberly G.] Auburn Univ, Auburn, AL 36849 USA. [Lightner, Teresa A.] Univ North Texas, Denton, TX 76203 USA. RP Key, KG (corresponding author), Auburn Univ, Auburn, AL 36849 USA. 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Using novel data from New York surveys that asked directly about cigarette prices and purchases from reservations, we focus on two under-studied but basic empirical economic questions this raises. First, what is the economic incidence of the tax break? In data from New York over a period when the state did not attempt to collect taxes on reservation purchases, our estimates suggest that the tax break is usually fully shifted to the consumer. The notable exception is on one reservation where a tribal monopoly captures almost half of the tax break. Second, has the tax break increased consumer demand for low-quality cigarettes relative to high-quality cigarettes? New York's cigarette tax is a fixed amount per pack, providing an opportunity to test the Alchian and Allen substitution theorem. We find some support for the prediction that the tax break increases consumer demand for lower-quality cigarettes. C1 [DeCicca, Philip] McMaster Univ, Dept Econ, Hamilton, ON, Canada. [Kenkel, Donald] Cornell Univ, Dept Policy Anal & Management, Ithaca, NY USA. [Liu, Feng] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China. RP DeCicca, P (corresponding author), McMaster Univ, Dept Econ, Hamilton, ON, Canada. EM decicca@mcmaster.ca; dsk10@cornell.edu; liu.feng@mail.shufe.edu.cn FU National Institutes of HealthUnited States Department of Health & Human ServicesNational Institutes of Health (NIH) - USA [R21 CA13160001A1] FX This research was supported by the National Institutes of Health, # R21 CA13160001A1. We thank Daniel Kenkel for excellent legal research assistance, and Christine Coyer and Hua Wang for excellent econometric research assistance. 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Mathur, Aparna TI A spatial model of corporate tax incidence SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE corporate tax; incidence; spatial model; wages ID INCOME-TAX; CAPITAL INCOME; TAXATION; ECONOMY; POLICY AB Using a unique, self-compiled data-set on international tax rates, we explore the link between taxes and manufacturing wages for a panel of 66 countries over 25 years. We find, controlling for other macroeconomic variables, that wages are significantly responsive to corporate taxation. Higher corporate tax rates depress wages. Using spatial modelling techniques, we also find that tax characteristics of neighbouring countries, whether geographic or economic, have a significant effect on domestic wages. We test for, and reject, spatial autocorrelation in our model using a modification of the Moran-I test statistic that accounts for country-specific fixed effects in a panel data setting. 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Econ. PY 2015 VL 47 IS 13 BP 1350 EP 1365 DI 10.1080/00036846.2014.995367 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA CA2BY UT WOS:000348715200006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bierbrauer, F AF Bierbrauer, Felix TI Tax incidence for fragile financial markets SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Financial markets; Financial transactions tax ID ASSET PRICES; LIQUIDITY; RISK; SECTOR AB Standard tax incidence analysis deals with households and firms that buy and sell consumption goods, as opposed to financial institutions that buy and sell financial products. This paper develops a framework that allows us to study tax incidence on financial markets, and applies it to a financial transactions tax. A main result is that the tax may contribute to financial distress. 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PD DEC PY 2014 VL 62 IS 4 BP 709 EP 755 DI 10.1111/joie.12059 PG 47 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA AX1YB UT WOS:000346738700006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Galper, H Rueben, K Auxier, R Eng, A AF Galper, Harvey Rueben, Kim Auxier, Richard Eng, Amanda TI MUNICIPAL DEBT: WHAT DOES IT BUY AND WHO BENEFITS? SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; tax-exempt bonds; implicit taxes and subsidies; distributional analysis; microsimulation models ID FEDERAL-GRANTS; RESPONSES AB This paper examines the incidence of the federal income tax exemption of interest on state and local bonds, applying a fixed-savings, simplified general equilibrium approach to estimate incidence effects on both the sources and uses of income. In contrast to traditional empirical work that allocates the benefit of tax exemption only to current holders of tax-exempt bonds based on current interest rates, we incorporate the fact that the existence of tax exemption causes the taxable interest rate to rise and the tax-exempt rate to fall. As a consequence, on the sources side, tax exemption can increase after-tax income for holders of both taxable and tax-exempt bonds. On the uses side, consumers of both private and public goods are affected by the higher cost of funds to private and federal government borrowers, the lower cost of funds to state and local borrowers, and the lower cost of funds to private-sector entities with access to the proceeds of tax-exempt borrowing. Overall, higher income individuals remain the primary beneficiaries of tax exemption on the sources side with this new approach, but less so than under the traditional approach. On the uses side, households who consume a relatively large share of state and local public services, such as those with several school-age children, receive significant net benefits. C1 [Galper, Harvey; Rueben, Kim; Auxier, Richard] Urban Inst, Washington, DC 20037 USA. [Eng, Amanda] Cornell Univ, Ithaca, NY USA. RP Galper, H (corresponding author), Urban Inst, Washington, DC 20037 USA. 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PD DEC PY 2014 VL 67 IS 4 BP 901 EP 924 DI 10.17310/ntj.2014.4.07 PG 24 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA AW1HE UT WOS:000346040000007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Martorano, B AF Martorano, Bruno TI The Impact of Uruguay's 2007 Tax Reform on Equity and Efficiency SO DEVELOPMENT POLICY REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Tax reform; tax incidence; income distribution; efficiency; matching estimators ID OPTIMUM INCOME TAXATION AB In 2007, the Uruguayan government implemented a tax reform which introduced a new progressive labour income tax and a flat capital income tax, and reduced some indirect taxes, with the objective of improving fiscal balance, income distribution and economic growth. This article evaluates the impact of such tax reform on equity and efficiency on the basis of data derived from the Encuesta Continua de Hogares (ECH) for 2006 and 2009. Using a Difference-in-Differences technique, it shows that the new system reduced inequality by 2 Gini points without producing any discernible disincentive effect, suggesting that suitably designed reforms of direct taxation can simultaneously promote equity and efficiency. C1 UNICEF Innocenti Res Ctr, Florence, Italy. RP Martorano, B (corresponding author), UNICEF Innocenti Res Ctr, Florence, Italy. EM bruno.martorano@unifi.it CR Amarante V., 2011, 201194 UN U WORLD I Amarante V., 2007, IMPACTO DIS IN PRESS Baltagi B.H., 2005, ECONOMETRIC ANAL PAN Barreix A, 2007, ROUTL INT STUD MONEY, P1 Blackwell C., 2007, INT STUDIES PROGRAM, V0724 Blundell R., 2006, OPTIMAL INCOME UNPUB Blundell R, 2009, J HUM RESOUR, V44, P565, DOI 10.1353/jhr.2009.0009 Buchholz W., 2007, 1997 CESIFO Caliendo M, 2008, J ECON SURV, V22, P31, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-6419.2007.00527.x Chen J, 2012, U LOUISVILLE LAW REV, V50, P659 Cornia G. 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Polít., V17, P111 Villela L., 2005, DESAFIO FISCAL MERCO World Bank, 2008, 44939UY WORLD BANK World Bank, 1991, LESS TAX REF NR 34 TC 4 Z9 4 U1 0 U2 6 PU WILEY-BLACKWELL PI HOBOKEN PA 111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA SN 0950-6764 EI 1467-7679 J9 DEV POLICY REV JI Dev. Policy Rev. PD NOV PY 2014 VL 32 IS 6 BP 701 EP 714 DI 10.1111/dpr.12085 PG 14 WC Development Studies SC Development Studies GA AQ4HV UT WOS:000342755600003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Carbonnier, C AF Carbonnier, Clement TI The incidence of non-linear price-dependent consumption taxes SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Consumption taxes; Price-dependent schedule; Imperfect competition ID MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; AD-VALOREM; TAXATION; OLIGOPOLY AB The present article generalizes economic literature on the incidence of consumption taxes to general schedules of consumption taxes dependent on price. Previous studies were limited to the cases of per unit and ad valorem taxes. Three main contributions are made. Methodologically, the elasticity of the tax function is introduced as a new parameter so that the price-elasticity of general consumption tax schedules in different models of imperfect competition might be dealt with in a tractable manner. Theoretically, existing results on the difference between the incidence of ad valorem and per unit consumption taxes are generalized to non-linear consumption taxes: the larger the elasticity of the tax function, the smaller the share of consumption tax borne by consumers. From the perspective of applied public economics, it is shown how the regulator may reduce prices in very uncompetitive markets by increasing the elasticity of the consumption tax on a targeted range of producer prices. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Cergy Pontoise THEMA, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France. RP Carbonnier, C (corresponding author), Univ Cergy Pontoise THEMA, 33 Bd Port, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France. 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Public Econ. PD OCT PY 2014 VL 118 BP 111 EP 119 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.07.001 PG 9 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA AQ1HW UT WOS:000342533500010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Chiou, L Muehlegger, E AF Chiou, Lesley Muehlegger, Erich TI CONSUMER RESPONSE TO CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX CHANGES SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE cigarettes; consumer behavior; excise taxes; stockpiling; tax avoidance; tax incidence ID TAXATION; PRICES AB We use a rich dataset of weekly cigarette sales to examine how consumers adapt their behavior before and after excise tax increases whether by stockpiling or substituting between quality tiers of a product. We find that stockpiling primarily occurs for low-tier cigarettes. In the short term, consumers shift from high-tier to low-tier cigarettes, presumably to maintain current consumption. However, in the long term, tax increases are associated with substitution toward high-tier cigarettes. 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Rev. Agric. Econ. PD JUL PY 2014 VL 41 IS 3 SI SI BP 375 EP 403 DI 10.1093/erae/jbu010 PG 29 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA AM2GA UT WOS:000339666700003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Grosche, P Schroder, C AF Groesche, Peter Schroeder, Carsten TI On the redistributive effects of Germany's feed-in tariff SO EMPIRICAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Income distribution; Redistribution; Tax incidence; Renewable resources; Energy policy; Feed-in tariff; Germany ID CARBON TAXES; ENERGY; CONSUMPTION; POLICY AB This article assesses the redistributive effects of a key element of German climate policy, the promotion of renewables in the electricity generation mix through the provision of a feed-in tariff. The tariff shapes the distribution of households' disposable incomes by charging a levy that is proportional to household electricity consumption and by transferring financial resources to households who are feeding green electricity into the public grid. Our study builds on representative household survey data, providing information on various socio-demographics, household electricity consumption, and ownership of photovoltaic facilities. The redistributive effects of the feed-in tariff are evaluated by means of inequality indices. All the indices indicate that Germany's feed-in tariff is regressive. C1 [Groesche, Peter] Anhalt Univ Appl Sci, Bernburg, Germany. [Schroeder, Carsten] Univ Kiel, Dept Econ, Kiel, Germany. RP Grosche, P (corresponding author), Anhalt Univ Appl Sci, Bernburg, Germany. 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PD JUN PY 2014 VL 46 IS 4 BP 1339 EP 1383 DI 10.1007/s00181-013-0728-z PG 45 WC Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods SC Business & Economics; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences GA AG8HV UT WOS:000335660300008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gu, XH Tam, PS AF Gu, Xinhua Tam, Pui Sun TI Market structure and casino taxation in tourist resorts SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE casino taxation; market structure; oligopoly; efficiency; Macao; D51; F10; H21; O12 ID TAX INCIDENCE AB This article examines the association of tax effects with market structure for casino gaming. We show that if market structure is uncompetitive, much of casino taxation falls on tourists whose demand is inelastic relative to supply. The tax is likely to be efficient under strong external demand if imposed on oligopoly casinos with a monopoly location in a cross-border market. The likelihood of economically good' taxation is greater under oligopoly than under competition but lower than under monopoly. Casino taxes should be lowered in a more competitive market with weaker external demand. Our prediction is consistent with the evidence found from casino tourism development in Macao with high' gambling taxes. C1 [Gu, Xinhua; Tam, Pui Sun] Univ Macau, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Fac Business Adm, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China. RP Gu, XH (corresponding author), Univ Macau, Dept Finance & Business Econ, Fac Business Adm, Av Padre Tomas Pereira, Taipa, Macao, Peoples R China. 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PD APR 3 PY 2014 VL 46 IS 10 BP 1049 EP 1057 DI 10.1080/00036846.2013.864037 PG 9 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 303TD UT WOS:000330696500001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Anton-Sarabia, A Hernandez-Trillo, F AF Anton-Sarabia, Arturo Hernandez-Trillo, Fausto TI Optimal gasoline tax in developing, oil-producing countries: The case of Mexico SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Gasoline tax; Gasoline subsidy; Tax incidence ID OPTIMAL TAXATION; EXTERNALITIES; POLLUTION; POLICY; WORLD AB This paper uses the methodology of Parry and Small (2005) to estimate the optimal gasoline tax for a less-developed oil-producing country. The relevance of the estimation relies on the differences between less-developed countries (LDCs) and industrial countries. We argue that lawless roads, general subsidies on gasoline, poor mass transportation systems, older vehicle fleets and unregulated city growth make the tax rates in LDCs differ substantially from the rates in the developed world. We find that the optimal gasoline tax is $1.90 per gallon at 2011 prices and show that the estimate differences are in line with the factors hypothesized. In contrast to the existing literature on industrial countries, we show that the relative gasoline tax incidence may be progressive in Mexico and, more generally, in LDCs. (C) 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. C1 [Anton-Sarabia, Arturo; Hernandez-Trillo, Fausto] CIDE, Mexico City 01210, DF, Mexico. RP Anton-Sarabia, A (corresponding author), CIDE, Carretera Mexico Toluca 3655, Mexico City 01210, DF, Mexico. EM arturo.anron@cide.edu RI HERNANDEZ-TRILLO, FAUSTO/W-3222-2019 OI HERNANDEZ-TRILLO, FAUSTO/0000-0002-8884-9361 FU Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) FX The authors thank the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) for financial support, three anonymous referees, Luis Miguel Galindo and David Heres for useful comments, and Alejandra Perez for excellent research assistance. 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We find that what is important for efficiency is not the tax rate itself but the tax incidence on tourists. Casino tourism in Macao engages in price discrimination via market segmentation. We prove that, compared with the mass market, the VIP market will grow faster with a greater price rise if a tax hike on the VIP market is not large, but will grow less rapidly with a smaller price increase if the tax hike is very large. An empirical study is carried out using data from Macao, which is typical of segmenting markets for discriminatory pricing. We show that our theory is largely consistent with observed evidence. This paper also provides some policy recommendations useful for Macao. We propose that its casino tax should be kept low at its current rate in the mass market but be raised substantially in the VIP market if its economic growth is to be made less unbalanced and more sustainable. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 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L., 2009, MACAO DAILY NEW 0726 Zheng V, 2012, J GAMBL STUD, V28, P541, DOI 10.1007/s10899-011-9251-3 NR 31 TC 5 Z9 5 U1 0 U2 15 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC PI NEW YORK PA 360 PARK AVE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NY 10010-1710 USA SN 1043-951X EI 1873-7781 J9 CHINA ECON REV JI China Econ. Rev. PD MAR PY 2014 VL 28 BP 135 EP 151 DI 10.1016/j.chieco.2013.10.003 PG 17 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA AE6YQ UT WOS:000334144300010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Zodrow, GR AF Zodrow, George R. TI Intrajurisdictional capitalization and the incidence of the property tax SO REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Property tax incidence; Intrajurisdictional capitalization; Capital tax view; New view; Benefit tax view ID TIEBOUT MODEL; BENEFIT VIEW; TAXATION; COMPETITION AB Two views dominate the debate about property tax incidence the "capital tax" or "new" view, under which the tax distorts capital allocation and is borne primarily by capital owners, and the "benefit tax" view, under which the tax is an efficient user charge. Evidence of both interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional capitalization of property taxes and public services has been argued to provide compelling evidence for the benefit tax view. This paper focuses on the latter the intra-jurisdictional capitalization effects that underlie what is arguably the most plausible derivation of the benefit tax view of the property tax. The analysis provides a model in which the capital reallocations that characterize the capital tax view induce intrajurisdictional capitalization effects that are generally similar indeed, in the benchmark case, identical to those that arise under the benefit tax view, suggesting that empirical evidence supporting such capitalization effects cannot distinguish between the two views. In addition, the analysis shows that these capitalization effects imply that even under the stringent assumptions of the benefit view, the property tax is not a benefit tax for a property-tax-financed increase in local public services; rather, it only becomes a benefit tax for future home purchasers - after the modeled intrajurisdictional capitalization effects occur. (C) 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Zodrow, George R.] Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA. [Zodrow, George R.] Rice Univ, Baker Inst Publ Policy, Houston, TX USA. [Zodrow, George R.] Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford, England. RP Zodrow, GR (corresponding author), Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA. 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Sci. Urban Econ. PD MAR PY 2014 VL 45 BP 57 EP 66 DI 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2014.01.002 PG 10 WC Economics; Environmental Studies; Urban Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology; Urban Studies GA AE3EI UT WOS:000333859400005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Konrad, KA Morath, F Muller, W AF Konrad, Kai A. Morath, Florian Mueller, Wieland TI Taxation and Market Power SO CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE LA English DT Article ID LIABILITY-SIDE EQUIVALENCE; REAL EFFORT EXPERIMENT; POSTED-OFFER MARKETS; TAX INCIDENCE; LAFFER CURVE; SALES TAXES; COMPETITION; PRICES; EQUILIBRIUM; FAIRNESS AB We analyze the incidence and welfare effects of unit sales tax increases in experimental monopoly and Bertrand markets. We find, in line with economic theory, that firms with no market power are able to shift a high share of the tax burden to consumers, independent of whether buyers are automated or human players. 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PD FEB PY 2014 VL 47 IS 1 BP 173 EP 202 DI 10.1111/caje.12067 PG 30 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA AI9HU UT WOS:000337244500007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT S AU Gesko, M AF Gesko, Martin GP SGEM TI INEFFICIENT CORPORATE TAXATION AND HIDDEN TAXES IN SLOVAKIA SO POLITICAL SCIENCES, LAW, FINANCE, ECONOMICS AND TOURISM, VOL II SE International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on Social Sciences and Arts (SGEM 2014) CY SEP 01-10, 2014 CL Albena, BULGARIA SP Bulgarian Acad Sci, Acad Sci Czech Republ, Latvian Acad Sci, Polish Acad Sci, Russian Acad Sci, Serbian Acad Sci & Arts, Slovak Acad Sci Intro, Natl Acad Sci Ukraine, Natl Acad Sci Armenia, Sci Counc Japan, World Acad Sci TWAS, European Acad Sci, Arts & Lett, Acad Fine Arts Zagreb Croatia, Croatian Acad Sci & Arts, Acad Sci Moldova, Montenegrin Acad Sci & Arts, Georgian Acad Sci, Acad Fine Arts & Design Bratislava, Russian Acad Arts, Turkish Acad Sci, SGEM DE corporate taxation; effective taxation; incidence; real-estate tax AB The main goal of the paper is to evaluate the following idea: Effective taxation of corporations in Slovakia is significantly lower than supposed. It is a situation where the public sector is unable to catch the corporate profits effectively due to the for example increased mobility of the capital. We tried to find a relevant macroeconomic corporate profit measure and compare it with the real one. As the measure we use the components of the gross operating surplus - the S.11 (Non-financial corporations) and S.12 (Financial corporations) sectors (ESA 95 classification). Pressumed low corporate tax effectiveness results further into the second idea to be analyzed. We assume that the low ability of the public sector to gather the tax from economic corporate profits leads public sector to shift the tax burden more heavily on less-mobile forms of corporate tax base. Besides the statutory tax rate on corporate income other elements could influence the final amount of the tax paid by corporation. These elements we call them hidden taxes - are usually not taken into consideration when assessing the final corporate tax burden. These hidden taxes may affect the corporations and may cause distortion efficiency by reducing the neutrality of the tax system. Subsequently we will consider the corporate tax incidence problem in order to identify key areas for further research in this area of the tax theory and policy. C1 Univ Econ, Fac Natl Econ, Dept Finance, Bratislava, Slovakia. RP Gesko, M (corresponding author), Univ Econ, Fac Natl Econ, Dept Finance, Bratislava, Slovakia. CR Bartlett B., 2013, EFFECTIVE CORPORATE Christensen K, 2001, NATL TAX J, V54, P495, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2001.3.05 Drucker J., 2010, GOOGLE 2 4 RATE SHOW Dwenger N., 2008, EFFECTIVE PROFIT TAX Gruber J., 2005, TAX CORP INC 21 CENT O'Toole James, 2013, CNN MONEY Riha J., 2013, THESIS NHF EU BRATIS Sansing R., 2005, ENCY TAXATION TAX PO NR 8 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU STEF92 TECHNOLOGY LTD PI SOFIA PA 1 ANDREY LYAPCHEV BLVD, SOFIA, 1797, BULGARIA SN 2367-5659 BN 978-619-7105-26-1 J9 INT MULTIDDISCIP SCI PY 2014 BP 343 EP 350 PG 8 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA BD3FT UT WOS:000359614600044 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ritz, RA AF Ritz, Robert A. TI A new version of Edgeworth's taxation paradox SO OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; COMPETITION; DEMAND; PRICES AB Edgeworth's taxation paradox states that a unit tax can decrease the market price of a good. 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Some proposals offset that effect by returning revenue to low-income workers via reduced labor tax. We build analytical general equilibrium models with both high-skilled and low-skilled labor, and we solve for the change in real net wage of each group. Decomposition shows the separate effects of the tax rebate, higher product prices, and the changes in relative wage rates. We also include numerical examples. Even though the pollution tax injures both types of labor, in most cases we find that returning all of the revenue to low-skilled workers is still not enough to offset higher product prices. Changes in relative wage rates may further hurt low-skilled labor. Protecting low-income workers is possible in this model only if they are defined as those below a relatively low wage threshold, but we discuss many possible elaborations of this model that could affect those results. (C) 2013 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 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PD NOV PY 2013 VL 66 IS 3 BP 539 EP 553 DI 10.1016/j.jeem.2013.09.001 PG 15 WC Business; Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA 280AE UT WOS:000329000200010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bonnet, C Requillart, V AF Bonnet, Celine Requillart, Vincent TI Tax incidence with strategic firms in the soft drink market SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Excise tax; Ad valorem tax; Tax incidence; Strategic pricing; Differentiated products; Soft drinks ID RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE; CIGARETTE EXCISE TAXES; PASS-THROUGH; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; TAXATION; CONSUMPTION; OLIGOPOLY; INDUSTRY; OBESITY; HEALTH AB Because soft drink (SD) consumption is considered to be a contributor to the 'epidemic' of obesity, there is a growing interest in evaluating the impact on SD consumption of alternative tax policies. In this paper, we propose a methodology to evaluate the impact of taxation of a food market taking into account the strategic price response of both manufacturers and retailers. We apply this methodology to the French SD market and simulate the impacts of ad valorem and excise taxes. We find that firms behave differently when facing an ad valorem tax or an excise tax. An excise tax is overshifted to consumer prices while an ad valorem tax is undershifted to consumer prices. We find that an excise tax based on the sugar content of SD is the most effective at reducing SD consumption. Our results also indicate that ignoring strategic pricing by firms leads to misestimations of the impact of taxation by between 15% and 40% depending on the products and the tax implemented. In the short-term, that is, ignoring positive long-term health effects, a is an element of 9 cents/1 excise tax has a small negative welfare effect (about El/person/year). (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. 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Public Econ. PD OCT PY 2013 VL 106 BP 77 EP 88 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.010 PG 12 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 239EU UT WOS:000326006200007 OA Green Accepted DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Conefrey, T Gerald, JDF Valeri, LM Tol, RSJ AF Conefrey, Thomas Gerald, John D. Fitz Valeri, Laura Malaguzzi Tol, Richard S. J. TI The impact of a carbon tax on economic growth and carbon dioxide emissions in Ireland SO JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING AND MANAGEMENT LA English DT Article DE carbon tax; Ireland; double dividend; tax incidence ID CLIMATE POLICY; COSTS; PROTECTION; TAXATION AB This paper analyses the medium-term effects of a carbon tax on growth and CO2 emissions in Ireland, a small open economy. We find that a double dividend exists if the carbon tax revenue is recycled through reduced income taxes. If the revenue is recycled by giving a lump-sum transfer to households, a double dividend is unlikely. We also determine that a greater incidence of the carbon tax falls on capital than on labour. When combined with a decrease in income tax, there is a clear shift of the tax burden from labour to capital. Finally, most of the effect on the economy is due to changes in the competitiveness of the manufacturing and market services sectors. C1 [Conefrey, Thomas] Cent Bank Ireland, Dublin 1, Ireland. [Gerald, John D. Fitz; Valeri, Laura Malaguzzi] Econ & Social Res Inst, Dublin 2, Ireland. [Gerald, John D. Fitz] Trinity Coll Dublin, Dept Econ, Dublin, Ireland. [Tol, Richard S. J.] Univ Sussex, Dept Econ, Falmer BN1 9RF, England. [Tol, Richard S. J.] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Inst Environm Studies, Amsterdam, Netherlands. [Tol, Richard S. J.] Vrije Univ Amsterdam, Dept Spatial Econ, Amsterdam, Netherlands. RP Conefrey, T (corresponding author), Cent Bank Ireland, Dublin 1, Ireland. EM thomas.conefrey@centralbank.ie RI Tol, Richard S. J./D-5245-2011 OI Tol, Richard S. 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PD SEP 1 PY 2013 VL 56 IS 7 BP 934 EP 952 DI 10.1080/09640568.2012.709467 PG 19 WC Development Studies; Regional & Urban Planning SC Development Studies; Public Administration GA 166PY UT WOS:000320570800002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Arsic, M Altiparmakov, N AF Arsic, Milojko Altiparmakov, Nikola TI Equity aspects of VAT in emerging European countries: A case study of Serbia SO ECONOMIC SYSTEMS LA English DT Article DE Tax equity; Annual vs. lifetime tax incidence; VAT ID LIFETIME INCIDENCE; INCOME AB A belief that consumption taxation is inherently inequitable has been entrenched in a significant portion of the general public and was supported by early empirical evidence that suggested a highly regressive annual VAT incidence. However, it has been shown that much of the estimated annual VAT regressivity is due to the income under-reporting bias inherent in sample surveys. This bias is particularly important in emerging European countries due to a high shadow economy and the evasion of direct income taxes, which suggests household expenditures as a more meaningful indicator of well-being than registered income. Furthermore, theoretical considerations favor the lifetime incidence approach, whereby VAT is estimated to be proportional or mildly progressive. A micro-simulation analysis of the Serbian expenditure survey data yields incidence estimates in line with the existing literature from other countries. We show that a significant presence of own-source (small) farming production of food in many emerging European countries, including Serbia, presents an important progressivity-enhancing buffer compared to the VAT incidence in developed European countries. We conclude that the common beliefs of inherently inequitable VAT taxation are vastly overstated and poorly founded in the economic reality of emerging European countries such as Serbia, where VAT can be most adequately described as being mildly progressive. (C) 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Arsic, Milojko] Univ Belgrade, Fac Econ, Belgrade 11001, Serbia. 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PD JUN PY 2013 VL 37 IS 2 BP 171 EP 186 DI 10.1016/j.ecosys.2012.12.003 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 161QK UT WOS:000320208200003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Amano, D Itaya, JI AF Amano, Daisuke Itaya, Jun-Ichi TI Taxation In The Two-Sector Neoclassical Growth Model With Sector-Specific Externalities And Endogenous Labour Supply SO JAPANESE ECONOMIC REVIEW LA English DT Article ID GROWING ECONOMY; TAX INCIDENCE; INDETERMINACY; RETURNS AB This paper examines the long-run impacts of selective (or sector-specific) commodity, payroll, and profit taxes in a two-sector endogenous growth model with sector-specific production externalities, in which one sector produces consumption goods and the other produces investment goods. The novelty of the model is that it allows not only for endogenous labour supply but also for the intersectoral allocation of resources, which may together lead to indeterminacy. 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Econ. Rev. PD JUN PY 2013 VL 64 IS 2 BP 248 EP 275 DI 10.1111/j.1468-5876.2012.00577.x PG 28 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 138NS UT WOS:000318515900004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Weyl, EG Fabinger, M AF Weyl, E. Glen Fabinger, Michal TI Pass-Through as an Economic Tool: Principles of Incidence under Imperfect Competition SO JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY LA English DT Article ID 3RD-DEGREE PRICE-DISCRIMINATION; PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION; TAX INCIDENCE; COST CHANGES; OLIGOPOLY; WELFARE; MONOPOLY; DESIGN; MARKET; TRADE AB We extend five principles of tax incidence under perfect competition to a general model of imperfect competition. The principles cover (1) the independence of physical and economic incidence, the (2) qualitative and (3) quantitative manner in which taxes are split between consumers and producers, (4) the determinants of tax pass-through, and (5) the integration of local incidence to determine the overall division of surplus. 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G., 2009, PRICE THEORY 2 SIDED Weyl EG, 2012, Q J ECON, V127, P1971, DOI 10.1093/qje/qjs032 Weyl EG, 2009, ECON LETT, V103, P99, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.02.004 NR 86 TC 160 Z9 160 U1 7 U2 48 PU UNIV CHICAGO PRESS PI CHICAGO PA 1427 E 60TH ST, CHICAGO, IL 60637-2954 USA SN 0022-3808 J9 J POLIT ECON JI J. Polit. Econ. PD JUN PY 2013 VL 121 IS 3 BP 528 EP 583 DI 10.1086/670401 PG 56 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 166YD UT WOS:000320596200003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kotlikoff, LJ Miao, JJ AF Kotlikoff, Laurence J. Miao, Jianjun TI What Does the Corporate Income Tax Tax? A Simple Model Without Capital SO ANNALS OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Corporate tax; Risk taking; Tax incidence; Entrepreneurship ID RISK AB This paper challenges the traditional view of the corporate tax as taxing corporate capital rather than the act of incorporating. Our model has no capital. Entrepreneurs pay to go public to diversify their risk. In discouraging incorporation, the tax keeps more entrepreneurs private and exposed to more risk. The tax falls primarily on high-skilled entrepreneurs and to a lesser extent on labor, who experience less demand for their services. The wage reduction also induces marginal entrepreneurs to set up shop and experience more risk. Hence, the answer to the title's question is that the corporate tax taxes risk-sharing. C1 [Kotlikoff, Laurence J.; Miao, Jianjun] Boston Univ, Dept Econ, Boston, MA 02215 USA. [Miao, Jianjun] Cent Univ Finance & Econ, CEMA, Beijing, Peoples R China. [Miao, Jianjun] Zhejiang Univ, AFR, Hangzhou, Zhejiang, Peoples R China. RP Kotlikoff, LJ (corresponding author), Boston Univ, Dept Econ, 270 Bay State Rd, Boston, MA 02215 USA. 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PD MAY PY 2013 VL 14 IS 1 BP 1 EP 19 PG 19 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 125JE UT WOS:000317535300001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Holmes, MJ Otero, J Panagiotidis, T AF Holmes, Mark J. Otero, Jesus Panagiotidis, Theodore TI On the dynamics of gasoline market integration in the United States: Evidence from a pair-wise approach SO ENERGY ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Panel data; Pair-wise approach; Market integration; Gasoline; Speed of adjustment ID PRICE CONVERGENCE; CRITICAL-VALUES; TAX INCIDENCE; LOCAL MARKET; LAG ORDER; COMPETITION; TESTS; PRODUCT; GROWTH AB This paper employs a pair-wise approach to examine regional integration in the US gasoline market. Using gasoline price data at the state level over a period of more than two decades, we find strong support for the view that the law of one price holds in regional markets, as more than 80% of bivariate price differentials turn out to be stationary. 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PD MAR PY 2013 VL 36 BP 503 EP 510 DI 10.1016/j.eneco.2012.10.008 PG 8 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 107SC UT WOS:000316240100045 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Espinosa, J Evans, WN AF Espinosa, Javier Evans, William N. TI Excise Taxes, Tax Incidence, and the Flight to Quality: Evidence from Scanner Data SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE cigarettes; excise taxes; tax incidence; scanner data AB Because excise taxes are independent of product price, rate hikes are predicted to lower the relative cost of high-priced goods, encouraging a shift toward their purchase. Using scanner data on cigarette sales from twenty-nine states over a six-year period, we examine whether tax hikes encourage a flight to quality. Results demonstrate that a one-cent hike in taxes increases retail prices of name-brand and generic cigarettes by exactly one cent. 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Rev. PD MAR PY 2013 VL 41 IS 2 BP 147 EP 176 DI 10.1177/1091142112460724 PG 30 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA VF6JA UT WOS:000443295100001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Vetter, H AF Vetter, Henrik TI Indirect Taxation of Monopolists: A Tax on Price SO ECONOMICS-THE OPEN ACCESS OPEN-ASSESSMENT E-JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE Tax on price; ad valorem tax; tax incidence ID AD-VALOREM AB A digressive tax such as a variable rate sales tax or a tax on price gives firms an incentive for expanding output. Thus, unlike unit and ad valorem taxes which amplify the harm from monopoly, a digressive tax lessens the harm. We analyse a tax on price with respect to efficiency and practical policy appeal. In particular, we show how tax reforms based only on observation of price and quantity can make use of a tax on price in order to improve welfare. That is, it is practical to use a tax on price. The argument extends to fixed-number homogenous oligopoly. C1 Statsbiblioteket, State & Univ Lib, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. RP Vetter, H (corresponding author), Statsbiblioteket, State & Univ Lib, Univ Pk, DK-8000 Aarhus C, Denmark. EM hv@statsbiblioteket.dk CR Dalton H., 1929, PUBLIC FINANCE DELIPALLA S, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V49, P351, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O GLAISTER S, 1987, J IND ECON, V35, P281, DOI 10.2307/2098635 Hamilton SF, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V71, P233, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00066-8 Hamilton SF, 2009, AM ECON REV, V99, P458, DOI 10.1257/aer.99.1.458 Myles G., 1996, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V3, P29 Robinson J., 1933, THE ECONOMICS OF IMP SEADE J, 1980, ECONOMETRICA, V48, P479, DOI 10.2307/1911111 Shilling N., 1969, EXCISE TAXATION OF M Suits DB, 1953, Q J ECON, V67, P598, DOI 10.2307/1883604 SUMNER M, 1993, PUBLIC FINANC, V48, P297 TAM MYS, 1993, PUBLIC FINANC, V48, P303 TAM MYS, 1991, PUBLIC FINANC, V46, P123 NR 13 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 10 PU KIEL INST WORLD ECONOMY PI KIEL PA HINDENBURGUFER 66, KIEL, D-24105, GERMANY SN 1864-6042 J9 ECONOMICS-KIEL JI Economics PD FEB 20 PY 2013 VL 7 AR 20136 DI 10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2013-6 PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 185IX UT WOS:000321962200001 OA DOAJ Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Carbonnier, C AF Carbonnier, Clement TI Pass-through of Per Unit and ad Valorem Consumption Taxes: Evidence from Alcoholic Beverages in France SO B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; VAT; excise taxes; alcoholic beverages; imperfect competition ID IMPERFECT COMPETITION; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; TAXATION; OLIGOPOLY; PRICES; RETAIL; ENTRY AB Economic theory states that in a market with imperfect competition, per unit consumption taxes should induce a greater increase in prices than ad valorem consumption taxes. This implies that consumers bear a greater share of the tax burden with per unit consumption taxes than that with ad valorem consumption taxes. This article seeks to test this theoretical result empirically using the French market for alcoholic beverages, which is subject to both per unit (excise taxes) and ad valorem (value-added tax, VAT) consumption taxes. Econometric analysis is applied to two consumption tax reforms affecting two distinct French markets for alcoholic beverages, those for beer and for aperitif. In 1995, the full rate of VAT increased from 18.6 to 20.6%; excise taxes on alcoholic beverages increased in 1997. Graphical evidence and econometric results confirm the statements of economic theory. For both classes of alcoholic beverages - beer and aperitif - the change in prices due to per unit excise taxes was significantly larger than that due to ad valorem VAT. C1 [Carbonnier, Clement] Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France. [Carbonnier, Clement] Sci Po, LIEPP, F-75007 Paris, France. RP Carbonnier, C (corresponding author), Univ Cergy Pontoise, THEMA, 33 Bd Port, F-95000 Cergy Pontoise, France. EM clement.carbonnier@u-cergy.fr CR Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P231, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00085-2 Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 BESLEY T, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V40, P359, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90048-0 Besley T. 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Econ. Anal. Policy PY 2013 VL 13 IS 2 BP 837 EP 863 DI 10.1515/bejeap-2013-0047 PG 27 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA AN0RO UT WOS:000340291900012 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Hajek, L Hamplova, E Jedlicka, P Kovarnik, J AF Hajek, Ladislav Hamplova, Eva Jedlicka, Pavel Kovarnik, Jaroslav TI THE CAUSALITIES OF THE TAX INCIDENCE - BASIC RESOURCES SO E & M EKONOMIE A MANAGEMENT LA Czech DT Article DE Direct tax; indirect tax; tax system; value added tax AB Tax could be defined as mandatory, irreversible, non-purpose, non-equivalent payment into the public budget. There are two important types of taxes in every tax system, namely direct and indirect taxes. This article is focused on important part of current tax theory and tax policy which explains tax incidence as a phenomenon following the taxes from the very beginning. The factors influencing the opinions on the tax system equity are important for the analysis of the impacts of taxes on the taxpayer. The analysis is based on the quantitative measurement through the tax collection and efficiency of this collection into the state budget. This article is focused on the qualitative analysis where the factors of tax incidence are to find, due to the opinions of the respondents of the questionnaire. The important role for the responses assessment and drawing of the conclusions has the level of economic, precisely tax literacy among the respondents. The analysis of this literacy is second important part of this article. Analyzed issue is part of broader context which is solved within the project of specific research of team from Department of Economics, Faculty of Informatics and Management, University of Hradec Kralove, called "The Causalities of Tax Incidence". The aim of this project is to identify the key factors of tax incidence and their scope according the different groups of inhabitants. This article also deals with value added tax as the most important indirect tax and its position in tax system of the Czech Republic, while the too high rates of this tax are considered as significant problems among the respondents of analysed questionnaire. C1 [Hajek, Ladislav; Hamplova, Eva; Jedlicka, Pavel; Kovarnik, Jaroslav] Univ Hradec Kralove, Katedra Ekon, Fak Informat & Managementu, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. RP Hajek, L (corresponding author), Univ Hradec Kralove, Katedra Ekon, Fak Informat & Managementu, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. EM ladislav.hajek@uhk.cz; eva.hamplova@uhk.cz; pavel.jedlicka@uhk.cz; jaroslav.kovarnik@uhk.cz RI Hamplova, Eva/N-8218-2017 OI Hamplova, Eva/0000-0002-4314-873X CR Banociova A, 2009, E M EKON MANAG, V12, P104 CERNOHAUSOVA P., 2011, VYVOI DPH ROKU 1993 CESKA DANOVA SPRAVA, 2012, DAT VYB DAN EUROSTAT, 2012, STAT VYB DAN Hajek L, 2003, POLIT EKON, V51, P714 HAJEK L., 2012, EKONOMIA HOSPODARSKA Hajek L., 2007, EKONOMIE DANE EKONOM OECD, 2012, DAN DAT D SPORTR DAN SVOBODOVA L., 2012, P 1 INT C FIN ACC AU, P293 NR 9 TC 5 Z9 5 U1 1 U2 14 PU TECHNICAL UNIV LIBEREC PI LIBEREC 1 PA FAC ECONOMICS, STUDENTSKA 2, IC 46747885, LIBEREC 1, 461 17, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 1212-3609 EI 2336-5064 J9 E M EKON MANAG JI E M Ekon. Manag. PY 2013 VL 16 IS 4 BP 158 EP 169 PG 12 WC Economics; Management SC Business & Economics GA 278YI UT WOS:000328925400012 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Chen, BL Lu, CH AF Chen, Been-Lon Lu, Chia-Hui TI Optimal factor tax incidence in two-sector human capital-based models SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Two-sector model; Human capital; Optimal factor tax incidence ID ENDOGENOUS GROWTH; OPTIMAL TAXATION; LIFE-CYCLE; INCOME TAXATION; ACCUMULATION; DYNAMICS; TRANSFORMATION; FLUCTUATIONS; EQUILIBRIUM; POLICY AB This paper studies the optimal factor tax incidence in a standard two-sector, human capital-based endogenous growth model elucidated by Lucas (1988). Capital income taxes generate dynamic inefficiency for capital accumulation and labor income taxes create dynamic inefficiency for human capital accumulation. A factor tax incidence is a tradeoff between these two inefficiencies. A switch from capital income taxes to labor income taxes reduces the long-run welfare coming from lower leisure and increases the long-run welfare originated from higher economic growth and higher consumption. Because the representative agent's learning time and human capital are inseparable and thus affect learning activities at the same degree, we find that based on the current US income tax code, it is optimal to first tax capital income, and to resort to taxing labor income only when tax revenue is insufficient to cover government expenditure. (C) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Chen, Been-Lon] Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, Taipei 11529, Taiwan. [Lu, Chia-Hui] Natl Taipei Univ, Dept Econ, Taipei, Taiwan. RP Chen, BL (corresponding author), Acad Sinica, Inst Econ, 128 Acad Rd,Sect 2, Taipei 11529, Taiwan. EM bchen@econ.sinica.edu.tw CR ATKESON A, 1999, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, V23, P3 BENHABIB J, 1994, J ECON THEORY, V63, P113, DOI 10.1006/jeth.1994.1035 Bond EW, 1996, J ECON THEORY, V68, P149, DOI 10.1006/jeth.1996.0008 CASSOU S. 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Public Econ. PD JAN PY 2013 VL 97 BP 75 EP 94 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2012.09.008 PG 20 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 094CE UT WOS:000315239800007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Zubr, V Kolerova, K AF Zubr, Vaclav Kolerova, Karolina BE Jedlicka, P TI CHANGES IN TAX LAWS AND THE METHOD OF PERCEPTION BY CITIZENS IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC SO INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: HRADEC ECONOMIC DAYS 2013 - ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF REGIONS, PT III LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT International Scientific Conference on Hradec Economic Days 2013 - Economic Development and Management Region CY FEB 19-20, 2013 CL Hradec Kralove, CZECH REPUBLIC SP Czech Natl Bank DE behaviour; payer; public opinion; tax system; taxation AB This paper focuses on the tax changes and its influence on the public opinion, specifically in the Czech Republic. Firstly, the concept of the tax and its fiscal function is explained. Secondly, the tax system in the Czech Republic is specified in more details. The main purpose of this paper is taxation and tax changes and its impact on the public purchase behavior. This behavior could be mostly influenced by the change of indirect taxes. These taxes are those one that are changed most frequently. Therefore, the central part is concentrated on the indirect taxes. Moreover, the results of the research dedicated on the causalities of the tax incidence are presented. C1 [Zubr, Vaclav; Kolerova, Karolina] Univ Hradec Kralove, Hradec Kralove, Czech Republic. EM vaclav.zubr@uhk.cz; karolina.kolerova@uhk.cz CR [Anonymous], 2012, PORTAL TAX ADVISORS Bird R., 2004, ASIA PACIFIC TAX B, P134 Czech, 2011, POR 9 ZAK DPH Czech, 2012, ZAK 1 2012 SBORN DAN Czech, 2011, POR 6 7 ZAK DAN PRIJ Radvan M., 2010, CZECH TAX LAW Toye J, 2000, CAMBRIDGE J ECON, V24, P21, DOI 10.1093/cje/24.1.21 NR 7 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU GAUDEAMUS PI HRADEC KRALOVE PA UNIV HRADEC KRALOVE, ROKITANSKEHO 62, HRADEC KRALOVE, 500 03, CZECH REPUBLIC BN 978-80-7435-251-5 PY 2013 BP 539 EP + PG 2 WC Economics; Regional & Urban Planning SC Business & Economics; Public Administration GA BC0II UT WOS:000349058600077 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ma, GN Yan, XD Xi, L AF Ma, Guonan Yan, Xiandong Liu Xi TI China's evolving reserve requirements SO JOURNAL OF CHINESE ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS STUDIES LA English DT Article DE reserve requirements; sterilisation tools; monetary policy; net interest margin and spread; tax incidence; Chinese economy AB We examine the role of reserve requirements as a cheaper substitute for the open market operations of the People's Bank of China (PBC) to sterilise foreign exchange interventions in recent years. China's reserve requirements have also been used to address a range of other policy objectives, not least macroeconomic management, financial stability and credit policy. The preference for reserve requirements reflects the size of foreign exchange sterilisation and the associated costs, in a quantity-oriented monetary policy framework faced with policy dilemmas. The PBC often finds it easier to make reserve requirement adjustments than interest rate decisions and enjoys greater discretion in applying this tool. The monetary effects of reserve requirements need to be explored not in isolation but in conjunction with other policy actions. Depending on the policy mix, higher reserve requirements tend to signal a tightening bias, to squeeze excess reserves of banks, to push market interest rates higher and to help widen net interest spreads, thus tightening domestic monetary conditions. Reserve requirements, however, impose an implicit tax burden on Chinese banks, albeit the latter seem to pass through a large but incomplete portion of these costs to their customers. C1 [Ma, Guonan] Bank Int Settlements, 78 F Two Int Financial Ctr, Hong Hom, Hong Kong, Peoples R China. [Yan, Xiandong; Liu Xi] Peoples Bank China, Stat & Anal Dept, Beijing, Peoples R China. RP Ma, GN (corresponding author), Bank Int Settlements, 78 F Two Int Financial Ctr, Hong Hom, Hong Kong, Peoples R China. EM Guonan.ma@bis.org CR Borio C, 1997, BIS WORKING PAPERS Borio C., 2009, BIS WORKING PAPERS Burger A, 1977, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK, P13 Chen H, 2011, HKIMR WORKING PAPERS, V26 Conway P, 2010, OECD EC DEP WORKING, V822 Disyatat Piti, 2008, BIS WORKING PAPERS, V269 He D., 2011, 212011 HKIMR Ho C., 2008, BIS WORKING PAPERS, V253 Ma G, 2011, BIS WORKING PAPERS, V360 Mohanty Madhusudan S., 2008, BIS PAPERS, V35, P1 Montoro C., 2011, BIS Q REV, P53 Shu C., 2010, HKMA CHINA EC ISSUES Wang T., 2011, UBS INVESTMENT R FEB Yi G., 2009, FINANCIAL RES, V1, P1 Zhang X., 2011, CHOICE APPL INNOVATI NR 15 TC 19 Z9 19 U1 0 U2 0 PU ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD PI ABINGDON PA 2-4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND SN 1476-5284 EI 1476-5292 J9 J CHIN ECON BUS STUD JI J. Chin. Econ. Bus. Stud. PY 2013 VL 11 IS 2 SI SI BP 117 EP 137 DI 10.1080/14765284.2013.789682 PG 21 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V81YD UT WOS:000212284600004 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bond, SA Gardiner, B Tyler, P AF Bond, Shaun A. Gardiner, Ben Tyler, Peter TI The impact of enterprise zone tax incentives on local property markets in England: who actually benefits? SO JOURNAL OF PROPERTY RESEARCH LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; property taxes; enterprise zones and commercial real estate leases; England; enterprise; commercial property; capitalisation rates; hedonic method AB Research on the impact of property taxes on local real estate markets has a long history in the urban economics literature but few studies have considered this issue in the context of the commercial real estate market or on data from outside the USA. This is surprising given the use which governments make of property tax exemptions to assist local regeneration with the UK Government recently announcing some 24 new enterprise zones (EZs) in England. In this study we use a novel data-set on commercial real estate leases to investigate the incidence of the local property tax savings. Our data-set covers both taxed and tax exempt areas during the operation of the EZ designations in the UK. Our findings show that a large part of the tax savings appears to be captured in higher rents charged by landlords. C1 [Bond, Shaun A.] Univ Cincinnati, Carl H Lindner Coll Business, UC Real Estate Ctr, Dept Finance & Real Estate, Cincinnati, OH USA. [Gardiner, Ben] Cambridge Econometr, Cambridge, England. [Gardiner, Ben] IPTS, JRC, Seville, Spain. [Tyler, Peter] Univ Cambridge, Dept Land Econ, 19 Silver St, Cambridge CB3 9EP, England. RP Tyler, P (corresponding author), Univ Cambridge, Dept Land Econ, 19 Silver St, Cambridge CB3 9EP, England. EM pt23@cam.ac.uk OI Bond, Shaun/0000-0002-6368-3828 CR Adair A. 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Prop. Res. PY 2013 VL 30 IS 1 BP 67 EP 85 DI 10.1080/09599916.2012.721381 PG 19 WC Urban Studies SC Urban Studies GA VB4MA UT WOS:000415484900004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Bozdoganoglu, B AF Bozdoganoglu, Burcin TI Accommodation Tax Application and Applicability in Turkey SO MALIYE DERGISI LA Turkish DT Article DE Accommodation Tax; City Tax; Tourism Tax; Tax Incidence; Exceptions and Exemptions AB Accommodation Tax is an indirect tax levied on accommodation cost and applied in different names such as City Tax, Tourism Tax, Hotel Tax, etc. in the EU countries, the USA and Japan. This study aims to examine the Accommodation Tax, which was included in a draft law but rejected by the sub-commission in Turkey in 2008, within the framework of its practice in foreign countries and to create an alternative tax proposal for Turkey. In this study, suggestions have been offered for taxation system which is the most suitable for the conditions our country after having examined the way of its application in foreign countries where Accommodation Tax, which is possible to be on the agenda in the EU harmonization process, is levied and the model which remained as a draft in our country. EM burcindogan@gmail.com CR [Anonymous], 2002, INV TAX EUR UN BONHAM C, 1992, NATL TAX J, V45, P433 Durbarry R, 2008, REV DEV ECON, V12, P21, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9361.2008.00432.x NR 3 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU MALIYE BAKANLIGI PI ANKARA PA MALIYE BAKANLIGI, ANKARA, 00000, TURKEY SN 1300-3623 J9 MALIYE DERG JI Maliye Derg. PD JAN-JUN PY 2013 IS 164 BP 131 EP 149 PG 19 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA V6H0T UT WOS:000420277400009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Clausing, KA AF Clausing, Kimberly A. TI WHO PAYS THE CORPORATE TAX IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY? SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE corporate taxation; tax incidence; tax competition; international taxation AB The theory of corporate tax incidence suggests that corporate taxes are more likely to harm labor in a globally integrated economy. However. a review of the prior empirical work in this area fails to reveal persuasive empirical evidence of adverse effects on labor, since these studies have several weaknesses that interfere with robust inferences. Using new data and methods, this paper provides additional evidence on the incidence of corporate taxation, finding no robust link between corporate taxation and wages. I discuss possible explanations for these findings as well as policy implications. C1 [Clausing, Kimberly A.] Reed Coll, Econ, Portland, OR 97202 USA. RP Clausing, KA (corresponding author), Reed Coll, Econ, Portland, OR 97202 USA. EM clausing@reed.edu FU Smith Richardson Foundation FX I am grateful for financial support from the Smith Richardson Foundation. This paper elaborates on the analysis of my prior work in Clausing (2012); some sections of text are excerpted from that paper. I received valuable comments on this work from Joel Slemrod, Ed Kleinbard, Jesse Edgerton, and participants at the 2011 American Tax Policy Institute conference on Competitiveness, the 2011 National Tax Association Conference in New Orleans, the 2012 International Conference on Econometrics at Eastern Mediterranean University, and seminars at the Paris School of Economics, the University of Cyprus, and Eastern Mediterranean University. 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S., 2011, CORPORATE TAXPAYERS Mirrlees J, 2012, NATL TAX J, V65, P655, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2012.3.06 Piketty Thomas, 2012, 17989 NBER Pirttila J, 2011, SCAND J ECON, V113, P120, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9442.2010.01635.x Randolph W. C., 2006, WORKING PAPER SERIES Riedel N, 2011, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V18, P399, DOI 10.1007/s10797-011-9164-1 Slemrod J., 2008, TAXING OURSELVES VanReenen J, 1996, Q J ECON, V111, P195 Zucman Gabriel, 2012, WORKING PAPER NR 47 TC 30 Z9 30 U1 0 U2 11 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 EI 1944-7477 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PY 2013 VL 66 IS 1 BP 151 EP 184 DI 10.17310/ntj.2013.1.06 PG 34 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA V40CQ UT WOS:000209457100006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gravelle, J AF Gravelle, Jennifer TI CORPORATE TAX INCIDENCE: REVIEW OF GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ESTIMATES AND ANALYSIS SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Review DE corporate tax incidence; general equilibrium models; Harberger model ID INCOME-TAX; TAXATION; SUBSTITUTION; LABOR AB This paper identifies the major drivers of corporate tax incidence in open-economy general equilibrium models and compares estimates from four major studies. These studies vary in their elasticity assumptions, and adjusting the estimates to reflect central empirical estimates of those elasticities suggests capital bears the majority of the corporate income tax burden. This paper further presents an alternative method for determining corporate tax incidence that distinguishes between global effects of corporate taxes and excise effects that vary among nations. Under this approach. even in an open economy, capital could bear virtually the entire tax burden. EM jennifer.gravelle@cbo.gov CR Altshuler Rosanne, 2006, TAX NOTES, V110, P979 ARMINGTON PS, 1969, INT MONET FUND S PAP, V16, P159 Atkinson A., 1980, LECT PUBLIC EC Auerbach AJ, 2006, TAX POL EC, V20, P1 BARON DP, 1981, INT ECON REV, V22, P567, DOI 10.2307/2526158 Batra Raveendra N., 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P343 BHATIA KB, 1981, J PUBLIC ECON, V16, P93, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90044-X Chirinko RS, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P339, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.2.07 Chirinko RS, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V74, P53, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00024-9 Congressional Budget Office, 2005, CORP INC TAX RAT INT CRAGG JG, 1967, J POLIT ECON, V75, P811, DOI 10.1086/259361 de Mooij RA, 2003, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V10, P673, DOI 10.1023/A:1026329920854 Gallaway Michael P., 2000, 200009A OFF EC US IN Gravelle J, 2010, TAX REFORM IN OPEN ECONOMIES: INTERNATIONAL AND COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES, P38 Gravelle Jane G., 2009, TAX REFORM 21 CENTUR, P355 Gravelle Jane G., 2006, BE J ECON ANAL POLI, V6 Gravelle Jennifer, 2007, P 100 ANN C TAX NAT, P94 GRAVELLE JG, 1989, J POLIT ECON, V97, P749, DOI 10.1086/261627 GRUBERT H, 1994, NATL TAX J, V47, P111 HAMERMESH DS, 1979, J HUM RESOUR, V14, P518, DOI 10.2307/145322 HARBERGER AC, 1962, J POLIT ECON, V70, P215, DOI 10.1086/258636 Harberger AC, 2008, FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS, P283 Harberger Arnold C., 1995, TAX POLICY EC GROWTH, P51 Krzyzaniak Marian, 1963, SHIFTING CORPORATION McDaniel Christine A., 2002, 200202A OFF EC US IN McLure Jr Charles E., 1975, J PUBLIC ECON, V4, P125 Mieszkowski P., 1972, J PUBLIC ECON, V1, P73 MUTTI J, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V27, P291, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90053-2 PARAI AK, 1988, PUBLIC FINANC, V43, P414 Parai Amar K., 1992, INT EC J, V6, P75 Randolph William C, 2006, 200609 CBO RATTI RA, 1977, J PUBLIC ECON, V8, P233, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(77)90021-4 RATTI RA, 1977, J ECON THEORY, V14, P68, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(77)90085-0 RATTI RA, 1977, SOUTHERN ECON J, V44, P85, DOI 10.2307/1057302 SHOVEN JB, 1976, J POLIT ECON, V84, P1261, DOI 10.1086/260511 Zodrow GR, 2001, PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE, P79 ZODROW GR, 1986, REG SCI URBAN ECON, V16, P309, DOI 10.1016/0166-0462(86)90028-1 NR 37 TC 28 Z9 28 U1 0 U2 7 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 EI 1944-7477 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PY 2013 VL 66 IS 1 BP 185 EP 214 DI 10.17310/ntj.2013.1.07 PG 30 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA V40CQ UT WOS:000209457100007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Liu, L Altshuler, R AF Liu, Li Altshuler, Rosanne TI MEASURING THE BURDEN OF THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX UNDER IMPERFECT COMPETITION SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; wage determination; corporate income tax; market structure ID EXTERNALITIES; COUNTRIES; TAXATION; WAGES AB We model and estimate the incidence of the corporate income tax under imperfect competition. Identification comes from variation in effective marginal tax rates in the United States across industries and time. Our empirical results suggest that labor bears a significant portion of the burden of the corporate income tax. In addition, we find that the elasticity of wages with respect to the corporate marginal effective tax rate increases with industry concentration. Over all industries, our estimates suggest that a $1.00 increase in corporate tax revenue decreases wages by approximately $0.60. C1 [Liu, Li] Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford, England. [Altshuler, Rosanne] Rutgers State Univ, Dept Econ, New Brunswick, NJ 08903 USA. RP Liu, L (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford, England. EM li.liu@sbs.ox.ac.uk; altshule@rci.rutgers.edu FU ESRCEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [RES -060-25-0033] FX We thank Steve Bond, Michael Devereux, Clemens Fuest, William Gentry, Jane Gravelle, Jennifer Gravelle, Benjamin Harris, Roger Klein, Mark Killingsworth, Jack Mintz, Hilary Sigman, and participants at the 2011 RES Annual Congress, the 2011 EEA-ESEM Annual Congress, the 2011 IIPF Annual Congress, the 2011 NTA Annual Conference, the 2012 AEA Annual Meetings, and workshops at Rutgers University and Oxford University for helpful comments. An earlier version of this paper was circulated with the title "Passing It On: The Incidence of the Corporate Income Tax under Imperfect Competition." Li acknowledges financial support from the ESRC (Grant No RES -060-25-0033). All errors are our own. CR Altshuler Rosanne, 2002, 200226 RUT U DEP EC Arulampalam W, 2012, EUR ECON REV, V56, P1038, DOI 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2012.03.003 Atkinson A., 1980, LECT PUBLIC EC Auerbach AJ, 2006, TAX POL EC, V20, P1 Besley TJ, 1998, J PUBLIC ECON, V70, P383, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00041-3 Carroll Robert, 2010, 8 TAX FDN Clausing KA, 2013, NATL TAX J, V66, P151, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2013.1.06 DAVIDSON C, 1985, J POLIT ECON, V93, P1212, DOI 10.1086/261356 Desai M. A., 2007, LABOR CAPITAL UNPUB Devereux MP, 2007, J PUBLIC ECON, V91, P451, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.07.005 Devereux MP, 2008, J PUBLIC ECON, V92, P1210, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.09.005 Dickens W. T., 1987, UNEMPLOYMENT STRUCTU, P48 Dickens W. 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H., 2009, CORPORATE TAX INCIDE Hassett Kevin A., 2010, 185 AM ENT I PUBL PO Heckman James J., 2006, HDB EC ED, V1, P307, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1574-0692(06)01007-5 HELWEGE J, 1992, J LABOR ECON, V10, P55, DOI 10.1086/298278 KRUEGER AB, 1988, ECONOMETRICA, V56, P259, DOI 10.2307/1911072 Liu Li, 2011, THESIS RUTGERS U NEW Mackie JB, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P293, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.2.06 MUTTI J, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V27, P291, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90053-2 Randolph William C., 2006, 200609 C BUDG OFF Rork JC, 2003, NATL TAX J, V56, P775, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2003.4.04 Symeonidis G, 2008, REV ECON STAT, V90, P134, DOI 10.1162/rest.90.1.134 Winner H, 2005, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V12, P667, DOI 10.1007/s10797-005-2915-0 Wooldridge J., 2008, ECONOMETRIC ANAL CRO NR 49 TC 27 Z9 27 U1 0 U2 8 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 EI 1944-7477 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PY 2013 VL 66 IS 1 BP 215 EP 237 DI 10.17310/ntj.2013.1.08 PG 23 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA V40CQ UT WOS:000209457100008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Cronin, JA Lin, EY Power, L Cooper, M AF Cronin, Julie Anne Lin, Emily Y. Power, Laura Cooper, Michael TI DISTRIBUTING THE CORPORATE INCOME TAX: REVISED US TREASURY METHODOLOGY SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article DE distributional analysis; corporate tax incidence AB The purpose of this analysis is to improve the U.S Department of the Treasury's distributional model and methodology by defining new model parameters. We compute the percentage of capital income attributable to normal versus supernormal return, the percentage of normal return attributable to the "cash flow tax" portion of the tax that does not impose a tax burden, and the portion of the burdensome tax on the normal return to capital borne by capital income versus labor income. In summary, 82 percent of the corporate income tax burden is borne by capital income and 18 percent is borne by labor income. C1 [Cronin, Julie Anne; Lin, Emily Y.; Power, Laura; Cooper, Michael] US Dept Treasury, Washington, DC 20226 USA. RP Cronin, JA (corresponding author), US Dept Treasury, Washington, DC 20226 USA. EM julie.anne.cronin@treasury.gov; emily.lin@treasury.gov; laura.power@treasury.gov; michael.cooper@treasury.gov CR [Anonymous], 2011, TRENDS DISTR HOUS IN Auerbach A., 1987, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLIC Auerbach A. 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Tax J. PY 2013 VL 66 IS 1 BP 239 EP 262 DI 10.17310/ntj.2013.1.09 PG 24 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA V40CQ UT WOS:000209457100009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Zimmermannova, J Mensik, M AF Zimmermannova, Jarmila Mensik, Michal TI EX-POST ANALYSIS OF SOLID FUELS, NATURAL GAS AND ELECTRICITY TAXATION INTRODUCTION SO POLITICKA EKONOMIE LA Czech DT Article DE ex-post analysis; environmental taxation; energy consumption; CO2 emissions; price indexes; energy intensive sectors; Czech Republic ID CZECH; TAXES; IMPACTS; REFORM; POLICY AB In January 2008 the Czech Republic introduced the environmental taxation based on the directive 2003/96/EC, restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity. Environmental taxes are imposed on electricity, solid fuels and natural gas. This paper discusses impacts of environmental taxation in the Czech Republic in the period after its implementation, particularly impacts on price indexes of energy intensive sectors, structure of energy products consumption in the economy and production of CO2 emissions by sectors ranking among EU ETS. The paper is divided into six parts. The first part is the introduction where both the main target of the paper and four hypotheses for testing are formulated. The theoretical problems which are connected with the impact of taxation and tax incidence are discussed in the second part. The third part describes the ideas and expectations of lawmakers regarding environmental taxation implementation, precisely European Commission, Ministry of Finance and Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic. In the fourth part authors describe the methodology and data, provide results of ex-post analysis based on both linear and non-linear correlation analyses. The next part deals with the discussion of the results and the hypotheses testing. The last part, conclusion, focuses on the main ex-post analysis findings and formulates the recommendations. C1 [Zimmermannova, Jarmila; Mensik, Michal] Moravian Univ Coll Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic. RP Zimmermannova, J (corresponding author), Moravian Univ Coll Olomouc, Olomouc, Czech Republic. EM jarmila.zimmermannova@mvso.cz; michal.mensik@mvso.cz RI Zimmermannova, Jarmila/Y-5089-2018 OI Zimmermannova, Jarmila/0000-0001-7805-2773 CR ANDERSEN M. 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Ekon. PY 2013 VL 61 IS 1 BP 46 EP 66 DI 10.18267/j.polek.883 PG 21 WC Economics; Political Science SC Business & Economics; Government & Law GA 109KY UT WOS:000316368600003 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Valencia, AR Reynoso, LH AF Robles Valencia, Arturo Huesca Reynoso, Luis TI Tax incidence in Mexico: Is it possible to increase revenues without affecting the population? SO REVISTA FINANZAS Y POLITICA ECONOMICA LA Spanish DT Article DE tax incidence; redistributive effect; tax collection effectiveness AB This document reviews the theoretical and empirical literature concerning tax incidence and the possibility of generating a situation in which tax collection is increased on the basis of fair treatment for taxpayers on the part of the tax system. All of the above with the intention of reaching horizontal equity and with the aim to improve the welfare level in accordance with a redistributive effect. 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Lin, Wei TI Constructing a Model of Lottery Tax Incidence Measurement: Revisiting the Illinois Lottery Tax for Education SO JOURNAL OF EDUCATION FINANCE LA English DT Article ID REGRESSIVITY AB Nearly half a century of lottery scholarship has measured lottery tax incidence predominantly through either the Suits Index or regression analysis. The present study builds on historic lottery tax burden measurement to present a comprehensive set of tools to determine the tax incidence of individual games in addition to determining which lottery consumer demographic bears the burden of the Illinois lottery tax. Previous research has suggested that the Illinois lottery presents an ambiguous tax-burden determination, which prompts our selection of that state for this study. Results of Suits Index analysis with corresponding confidence intervals suggest that the Illinois lottery functions as a regressive tax on lottery consumers. Lottery games in Illinois were found to vary greatly in their degree of regressivity. Regression analysis provides a sequential model building illustration to suggest the importance of model justification and appropriateness in determining lottery tax incidence. Regression results reveal the impact of gender, education, race, age, and economic status on lottery burden determination. The significance of this study is in the presentation of a comprehensive set of metrics provided to educational policymakers as they determine which public finance tools to employ in raising funds to finance public schools. C1 [Daberkow, Kevin S.] Ohio Univ, Coll Educ, Dept Educ Studies, Athens, OH 45701 USA. [Lin, Wei] Ohio Univ, Dept Math, Athens, OH 45701 USA. RP Daberkow, KS (corresponding author), Ohio Univ, Coll Educ, Dept Educ Studies, Athens, OH 45701 USA. CR Anderson JE, 2003, NATL TAX J, V56, P81, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2003.1.05 BRINNER RE, 1975, NATL TAX J, V28, P395 Campbell N. 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TI The Effect of Cigarette Taxation on Prices: An Empirical Analysis Using Local-Level Data SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; cigarettes; excise taxes; taxation; overshifting AB This article combines new, author-collected tax data with data both from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association cost of living index and from the Tax Burden on Tobacco to measure the relative effects of city, county, and state excise cigarette taxation on cigarette prices. The results indicate that a $1 increase in the state excise cigarette tax increases cigarette prices between $1.10 and $1.14, but that a $1 increase in a city-or county-level excise tax increases prices by $1.07. These findings are similar between premium and generic cigarette brands. Additionally, urban areas located near states with lower cigarette taxes tend to have lower cigarette prices relative to urban areas located near states with the same or higher tax rates. C1 [Sullivan, Ryan S.] Naval Postgrad Sch, Econ, Monterey, CA USA. [Dutkowsky, Donald H.] Syracuse Univ, Dept Econ, Maxwell Sch Citizenship & Publ Affairs, Syracuse, NY 13244 USA. RP Sullivan, RS (corresponding author), Naval Postgrad Sch, 287 Halligan Hall, Monterey, CA 93943 USA. 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TI Tax incidence under imperfect competition: Comment SO INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION LA English DT Editorial Material DE Tax incidence; Market power; Conjectural variations; Conduct parameter AB Delipalla and O'Donnell (2001) contains a formula for the incidence of specific and ad valorem taxes in a conjectural variation oligopoly model with potentially asymmetric firms. The formula is incorrect. We derive the correct formula and provide a discussion of the error and its implications for empirical studies of pass-through. (c) 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Reny, Philip J.] Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA. [Wilkie, Simon J.] Univ So Calif, Dept Econ, Los Angeles, CA 90089 USA. [Williams, Michael A.] Competit Econ LLC, Emeryville, CA USA. RP Reny, PJ (corresponding author), Univ Chicago, Dept Econ, Chicago, IL 60637 USA. 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PD SEP PY 2012 VL 30 IS 5 BP 399 EP 402 DI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2012.04.001 PG 4 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 998XH UT WOS:000308273200001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Guenther, DA Sansing, RC AF Guenther, David A. Sansing, Richard C. TI Unintended Consequences of LIFO Repeal: The Case of the Oil Industry SO ACCOUNTING REVIEW LA English DT Article DE LIFO; FIFO; tax incidence ID PARADOX; DEMAND AB This study examines the effect on firm value of repealing the last-in, first-out (LIFO) inventory method for tax purposes. Our model extends prior literature by determining quantities and prices in equilibrium, rather than specifying them exogenously. We find that LIFO repeal could increase the future after-tax cash flows of firms that had used LIFO, because the higher tax costs associated with FIFO result in lower equilibrium quantities and higher equilibrium output prices, which increase pretax cash flows. 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PD SEP PY 2012 VL 87 IS 5 BP 1589 EP 1602 DI 10.2308/accr-50194 PG 14 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA 015IM UT WOS:000309439600005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Muthitacharoen, A Zodrow, GR AF Muthitacharoen, Athiphat Zodrow, George R. TI Revisiting the Excise Tax Effects of the Property Tax SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE property tax incidence; excise tax effects; capital tax view; new view; small open economy AB The authors analyze the excise tax effects of a general property tax from the perspective of a small open economy facing a perfectly elastic supply of capital. The model differs from most that have appeared in the literature in the following ways: (1) the property tax is applied in a four-sector model with three taxed sectors-manufacturing, housing, and services, and a tax-exempt agricultural sector. Only manufacturing and agriculture produce tradable goods; (2) the analysis considers an "intermediate run'' time frame in which labor is perfectly mobile across production sectors but fixed within the jurisdiction, while land is fixed in each sector; and (3) all production sectors use capital, labor, and land. The authors find that the excise tax effects are borne primarily by labor and land. The results also indicate that the degree of backward tax shifting declines markedly in a longer run time frame in which labor is perfectly mobile across jurisdictions. C1 [Muthitacharoen, Athiphat] Congress Budget Off, Tax Anal Div, Washington, DC 20515 USA. [Zodrow, George R.] Rice Univ, Baker Inst Publ Policy, Houston, TX USA. [Zodrow, George R.] Univ Oxford, Ctr Business Taxat, Oxford, England. RP Muthitacharoen, A (corresponding author), Congress Budget Off, Tax Anal Div, Washington, DC 20515 USA. 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Rev. PD SEP PY 2012 VL 40 IS 5 BP 555 EP 583 DI 10.1177/1091142112448416 PG 29 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA VF6IQ UT WOS:000443292700001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Turner, N AF Turner, Nicholas TI Who benefits from student aid? The economic incidence of tax-based federal student aid SO ECONOMICS OF EDUCATION REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Bennett Hypothesis; Student aid incidence; Tax-based federal student aid ID HIGHER-EDUCATION; COLLEGE ATTENDANCE; PRICE RESPONSE; FINANCIAL-AID; IMPACT; SUBSIDIES; TUITION; REFORM; CROWD; HOPE AB Federal benefit programs. including federal student aid, are designed to aid targeted populations. Behavioral responses to these programs may alter the incidence of their benefits, a possibility that receives less attention in the literature compared to tax incidence. 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PD AUG PY 2012 VL 31 IS 4 BP 463 EP 481 DI 10.1016/j.econedurev.2011.12.008 PG 19 WC Economics; Education & Educational Research SC Business & Economics; Education & Educational Research GA 958UG UT WOS:000305265600009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Di Giacomo, M Piacenza, M Turati, G AF Di Giacomo, Marina Piacenza, Massimiliano Turati, Gilberto TI Are "flexible" taxation mechanisms effective in stabilizing fuel prices? An evaluation considering wholesale fuel markets SO ENERGY ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Fuel markets; Excise taxes; Sterilization policy; Antitrust policy ID AD-VALOREM; GASOLINE; REGRESSION AB This paper analyses the incidence of specific taxes in fuel markets, and exploits the findings to simulate the effects of government interventions aimed at mitigating oil price fluctuations. Several reduced-form model specifications are estimated to study tax incidence, using wholesale equilibrium prices for both gasoline and motor diesel in the Italian fuel industry over the period 1996-2007 as dependent variables. We then assess the impact on fuel prices stemming from the creation of an automatic fiscal mechanism consisting of reductions in specific taxes matching the rise in oil prices. Our evidence supports the idea that "flexible" taxation mechanisms focused only on excise taxes could not be a viable policy for stabilizing the price level in fuel markets and more complex policies (based also on ad valorem taxes) are needed. Alternative interventions to control prices can be designed focusing on the market structure of these industries, where Antitrust Authority could play a significant role. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Piacenza, Massimiliano] Univ Turin, Sch Econ, Corso Unione Soviet Bis 218, Dept Econ & Publ Finance G Prato, I-10134 Turin, Italy. HERMES, Ctr Res Regulated Serv, I-10024 Moncalieri, TO, Italy. RP Piacenza, M (corresponding author), Univ Turin, Sch Econ, Corso Unione Soviet Bis 218, Dept Econ & Publ Finance G Prato, I-10134 Turin, Italy. EM digiacomo@econ.unito.it; piacenza@econ.unito.it; turati@econ.unito.it RI Di Giacomo, Marina/I-5585-2016; PIACENZA, MASSIMILIANO/ABF-1996-2020 OI Di Giacomo, Marina/0000-0002-7158-7545; Piacenza, Massimiliano/0000-0003-2437-8254; Turati, Gilberto/0000-0002-2146-7887 CR ACI, AUT CLUB IT VAR YEAR AGCM Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2006, AGCM B AGCM Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2007, AGCM B AGCM Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2001, INDAGINE CONOSCITIVA AGCM Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, 1996, IND CON PREZZ CARB A AGCM Autorita Garante delta Concorrenza e del Mercato, 2000, AGCM B Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Borenstein S, 1997, Q J ECON, V112, P305, DOI 10.1162/003355397555118 Borenstein S, 2002, RAND J ECON, V33, P116, DOI 10.2307/2696378 BROWN RL, 1975, J ROY STAT SOC B MET, V37, P149 Chouinard H, 2004, ECON LETT, V83, P55, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2003.10.004 Chouinard HH, 2007, BE J ECON ANAL POLI, V7, DOI 10.2202/1935-1682.1599 Colangelo G, 2001, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V8, P53, DOI 10.1023/A:1008741516400 Creel M, 1996, ECON LETT, V53, P239, DOI 10.1016/S0165-1765(96)00919-6 De Simone M., 2008, P C EV CARB STAZ SER DELIPALLA S, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V49, P351, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O Doyle JJ, 2008, J PUBLIC ECON, V92, P869, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.011 Fullerton Don, 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4 Galeotti M, 2003, ENERG ECON, V25, P175, DOI 10.1016/S0140-9883(02)00102-0 Rotemberg J.J., 2008, NBER WORKING PAPER S Staiger D, 1997, ECONOMETRICA, V65, P557, DOI 10.2307/2171753 STERN N, 1987, J PUBLIC ECON, V32, P133, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90009-0 Wlazlowski S, 2009, ENERG ECON, V31, P99, DOI 10.1016/j.eneco.2008.08.009 ZELLNER A, 1962, J AM STAT ASSOC, V57, P348, DOI 10.2307/2281644 NR 24 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 11 PU ELSEVIER PI AMSTERDAM PA RADARWEG 29, 1043 NX AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0140-9883 EI 1873-6181 J9 ENERG ECON JI Energy Econ. PD JUL PY 2012 VL 34 IS 4 BP 1176 EP 1186 DI 10.1016/j.eneco.2011.10.014 PG 11 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 970UO UT WOS:000306158000033 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Boone, J Muller, W AF Boone, Jan Mueller, Wieland TI The distribution of harm in price-fixing cases SO INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION LA English DT Article DE Cartel; Abuse of a dominant position; Pass-on defence; Supply curve; Apportionment of harm; Tax incidence ID COMPARATIVE STATICS; INDIRECT PURCHASERS; TAX INCIDENCE; AD-VALOREM; OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; DAMAGES; CARTEL; EQUILIBRIUM; COMPETITION AB We consider a vertically related industry and analyze how the total harm due to a price increase upstream is distributed over downstream firms and final consumers. For this purpose, we develop a general model without making specific assumptions regarding demand, costs, or the mode of competition. We consider both the case of homogeneous and differentiated goods markets, and illustrate how basic intuition from the tax incidence literature carries over to the distribution of harm. Furthermore, we discuss data requirements and suggest explicit formulas and regression specifications that can be used to estimate the relevant terms in the harm distribution in practice. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Boone, Jan] Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, ENCORE, CentER,TILEC,CEPR, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands. [Mueller, Wieland] Univ Vienna, Dept Econ, ENCORE, CentER,TILEC, A-1210 Vienna, Austria. RP Boone, J (corresponding author), Tilburg Univ, Dept Econ, ENCORE, CentER,TILEC,CEPR, POB 90153, NL-5000 LE Tilburg, Netherlands. EM j.boone@uvt.nl; wieland.mueller@univie.ac.at OI boone, jan/0000-0002-0958-2444 CR Aghion P, 2005, Q J ECON, V120, P701, DOI 10.1093/qje/120.2.701 Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P231, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00085-2 Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 Baker J.B., 1999, AM L EC REV, V1, P386, DOI DOI 10.1093/ALER/1.1.386 Basmann R.L., 1999, ROLE ACAD EC LITIGAT, P147 Basso LJ, 2010, J IND ECON, V58, P895, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2010.00437.x BESLEY T, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V40, P359, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90048-0 Brandner J. 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M., 1990, IND MARKET STRUCTURE Schinkel M.P., 2008, 200808 AMST CTR LAW Schinkel MP, 2008, RAND J ECON, V39, P683 Seade J, 1985, WARWICK EC RES PAPER, V260 SKEATH SE, 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V53, P53, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90013-2 STERN N, 1987, J PUBLIC ECON, V32, P133, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90009-0 Ten Kate A., 2005, EUROPEAN J LAW EC, V2, P323 Van Dijk T, 2008, ISSUES COMPETITION L, V3 Verboven F, 2009, J IND ECON, V57, P457, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-6451.2009.00390.x Waelbroeck D, 2004, STUDY CONDITIONS CLA White LJ, 2001, REV IND ORGAN, V18, P23, DOI 10.1023/A:1026565911466 NR 45 TC 3 Z9 3 U1 0 U2 11 PU ELSEVIER PI AMSTERDAM PA RADARWEG 29, 1043 NX AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0167-7187 EI 1873-7986 J9 INT J IND ORGAN JI Int. J. Ind. Organ. PD MAR PY 2012 VL 30 IS 2 BP 265 EP 276 DI 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2011.11.002 PG 12 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 921YY UT WOS:000302515200013 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Menezes, FM AF Menezes, Flavio TI The Business Tax Reform Agenda SO ECONOMIC PAPERS LA English DT Article DE tax; tax reform; tax incidence; Allowance for Corporate Equity AB During the session on business taxation at the National Tax Forum in 2011, little consensus emerged between business representatives and union leaders on the reformations that should be made to the business taxation system. One proposal that greatly divided opinion was a reduction in the corporate tax rate. In this article, it is argued that changes in the treatment of tax losses and the introduction of a well-designed allowance for corporate equity represent a better business tax reform strategy than cutting the corporate tax rate. C1 [Menezes, Flavio] Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Qld 4069, Australia. RP Menezes, FM (corresponding author), Univ Queensland, Sch Econ, Brisbane, Qld 4069, Australia. EM f.menezes@uq.edu.au RI Menezes, Flavio/L-4434-2019 OI Menezes, Flavio/0000-0003-0889-9551 CR Abhayaratna T., 2009, AUSTR TAX FORUM, V24, P59 Auerbach AJ, 2006, TAX POL EC, V20, P1 Chan K, 2005, J FINANC, V60, P1495, DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.768_1.x Dwenger N., 2009, 855 DIW Felix R. Alison, 2009, 15263 NBER Fullerton D., 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4, P1787, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80005-2 Gentry William M, 2007, 101 OTA Greagg P., 2011, EC ROUNDUP, V2, P157 Klemm A, 2007, CESIFO ECON STUD, V53, P229, DOI 10.1093/cesifo/ifm007 Lewis KK, 1999, J ECON LIT, V37, P571, DOI 10.1257/jel.37.2.571 McDonald J., 2011, TAX POLICIES IMPROVE Mirrlees J., 2011, TAX DESIGN MIRRLEES NR 12 TC 3 Z9 3 U1 0 U2 0 PU WILEY PI HOBOKEN PA 111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA SN 0812-0439 EI 1759-3441 J9 ECON PAP JI Econ. Pap. PD MAR PY 2012 VL 31 IS 1 BP 3 EP 7 DI 10.1111/j.1759-3441.2012.00165.x PG 5 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V56BF UT WOS:000210535000002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ross, JM AF Ross, Justin M. TI Interjurisdictional Determinants of Property Assessment Regressivity SO LAND ECONOMICS LA English DT Article ID INSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES; UNIFORM ASSESSMENT; TAX INCIDENCE AB The previous literature on vertical equity in property assessment has focused on parcel-level data within a single area and has produced mixed conclusions on whether the process is progressive or regressive. This paper advances the discussion to identifying what differences between jurisdictions might account for the mix of findings. Using data from Virginia cities and counties between 2001 and 2007, evidence is presented that indicates having tax maps available online, appointed assessors, and senior citizens all influence the level of regressivity observed between jurisdictions. Overall, the results support the hypothesis that interjurisdictional differences are determinants of vertical inequity. C1 Indiana Univ, Sch Publ & Environm Affairs, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA. RP Ross, JM (corresponding author), Indiana Univ, Sch Publ & Environm Affairs, Bloomington, IN 47405 USA. RI Ross, Justin/AAJ-5926-2020 CR BELL EJ, 1984, PROPERTY TAX J, V3, P123 Birch John W., 1992, PROPERTY TAX J, V11, P256 BLACK DE, 1977, NATL TAX J, V30, P429 BOWMAN JH, 1978, NATL TAX J, V31, P137 BOWMAN JH, 1989, NATL TAX J, V42, P181 BOWMAN JH, 1986, NATL TAX J, V39, P157 CAMERON CA, 2005, MICROECONOMETRICS Clapp J. M., 1990, J REAL ESTATE FINANC, V3, P233 Fischel William A., 2001, HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIS HAUSMAN JA, 1978, ECONOMETRICA, V46, P1251, DOI 10.2307/1913827 Hoover GA, 2008, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V36, P635, DOI 10.1177/1091142107311219 IHLANFELDT KR, 1982, NATL TAX J, V35, P89 Ihlanfeldt KR, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P7, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.1.01 John L.Knapp, 2010, VIRGINIA LOCAL TAX R JOHNSON MS, 1989, SOUTHERN ECON J, V55, P880, DOI 10.2307/1059469 JUD GD, 1994, J REAL ESTATE RES, V9, P289 LOWERY D, 1982, AM J POLIT SCI, V26, P57, DOI 10.2307/2110839 Lowery David, 1984, J FEDERALISM, V14, P55 McMillen DP, 2008, NATL TAX J, V61, P653, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2008.4.05 MIKESELL JL, 1980, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V8, P23, DOI 10.1177/109114218000800102 Paglin M., 1972, NATL TAX J, V25, P557 Ross Justin M., 2010, SO EC J, V77, P776 Sirmans G. Stacy, 2008, J REAL EST LITERATUR, V16, P167 SIRMANS GS, 1995, NATL TAX J, V48, P71 Smith B., 2003, J PUBLIC BUDGETING A, V15, P571 Sunderman M.A., 1990, J REAL ESTATE RES, V5, P319 Virginia Department of Housing and Community Development, 2010, REP COMP REV CAP REV Virginia Department of Taxation, 2009, 2007 VIRG ASS SAL RA Weber RN, 2010, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V38, P74, DOI 10.1177/1091142109358703 WHALLEY A, 2010, 15643 NBER Zodrow GR, 2001, NATL TAX J, V54, P139, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2001.1.07 NR 31 TC 7 Z9 7 U1 0 U2 12 PU UNIV WISCONSIN PI MADISON PA SOCIAL SCIENCE BLDG, MADISON, WI 53706 USA SN 0023-7639 J9 LAND ECON JI Land Econ. PD FEB PY 2012 VL 88 IS 1 BP 28 EP 42 DI 10.3368/le.88.1.28 PG 15 WC Economics; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA 881DE UT WOS:000299459900003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Soroceanu, M Costuleanu, CL AF Soroceanu, Mircea Costuleanu, Carmen Luiza BE Zhu, M TI Formation and Redistribution Doctrinal Concepts of Public Financial Funds SO ICEEM 2012: 2012 2ND INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ECONOMIC, EDUCATION AND MANAGEMENT, VOL 1 LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 2nd International Conference on Economic, Education and Management (ICEEM 2012) CY JUN 01-02, 2012 CL Shanghai, PEOPLES R CHINA DE Tax System; Tax Incidence Theory; Shifting The Tax; Institutional Decider AB Taxes and contributions are involved in the formation of public financial funds due to the rigorous operation of a comprehensive system designed to include all channels of information transmission and collection of required tax levy from RAs, companies, cooperatives, associations with or without profit, from resident and non-resident individuals, the system called: the tax system. C1 [Soroceanu, Mircea] Alexandru Ioan Cuza Univ, Iasi, Romania. [Costuleanu, Carmen Luiza] Univ Petre Andrei, Fac Econ, Iasi, Romania. EM mircea.soroceanu@yahoo.com; ccostuleanu@yahoo.com CR Brezeanu P., 1999, TAXATION CONCEPTS ME Condor I., 1994, REGIA AUTONOMA PUBLI Corduneanu C., 1998, TAX SYSTEM SCI FINAN Filip G., 2001, FINANCE Hoanta N., 1997, TAX EVASION SOROCEANU M, 2011, THEORETICAL APPL EC, V18, P65 Vallee A., 1994, EC SYSTEMES FISCAUX Vintila G., 2006, TAXATION METHODS TEC NR 8 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU HONG KONG EDUCATION SOC PI TSEUNG KWAN O PA FLAT 16E BLOCK 3 THE PINNACLE, 8 WANG HANG RD, TSEUNG KWAN O, NEW TERRITORIES 00000, PEOPLES R CHINA BN 978-988-19750-3-4 PY 2012 BP 565 EP + PG 2 WC Economics; Education & Educational Research; Management SC Business & Economics; Education & Educational Research GA BET96 UT WOS:000318122400101 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Friedrich, V Makova, K Siroky, J AF Friedrich, Vaclav Makova, Katerina Siroky, Jan TI TESTING THE PREDICATIVE ABILITY OF THE TAX PROGRESSIVENESS INDICES (USING THE EXAMPLE OF AN EMPLOYEE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC IN 1993-2008) SO E & M EKONOMIE A MANAGEMENT LA English DT Article DE effective tax rate; even tax rate; personal income tax; tax obligation; tax progressiveness ID INCOME-TAX AB The personal income tax is not harmonised in the European Union that's why there are different systems of the personal income tax which reflects in different nominal tax rates, different allowances, deductions and tax credits. The comparisons based on nominal tax rates predicate the real rate of taxation insufficiently because of these differences. More objective way how to measure the tax circumstances of the taxpayers in individual countries are relative indicators such as the tax incidence of the taxpayer with an average wage, the calculation of an effective tax rate or measuring the tax progressiveness. The index of the tax progressiveness which is based on the effective tax rate predicates the effective tax burden and the relationship between the change of the income and the tax burden. The personal income tax paid by the employee in the period of 1993-2008 in the Czech Republic was chosen for analysis. The paper deals with the application of tax progressiveness indices on the tax system of the Czech Republic. Calculations are performed of the effective tax rate, the progressiveness of the average rate, the progressiveness of the tax obligation and the progressiveness of earning after taxation for an employee who claims only the basic allowances (from 1993-2005), or the tax credit (from 2006-2008) and does not claim any other tax reliefs or credits. It is tested how sensitively the particular indices of the tax progressiveness react to the changes of the effective tax rate. C1 [Friedrich, Vaclav] Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Math Methods Econ, Ostrava, Czech Republic. [Makova, Katerina; Siroky, Jan] Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Publ Econ, Ostrava, Czech Republic. RP Friedrich, V (corresponding author), Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Math Methods Econ, Ostrava, Czech Republic. EM vaclav.friedrich@vsb.cz; katerina.makova@seznam.cz; jan.siroky@vsb.cz RI Friedrich, Vaclav/J-9265-2012; Siroky, Jan/I-6346-2018 OI Friedrich, Vaclav/0000-0003-0076-5233; Siroky, Jan/0000-0001-9802-5801 CR AUERBACH AJ, 1987, HDB PUBLIC EC, V2 CAMINADA K., 2001, PUBLIC FINANCE MANAG, V1 CREEDY J, 1994, TAXATION POVERTY INC FRIEDRICH V., 2008, VICENASOBNA LINEARNI KINKOR J, 1994, FINANC UVER, V44, P455 MAKOVA K, 2007, 2007 LABS INT C POL MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V38, P175, DOI 10.2307/2296779 Musgrave P. B., 1989, PUBLIC FINANCE THEOR Musgrave RA, 1948, J POLIT ECON, V56, P498, DOI 10.1086/256742 Siroky J, 2009, EKON CAS, V57, P653 Siroky Jan a kol, 2008, DANOVE TEORIE S PRAK Slemrod J., 1996, TAX PROGR INCOME INE Vlachy J, 2008, E M EKON MANAG, V11, P85 NR 13 TC 12 Z9 12 U1 0 U2 15 PU TECHNICKA UNIV & LIBERCI PI LIBEREC 1 PA HOSPODARSKA FAKULTA, STUDENTSKA 2, HALKOVA 6, IC 46747885, LIBEREC 1, 461 17, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 1212-3609 J9 E M EKON MANAG JI E M Ekon. Manag. PY 2012 VL 15 IS 1 BP 4 EP 16 PG 13 WC Economics; Management SC Business & Economics GA 926RF UT WOS:000302848000001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Buus, T AF Buus, Tomas TI TAXES ON INCOME VS. VALUE ADDED TAX IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMY SO POLITICKA EKONOMIE LA Czech DT Article DE tax; tax incidence; value added tax; general equilibrium model; agency cost ID FISCAL-POLICY; TAXATION AB In this paper we are presenting an analysis of shift of tax burden from income onto consumption. The analyzed consumption tax is value added tax, while destination principle is applied. The result of analysis is finding that the contemporary tax policy in the Czech Republic is suboptimal from the point of view of tax burden distribution between production factors and consumption. Theoretical findings are confirmed by analysis of data from European countries. Every percentage above the EU27 average of consumption taxes share on total tax quota results into increase of GDP growth by 0,04% to 0,05% p.a. The Czech political "elite" determines the fiscal policy to be popular and recent surveys confirmed Czechs' dislike towards consumption taxes, especially value added tax. Therefore the huge cost of the Czech tax system - high taxation of wages and low value added tax - can be viewed also as agency cost. C1 Univ Econ, Dept Corp Finance, CZ-13067 Prague 3, Czech Republic. RP Buus, T (corresponding author), Univ Econ, Dept Corp Finance, Nam W Churchilla 4, CZ-13067 Prague 3, Czech Republic. EM buust@vse.cz RI Buus, Tomas/AAF-6157-2020 OI Buus, Tomas/0000-0003-0874-1105 CR ANTRAS P, 2004, CONTRIBUTIONS MACROE, V4, P28 Ballard C. L., 1987, EFFECTS TAXATION CAP, P445 Barrell R, 2000, ECON TRANSIT, V8, P477, DOI 10.1111/1468-0351.00052 Buus T, 2010, EUROPEAN FINANCIAL A, V5, P28 Cade BS, 1996, BIOMETRICS, V52, P886, DOI 10.2307/2533050 CERVENKA J, 2011, OBCANE DANICH Chetty R, 2011, AM ECON REV, V101, P471, DOI 10.1257/aer.101.3.471 Dielman TE, 2005, J STAT COMPUT SIM, V75, P263, DOI 10.1080/0094965042000223680 European Commission, 2011, VAT RAT APPL MEMB ST Fehr E, 2002, NATURE, V415, P137, DOI 10.1038/415137a FELIX R. A, 2007, PASSING BURDEN CORPO FIORITO R., 2009, LABOR SUPPLY ELASTIC Fullerton D., 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4, P1787, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80005-2 Gemmell N, 2011, ECON J, V121, pF33, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2010.02414.x Gruber J, 1997, J LABOR ECON, V15, pS72, DOI 10.1086/209877 Hajkova D, 2007, FINANC UVER, V57, P465 HAMILTON K, 2006, WHERE IS WEALTH NATI Kotlikoff Laurence, 1987, HDB PUBLIC EC, V2, P1043, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(87)80011-3 KUGLER A., 2003, LABOR MARKET EFFECTS LEON-LEDESMA M.A., 2010, DUBIO PROCES SUPPLY Little IMD, 1951, ECON J, V61, P577, DOI 10.2307/2226489 METCALF GE, 1995, J ECON PERSPECT, V9, P121, DOI 10.1257/jep.9.1.121 Romer CD, 2010, AM ECON REV, V100, P763, DOI 10.1257/aer.100.3.763 TRABANDT M., 2009, FAR ARE WE SLIPPERY Turnovsky SJ, 2004, J MONEY CREDIT BANK, V36, P883, DOI 10.1353/mcb.2004.0069 NR 25 TC 7 Z9 7 U1 2 U2 15 PU VYSOKA SKOLA EKONOMICKA PI PRAGUE PA NAM W CHURCHILLA 4, PRAGUE 13067, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 0032-3233 J9 POLIT EKON JI Polit. Ekon. PY 2012 VL 60 IS 1 BP 58 EP 80 DI 10.18267/j.polek.832 PG 23 WC Economics; Political Science SC Business & Economics; Government & Law GA 915SS UT WOS:000302048300004 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Combs, KL Spry, JA AF Combs, Kathryn L. Spry, John A. TI Who plays the numbers games in the middle of the day? SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; REGRESSIVITY; DEMAND; LOTTO AB We analyse the increase in sales of Pick 3 and Pick 4 daily numbers lottery games and other Ohio Lottery games after Ohio introduced midday drawings for the Pick 3 and Pick 4 games in August 1999. The midday drawings increased Pick 3 sales by 5%, Pick 4 sales by 12%, and total lottery sales by 2% based on our analysis of a 36-month panel dataset of Ohio lottery sales by zip code. Midday drawings raise more revenue from the strongly regressive daily numbers games. However, the introduction of midday drawings does not change the negative income elasticities of demand for numbers games in an economically meaningful manner. C1 [Combs, Kathryn L.; Spry, John A.] Univ St Thomas, Dept Finance, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. RP Combs, KL (corresponding author), Univ St Thomas, Dept Finance, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. EM klcombs@stthomas.edu CR *CACI MARK SYST, 1999, SOURC ZIP COD DEM Cincinnati Post, 1999, CINCINNATI POST 0804 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 1999, CLEVELAND PLAIN 1019 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 2007, CLEVELAND PLAIN 0125 Cleveland Plain Dealer, 1999, CLEVELAND PLAIN 0715 CLOTFELTER CT, 1990, J ECON PERSPECT, V4, P105, DOI 10.1257/jep.4.4.105 CLOTFELTER CT, 1979, NATL TAX J, V32, P543 CLOTFELTER CT, 1987, NATL TAX J, V40, P533 Combs KL, 2008, APPL ECON, V40, P35, DOI 10.1080/13504850701439327 Cornwell C., 2001, DISTRIBUTIONAL UNPUB Farrell L, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V72, P99, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00089-9 Farrell L, 1999, OXFORD B ECON STAT, V61, P513, DOI 10.1111/1468-0084.00141 Farrell L, 2000, J BUS ECON STAT, V18, P228, DOI 10.2307/1392560 Forrest D, 2004, APPL ECON, V36, P645, DOI 10.1080/0003684042000222034 Forrest D, 2000, NATL TAX J, V53, P853, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2000.4.04 Garrett TA, 2002, REG SCI URBAN ECON, V32, P501, DOI 10.1016/S0166-0462(01)00089-8 Gujarati D., 2003, BASIC ECONOMETRICS Hansen A, 2000, J CONSUM AFF, V34, P182, DOI 10.1111/j.1745-6606.2000.tb00090.x HANSEN A, 1995, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V23, P385, DOI 10.1177/109114219502300305 Oster E, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P179, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.2.02 Price DI, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P741 Price DI, 2000, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V28, P82, DOI 10.1177/109114210002800105 Scott F., 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V54, P57 SPIRO MH, 1974, NATL TAX J, V27, P57 Spry J. A., 2003, 2003 P NAT TAX ASS N, P198 Stanek E. J., 1997, COMMUNICATION 0929 The Ohio Lottery Commission, 2006, COMPR ANN FIN REP FI Tosun MS, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P163, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.2.01 NR 28 TC 4 Z9 4 U1 0 U2 3 PU ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD PI ABINGDON PA 2-4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0003-6846 EI 1466-4283 J9 APPL ECON JI Appl. Econ. PY 2012 VL 44 IS 7 BP 889 EP 897 DI 10.1080/00036846.2010.524634 PG 9 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 909AS UT WOS:000301534900008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lu, CH AF Lu, Chia-Hui TI Tax Luxury or Necessity SO ECONOMICS BULLETIN LA English DT Article AB This paper studies the optimal taxation between luxury and necessity goods. We set up a three-production-sector neoclassical growth model with inelastic labor supply, and analyze the tax incidence. We find that the two consumption taxes are neutral to economic growth and that the welfare maximization optimal tax mix involves levying the same rate on those two goods. In reality, the tax rate levied on the luxury good is usually higher, so that the government should reduce the tax rate on the luxury good and raise that on the necessity good to the same level in order to enhance the household's lifetime welfare. C1 [Lu, Chia-Hui] Natl Taipei Univ, Dept Econ, New Taipei, Taiwan. RP Lu, CH (corresponding author), Natl Taipei Univ, Dept Econ, New Taipei, Taiwan. EM chhu@mail.ntpu.edu.tw CR Bagwell LS, 1996, AM ECON REV, V86, P349 CHAMLEY C, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P607, DOI 10.2307/1911310 Cooley T. F., 1995, FRONTIERS BUSINESS C Frank R. H., 1999, LUXURY FEVER MONEY H IRELAND NJ, 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V53, P91, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90015-9 JUDD KL, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V28, P59, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90020-9 KYDLAND FE, 1991, ECON THEOR, V1, P63 NG YK, 1987, AM ECON REV, V77, P186 NR 8 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ECONOMICS BULLETIN PI NASHVILLE PA C/O JOHN CONLEY, DEPT ECONOMICS, 414 CALHOUN HALL, NASHVILLE, TN 37235 USA SN 1545-2921 J9 ECON BULL JI Econ. Bull. PY 2012 VL 32 IS 1 BP 952 EP 959 PG 8 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V5M6B UT WOS:000219745200090 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU FitzGerald, V AF FitzGerald, Valpy TI Global capital markets, direct taxation and the redistribution of income SO INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE international taxation; capital markets; fiscal incidence; development finance AB Standard fiscal theory suggests that taxation should be heaviest on the least mobile factors of production - for both efficiency and revenue reasons. A shift in tax burdens from capital to labour as economies become globally integrated is thus justified. This theoretical tradition (founded by Ramsay and continued by Mirrlees and Lucas) assumes by construction that profit taxes reduce investment and growth; and while sensitive to inter-generational equity, sidesteps the issue of income distribution within generations. In contrast, starting from Keynes' critique of these assumptions and building on modern endogenous growth models, it can be shown that profit taxation is not necessarily injurious to productive investment. In practice, moreover, the effect of globalisation has not been to reduce tax rates on capital, but rather to erode the tax base itself (i.e. 'tax evasion'). Improved information exchange between tax authorities, which is now being driven by fiscal insolvency in developed countries, would allow tax incidence to be shifted so as to improve income distribution within OECD countries. Such cooperation could also permit the replacement of the current discretionary system of fiscal transfers from rich to poor countries ('development aid') by equitable sharing of global capital tax revenue. C1 [FitzGerald, Valpy] Univ Oxford, Dept Int Dev, 3 Mansfield Rd, Oxford OX1 3TB, England. RP FitzGerald, V (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Dept Int Dev, 3 Mansfield Rd, Oxford OX1 3TB, England. EM edmund.fitzgerald@sant.ox.ac.uk CR Aghion P., 1998, ENDOGENOUS GROWTH TH Arnold J. M, 2008, 643 OECD EC DEP Bacchetta P, 2000, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V7, P275, DOI 10.1023/A:1008753629558 Barrett R., 1997, INT TAX J, V23, P12 Bovenberg A.L., 1994, HDB INT MACROECONOMI, P116 BURGESS R, 1993, J ECON LIT, V31, P762 FitzGerald V., 2002, CEPAL REV, P65 FITZGERALD V, 2004, EUROPEAN J POLITICAL, V20, P387 FRENKEL JA, 1991, INT TAXATION INTEGRA GASPARD M, 2003, J HIST ECON THOUGHT, V25, P413 Heijdra B., 2002, FDN MODERN MACROECON Huizinga H, 2003, J PUBLIC ECON, V87, P39, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00171-2 KAY JA, 1990, ECON J, V100, P18, DOI 10.2307/2233594 Keen M, 2006, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V13, P81, DOI 10.1007/s10797-006-3090-7 Keen M., 2009, WP09157 IMF Keynes J.M., 1936, GEN THEORY EMPLOYMEN, VII LUCAS RE, 1990, OXFORD ECON PAP, V42, P293, DOI 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041948 MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V38, P175, DOI 10.2307/2296779 MIRRLEES JA, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V6, P327, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(76)90047-5 OECD, 1997, MOD DOUBL TAX CONV I *OECD, 2000, IMPR ACC BANK INF TA OECD, 2010, PROM TRANSP EXCH INF OECD, 2001, OECD TAX POL STUD, V5 *OECD, 2010, TAX POL STUD, V20 OECD, 1998, HARMF TAX COMP EM GL Ramsey FP, 1928, ECON J, V38, P543, DOI 10.2307/2224098 Ramsey FP, 1927, ECON J, V37, P47, DOI 10.2307/2222721 Slemrod J, 2009, J PUBLIC ECON, V93, P1261, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.08.004 TANZI V, 1999, INT STUDIES TAXATION Tanzi V., 1996, TAXATION INTEGRATING Uhlig H, 1996, EUR ECON REV, V40, P1521, DOI 10.1016/0014-2921(96)00032-3 UN, 2000, REV UN MOD DOUBL TAX UN, 2001, REP HIGH LEV PAN FIN UN, 2009, REP COMM EXP INT COO UN, 1980, UN MOD DOUBL TAX CON United Nations, 2009, REP COMM EXP REF INT NR 36 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD PI ABINGDON PA 2-4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0269-2171 EI 1465-3486 J9 INT REV APPL ECON JI Int. Rev. Appl. Econ. PY 2012 VL 26 IS 2 SI SI BP 241 EP 252 DI 10.1080/02692171.2011.640313 PG 12 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V62PH UT WOS:000210977200008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Provaznik, K AF Provaznik, Kamil BE Vitek, L TI Bank Guarantees as a form of securing excise duties from tobacco products SO NEW ROLE OF PUBLIC FINANCE 2012 LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 17th International Conference on New Role of Public Finance 2012 CY APR 12-14, 2012 CL Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC SP Univ Econ Prague, Univ Econ, Fac Finance & Account, Univ Econ, Dept Publ Finance DE tobacco; excise duty; bank guarantee; tax incidence AB Excise duty on tobacco products is the only tax that is fully secured. Before collecting the tobacco stamps the buyer of the stamps must submit a bank guarantee to the relevant customs office. This bank guarantee must cover the amount of the tax obligation that arises with this collection of the tobacco stamps. If the buyer of the tobacco stamps does not pay the excise duty by the legal deadline, the customs office can ask the bank that issued the bank guarantee for payment in the full amount of the tax obligation. The excise duty for tobacco products continues to grow, and therefore the producer's expenses for securing the duty are also increasing. Economic fluctuations also play no small role, as they result in further price increases that the producers of the tobacco products have to pay to the banks in order to provide the appropriate bank guarantee. This thesis deals with the possibilities that could, in the future, limit the disproportional growth of financial expenses connected with securing the excise duty. C1 [Provaznik, Kamil] Univ Econ, Fac Finance & Accounting, Dept Publ Finance, Prague, Czech Republic. CR Binder A. S., 1991, EC PRINCIPLES POLICY CIPRA T., 2002, KAPITALOVA PRIMERENO JHA P., 1972, TOBACCO CONTROL DEV, P237 Jilek J, 2009, FINANCNI TRHY INVEST Kaderabkova B., 2003, UVOD MAKROEKONOMIE N Kubatova K., 2006, DANOVA TEORIE POLITI Machacek Otakar, 2001, FINANCNI POJISTNA MA Merriaman D., 1994, ECON INQ, V31, P19 Musilek P., 2011, TRHY CENNYCH PAPIRU Svatkova S., 2007, ZATIZENI SPOTREBNIHO NR 10 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU WOLTERS KLUWER CR A S PI PRAHA 3 PA U NAKLADOVEHO NADRAZI 6, PRAHA 3, PRAGUE 130 00, CZECH REPUBLIC BN 978-80-7478-012-7 PY 2012 BP 190 EP 201 PG 12 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA BJP92 UT WOS:000329534700018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Davis, P McCluskey, W Grissom, TV McCord, M AF Davis, Peadar McCluskey, William Grissom, Terry McCord, Michael TI An empirical analysis of simplified valuation approaches for residential property tax purposes SO PROPERTY MANAGEMENT LA English DT Article DE Property tax; Revaluation; Decentralized control; Economic sustainability; Government policy; Performance measures; Northern Ireland; Asset valuation ID FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION; PERFORMANCE; TAXATION; CZECH AB Purpose - This paper seeks to examine the potential for simplified market value and non market value based banded approaches to be utilised for residential property tax purposes. The broad aim is to ascertain whether relatively low complexity approaches to establishing a property tax base can perform adequately in comparison to established best practice - in essence whether there is evidence of equifinality (equivalent performance from approaches of substantially different complexity) between simpler and more complex approaches. Design/methodology/approach - The research comprises empirical analysis of a database of property sales and property attribute data drawn from a UK District Council area. Several simplified methods are used to create different tax base scenarios and the outflowing tax incidence is compared with that of using a complex, industry standard market value approach. The methods of comparison are regression and spline regression based models testing for tax inequity, drawn from the literature. The approach here differs from previous work in that it occurs at the actual tax bill level allowing the comparison of value, non- value and banded approaches. Findings - The findings of the research indicate that simplified approaches to establishing a property tax base can perform in a broadly similar fashion to more complex systems currently practiced in developed economies and therefore evidence of equifinality exists. Practical implications - The research provides useful tools to property tax policy makers and practitioners in developing and transitional economies in furthering their aspirations of embedding robust property taxes for the furtherance of socio- economic and political development and the general wellbeing of society and they are of value to property tax policy makers and to academics in the field. Originality/value - The paper provides evidence of the efficacy of simplified and banded approaches as an option for jurisdictions in developing and transitional economic circumstances or elsewhere in circumstances which mitigate against full scale appraisal of the property tax base to discrete market values. The approaches and techniques pioneered open up opportunities to carry out a range of new comparative analysis of tax base options. C1 [Davis, Peadar; McCluskey, William; Grissom, Terry; McCord, Michael] Univ Ulster, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. RP Davis, P (corresponding author), Univ Ulster, Newtownabbey, North Ireland. 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TI Fiscal competition for imperfectly-mobile labor and capital: A comparative dynamic analysis SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Fiscal competition; Dynamic tax incidence ID INVESTMENT TAX INCENTIVES; GOVERNMENTS; STATE; COORDINATION; TAXATION; POLICY AB Interjurisdictional flows of imperfectly-mobile migrants, investment, and other productive resources result in the costly dynamic adjustment of resource stocks. This paper investigates the comparative dynamics of adjustment to changes in local fiscal policy with two imperfectly mobile productive resources. The intertemporal adjustments for both resources depend on complementarity/substitutability in production and the adjustment cost technologies for each, implying that the evaluation of the fiscal treatment of one resource must account for the simultaneous adjustment of both. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Kentucky, Martin Sch Publ Policy, Lexington, KY 40506 USA. RP Wildasin, DE (corresponding author), Univ Kentucky, Martin Sch Publ Policy, Lexington, KY 40506 USA. 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Public Econ. PD DEC PY 2011 VL 95 IS 11-12 BP 1312 EP 1321 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2010.11.014 PG 10 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 871AR UT WOS:000298710500009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Politi, RB Mattos, E AF Politi, Ricardo Batista Mattos, Enlinson TI Ad-valorem tax incidence and after-tax price adjustments: evidence from Brazilian basic basket food SO CANADIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS-REVUE CANADIENNE D ECONOMIQUE LA English DT Article DE H2; H22 ID MARKET POWER; ERROR-CORRECTION; STICKY PRICES; SALES TAXES; RETAIL; INVENTORIES; WHOLESALE; TAXATION; SEARCH; POLICY AB Recent empirical work on tax incidence suggests that after-tax price responses are independent of the tax change direction. This paper investigates asymmetric price responses to ad-valorem tax changes in the Brazilian food market for 10 goods in 16 states during the period 19942008. Our results suggest that when tax rates increase, tax full shifting occurs for 2 of the 10 goods and tax overshifting occurs for one of the 10 goods; the price response to tax cuts is an undershifting for all goods. Moreover, this last result is similar to our estimation of (average) tax incidence (undershifting). We also investigate the short-term and long-term relationships between prices and VAT rate parameters and find that prices seem to respond to tax shocks within four months. C1 [Politi, Ricardo Batista; Mattos, Enlinson] Getulio Vargas Fdn EESP FGV, Sao Paulo Sch Econ, Sao Paulo, Brazil. RP Politi, RB (corresponding author), Getulio Vargas Fdn EESP FGV, Sao Paulo Sch Econ, Sao Paulo, Brazil. EM rbpoliti@gvmail.br; enlinson.mattos@fgv.br RI Politi, Ricardo B/O-7109-2015 CR Alm J, 2009, ECON INQ, V47, P118, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x Atkeson A, 2008, AM ECON REV, V98, P1998, DOI 10.1257/aer.98.5.1998 Azevedo P. 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PD NOV PY 2011 VL 44 IS 4 BP 1438 EP 1470 DI 10.1111/j.1540-5982.2011.01680.x PG 33 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 849XR UT WOS:000297159200014 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Jensen, S Schjelderup, G AF Jensen, Sissel Schjelderup, Guttorm TI Indirect taxation and tax incidence under nonlinear pricing SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Nonlinear pricing schemes; Indirect taxation ID AD-VALOREM; 2-PART TARIFFS; UNIT TAXES; MONOPOLY AB This paper study how a change in specific and ad valorem taxes under nonlinear pricing affects tax incidence. We show that an increase in either tax rate leads to a higher usage fee for all consumers, whereas the fixed fee under reasonable assumptions will fall. Finally, the model shows that the presumption in favor of ad valorem taxes over specific taxes also holds under nonlinear pricing and incomplete market coverage. C1 [Jensen, Sissel; Schjelderup, Guttorm] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. [Schjelderup, Guttorm] CESifo, Munich, Germany. RP Jensen, S (corresponding author), Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Helleveien 30, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. 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PD OCT PY 2011 VL 18 IS 5 BP 519 EP 532 DI 10.1007/s10797-011-9167-y PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 819KO UT WOS:000294824000003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Marion, J Muehlegger, E AF Marion, Justin Muehlegger, Erich TI Fuel tax incidence and supply conditions SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Conference on the Role of Firms in Tax Systems CY APR 17-18, 2009 CL Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI SP Stephen M. Ross Sch Business, Off Tax Policy Res HO Univ Michigan DE Tax incidence; Gasoline; Fuel supply ID OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; PRICES; COMPETITION; REDUCTION; STATE AB The incidence of taxes on consumers and producers plays a central role in evaluating energy tax policy, yet the literature testing the main predictions of the tax incidence model is sparse. In this paper, we examine the pass-through rate of state gasoline and diesel taxes to retail prices, and importantly we estimate the dependence of pass-through on factors constraining the gasoline and diesel supply chains. We consider several factors that alter the elasticity of supply, including within state heterogeneity in gasoline content requirements, refinery capacity utilization, inventory constraints, and variation in the demand for untaxed uses of diesel. In general, we find that in periods of time when the supply chain is constrained, and the constraint is plausibly unrelated to shifts in demand, the pass-through rate of fuel taxes declines. We describe several potential implications for tax policy, including tax breaks during peak driving season and during times of supply disruptions such as after major hurricanes. (C) 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Marion, Justin] Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA. [Muehlegger, Erich] Harvard Univ, John F Kennedy Sch Govt, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Marion, J (corresponding author), Univ Calif Santa Cruz, Santa Cruz, CA 95064 USA. 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Public Econ. PD OCT PY 2011 VL 95 IS 9-10 SI SI BP 1202 EP 1212 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.04.003 PG 11 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 815FR UT WOS:000294512000016 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Barnett, W Block, WE AF Barnett, William, II Block, Walter E. TI On Rothbard on the Shifting and Incidence of a General Sales Tax: A Critique SO JOURNAL OF PRIVATE ENTERPRISE LA English DT Article DE Costs of production; Tax shifting; Tax incidence; Derived demand; Cost push inflation; Monetarism AB Rothbard takes the position that a general sales tax cannot be shifted forward onto consumers. In his view, costs of production, of which a tax is an instance, cannot determine price. Rather, the causation is in the other direction: The prices of capital and intermediate goods are derived from the value of the final or consumer goods that they create. In contrast, we take the position that the causal effects run not in only one but in both directions. C1 [Barnett, William, II; Block, Walter E.] Loyola Univ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA. RP Barnett, W (corresponding author), Loyola Univ, New Orleans, LA 70118 USA. CR Barnett II William, 2005, CORPORATE OWNERSHIP, V3, P203 Barnett II William, 2007, NEW PERSPECTIVES POL, V3, P129 Barnett W., 1989, REV AUSTRIAN EC, V3, P137 BUCHANAN JM, 1969, COST CHOICE INQUIRY Cordato R. E., 1989, HAMLINE LAW REV, V12, P229 MARSHALL A, 1936, PRINCIPLES EC MISES L. Von, 1998, HUMAN ACTION Rothbard M. N., 1962, MAN EC STATE ROTHBARD MN, 1997, LOGIC ACTION METHOD, V1, P211 NR 9 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU ASSOC PRIVATE ENTERPRISE EDUCATION PI CHATTANOOGA PA 313 FLETCHER HALL, DEPT 6106, 615 MCCALLIE AVE, CHATTANOOGA, TN 37403 USA SN 0890-913X J9 J PRIV ENTERP JI J. Priv. Enterp. PD SPR PY 2011 VL 26 IS 2 BP 117 EP 126 PG 10 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V6H9Z UT WOS:000420301400007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Capobiango, RP Abrantes, LA AF Capobiango, Ronan Pereira Abrantes, Luiz Antonio TI Tax incidence on the cost of production and marketing of milk in Minas Gerais SO CUSTOS E AGRONEGOCIO LA Portuguese DT Article DE Milk; Production Costs; Taxation AB The agro-industrial chain of milk represents an activity of well-known economic and social participation in Brazil, mainly for Minas Gerais. However, factors such as the cost structure of inputs and capital goods and the tax burden on her, that along the production chain generates a cumulative effect, result in implications that go from the producer to the consumer. The objective of this study was to identify and highlight the tax burden in the formation of production costs for the segment producer of milk and its marketing to different strata of the daily production. To this end, we adopted the construction of an analytical model aimed at quantifying the effect the tax burden. The combined impact of the ICMS, PIS / COFINS and charges levied on the production cost of 3.19%, 4.17%, 4.88%, 5.50% and 5.35%, considering, respectively, the strata costs for the following range of production: less than 50 liters of milk, 51 to 200 liters, 201 to 500 liters, 501 to 1000 liters to 1000 liters and above. At the time of marketing aggregates was also 2.3% more by way of pension contributions that the individual farmer collects on the gross revenue generated by raising the final cost. Production costs, as well as their components and the taxes imposed on them, are important factors that reflect the competitiveness of the entire production chain, and taxation as an aggravating factor in the relationship between the different segments of agribusiness chains. C1 [Capobiango, Ronan Pereira; Abrantes, Luiz Antonio] Univ Fed Vicosa, BR-36571000 Vicosa, MG, Brazil. RP Capobiango, RP (corresponding author), Univ Fed Vicosa, Ave Peter Henry Rolfs S-N,Campus Univ, BR-36571000 Vicosa, MG, Brazil. EM ronancapobiango@hotmail.com; Abrantes@ufv.br CR ABRANTES LA, 2006, THESIS U FEDERAL LAV *BRASIL, 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL 1128 *BRASIL, 1970, DIARIO OFICIAL 0910 *BRASIL, 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL 0430 *BRASIL, 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL 1126 *BRASIL, 2003, DIARIO OFICIAL 1230 *BRASIL, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL 1231 *BRASIL, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL 1231 *BRASIL, 2005, DIARIO OFICIAL 0715 *BRASIL, 1991, DIARIO OFICIAL 0725 *BRASIL, 2004, DIARIO OFICIAL 0726 *BRASIL CONT FED, 1998, DIARIO OFICIAL 1005 *CEPEA, DES MET CALC PIB CAD *EMBRAPA, LEIT NUM *EMBRAPA GADO LEIT, CLASS MUND PRINC PAI FABRETTI LC, 2007, CONTABILIDADE TRIBUT *G S ASS AN EC, INC TRIB AGR PROD AL GOMES ST, 2006, DIAGN PEC LEIT EST M MARTINS PD, 2001, CADEIAS PRODUTIVAS B, P239 *MINAS GERAIS, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL 1214 MOREIRA RD, 2008, INTEGRACAO CADEIAS P NETO OJO, 2004, CLUSTERS AGRUPAMENTO TOMICH FA, 1997, TEXTO DISCUSSAO 467 2006, DIAGN PEC LEIT EST M NR 24 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 1 U2 7 PU UNIV FED RURAL PERNAMBUCO, DEPT LETRAS CIENCIAS HUMANAS PI BAIRRO DE DOIS IRMAOS PA AV D MANOEL MEDEIROS S-N, BAIRRO DE DOIS IRMAOS, RECIFE PE CEP50670-901, BRAZIL SN 1808-2882 J9 CUST AGRONEGOCIO JI Custos Agronegocio PD JAN-APR PY 2011 VL 7 IS 1 BP 56 EP 77 PG 22 WC Agricultural Economics & Policy; Business; Economics SC Agriculture; Business & Economics GA 858ZW UT WOS:000297844300004 OA DOAJ Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Salanie, B AF Salanie, Bernard BA Salanie, B BF Salanie, B TI Tax Incidence SO ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, 2ND EDITION LA English DT Article; Book Chapter CR Auerbach A., 1987, DYNAMIC FISCAL POLIC BALLENTINE JG, 1975, J POLIT ECON, V83, P633, DOI 10.1086/260344 Fullerton D., 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4, P1787, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80005-2 HARBERGER AC, 1962, J POLIT ECON, V70, P215, DOI 10.1086/258636 Shoven J. B., 1972, J PUBLIC ECON, V1, P281, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90009-6 SHOVEN JB, 1984, J ECON LIT, V22, P1007 NR 6 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU MIT PRESS PI CAMBRIDGE PA FIVE CAMBRIDGE CENTER, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 USA BN 978-0-262-30322-4 PY 2011 BP 41 EP 61 PG 21 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA BAF91 UT WOS:000304054400005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kind, HJ Koethenbuerger, M Schjelderup, G AF Kind, Hans Jarle Koethenbuerger, Marko Schjelderup, Guttorm TI Tax responses in platform industries SO OXFORD ECONOMIC PAPERS-NEW SERIES LA English DT Article DE D4; D43; H21; H22; L13 ID EDGEWORTHS TAXATION PARADOX; 2-SIDED MARKETS; IMPERFECT COMPETITION; MEDIA BIAS; NEWS; EFFICIENCY; DEMAND AB Two-sided platform firms serve distinct customer groups that are connected through interdependent demand, and include major businesses such as the media industry, banking, and the software industry. A well known result of tax incidence is that consumers of a more heavily taxed good pay a higher price and thus buy less of the good. The present paper shows that this result need not hold in a two-sided market. On the contrary, a higher ad valorem tax may lower end-user prices and spur sales. Thus, two-sided platform firms may not at all engage in tax shifting via price increases. We further show that a higher ad valorem tax may undermine a firm's incentive to differentiate its product from that of its competitors. Finally, we demonstrate that the effects of increasing specific taxes may be the opposite of those of increasing value added taxes. C1 [Kind, Hans Jarle] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Dept Econ, N-5035 Bergen, Norway. [Koethenbuerger, Marko] Univ Copenhagen, Dept Econ, Copenhagen, Denmark. [Schjelderup, Guttorm] Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Dept Finance & Management Sci, N-5035 Bergen, Norway. RP Kind, HJ (corresponding author), Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Dept Econ, N-5035 Bergen, Norway. 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Econ. Pap.-New Ser. PD OCT PY 2010 VL 62 IS 4 BP 764 EP 783 DI 10.1093/oep/gpq008 PG 20 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 646JJ UT WOS:000281535600007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Silva, RB AF Silva, Rafael Brum TI THE TAX ON THE CIRCULATION OF GOODS (ICM) IN IMPORTS CONDUCTED BY LEASING SO REVISTA DIREITO GV LA Portuguese DT Article DE TAX LAW; TAX ON THE CIRCULATION OF GOODS; IMPORT; LEASING AB The main purpose of this study is to understand the tax incidence on the circulation of goods (icm) related to imports, particularly those conducted by leasing. The federated states and the federal district have always aimed to make the taxes collection of any imported goods, regardless of the legal business nature done outside the country. However, these states' practice has generated a discussion in the judiciary, as the taxpayers have protested against these charges. almost all the doctrine believes that icm will just focus on importation - but only if in this operation the imported goods ownership transference takes place. This understanding is based on the fact that the importation is only an icm impact extension. For this reason, it should be bounded to the constitutional law of this tax. It is also important to emphasize the existence of a minority doctrine position, which believes that the icm of importation is a new incidence of tax (icm), granted to the federal states and the federal district by the constitutional legislator, adding the impact of taxes on any and all input of goods from abroad. Due to this positioning of the doctrine is that states have the legal support to make the collection of tax on any import transaction, regardless of whether or not there is transfer of ownership of the goods upon importation. However, the supreme court has dismissed the collection of the tax when in the import operations do not occur a transfer of ownership of the property, as in contracts for imports through leasing. In these contracts, the products imported by leasing remain within the property of the lessor, and the lessee only has the immediate possession of the property. In other words, in these operations the transfer of ownership of the property does not occur, consequently, there isn't the incidence of icm in these operations. RP Silva, RB (corresponding author), Ave Voluntarios Patria 364, BR-86061120 Londrina, PR, Brazil. 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Direito GV PD JUL-DEC PY 2010 VL 6 IS 2 BP 583 EP 629 DI 10.1590/S1808-24322010000200012 PG 47 WC Law SC Government & Law GA V1P0R UT WOS:000217105200012 OA DOAJ Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Slintakova, B Klazar, S AF Slintakova, Barbora Klazar, Stanislav TI IMPACT OF HARMONISATION ON DISTRIBUTION OF VAT IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC SO PRAGUE ECONOMIC PAPERS LA English DT Article DE value added tax; tax incidence; progressivity; redistributive effect; inequality measures; tax harmonisation AB The aim of this paper is to analyse progressivity of value added tax in the Czech Republic under the framework of both annual incidence and lifetime incidence. Moreover, impact of the harmonisation of VAT rates connected with the accession of the Czech Republic to the EU on the income distribution is examined. The burden table serves to show the distribution of the VAT burden among households by income categories; the generalised entropy measures and the Gini coefficient are used for measurement of inequality of income. Results show that the Czech VAT is regressive when annual income is analysed while the lifetime income analysis indicated that VAT is progressive. Furthermore, the results suggest that the distribution of income (annual as well as lifetime) after taxation was more equal before the harmonisation, and that impact of the changes in VAT rates in 2004 was likely larger on the lower-income households. C1 [Slintakova, Barbora; Klazar, Stanislav] Univ Econ, Prague, Czech Republic. RP Klazar, S (corresponding author), Univ Econ, Prague, Czech Republic. EM barbora@vse.cz; klazar@vse.cz CR BRADFORD D, 1995, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANAL Caspersen E., 1993, 4387 NBER Coronado J. L., 2000, 7520 NBER Feenberg D., 1997, 5885 NBER Fernandez-Corugedo E, 2004, HDB CENTRAL BANKING Fullerton D., 1995, DISTRIBUTIONAL ANAL, P262 FULLERTON D., 1991, 3750 NBER Hassett Kevin A., 2007, 13554 NBER Jenkins G.P., 2006, IS VALUE ADDED TAX N KAROLY LA, 1996, TAX PROGRESSIVITY IN, P95 KUJOVA I, 2004, INCIDENCE DANE PRIDA Litchfield J.A., 1999, INEQUALITY METHODS T MATHIS A, 2004, TAXATION PAPERS WORK, V2 METCALF GE, 1998, 6546 NBER METCALF GE, 1994, 4619 NBER Metcalf Gilbert E., 2002, 8978 NBER MUSGRAVE R. A., 1994, VEREJNE FINANCE TEOR Mussard S., 2003, EC B, V4, P1 PIOTROWSKA M, 2001, 57 C IIPF LINZ POTERBA JM, 1989, 2833 NBER Svatkova S., 2007, ZATIZENI SPOTREBNIHO ZANDVAKILI S, 2000, IIPF C SEV NR 22 TC 10 Z9 10 U1 0 U2 9 PU UNIV ECONOMICS-PRAGUE PI PRAGUE 3 PA OECONOMICA PUBL, NAM W CHIRCHILLA 4, PRAGUE 3, CZ-130 67, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 1210-0455 EI 2336-730X J9 PRAGUE ECON PAP JI Prague Econ. Pap. PD JUN PY 2010 VL 19 IS 2 BP 133 EP 149 DI 10.18267/j.pep.368 PG 17 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 623PR UT WOS:000279754800003 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Blackman, A Osakwe, R Alpizar, F AF Blackman, Allen Osakwe, Rebecca Alpizar, Francisco TI Fuel tax incidence in developing countries: The case of Costa Rica SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Fuel tax incidence; Transportation; Costa Rica ID POLICY AB Although fuel taxes are a practical means of curbing vehicular air pollution, congestion, and accidents in developing countries all of which are typically major problems they are often opposed on distributional grounds. Yet few studies have investigated fuel tax incidence in a developing country context. We use household survey data and income-outcome coefficients to analyze fuel tax incidence in Costa Rica. We find that the effect of a 10% fuel price hike through direct spending on gasoline would be progressive, its effect through spending on diesel both directly and via bus transportation would be regressive (mainly because poorer households rely heavily on buses), and its effect through spending on goods other than fuel and bus transportation would be relatively small, albeit regressive. Finally, we find that the overall effect of a 10% fuel price hike through all types of direct and indirect spending would be neutral and the magnitude of this combined effect would be modest. We conclude that distributional concerns need not rule out using fuel taxes to address pressing public health and safety problems, particularly if gasoline and diesel taxes can be differentiated. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. C1 [Blackman, Allen] Resources Future Inc, Washington, DC 20036 USA. [Blackman, Allen; Osakwe, Rebecca; Alpizar, Francisco] Environm Dev Ctr Cent Amer, Turriabla, Costa Rica. RP Blackman, A (corresponding author), Resources Future Inc, 1616 P St NW, Washington, DC 20036 USA. EM blackman@rff.org OI Alpizar, Francisco/0000-0001-8479-081X CR ALFARO R, 2001, CONCENTRACION MONOXI Alpizar F, 2003, ENVIRON DEV ECON, V8, P603, DOI 10.1017/S1355770X0300329 AVALOS A, 2007, NACION 1115 Baldasano JM, 2003, SCI TOTAL ENVIRON, V307, P141, DOI 10.1016/S0048-9697(02)00537-5 BUREAU B, 2009, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFEC CANTERO M, 2008, NACION 0705 CELIS R, 1996, INFORM FINAL EC AMBI Dargay J, 2007, ENERG J, V28, P143 DATTA A, 2008, INCIDENCE FUEL TAXAT Friedman M, 1957, THEORY CONSUMPTION F Hassett KA, 2009, ENERG J, V30, P155 HERRERA J, 2005, SEGUNDO INFORM CALID HERRERA J, 2008, INFORM CALIDAD AIRE JOHNSTONE N, 2001, J ENVIRON PLANN MAN, V44, P803 *KPMG PEAT MARWICK, 1990, CHANG PROGR FED TAX Leontief W., 1986, INPUT OUTPUT EC Metcalf GE, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P655 Pachauri RK, 2007, AR4 IPCC PARRY I, 2008, 0817 RES FUT Parry IWH, 2007, J ECON LIT, V45, P373, DOI 10.1257/jel.45.2.373 Parry IWH, 2005, AM ECON REV, V95, P1276, DOI 10.1257/0002828054825510 Poterba J.M., 1991, TAX POLICY EC, V5, P145, DOI DOI 10.3386/W3578 Raa TT, 2005, ECONOMICS OF INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS, P1, DOI 10.2277/ 052160267X RUSSELL CS, 2003, INT YB ENV RESOURCE, V7 SANCHEZ M, 2006, SER CEPAL, V47 Santos G, 2005, TRANSPORT RES REC, P103 Sterner T., 2003, POLICY INSTRUMENTS E STERNER T, INCOME DIST IN PRESS Sterner T, 2007, ENERG POLICY, V35, P3194, DOI 10.1016/j.enpol.2006.10.025 SUITS DB, 1977, AM ECON REV, V67, P747 TIMILSINA G, 2009, 4867 WORLD BANK Timilsina G., 2008, 4652 WORLD BANK VEGA E, 2004, INFORM CUATIFICACION Walls M, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P53 West SE, 2007, J PUBLIC ECON, V91, P593, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.08.007 West SE, 2004, J ENVIRON ECON MANAG, V47, P535, DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.11.004 WIESE AM, 1995, LAND ECON, V71, P229, DOI 10.2307/3146503 World Bank, 2009, COUNTR CLASS ZIRAMBA E, 2009, EC INSTRUMENTS UNPUB 2009, GACETA 0513 NR 40 TC 10 Z9 11 U1 0 U2 9 PU ELSEVIER SCI LTD PI OXFORD PA THE BOULEVARD, LANGFORD LANE, KIDLINGTON, OXFORD OX5 1GB, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0301-4215 EI 1873-6777 J9 ENERG POLICY JI Energy Policy PD MAY PY 2010 VL 38 IS 5 BP 2208 EP 2215 DI 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.12.007 PG 8 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA 578JL UT WOS:000276289500018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Acuna, H Holcombe, RG AF Acuna, Hernan Holcombe, Randall G. TI The Effect of Changes in the Tax Structure on the Reported Income of High-Income Individuals SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax shifting; income taxation; progressive taxation AB Tax incidence theory shows how taxes initially placed on one group can be shifted and ultimately borne by others. This paper shows that income of high-income taxpayers is affected both by the rates they face and by the rates faced by non-high-income taxpayers. The income of high-income taxpayers rises when they face lower tax rates, but also rises in response to lower tax rates imposed on non-high-income taxpayers. While high-income responses to own statutory tax changes may be explained-at least partially-by their making a "smart use of the tax code," high-income responses to tax changes on non-high income individuals indicate the presence of structural effects of tax changes. C1 [Acuna, Hernan] Planning Minist Chile, Dept Social Studies, Santiago, Chile. 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Conditional Cash Transfers and Tax Incidence SO AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-ECONOMIC POLICY LA English DT Article ID INCOME-TAX; WORK REQUIREMENTS; SINGLE MOTHERS; LABOR-MARKET; WELFARE; CREDIT; PROGRAMS; WAGES; MODEL; PARTICIPATION AB The EITC is intended to encourage work But EITC-induced increases in labor supply may drive wages down I simulate the economic incidence of the EITC In each scenario that I consider, a large portion of low-income single mothers' EITC payments is captured by employer) through reduced wages Workers who are EITC ineligible also see wage declines By contrast, a traditional Negative Income Tax (NIT) discourages work, and so induces large transfers from employers to their workers With my preferred parameters $1 in EITC spending increases after-tax incomes by $0 73, while $1 spent on the NIT yields $1 39 C1 Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. RP Rothstein, J (corresponding author), Univ Calif Berkeley, 2607 Hearst Ave, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. 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PD JAN PY 2010 VL 69 IS 1 BP 524 EP 562 DI 10.1111/j.1536-7150.2009.00684.x PG 39 WC Economics; Sociology SC Business & Economics; Sociology GA 546OV UT WOS:000273821000034 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Tsoulfidis, L AF Tsoulfidis, Lefteris BA Tsoulfidis, L BF Tsoulfidis, L TI Competing Schools of Economic Thought Introduction SO COMPETING SCHOOLS OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT LA English DT Editorial Material; Book Chapter ID UNITED-STATES-ECONOMY; REAL BUSINESS CYCLES; MONEY WAGE RATES; CLASSICAL-THEORY; RATIONAL-EXPECTATIONS; KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS; POLITICAL-ECONOMY; CAPITAL THEORY; TAX INCIDENCE; MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION C1 Univ Macedonia, Dept Econ, Thessaloniki 54006, Greece. RP Tsoulfidis, L (corresponding author), Univ Macedonia, Dept Econ, 156 Egnatia St, Thessaloniki 54006, Greece. EM Lnt@uom.gr NR 0 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN PI BERLIN PA HEIDELBERGER PLATZ 3, D-14197 BERLIN, GERMANY BN 978-3-540-92692-4 PY 2010 BP 1 EP + DI 10.1007/978-3-540-92693-1_1 PG 22 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BQA81 UT WOS:000280526400001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU David, P AF David, Petr TI Incidence of Increment of Tax Burden Imposed on Cigarettes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia SO EKONOMICKY CASOPIS LA Slovak DT Article DE excise; cigarette; tax burden; consumer; producer; Czech Republic; Slovakia AB The paper determines absolute and relative values of tax burden dissociation imposed on cigarettes in the Czech Republic and Slovakia based on analysis of average weighted prices of cigarettes in the years 2004 - 2009. Essential is comparing of calculated prices and tax burden imposed on cigarettes in given price level before and after tax burden change. The identification of determinants which affect tax shift measure and factors which affect calculated outcomes is important. The methods of measuring tax incidence including its outcomes in this paper are also described. This makes possible to set the common results about shifts of increased tax burden imposed on cigarettes in specific conditions-in the Czech Republic and Slovakia including their comparison with theoretical and practical observations in given area. C1 Mendelova Univ Brne, Provome Ekon Fak, Ustav Ucetnictvi Dani, Brno 61300, Czech Republic. RP David, P (corresponding author), Mendelova Univ Brne, Provome Ekon Fak, Ustav Ucetnictvi Dani, Zemedelska 1, Brno 61300, Czech Republic. EM david@mendelu.cz RI David, Petr/Q-5673-2016 OI David, Petr/0000-0002-5055-0989 CR BONEK V, 2001, LEXILCON DANOVE POJM BRADFORD DF, 1970, AM ECON REV, V2, P94 BREAK GF, 1974, EC PUBLIC FINANCE, V1, P112 BURTLESS GT, 1987, MAGAZINE EC AFFAIRS, V1, P45 *CS CR, 2010, INT MAT CELN SPRAV S *CS CR, 2010, INT MAT CELN SPRAVY DAVID P, 2009, AGR EC, V1, P40 Davidson EA, 2007, NAT CHEM BIOL, V3, P23, DOI 10.1038/nchembio846 DEVARAJAN S, 1980, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P155 HAMERNIKOVA B, 1999, EUROLEX BOHEMIA JACKSON PM, 2003, EKONOMIE VEFEJNEHO S Jha P, 2000, TOBACCO CONTROL DEV KUBATOVA K, 1994, DANOVA TEORIE POLITI KUBATOVA K, 2006, DANOVA TEORIE POLITI KUBATOVA K., 1994, MODERNI PRUVODCE DAN Kubatova K, 1996, FINANCE, V46, P335 MUSGRAVE R. A., 1994, VEREJNE FINANCE TEOR SANDMO A, 1976, J PUBLIC ECON, V6, P37, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(76)90040-2 Siroky J., 2008, DANOVE TEORIE PRAKTI SOUKUPOVA J, 1998, MIKCROEKONOMIE STIGLITZ J. E., 1997, EKONOMIE VEREJNEHO S Svatkova S., 2007, ZATIZENI SPOTREBNIHO Vlachy J, 2008, EKON CAS, V56, P649 ZAKON C, 2003, SB SPOTREBNICH DANIC, P353 ZAKON C, 2004, Z Z SPOTREBNEJ DANI, P106 ZAKON C, 1996, SPOTREBNICH DANICH, P587 NR 26 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 9 PU SLOVAK ACADEMIC PRESS LTD PI BRATISLAVA PA PO BOX 57 NAM SLOBODY 6, 810 05 BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA SN 0013-3035 J9 EKON CAS JI Ekon. Cas. PY 2010 VL 58 IS 6 BP 635 EP 650 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 648LX UT WOS:000281696600003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Fankhauser, S Martin, N AF Fankhauser, Samuel Martin, Nat TI The economics of the CDM levy: Revenue potential, tax incidence and distortionary effects SO ENERGY POLICY LA English DT Article DE Clean development mechanism; CDM levy; Adaptation finance AB A levy on the Clean Development Mechanism and other carbon trading schemes is a potential source of finance for climate change adaptation. An adaptation levy of 2% is currently imposed on all CDM transactions which could raise around $500 million between now and 2012. This paper analyses the scope for raising further adaptation finance from the CDM, the economic costs (deadweight loss) of such a measure and the incidence of the levy, that is, the economic burden the levy would impose on the buyers and sellers of credits. We find that a levy of 2% could raise up to $2 billion a year in 2020 if there are no restrictions on demand. This could rise to $10 billion for a 10% tax. Restrictions on credit demand (called supplementarity limits, the requirement that most emission abatement should happen domestically) curtail trade volumes and consequently tax revenues. They also alter the economic impact of the CDM levy. Without supplementarity restrictions sellers (developing countries) bear twothirds of the cost of the tax. If there are supplementarity limits they can pass on the tax burden to buyers (developed countries) more or less in full. Without supplementarity restrictions the distortionary effect of the levy (its deadweight loss) rises sharply with the tax rate. With them the deadweight loss is close to zero. (C) 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. C1 [Fankhauser, Samuel] London Sch Econ, Grantham Res Inst, London, England. [Martin, Nat] Univ Cape Town, ZA-7700 Rondebosch, South Africa. RP Fankhauser, S (corresponding author), London Sch Econ, Grantham Res Inst, London, England. EM s.fankhauser@lse.ac.uk OI Fankhauser, Samuel/0000-0003-2100-7888 FU Economic and Social Research CouncilEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [ES/G021694/1] Funding Source: researchfish CR AGRAWALA S, 2008, EC ASPECTS ADAPTATIO Barker T, 2007, CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 Benitez PC, 2007, ECOL ECON, V60, P572, DOI 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2005.12.015 Bouwman A., 2006, INTEGRATED MODELLING Edmonds J, 2008, CLIM POLICY, V8, P355, DOI 10.3763/cpol.2007.0469 Eliasch J., 2008, CLIMATE CHANGE FINAN European Commission, 1996, 17358 EUR EN EUR COM FANKHAUSER S, WILEY INTER IN PRESS FANKHAUSER S, 2009, VIVID EC MAY Harmeling S, 2009, FUNDING SOURCES INT HOOGZAAD J, 2008, CARBON FINANCE IETA, 2008, STAT CDM 2008 FAC SM Muller B., 2008, 42 OXF I EN STUD Parry M.L., 2009, ASSESSING COSTS ADAP STEHR HJ, 2008, PERSPECTIVES SERIES Stern N.H., 1987, NEW PALGRAVE DICT EC Streck C, 2007, CARBON CLIMATE LAW R, V1, P53 Streck C, 2008, EUR J INT LAW, V19, P409, DOI 10.1093/ejil/chn014 Wara M, 2007, NATURE, V445, P595, DOI 10.1038/445595a *WORLD BANK, 2009, WORLD DEV 2010 DEV C NR 20 TC 15 Z9 15 U1 0 U2 7 PU ELSEVIER SCI LTD PI OXFORD PA THE BOULEVARD, LANGFORD LANE, KIDLINGTON, OXFORD OX5 1GB, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0301-4215 J9 ENERG POLICY JI Energy Policy PD JAN PY 2010 VL 38 IS 1 BP 357 EP 363 DI 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.09.026 PG 7 WC Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences; Environmental Studies SC Business & Economics; Energy & Fuels; Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA 536ZE UT WOS:000273081700037 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Timmons, JF AF Timmons, Jeffrey F. TI Taxation and Representation in Recent History SO JOURNAL OF POLITICS LA English DT Article ID FISCAL-POLICY; DEMOCRACY; SIZE; GROWTH; TESTS AB This paper disaggregates government accounts to examine whether and how representation affects the level and distribution of taxation. Using panel data for over 100 countries from 1970 to 1999 and cross-sectional data for approxiniately 75 democracies from 1990 to 1998, we find that both democratization and voter turnout induced a modest but highly systematic increase in revenue from regressive taxes on consumption. While one-third of the increase due to democratization reflects a shift from more inefficient and similarly regressive taxes on trade, most of it was new revenue. Less convincingly, democratization and voter turnout also increased total tax revenue. By contrast, neither democracy, nor voter turnout systematically increased revenue from progressive taxes on income and capital. With reasonable assumptions about tax incidence and participation patterns, these findings shed light on competing conceptions of taxation and representation. C1 Inst Tecnol Autonomo Mexico, Mexico City 01000, DF, Mexico. RP Timmons, JF (corresponding author), Inst Tecnol Autonomo Mexico, Mexico City 01000, DF, Mexico. CR Acemoglu D, 2000, Q J ECON, V115, P1167, DOI 10.1162/003355300555042 Acemoglu Daron, 2005, EC ORIGINS DICTATORS ALM J, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V48, P21, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90040-M Andreoni J, 1998, J ECON LIT, V36, P818 BATES RH, 1985, POLIT SOC, V14, P53, DOI 10.1177/003232928501400102 BECK N, 1995, AM POLIT SCI REV, V89, P634, DOI 10.2307/2082979 Becker GS, 2003, J LAW ECON, V46, P293, DOI 10.1086/377114 Beramendi P, 2007, BRIT J POLIT SCI, V37, P619, DOI 10.1017/S0007123407000348 BIRD RM, 1992, LAT AM RES REV, V27, P7 Boix C, 1998, POLITICAL PARTIES GR Boylan DM, 1996, LAT AM RES REV, V31, P7 BRASHARES E, 1988, NATL TAX J, V41, P155 *C BUDG OFF, 2007, EST FUND OP IR WAR T Cheibub JA, 1998, WORLD POLIT, V50, P349, DOI 10.1017/S0043887100012843 Corak M, 2006, 1993 I STUD LAB Cukierman Alex, 1991, POLITICAL EC, P76 Davidson R., 1993, ESTIMATION INFERENCE De Donder P, 2003, J PUBLIC ECON, V87, P2491, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00051-8 DEBOEF S, 2005, ANN M SOC POL METH F EASTERLY W, 1993, J MONETARY ECON, V32, P417, DOI 10.1016/0304-3932(93)90025-B Ebrill L., 2001, MODERN VAT FRANSEZE R, 2002, POLITICAL PART UNPUB Fullerton Don, 2002, 8829 NBER Gould AC, 2002, ANNU REV POLIT SCI, V5, P87, DOI 10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.100201.101909 GRUDER VR, 1982, LEGIS STUD QUART, V7, P263, DOI 10.2307/439671 HADENIUS A, 2005, SAME SAME DIFF UNPUB Herb M, 2005, COMP POLIT, V37, P297, DOI 10.2307/20072891 Hinrichs H. 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G., 1982, CONT DEMOCRACIES PAR PRZEWORSKI A, 1988, AM POLIT SCI REV, V82, P11, DOI 10.2307/1958056 RODRIGUEZ F, 1999, ECON POLIT-OXFORD, V2, P171 Rodrik D, 1998, J POLIT ECON, V106, P997, DOI 10.1086/250038 Ross ML, 2004, BRIT J POLIT SCI, V34, P229, DOI 10.1017/S0007123404000031 Ross ML, 1999, WORLD POLIT, V51, P297, DOI 10.1017/S0043887100008200 Sarkees MR, 2000, CONFLICT MANAG PEACE, V18, P123, DOI 10.1177/073889420001800105 SCHEVE K, 2008, CONSCRIPTION W UNPUB SCHUMPETER JA, 1918, INT EC PAPERS TRANSL, P5 Slemrod J., 2001, TAXING OURSELVES CIT TANZI V, 2000, 76 WP STANF U CTR RE Tilly Charles, 1985, BRINGING STATE BACK Timmons JF, 2005, WORLD POLIT, V57, P530, DOI 10.1353/wp.2006.0015 TIMMONS JF, COMP POLITI IN PRESS Vanhanen T, 2000, J PEACE RES, V37, P251, DOI 10.1177/0022343300037002008 WEYLAND K, 1996, DEMOCRACY EQUITY FAI World Bank, 2004, WORLD DEV IND *WORLD BANK, 2007, FISC DEC IND ZELLNER A, 1962, J AM STAT ASSOC, V57, P348, DOI 10.2307/2281644 NR 69 TC 32 Z9 33 U1 0 U2 19 PU UNIV CHICAGO PRESS PI CHICAGO PA 1427 E 60TH ST, CHICAGO, IL 60637-2954 USA SN 0022-3816 EI 1468-2508 J9 J POLIT JI J. Polit. PD JAN PY 2010 VL 72 IS 1 BP 191 EP 208 DI 10.1017/S0022381609990569 PG 18 WC Political Science SC Government & Law GA 548FS UT WOS:000273945700014 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Jha, R AF Jha, Raghbendra BA Jha, R BF Jha, R TI The theory of tax incidence SO MODERN PUBLIC ECONOMICS, SECOND EDITION SE Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance LA English DT Article; Book Chapter DE tax incidence in partial and general equilibrium; output and factor substitution effects; fair wages; rate of return regulation C1 Australian Natl Univ, Australia S Asia Res Ctr, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. RP Jha, R (corresponding author), Australian Natl Univ, Australia S Asia Res Ctr, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. NR 0 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU ROUTLEDGE PI ABINGDON PA 2 PARK SQ, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXFORD, ENGLAND BN 978-0-203-87004-4 J9 ROUTL ADV TEXTS ECON PY 2010 BP 249 EP 272 PG 24 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BNH66 UT WOS:000274574900013 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Jha, R AF Jha, Raghbendra BA Jha, R BF Jha, R TI Tax incidence in dynamic models SO MODERN PUBLIC ECONOMICS, SECOND EDITION SE Routledge Advanced Texts in Economics and Finance LA English DT Article; Book Chapter DE neoclassical model of economic growth; balanced growth path tax incidence; the life-cycle model; tax incidence in monetary growth models; general life-cycle model; incidence of a tax on land C1 Australian Natl Univ, Australia S Asia Res Ctr, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. RP Jha, R (corresponding author), Australian Natl Univ, Australia S Asia Res Ctr, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. NR 0 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ROUTLEDGE PI ABINGDON PA 2 PARK SQ, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXFORD, ENGLAND BN 978-0-203-87004-4 J9 ROUTL ADV TEXTS ECON PY 2010 BP 273 EP 303 PG 31 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BNH66 UT WOS:000274574900014 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU McGrath, RD Cebula, RJ AF McGrath, Richard D. Cebula, Richard J. BE Tavidze, A TI TAX INCIDENCE IN A GROWING ECONOMY WITH A VARIABLE SAVINGS RATE SO PROGRESS IN ECONOMICS RESEARCH, VOL 16 SE Progress in Economics Research Series LA English DT Article; Book Chapter AB Tax incidence theory emphasizes that the burden of a specific factor tax is shared by other factors of production. Thus, a tax on labor will reduce the quantity of labor hired, increase the capital-to-labor ratio, and reduce interest rates. That is, owners of capital will share the tax burden, depending upon the relative supply and demand elasticities of the factors of production However, it has been previously shown that labor will bear the entire burden (100 percent) of a wage tax in an overlapping generations model The present study provides a less restrictive and more plausible model and then derives several circumstances under which labor bears either more or less than 100 percent of the tax burden. C1 [McGrath, Richard D.; Cebula, Richard J.] Armstrong Atlantic State Univ, Savannah, GA 31419 USA. RP McGrath, RD (corresponding author), Armstrong Atlantic State Univ, Savannah, GA 31419 USA. CR CEBULA RJ, 1996, EC INTERNAZIONALE, V49, P19 DALY MJ, 1988, PUBLIC FINANC, V43, P349 EVANS O, 1983, AM ECON REV, V73, P399 FELDSTEIN MS, 1974, Q J ECON, V88, P551, DOI 10.2307/1881822 KOTLIKOFF LJ, 1979, Q J ECON, V93, P705, DOI 10.2307/1884477 SMITH RS, 1990, IMF STAFF PAPERS, V37, P75 NR 6 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU NOVA SCIENCE PUBLISHERS, INC PI HAUPPAUGE PA 400 OSER AVE, STE 1600, HAUPPAUGE, NY 11788-3635 USA BN 978-1-60741-667-8 J9 PROG ECON RES SER PY 2010 VL 16 BP 175 EP 181 PG 7 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BQQ49 UT WOS:000281548000010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lahuerta, MAB Garde, MM AF Barberan Lahuerta, Miguel Angel Melguizo Garde, Marta TI The federal regulation in the spanish free transmission tax: effectiveness and redistributive effect SO REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS REGIONALES LA Spanish DT Article DE Tax incidence; Tax progressiveness; Wealth redistribution; Inheritance tax AB The aim of this paper is to analyse the redistributive effect to analyse the effect of the recent reforms carried out in The Inheritance and Gift Tax of Spain by the Autonomous Communities. To that end, we simulate each regional tax law of 2008 over a panel of taxpayers of the last year before the tax reforms. Afterthat we realice an empirical analysis to determine the tax incidence, the changes of the tax collections and the impact on the redistributive effects that the inheritance tax has respect to the wealth of the individuals. C1 [Barberan Lahuerta, Miguel Angel; Melguizo Garde, Marta] Univ Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain. RP Lahuerta, MAB (corresponding author), Univ Zaragoza, Zaragoza, Spain. CR Albi Ibanez E., 1974, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V28, P153 Atkinson A., 1981, EC DESIGUALDAD Atkinson A., 1977, HACIENDA PUBLIA ESPA, V45, P156 Barberan M. A., 2005, REV ASTURIANA EC, V32, P95 Barberan M. A., 2006, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V177, P25 Barberan M. A., 2005, IMPOSICION HERENCIAS Barberan M. 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Estud. Reg. PD JAN-APR PY 2010 IS 87 BP 187 EP 211 PG 25 WC Environmental Studies SC Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA V7K4D UT WOS:000421040200007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Korkeamaki, O Uusitalo, R AF Korkeamaki, Ossi Uusitalo, Roope TI Employment and wage effects of a payroll-tax cut-evidence from a regional experiment SO INTERNATIONAL TAX AND PUBLIC FINANCE LA English DT Article DE Payroll tax; Labor demand; Tax incidence; Propensity score matching AB In this paper, we evaluate the effects of a regional experiment that reduced payroll taxes by 3-6 percentage points for 3 years in northern Finland. We match each firm in the target region with a similar firm in a comparison region and estimate the effect of the payroll tax reduction by comparing employment and wage changes within the matched pairs before and after the start of the experiment. According to our results, the reduction in the payroll taxes led to an increase in wages in the target region. The point estimates indicate that the increase in wages offset roughly half of the impact of the payroll tax cut on the labor costs. The remaining labor cost reduction had no significant effects on employment. C1 [Korkeamaki, Ossi; Uusitalo, Roope] Govt Inst Econ Res, Helsinki 00101, Finland. [Uusitalo, Roope] Inst Labor Market Policy Evaluat, Uppsala, Sweden. RP Uusitalo, R (corresponding author), Govt Inst Econ Res, POB 1279, Helsinki 00101, Finland. EM ossi.korkeamaki@vatt.fi; roope.uusitalo@vatt.fi OI Uusitalo, Roope/0000-0002-6708-0004 CR Anderson PM, 1997, J PUBLIC ECON, V65, P119, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01624-6 BENNMAKER H, 2007, DO PAYROLL TAX DEDUC BOHM P, 1993, REG SCI URBAN ECON, V23, P51, DOI 10.1016/0166-0462(93)90028-D BOHM P, 1989, 19842 SIND PM DIAMOND A, 2006, WP200635 I GOV STUD GRUBER J, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P622 Gruber J, 1997, J LABOR ECON, V15, pS72, DOI 10.1086/209877 Hamermesh D., 1993, LABOR DEMAND JOHANSEN F, 1998, 271998 U OSL DEP EC *KELA, 2003, STAT YB SOC INS I T, V1, P38 KORKEAMAKI O, 2004, DISCUSSION PAPERS LA, V194 KORKEAMAKI O, 2008, 443 GOV I EC RES Murphy KJ, 2007, LABOUR ECON, V14, P457, DOI 10.1016/j.labeco.2006.02.002 ROSENBAUM PR, 1985, AM STAT, V39, P33, DOI 10.2307/2683903 Uusitalo R, 2005, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND WAGE FORMATION: PREFORMANCE AND CHALLENGES, P121, DOI 10.1007/3-7908-1598-5_9 UUSITALO R, 2008, WAGE STRUCT IN PRESS NR 16 TC 15 Z9 15 U1 0 U2 11 PU SPRINGER PI DORDRECHT PA VAN GODEWIJCKSTRAAT 30, 3311 GZ DORDRECHT, NETHERLANDS SN 0927-5940 EI 1573-6970 J9 INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN JI Int. Tax Public Financ. PD DEC PY 2009 VL 16 IS 6 BP 753 EP 772 DI 10.1007/s10797-008-9088-6 PG 20 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 530EY UT WOS:000272573000002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Groves, JR AF Groves, Jeremy R. TI The impact of positive property tax differentials on the timing of development SO REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE Property tax; Property tax incidence; Duration analysis; Urban growth; Sprawl ID URBAN SPRAWL; TAXATION AB To date, few empirical studies have focused oil the location decision by residential developers in response to changes in the property tax. Based oil a dynamic time-to-development model by Turnbull, this paper finds, using 17 years of parcel level data from Saint Louis County, Missouri, that higher than average tax rates increase the time-to-development for vacant parcels by between 4 and 11%, all else equal. Additionally this paper finds that the tax differential effect is cumulative, resulting in about a 20% increase in the time-to-development for the parcel facing the average number of years with a higher than average rate. These results support the analytical results by both Turnbull [Turnbull, G.K., 1988. The effects of local taxes and public services oil residential development patterns. journal of Regional Science, 28 (4), 541 -562.] and McMillen [McMillen, D.R, 1990. The timing and duration of development tax rate increases. journal of Urban Economics, 28, 1-18.] that the property tax can distort residential capital markets leading to inefficient urban growth, or sprawl. (C) 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 No Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, De Kalb, IL 60115 USA. RP Groves, JR (corresponding author), No Illinois Univ, Dept Econ, De Kalb, IL 60115 USA. 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Sci. Urban Econ. PD NOV PY 2009 VL 39 IS 6 BP 739 EP 748 DI 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2009.07.004 PG 10 WC Economics; Environmental Studies; Urban Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology; Urban Studies GA 511NP UT WOS:000271172800010 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Halcoussis, D Ng, K Virts, N AF Halcoussis, Dennis Ng, Kenneth Virts, Nancy TI Property Ownership and Educational Discrimination in the South SO JOURNAL OF EDUCATION FINANCE LA English DT Article AB In the postbellum southern U.S., African Americans were steadily disenfranchised, a modern publicly financed universal school system with racially segregated schools was created, and public school monies were allocated so that white pupils received substantially more than black pupils. An earlier paper (Ng and Halcoussis 2003) established a statistical relationship between black voter participation, the prevalence of black children and the degree of fund diversion. This article extends the analysis by examining the effect of land distribution, political participation, and tax incidence on black and white student expenditures. A positive statistical relationship is found between black per student expenditures and counties with higher political participation. A negative statistical relationship is found between black per student expenditures and counties where large tenant plantations are more prevalent. This establishes that both voting power and the source of school funding also played important roles in the existence and extent of racially based school fund diversion. C1 [Halcoussis, Dennis; Ng, Kenneth; Virts, Nancy] Calif State Northridge, Dept Econ, Northridge, CA 91330 USA. RP Halcoussis, D (corresponding author), Calif State Northridge, Dept Econ, Northridge, CA 91330 USA. CR ALSTON LJ, 1989, J INST THEOR ECON, V145, P133 ALSTON LJ, 1985, J ECON HIST, V45, P95, DOI 10.1017/S002205070003360X Brannen C. 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PD FAL PY 2009 VL 35 IS 2 BP 128 EP 139 DI 10.1353/jef.0.0007 PG 12 WC Education & Educational Research SC Education & Educational Research GA V6F6K UT WOS:000420240100002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Simula, L Trannoy, A AF Simula, Laurent Trannoy, Alain TI The French Local Business Tax, the Taxation of Firms and the User Cost of Capital SO REVUE D ECONOMIE POLITIQUE LA French DT Editorial Material DE Tax Incidence; Local Business Taxation; Corporate Income Taxation ID INVESTMENT BEHAVIOR; POLICY AB This article contributes to the debate about the reform of the French local business tax. It casts light on an argument in favour of its replacement by a tax based on the value added, an argument that was apparently overlooked, For this purpose, it uses the user cost of the production factors, and in particular the user cost of capital. Taking account of the other taxes paid by French firms, we show that the proposed change is accompanied by a significant drop in the user cost of capital and a limited increase in the costs of labor and use of land. C1 [Simula, Laurent] Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. [Simula, Laurent] Uppsala Univ, IDEP, Dept Econ, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. [Trannoy, Alain] Ctr Vieille Charite, IDEP, F-13236 Marseille, France. [Trannoy, Alain] Ctr Vieille Charite, EHESS, GREQAM, F-13236 Marseille 02, France. RP Simula, L (corresponding author), Uppsala Univ, Uppsala Ctr Fiscal Studies, POB 513, SE-75120 Uppsala, Sweden. 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PD SEP-OCT PY 2009 VL 119 IS 5 BP 677 EP 690 DI 10.3917/redp.195.0677 PG 14 WC Economics; Political Science SC Business & Economics; Government & Law GA 564VD UT WOS:000275245100001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Beckert, J Lutter, M AF Beckert, Jens Lutter, Mark TI The Inequality of Fair Play: Lottery Gambling and Social Stratification in Germany SO EUROPEAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW LA English DT Article ID SAMPLE SELECTION BIAS; TAX INCIDENCE; STATE LOTTERIES; REGRESSIVITY; DEMAND; PARTICIPATION; EXPENDITURES; EDUCATION; TAXATION; MARKETS AB On the basis of a telephone survey conducted on a random sample of the German residential population, we examine the distribution effects state lotteries have on Germanys social structure. Lotteries are highly taxed economic transactions, whose proceeds make up a considerable share of public fiscal revenues. Our analysis shows that lotteries are a form of regressive taxation. 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T., 2007, INT J SOC RES METHOD, V10, P63, DOI DOI 10.1080/13645570701211209 NR 74 TC 40 Z9 40 U1 0 U2 9 PU OXFORD UNIV PRESS PI OXFORD PA GREAT CLARENDON ST, OXFORD OX2 6DP, ENGLAND SN 0266-7215 J9 EUR SOCIOL REV JI Eur. Sociol. Rev. PD AUG PY 2009 VL 25 IS 4 BP 475 EP 488 DI 10.1093/esr/jcn063 PG 14 WC Sociology SC Sociology GA 472DP UT WOS:000268109700006 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ghezzi, L Sciclone, N AF Ghezzi, Leonardo Sciclone, Nicola TI A Micro-macro Model for Fiscal Policy Simulations SO POLITICA ECONOMICA LA Italian DT Article DE micro and macro models; distribution of economic welfare; tax incidence AB This paper develops a macro micro approach to study the impact of fiscal policies on firms and families. Macro and micro models differ in aims and data sources. The first ones are mainly focused on representing the structural features of the economic system and the flows among economic agents. 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PD AUG PY 2009 VL 25 IS 2 BP 185 EP 210 DI 10.1429/30316 PG 26 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA VD6VK UT WOS:000437487200003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Boyle, MA Matheson, VA AF Boyle, Melissa Matheson, Victor TI Measuring tax incidence: a natural experiment in the hybrid vehicle market SO ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY STUDIES LA English DT Article DE Automobiles; Tax incidence; Hybrids; Taxation AB This study measures the economic incidence of the hybrid vehicle tax credit implemented in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. By comparing hybrids with gasoline-powered counterparts as the credit was phased out and expired, we are able to isolate the impact of the credit on the market price of hybrid vehicles. We conclude that hybrid prices increase by $0.75 on average for every additional dollar of credit. Thus, the majority of the subsidy accrues to sellers, potentially encouraging producers to increase the variety and availability of hybrid models on the market. C1 [Boyle, Melissa; Matheson, Victor] Coll Holy Cross, Dept Econ, Worcester, MA 01610 USA. RP Boyle, MA (corresponding author), Coll Holy Cross, Dept Econ, Worcester, MA 01610 USA. CR Beresteanu A, 2009, INT EC REV IN PRESS Edmunds. com, 2009, EDMUNDS Gallagher K. S., 2008, FACULTY RES WORKING Kahn ME, 2007, J ENVIRON ECON MANAG, V54, P129, DOI 10.1016/j.jeem.2007.05.001 Sallee JM, 2008, WORKING PAPER Toyota Motor Corporation, 2008, SEC EXCH COMM 2008 A NR 6 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 0 PU SPRINGER PI NEW YORK PA 233 SPRING ST, NEW YORK, NY 10013 USA SN 1432-847X EI 1867-383X J9 ENVIRON ECON POLICY JI Environ. Econ. Policy Stud. PD JUN PY 2009 VL 10 IS 2-4 BP 101 EP 107 DI 10.1007/BF03353981 PG 7 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V77JA UT WOS:000211974900003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Blumkin, T Menirav, E AF Blumkin, Tomer Menirav, Ehud TI Framing the rabbit to snare the votes SO SOCIAL CHOICE AND WELFARE LA English DT Article ID PUBLIC-FINANCE; TAX; EQUIVALENCE; MARKETS; PRICE AB Results in cognitive psychology and experimental economics suggest that people are prone to systematic misperception of policy. This paper embodies voters' misperceptions of policy into a standard political economy framework with complete information, and examines whether and to what extent political parties may use this misperception to manipulate voters and derive political gains. We analyze the equilibria and welfare implications for different setups. A payroll tax incidence detailed example is used to illustrate the framework. C1 [Blumkin, Tomer] Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel. [Menirav, Ehud] Tel Aviv Univ, Eitan Berglas Sch Econ, IL-69978 Tel Aviv, Israel. RP Blumkin, T (corresponding author), Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel. EM tomerblu@bgu.ac.il; menirav@post.tau.ac.il OI Blumkin, Tomer/0000-0002-9215-6816 CR Ashenfelter O, 2003, J ECON LIT, V41, P763, DOI 10.1257/002205103322436188 ASHENFELTER OC, 2004, 4662 CEPR Borck R, 2002, SOUTH ECON J, V68, P672, DOI 10.2307/1061725 Buchanan J.M., 1967, PUBLIC FINANCE DEMOC Cukierman A, 1998, AM ECON REV, V88, P180 Eckel CC, 2003, J PUBLIC ECON, V87, P681, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00094-9 Kachelmeier Steven J., 1994, CONTEMP ACCOUNT RES, V10, P505 Kerschbamer R, 2000, ECON THEOR, V16, P719 Krishna A, 2003, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V10, P189, DOI 10.1023/A:1023337907802 Liebman Jeffrey B., 2004, SCHMEDULING UNPUB MANKIW NG, 2001, PRINCIPLES EC Mueller Dennis C., 2003, PUBLIC CHOICE Roemer John, 2001, POLITICAL COMPETITIO Ruffle BJ, 2005, J PUBLIC ECON, V89, P1519, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.04.009 Sausgruber R, 2005, PUBLIC CHOICE, V122, P39, DOI 10.1007/s11127-005-3992-4 Stiglitz JE, 2002, J PUBLIC ECON, V86, P341, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00193-1 TRAUB S, 1999, FRAMING EFFECTS TAXA NR 17 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 5 PU SPRINGER PI NEW YORK PA 233 SPRING ST, NEW YORK, NY 10013 USA SN 0176-1714 J9 SOC CHOICE WELFARE JI Soc Choice Welf. PD MAY PY 2009 VL 32 IS 4 BP 603 EP 634 DI 10.1007/s00355-008-0341-9 PG 32 WC Economics; Social Sciences, Mathematical Methods SC Business & Economics; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences GA 418GG UT WOS:000264136100004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Smart, M Bird, RM AF Smart, Michael Bird, Richard M. TI The Economic Incidence of Replacing a Retail Sales Tax with a Value-Added Tax: Evidence from Canadian Experience SO CANADIAN PUBLIC POLICY-ANALYSE DE POLITIQUES LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; sales tax; value-added tax ID ATLANTIC CANADA; GOVERNMENT AB A decade ago, several Canadian provinces replaced the retail sales taxes with value-added taxes. This paper estimates the effects of this tax substitution on consumer prices in the reforming provinces. Consistent with theory, we find that the resulting effective tax-rate changes were shifted forward to consumers in most sectors of the economy. The overall effect on tax-inclusive consumer prices was small, albeit perhaps somewhat regressive. C1 [Smart, Michael] Univ Toronto, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada. [Bird, Richard M.] Univ Toronto, Rotman Sch Management, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada. RP Smart, M (corresponding author), Univ Toronto, Dept Econ, Toronto, ON M5S 1A1, Canada. 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PD MAR PY 2009 VL 35 IS 1 BP 85 EP 97 PG 13 WC Economics; Public Administration SC Business & Economics; Public Administration GA 432VI UT WOS:000265162000005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Garrett, TA Coughlin, CC AF Garrett, Thomas A. Coughlin, Cletus C. TI Inter-temporal Differences in the Income Elasticity of Demand for Lottery Tickets SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; REGRESSIVITY; COMPETITION; PROPENSITY; SALES AB We estiniatc annual income elasticities of demand for lottery tickets using county-level panel data for three states and,find that the income elasticity of demand (and, thus, the tax burden) for lottery tickets has changed over time. This is due to changes in a state's lottery game portfolio and the growth in consumer income more so than competition from alternative gambling opportunities. Trends in the income elasticity for instant and online lottery games appear to be different. Our results raise doubts about the long-term growth potential of lottery revenue and have policy implications for state governments and those concerned about regressivity. C1 [Garrett, Thomas A.; Coughlin, Cletus C.] Fed Reserve Bank St Louis, St Louis, MO 63166 USA. RP Garrett, TA (corresponding author), Fed Reserve Bank St Louis, POB 442, St Louis, MO 63166 USA. 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J., 1995, PUBLIC BUDGETING FIN, V15, P54, DOI DOI 10.1111/1540-5850.01046 STOVER ME, 1987, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V15, P428, DOI 10.1177/109114218701500405 Tosun MS, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P163, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.2.01 NR 36 TC 11 Z9 11 U1 0 U2 3 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 EI 1944-7477 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PD MAR PY 2009 VL 62 IS 1 BP 77 EP 99 DI 10.17310/ntj.2009.1.04 PG 23 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 454QS UT WOS:000266698100005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Alm, J Sennoga, E Skidmore, M AF Alm, James Sennoga, Edward Skidmore, Mark TI PERFECT COMPETITION, URBANIZATION, AND TAX INCIDENCE IN THE RETAIL GASOLINE MARKET SO ECONOMIC INQUIRY LA English DT Article ID SHORT-RUN INCIDENCE; PRICE; REDUCTION; OLIGOPOLY; BEHAVIOR AB We use monthly gasoline price data for all 50 U.S. states over the period 1984-1999 to examine the incidence of state gasoline excise taxes. Our estimation results indicate full shifting of gasoline taxes to the final consumer. In addition, although we find that gasoline retail prices demonstrate asymmetric responses to changes in gasoline wholesale prices, we find only limited evidence of such behavior for retail prices with respect to gasoline excise taxes. Finally, we find that gasoline markets in urban states exhibit full shifting, but those in rural states (with less competition) demonstrate somewhat less than full shifting. (JEL H22). C1 [Alm, James] Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA. [Sennoga, Edward] Makerere Univ, Fac Econ & Management, Dept Econ Policy & Planning, Kampala, Uganda. [Skidmore, Mark] Michigan State Univ, Dept Agr Econ, E Lansing, MI 48824 USA. RP Alm, J (corresponding author), Georgia State Univ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Campus Box 3992, Atlanta, GA 30302 USA. EM jalm@gsu.edu; esennoga@fema.mak.ac.ug; mskidmor@msu.edu CR Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 Baltagi B. 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A., 1959, THEORY PUBLIC FINANC Pechman Joseph A., 1985, WHO PAID TAXES 1966 Poterba JM, 1996, NATL TAX J, V49, P165 Rolph ER, 1952, J POLIT ECON, V60, P102, DOI 10.1086/257173 SALOP SC, 1979, BELL J ECON, V10, P141, DOI 10.2307/3003323 SHEPARD L, 1976, J ECON ISSUES, V10, P169, DOI 10.1080/00213624.1976.11503333 Sidhu N.D., 1971, P 64 ANN C TAXATION, P720 Skidmore M, 2005, J URBAN ECON, V57, P189, DOI 10.1016/j.jue.2004.10.004 *STAT WI DEP REV, 2004, WISC TAX INC STUD STERN N, 1987, J PUBLIC ECON, V32, P133, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90009-0 SULLIVAN D, 1985, J POLIT ECON, V93, P586, DOI 10.1086/261317 SUMNER DA, 1981, J POLIT ECON, V89, P1010, DOI 10.1086/261017 *US FED HIGHW ADM, 1980, HIGHW STAT VERLINDA JA, 2004, PRICE RESPONSE ASYMM Vita MG, 2000, J REGUL ECON, V18, P217, DOI 10.1023/A:1008150819999 WIESE AM, 1995, LAND ECON, V71, P229, DOI 10.2307/3146503 WOODARD FO, 1967, NATL TAX J, V20, P250 Wooldridge J., 2002, ECONOMETRIC ANAL CRO ZUPNICK JW, 1975, J ECON ISSUES, V9, P409, DOI 10.1080/00213624.1975.11503295 NR 45 TC 46 Z9 47 U1 0 U2 13 PU WILEY PI HOBOKEN PA 111 RIVER ST, HOBOKEN 07030-5774, NJ USA SN 0095-2583 EI 1465-7295 J9 ECON INQ JI Econ. Inq. PD JAN PY 2009 VL 47 IS 1 BP 118 EP 134 DI 10.1111/j.1465-7295.2008.00164.x PG 17 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 397MJ UT WOS:000262666500008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Siroky, J Makova, K AF Siroky, Jan Makova, Katerina TI Independence between the Efficient Tax Rate and Tax Progressiveness in the Czech Republic During 1993-2007 SO EKONOMICKY CASOPIS LA English DT Article DE average wage; efficient tax rate; flat tax rate; personal income tax; tax liability; tax progressiveness AB There has been a discussion on simplification of personal income tax in many European Union member states since 2000. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe in particular tend to consider a new tax phenomenon - a flat tax rate. This has been a part of the tax system in the Czech Republic since January 1, 2008 as well. The nominal tax rates predicate the real rate of taxation insufficiently. A more objective way to measure the tax circumstances of the taxpayers in individual countries is relative indicators such as the tax incidence of taxpayers with an average wage, the calculation of an efficient tax rate or measuring the tax progressiveness. This paper shows that changes in the efficient tax rate do not have to influence the relevant change of tax progressiveness. The aim of this paper is to show the impact of personal income tax changes on the efficient tax rate and the tax progressiveness in the Czech Republic. C1 [Siroky, Jan; Makova, Katerina] Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Publ Econ, Ostrava 70121, Czech Republic. RP Siroky, J (corresponding author), Tech Univ Ostrava, Fac Econ, Dept Publ Econ, Sokolska 33, Ostrava 70121, Czech Republic. EM jan.siroky@vsb.cz; katerina.makova@seznam.cz RI Siroky, Jan/I-6346-2018 OI Siroky, Jan/0000-0001-9802-5801 CR AUERBACH AJ, 1987, HDB PUBLIC EC, V2 Caminada K., 2001, PUBLIC FINANCE MANAG, V1, P471 CREEDY J, 1994, TAXATION POVERTY INC KINKOR J, 1994, FINANC UVER, V44, P455 MAKOVA K, 2007, 2007 LABS INT C POL MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, P471 MUSGRAVE P, 1994, PUBLIC FINANCE THEOR MUSGRAVE R, 1968, J POLITICAL EC, V56, P498 Roemer JE, 1999, ECONOMETRICA, V67, P1, DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00001 Salanie B, 2003, ECONOMICS OF TAXATION, P1 Sirois S, 2007, CURR COMPUT-AID DRUG, V3, P191, DOI 10.2174/157340907781695440 Slemrod J., 1994, TAX PROGRESSIVITY IN TOBIN J, 1967, YALE LAW J, V77, P1, DOI 10.2307/795069 NR 13 TC 5 Z9 5 U1 0 U2 5 PU SLOVAK ACADEMIC PRESS LTD PI BRATISLAVA PA PO BOX 57 NAM SLOBODY 6, 810 05 BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA SN 0013-3035 J9 EKON CAS JI Ekon. Cas. PY 2009 VL 57 IS 7 BP 653 EP 666 PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 522WN UT WOS:000272030900003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Zimmermannova, J AF Zimmermannova, Jarmila TI THE IMPACT OF TAXATION OF ELECTRICITY, NATURAL GAS AND SOLID FUELS ON SECTORS OF NACE IN THE CZECH REPUBLIC SO POLITICKA EKONOMIE LA Czech DT Article DE Czech Republic; NACE; Taxation; Energy; Input-Output Model; Prices of Production; Energy Intensive Sectors ID TAXES AB The Czech Republic has introduced new energy taxation in connection with implementation of the directive 2003/96/EC, restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of energy products and electricity New energy taxes are imposed on electricity, solid fuels and natural gas, with term of initiation on 1st January 2008. This paper discusses impact of new energy taxation on sectors NACE in the Czech Republic, particularly on prices of production. I have created the simple short-term price model for the Czech Republic, which is based on input-output methodology by Leontief. The paper is divided into six parts. The first part is introduction, where are formulated both the main target of the paper and two hypotheses for testing. The theoretical problems, which are connected with the impact of taxation and tax incidence, are discussed in the second part. The third part describes possibilities of analysing and modelling in the area of changes of tax system and tax rates. In the fourth part I describe the methodology and then I am creating the short-term price model for the Czech Republic. The next part consists of the main results, emerged from the price model and the two hypothesis testing, with focus on energy intensive sectors of NACE. The last part, conclusion, summarizes the main results and formulates the possibilities of additional research in energy taxation area. C1 Minist Environm Czech Republ, CZ-10010 Prague 10, Czech Republic. RP Zimmermannova, J (corresponding author), Minist Environm Czech Republ, Vrsovicka 65, CZ-10010 Prague 10, Czech Republic. EM jarmila_zimmermannova@env.cz RI Zimmermannova, Jarmila/Y-5089-2018 OI Zimmermannova, Jarmila/0000-0001-7805-2773 CR ANDERSEN MS, 2007, COMETR POLICY BRIEF Baranzini A, 2000, ECOL ECON, V32, P395, DOI 10.1016/S0921-8009(99)00122-6 BARDAZZI R., 2004, AUSTRIAN J STAT, V3, P237 BORK C, 2006, DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFEC, V1, P139 Bosquet B, 2000, ECOL ECON, V34, P19, DOI 10.1016/S0921-8009(00)00173-7 Buchanan J. 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A., 1994, VEREJNE FINANCE TEOR OECD, 2006, POL EC ENV REL TAX *OECD EEA, 2000, DAT INSTR US ENV POL PAVEL J, 2006, NARODOHOSPODARSKE MO, P186 PELZBAUEROVA V, 1996, ZAKLADY STRUKTURNI A, P148 PORTER ME, 1995, J ECON PERSPECT, V9, P97, DOI 10.1257/jep.9.4.97 ROTHBARD M, 2001, EKONOMIE STATNICH ZA SCASNY M, 2004, DOPADY VAZBY EKOLOGI, P250 SCASNY M., 2007, PREDIKCE SOCIALNICH SLAVIK J, 2007, POLITICKE EKONOMIE, P526 SMAUELSON PA, 1991, EKONOMIE Wier M, 2005, ECOL ECON, V52, P239, DOI 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2004.08.005 ZAKON C, 2007, STABILIZACI VEREJNYC NR 31 TC 8 Z9 8 U1 0 U2 7 PU VYSOKA SKOLA EKONOMICKA PI PRAGUE PA NAM W CHURCHILLA 4, PRAGUE 13067, CZECH REPUBLIC SN 0032-3233 J9 POLIT EKON JI Polit. Ekon. PY 2009 VL 57 IS 2 BP 213 EP 231 DI 10.18267/j.polek.682 PG 19 WC Economics; Political Science SC Business & Economics; Government & Law GA 453QU UT WOS:000266626800005 OA Other Gold DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Recio, LAH Rodriguez, DP Maldonado, JS Sala, SG Garcia, MJ AF Hierro Recio, Luis Angel Patino Rodriguez, David Sanchez Maldonado, Jose Gomez Sala, Salvador Jaen Garcia, Manuel TI Territorial incidence of Andalusian Government budget. An exercise of provincial fiscal balance SO REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS REGIONALES LA Spanish DT Article DE Territorial tax incidence; Territorial income redistribution; Fiscal balances; Public revenues and expenditures; Spanish Autonomous Communities; Andalusia AB This paper performs an estimation of the "Junta de Andalucia" fiscal flow with the Andalusian provinces in 2001. In order to do that, we have developed a methodology that agrees with the fiscal flows' usual estimations of the State with the Autonomous Communities. This methodology contains a detailed description of the incidence assumptions of receipts and expenditures that follows the habitual tradition. Our paper also incorporates some methodological changes like the incorporation of the state-owned companies, a new treatment State grants to the "Junta de Andalucia" and an analysis of the obtained outcome in the calculation. C1 [Hierro Recio, Luis Angel; Patino Rodriguez, David] Univ Seville, Seville, Spain. [Sanchez Maldonado, Jose; Gomez Sala, Salvador] Univ Malaga, Malaga, Spain. [Jaen Garcia, Manuel] Univ Almeria, Almeria, Spain. RP Recio, LAH (corresponding author), Univ Seville, Seville, Spain. RI Hierro, Luis A./R-9475-2018 OI Hierro, Luis A./0000-0002-5868-5589 CR [Anonymous], SEG SOC ASENSIO M., 2002, BALANZAS FISCALES CO Barberan R., 2007, INVESTIGACIONES REGI Barberan R., 2007, INCIDENCIA TERRITORI Camara de Cuentas de Andalucia, 2003, FISC CUENT GEN JUNT Castells A., 1993, 1 S IG DISTR RENT RI, VIX, P17 Castells A., 1981, INVEST ECON-SPAIN, V16, P151 Consejeria de Economia y Hacienda de la Junta de Andalucia, 2002, CUENT GEN COM AUT AN De la Fuente A., 2001, POLITICAS PUBLICAS E, P57 Direccion General de Trafico, 2003, AN EST GEN 2001 HIERO L. A., 2005, INCIDENCIA PROVINCIA Hiero L. A., 1996, RECAUDACION IMPUESTO HIERO L. A, 2007, REV ESTUDIOS REGIONA, VIII, P80 Instituto de Estadistica de Andalucia, EST SIST FIN AND BAN Instituto de Estadistica de Andalucia, EST INT BIEN ENTR ES Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, ENC OC HOT Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, ENC POBL ACT Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2001, CENS POBL VIV Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 2001, CONT REG ESP BAS Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, EST VAR RES LOSA A., 1997, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V140, P115 Ministerio de Educacion y Ciencia, 2000, CIENC EST ENS U RES Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, OBS ESP EC SOC PEREZ GARCIA F, 2003, STOCK CAPITAL ESPANA Secretaria General de Agricultura y Pesca de la Junta de Andalucia, 2004, AN EST AGR PESQ ANO NR 25 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ASOC UNIV PUBLICAS ANDALUCIA-AUPA PI CADIZ PA C ANCHA 16, UNIV CADIZ, CADIZ, 11001, SPAIN SN 0213-7585 J9 REV ESTUD REG JI Rev. Estud. Reg. PD JAN-APR PY 2009 IS 84 BP 19 EP 52 PG 34 WC Environmental Studies SC Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA V9K2X UT WOS:000422389000001 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Haisley, E Mostafa, R Loewenstein, G AF Haisley, Emily Mostafa, Romel Loewenstein, George TI Myopic risk-seeking: The impact of narrow decision bracketing on lottery play SO JOURNAL OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY LA English DT Article DE decision framing; bracketing; state lotteries; myopic loss aversion; peanuts effect; gambling ID PROBABILITY WEIGHTING FUNCTION; PROSPECT-THEORY; LOSS AVERSION; TAX INCIDENCE; EVALUATION PERIODS; REPEATED GAMBLES; HOUSE MONEY; UNCERTAINTY; COMMON; FEEDBACK AB In two experiments conducted with low-income participants, we find that individuals are more likely to buy state lottery tickets when they make several purchase decisions one-at-a-time, i.e. myopically, than when they make one decision about how many tickets to purchase. These results extend earlier findings showing that "broad bracketing" of decisions encourages behavior consistent with expected value maximization. Additionally, the results suggest that the combination of myopic decision making and the "peanuts effect''-greater risk seeking for low stakes than high stakes gambles-can help explain the popularity of state lotteries. C1 [Mostafa, Romel; Loewenstein, George] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Social & Decis Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA. [Haisley, Emily] Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Org Behav & Theory, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA. RP Loewenstein, G (corresponding author), Carnegie Mellon Univ, Dept Social & Decis Sci, Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA. 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Risk Uncertain. PD SEP PY 2008 VL 37 IS 1 BP 57 EP 75 DI 10.1007/s11166-008-9041-1 PG 19 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 337RZ UT WOS:000258454500003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ahmed, S Wirjanto, TS AF Ahmed, Shamim Wirjanto, Tony S. TI The impact of sales taxation on internet commerce - An empirical analysis SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; business taxation AB This paper examines how sales taxation on Internet purchases could affect the decision to buy goods over the Internet. The results appear robust with respect to unobserved technological sophistication or other alternative explanations. The tax effect is found to be significant and its magnitude suggests that applying a provincial average sales tax of 14% to all Internet sales in Canada would reduce the number of online buyers by as much as 44%. (c) 2007 Elsevier B. V. All rights reserved. C1 [Wirjanto, Tony S.] Univ Waterloo, Dept Econ, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada. RP Ahmed, S (corresponding author), Flat B1,House 60,Rd 13-A,Dhanmondi R-A, Dhaka 1209, Bangladesh. EM shamim1414@yaboo.com CR Ellison G, 2005, J ECON PERSPECT, V19, P139, DOI 10.1257/0895330054048632 ELLISON G, 2006, 0614 MIT DEP EC Goolsbee A, 2000, Q J ECON, V115, P561, DOI 10.1162/003355300554854 KREVER R, 2000, ASIA PACIFIC TAX B, V6, P151 *STAT CAN, 2002, HOUS INT US SURV QUE *STAT CAN, 2002, HOUS INT US SURV 200 *STAT CAN, 2002, HOUS INT US SURV COD NR 7 TC 5 Z9 5 U1 0 U2 7 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD JUN PY 2008 VL 99 IS 3 BP 557 EP 560 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.001 PG 4 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 321JI UT WOS:000257300300035 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU De Carvalho, FA Azevedo, CF AF De Carvalho, Fabia A. Azevedo, Cyntia F. TI The incidence of reserve requirements in Brazil: Do bank stockholders share the burden? SO JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; reserve requirements; event studies ID UNIQUENESS; RETURNS; PRICES; LOANS AB There is consensus in the economic literature that reserve requirements are a tax levied upon financial intermediation, yet the incidence of the tax remains controversial. In this paper, we test whether changes in reserve requirements in Brazil impact the stock returns of the Brazilian financial system distinctly from the rest of the economy. We show that Brazilian bank stock returns may have been affected by changes in reserve requirements on both time deposits and transaction accounts, which implies that the tax burden of required reserves has not been fully passed through to banks' borrowers or clients. Stock returns of non-financial firms may also have been affected by changes in reserve requirements, suggesting that in some cases reserve requirements on time deposits and transaction accounts served as a non-neutral instrument of monetary or fiscal policy in Brazil. C1 [De Carvalho, Fabia A.; Azevedo, Cyntia F.] Cent Bank Brazil, DIPEC, GEESP, SBS, BR-70074900 Brasilia, DF, Brazil. [Azevedo, Cyntia F.] Columbia Univ, New York, NY 10027 USA. RP De Carvalho, FA (corresponding author), Cent Bank Brazil, DIPEC, GEESP, SBS, Quadra 3,Bloco B,Edificio Sede Banco Cent Brasil, BR-70074900 Brasilia, DF, Brazil. 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PD MAY PY 2008 VL 11 IS 1 BP 61 EP 90 DI 10.1080/15140326.2008.12040499 PG 30 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 325JL UT WOS:000257585100003 OA Bronze DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Tokarick, S AF Tokarick, Stephen TI A simple rule for assessing tariff and tax incidence (vol 93, pg 116, 2006) SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Correction C1 Int Monetary Fund, Res Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA. RP Tokarick, S (corresponding author), Int Monetary Fund, Res Dept, 700 19th St NW, Washington, DC 20431 USA. EM stokafick@imf.org CR Tokarick S, 2006, ECON LETT, V93, P116, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.044 NR 1 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 EI 1873-7374 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD APR PY 2008 VL 99 IS 1 BP 213 EP 213 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.10.018 PG 1 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 297GF UT WOS:000255604400055 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Doyle, JJ Samphantharak, K AF Doyle, Joseph J., Jr. Samphantharak, Krislert TI $2.00 Gas! Studying the effects of a gas tax moratorium SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; gasoline; spatial competition ID EMPIRICAL-EVIDENCE; PRICES; OLIGOPOLY; MARKET; COMPETITION; TAXATION; STATE AB There are surprisingly few estimates of the effects of sales taxes on retail prices, especially at the firm level. We consider the temporary suspension, and subsequent reinstatement, of the gasoline sales tax in Illinois and Indiana following a price spike in 2000. Earlier laws set the timing of the reinstatements, providing plausibly exogenous changes in the tax rates. Using a unique dataset of daily prices at the gas-station level, 70% of the tax suspension is passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices, while 80-100% of the tax reinstatements are passed on to consumers. Some evidence suggests that these short-run pass-through estimates are smaller near the state borders, with the tax reinstatements associated with relatively higher prices up to an hour's drive into neighboring states. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Doyle, Joseph J., Jr.] MIT, Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. [Doyle, Joseph J., Jr.] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. [Samphantharak, Krislert] Univ Calif San Diego, Grad Sch Int Relat & Pacific Studies, San Diego, CA 92103 USA. RP Doyle, JJ (corresponding author), MIT, Sloan Sch Management, 50 Mem Dr,E52-447, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. 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Public Econ. PD APR PY 2008 VL 92 IS 3-4 BP 869 EP 884 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.05.011 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 280AP UT WOS:000254397600027 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Desai, MA Hines, JR AF Desai, Mihir A. Hines, James R., Jr. TI Market reactions to export subsidies SO JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE export subsidies; foreign sales corporations; tax incidence ID STRATEGIC TRADE-POLICY; INDUSTRIAL-POLICY; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; DOMESTIC POLICIES; PRECOMMITMENT; DISTORTIONS; COMPETITION; PROMOTION; OLIGOPOLY; MONOPOLY AB This paper analyzes the economic impact of export subsidies by investigating stock price reactions to a critical event in 1997. On November 18, 1997, the European Union announced its intention to file a complaint before the World Trade Organization (WTO), arguing that the United States provided American exporters illegal subsidies by permitting them to use Foreign Sales Corporations to exempt a fraction of export profits from taxation. Share prices of American exporters fell sharply on this news, and its implication that the WTO might force the United States to eliminate the subsidy, which happened in 2004. The share price declines were largest for exporters with high profit margins and those whose tax situations made the threatened export subsidy particularly valuable. This evidence suggests that export subsidies do not merely benefit foreign consumers, but also improve the profitability of exporters, particularly those earning rents in imperfectly competitive markets. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 [Desai, Mihir A.; Hines, James R., Jr.] NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. [Hines, James R., Jr.] Univ Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109 USA. [Desai, Mihir A.] Harvard Univ, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Hines, JR (corresponding author), NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. 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PD MAR PY 2008 VL 74 IS 2 BP 459 EP 474 DI 10.1016/j.jinteco.2007.04.006 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 284AY UT WOS:000254678800012 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Combs, KL Kim, J Spry, JA AF Combs, Kathryn L. Kim, Jaebeom Spry, John A. TI The relative regressivity of seven lottery games SO APPLIED ECONOMICS LA English DT Article ID STATE; UK AB We study the implicit tax incidence of raising state revenue through a monopoly state-run lottery using a new dataset on individual Minnesota lottery game sales by zip code. We use the bootstrap to compute SEs and construct confidence intervals for Suits Indices of seven lottery products. We conclude that the implicit tax on each product is regressive, and find statistically significant differences in regressivity between some products. Minnesota's newly introduced G3 instant scratch product, printed at time and place of purchase, is also the most regressive lottery game. C1 [Combs, Kathryn L.; Spry, John A.] Univ St Thomas, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. [Kim, Jaebeom] Oklahoma State Univ, Stillwater, OK 74078 USA. RP Combs, KL (corresponding author), Univ St Thomas, Minneapolis, MN 55403 USA. 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Econ. PY 2008 VL 40 IS 1 BP 35 EP 39 DI 10.1080/13504850701439327 PG 5 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 250OF UT WOS:000252309200005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ritz, RA AF Ritz, Robert A. TI Cost Pass-Through under Delegation SO B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE cost pass-through; excise taxation; executive compensation; market share; strategic delegation ID STRATEGIC DELEGATION; TAX INCIDENCE; MARKET SHARE; INCENTIVES; OLIGOPOLY; COMPETITION; INDUSTRY; CONDUCT; PRICES AB The rate of cost pass-through exceeds 50% under strategic delegation of decision-making to managers with sales revenue contracts-regardless of the number of firms in the industry and demand curvature. This contrasts sharply with profit-maximization, for which cost pass-through can take on any positive value. The key intuition is that firms under delegation act as if they faced more rivals than they actually do, thus pushing cost pass-through towards 100%. Cost pass-through with market share contracts is similarly bounded below, and this note also generalizes existing results on equilibrium characterization for this case. C1 Univ Oxford, Oxford OX1 2JD, England. RP Ritz, RA (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Oxford OX1 2JD, England. 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A computational general equilibrium analysis SO COMPETITIVENESS REVIEW LA English DT Article DE Taxation; Regional development; Business enterprise; Capital; Labour; United States of America AB Purpose - This paper's purpose is to investigate the claim that capital taxes imposed by a subnational government reduce the economic competitiveness of the geographic area in which these taxes are imposed. Design/methodology/approach - A two-region, four-good, three-factor computational general equilibrium model of the USA is constructed. Simulations are performed to represent US state governments replacing wage taxes with capital taxes. Findings - Household utilities rose when wage taxes were replaced by capital taxes, contradicting the conventional wisdom that capital taxes are harmful to a region's residents. Research limitations/implications - As with all computational economic models, there are simplifications in this paper's model that abstract from reality and may limit the applicability of model results to the real world. Practical implications - Subnational governments need not shy away from capital taxes when funding government programs. Originality/value - This paper contributes to the investigation of subnational tax incidence. C1 [Williams, Michael] Prairie View A&M Univ, Praire, TX 77446 USA. RP Williams, MF (corresponding author), Prairie View A&M Univ, Praire, TX 77446 USA. 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PY 2008 VL 18 IS 3 BP 227 EP 240 DI 10.1108/10595420810906000 PG 14 WC Business SC Business & Economics GA V73GT UT WOS:000211698600006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Kotakorpi, K AF Kotakorpi, Kaisa TI The incidence of sin taxes SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; self-control AB We show that the burden of sin taxes does not necessarily fall most heavily on individuals with the highest level of consumption and derive a condition for cases where sin taxes improve individual welfare. We further argue that taxes on goods such as unhealthy food can be progressive when consumers have time-inconsistent preferences. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Tampere, Dept Econ & Accounting, FI-33014 Tampere, Finland. RP Kotakorpi, K (corresponding author), Univ Tampere, Dept Econ & Accounting, FI-33014 Tampere, Finland. 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BE Diamond, JW Zodrow, GR TI Corporation Tax Incidence: Reflections on What Is Known, Unknown, and Unknowable SO FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM: ISSUES, CHOICES, AND IMPLICATIONS LA English DT Article; Book Chapter C1 Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA. RP Harberger, AC (corresponding author), Univ Calif Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA 90024 USA. NR 0 TC 24 Z9 24 U1 0 U2 0 PU M I T PRESS PI CAMBRIDGE PA FIVE CAMBRIDGE CENTER, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 USA BN 978-0-262-04247-5 PY 2008 BP 283 EP 312 PG 30 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA BPL63 UT WOS:000279157200018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Zodrow, GR AF Zodrow, George R. TI The property tax incidence debate and the mix of state and local finance of local public expenditures SO CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Conference on New Directions in Fiscal Freedom CY SEP, 2006 CL Lexington, KY SP Univ Kentucky, Inst Federalism & Intergovt Relat, CESifo DE property tax incidence; capitalization; capital tax view; new view; benefit tax; view; Texas tax reform; margin tax ID CAPITAL MOBILITY; OPTIMAL TAXATION; TIEBOUT MODEL; BENEFIT VIEW; CONGESTION; INCOME AB Many states in the US have in recent years changed the mix of state and local revenue sources used to finance local public expenditures, especially primary and secondary education, with local property taxes being replaced by various sources of state tax revenue. This article examines the desirability of such a tax substitution, focusing on the implications of the long-standing debate between the "benefit tax" and "capital tax" views of the incidence of the tax. 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Stud. PD DEC PY 2007 VL 53 IS 4 BP 495 EP 521 PG 27 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 275ML UT WOS:000254076200002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Fullerton, D Heutel, G AF Fullerton, Don Heutel, Garth TI Who bears the burden of a tax on carbon emissions in Japan? SO ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY STUDIES LA English DT Article DE Tax incidence; Pollution; Carbon tax; Kyoto Protocol; Japan AB We develop a simple general equilibrium model in the style of Harberger to analyze the distributional effects of the proposed "environment tax" on carbon in Japan. We derive closed-form equations that show how a change in the tax rate affects the economy-wide return to capital, wage, and output prices. The two main features of the economy that determine the sources-side incidence of the tax are the factor intensities of the polluting and nonpolluting industries and the elasticity of substitution in production between polluting inputs and labor or capital. The input that is a better substitute for pollution usually bears a lower burden of the tax than the other input, although we find conditions under which this is not true. If the polluting sector is relatively capital intensive, then capital can bear a higher burden of the tax. Calibrating this model to the Japanese economy, we find a trade-off between these two effects. Polluting industries are more capital intensive, but capital is likely to be a better substitute for pollution than is labor. C1 [Fullerton, Don] Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA. [Heutel, Garth] Harvard Univ, Ctr Environm, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Fullerton, D (corresponding author), Univ Texas Austin, Dept Econ, Austin, TX 78712 USA. FU Japan's Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI); National Science FoundationNational Science Foundation (NSF) FX We are grateful for financial assistance from Japan's Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and the National Science Foundation. CR Allen R. G. 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However in markets with a price distribution, the tax incidence may vary across the distribution. (c) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. Texas A&M Univ, Dept Agr Econ, College Stn, TX 77843 USA. RP Perloff, JM (corresponding author), Univ Calif Berkeley, Dept Agr & Resource Econ, 207 Giannini Hall MC 3310, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. EM perloff@are.berkeley.edu CR FULLERTON, 2002, HDB PUBLIC EV, V4, P1787 NR 1 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 5 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD JUL PY 2007 VL 96 IS 1 BP 116 EP 119 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.12.019 PG 4 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 186CM UT WOS:000247756700018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Carbonnier, C AF Carbonnier, Clement TI Who pays sales taxes? Evidence from French VAT reforms, 1987-1999 SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE commodity taxation; tax burden; tax incidence; oligopoly ID IMPERFECT COMPETITION; OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; PRICES; ENTRY AB The point of this paper is to provide visual evidence of tax shifting and to measure empirically the distribution of the sales tax burden between consumers and producers. For that purpose, two French reforms are studied. These reforms entail steep decreases of the VAT rate. September 1st 1987, the VAT rate on car sales went down from the luxury-rate of 33.33% to the full-rate of 18.6%. September 1st 1999, the VAT rate on housing repair services went down from the full-rate of 20.6% to the reduced-rate of 5.5%. The consumer share of the sales tax burden is 57% in the new car sales market and 77% in the housing repair services market. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 ENS, ENPC, CNRS, EHESS PSE, F-75014 Paris, France. RP Carbonnier, C (corresponding author), ENS, ENPC, CNRS, EHESS PSE, Campus Jourdan,48 Bd Jourdan, F-75014 Paris, France. EM carbonnier@jourdan.ens.fr CR BARNETT PG, 1995, J PUBLIC ECON, V57, P457, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80006-U BESLEY T, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V40, P359, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90048-0 Besley TJ, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P157 CARBONNIER C, 2006, WP200613 PSE CARBONNIER C, 2005, WP200534 PSE DELIPALLA S, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V49, P351, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O Delipalla S, 2001, INT J IND ORGAN, V19, P885, DOI 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00057-0 KATZ ML, 1985, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V13, P3, DOI 10.1177/109114218501300101 SEADE J, 1980, ECONOMETRICA, V48, P479, DOI 10.2307/1911111 STERN N, 1987, J PUBLIC ECON, V32, P133, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90009-0 Young DJ, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P57, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.1.04 NR 11 TC 35 Z9 37 U1 1 U2 12 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD JUN PY 2007 VL 91 IS 5-6 BP 1219 EP 1229 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2006.12.004 PG 11 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 162LT UT WOS:000246089600019 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Murphy, KJ AF Murphy, Kevin J. TI The impact of unemployment insurance taxes on wages SO LABOUR ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE payroll tax incidence; unemployment insurance; wages; mobility ID UNITED-STATES-ECONOMY; LIFETIME JOBS; STABILITY; BENEFITS; TRENDS AB This paper examines the incidence of state unemployment insurance taxes on wages paid to workers in various demographic groups. The empirical work matches state level measures of unemployment insurance tax and benefit variables to data aggregated from the Current Population Survey on worker earnings for the period 1992 to 2002. Econometric evidence presented in the paper supports the paper's main hypothesis that U1 tax rate structure has its greatest adverse impact on less mobile workers (prime age married women and young workers) and little impact on more mobile workers (prime age men). (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Oakland Univ, Dept Econ, Rochester, MI 48309 USA. RP Murphy, KJ (corresponding author), Oakland Univ, Dept Econ, Rochester, MI 48309 USA. EM murphy@oakland.edu CR Anderson PM, 1997, J PUBLIC ECON, V65, P119, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(96)01624-6 Bartik TJ, 1991, WHO BENEFITS STATE L BLANK RM, 1991, Q J ECON, V106, P1157, DOI 10.2307/2937960 BRITTAIN JA, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P110 CARD D, 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V53, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90011-6 Dickens William T., 1987, UNEMPLOYMENT STRUCTU FARBER H, 1995, NATL BUREAU EC RES W, V5014 GIBBONS R, 1992, REV ECON STUD, V59, P515, DOI 10.2307/2297862 Gottschalk P, 1999, J LABOR ECON, V17, pS91, DOI 10.1086/209944 Granger CW, 1974, J ECONOMETRICS, V2, P111, DOI DOI 10.1016/0304-4076(74)90034-7 GRUBER J, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P622 GRUBER J, 1997, J LABOR ECON, V15, P72 HALL RE, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P716 HAMERMESH DS, 1979, SOUTHERN ECON J, V45, P1208, DOI 10.2307/1056965 Jaeger DA, 1999, J LABOR ECON, V17, pS1, DOI 10.1086/209941 KRUEGER AB, 1988, ECONOMETRICA, V56, P259, DOI 10.2307/1911072 LEVINE PB, 1997, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURAN MEYER BD, 1996, NATL BUREAU EC RES W, V5423 MINCER J, 1978, J POLIT ECON, V86, P749, DOI 10.1086/260710 MIZON GE, 1986, ECONOMETRICA, V54, P657, DOI 10.2307/1911313 MURPHY KJ, 2003, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V31, P44 Neumark D, 1999, J LABOR ECON, V17, pS29, DOI 10.1086/209942 Ofek H, 1997, ECON INQ, V35, P28 *SOC SEC ADM OFF R, 2001, ANN STAT SUPPL SOC S SUMMERS LH, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P177 URETA M, 1992, AM ECON REV, V82, P322 *US DEP LAB, 1999, ET HDB, V394 Winkler AE, 1998, MON LABOR REV, V121, P42 WINKLER AE, 2000, RES LAB EC, V19 Wooldridge J. M., 2003, INTRO ECONOMETRICS NR 30 TC 11 Z9 11 U1 1 U2 6 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV PI AMSTERDAM PA PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0927-5371 J9 LABOUR ECON JI Labour Econ. PD JUN PY 2007 VL 14 IS 3 BP 457 EP 484 DI 10.1016/j.labeco.2006.02.002 PG 28 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 170GX UT WOS:000246651900009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Tao, R Qin, P AF Tao, Ran Qin, Ping TI How has rural tax reform affected farmers and local governance in China? SO CHINA & WORLD ECONOMY LA English DT Article DE farmers' tax burdens; local governance; rural tax reform; tax incidence ID TAXATION AB Using nationally representative data, the present paper examines the impact of China's ongoing rural tax reform on farmers. The difficulties in further local governance restructuring are also discussed. It is argued that the issues associated with rural taxation and local governance in China result from inherent tension between an increasingly liberalized economic system and a still centralized political system. Although rural tax reform has helped to reduce farmers' tax burdens in the short term, the establishment of an effective local governance regime requires coordinated reforms to downsize local bureaucracy by providing social security for laid-off cadres, to strengthen local accountability by granting higher local formal tax autonomy, and to promote meaningful participation by expanding local democracy. C1 Univ Oxford, Inst Chinese Studies, Beijing, Peoples R China. Chinese Acad Sci, Ctr Chinese Agr Policy, Beijing, Peoples R China. Univ Gothenburg, Dept Econ, Gothenburg, Sweden. RP Tao, R (corresponding author), Univ Oxford, Inst Chinese Studies, Beijing, Peoples R China. EM tao.ccap@igsnrr.ac.cn CR Bernstein TP, 2000, CHINA QUART, P742 BURGESS R, 1993, J ECON LIT, V31, P762 Chen X., 2003, STUDY CHINAS COUNTY Tao R., 2005, J ASIA PAC ECON, V10, P486 Tao R, 2006, J POLICY REFORM, V9, P177, DOI 10.1080/13841280600911568 World Bank, 2002, CHIN NAT DEV SUBN FI ZHANG XS, 2005, GUANLI SHIJIE NR 7 TC 16 Z9 17 U1 1 U2 13 PU BLACKWELL PUBLISHING PI OXFORD PA 9600 GARSINGTON RD, OXFORD OX4 2DQ, OXON, ENGLAND SN 1671-2234 J9 CHINA WORLD ECON JI China World Econ. PD MAY-JUN PY 2007 VL 15 IS 3 BP 19 EP 32 DI 10.1111/j.1749-124X.2007.00066.x PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 176OG UT WOS:000247094200002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Tokanick, S AF Tokanick, Stephen TI A simple rule for assessing tariff and tax incidence (vol 93, pg 116, 2006) SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Correction C1 Int Monetary Fund, Dept Res, Washington, DC 20431 USA. RP Tokanick, S (corresponding author), Int Monetary Fund, Dept Res, 700 19th St NW, Washington, DC 20431 USA. EM stokarick@imf.org CR Tokarick S, 2006, ECON LETT, V93, P116, DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.044 NR 1 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 1 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 EI 1873-7374 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD APR PY 2007 VL 95 IS 1 BP 157 EP 157 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.11.006 PG 1 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 158US UT WOS:000245821000025 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Arachi, G AF Arachi, Giampaolo TI Optimal origin-based commodity taxation in a small open economy SO B E JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS & POLICY LA English DT Article DE capital income taxation; commodity taxation; income distribution; taxation in open economies; tax incidence ID TAX COMPETITION AB This paper investigates whether the pursuit of redistributional objectives may provide a rationale for origin-based taxation in small open economies. The analysis is developed in a simple two-class economy where consumers are classified according to the type of labour they supply. As world prices are given for a small open economy, the full burden of origin-based commodity taxes falls on the two types of labour. When a non-linear tax is levied on labour income, origin-based taxes cannot directly improve income distribution as the two types of labour face different marginal tax rates. However, the government can exploit the differential incidence of these origin-based taxes and increase social welfare by relaxing the self-selection constraints that bind the non-linear tax. Rather surprisingly, the value judgements embedded in the social welfare functional do not affect the structure of optimal origin-based commodity taxation. The paper also shows that the optimal structure of origin-based commodity taxation does not change when the labour income tax schedule is constrained to be linear, and that a positive source-based tax on capital income may be optimal if it results in a differential burden on the two types of labour. C1 Univ Salento, Lecce, Italy. RP Arachi, G (corresponding author), Univ Salento, Lecce, Italy. EM g.arachi@economia.unile.it RI Arachi, Giampaolo/N-7179-2015 OI Arachi, Giampaolo/0000-0001-8100-5820 CR Atkinson A., 1980, LECT PUBLIC EC BUCOVETSKY S, 1991, REG SCI URBAN ECON, V21, P333, DOI 10.1016/0166-0462(91)90062-R DIAMOND PA, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P8 GERBER IR, 1987, J URBAN ECON, V21, P69 GORDON RH, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P1086 Haufler A, 1997, SCAND J ECON, V99, P425, DOI 10.1111/1467-9442.00072 HAUFLER A, 1996, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V3, P425 Huber B, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V71, P441, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00083-8 LOPEZ S, 1996, 9625 COR OECD, 2006, OECD TAX POL STUD STIGLITZ JE, 1986, HDB PUBLIC EC NR 11 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU BERKELEY ELECTRONIC PRESS PI BERKELEY PA 2809 TELEGRAPH AVENUE, STE 202, BERKELEY, CA 94705 USA SN 1935-1682 J9 BE J ECON ANAL POLI JI B E J. Econ. Anal. Policy PY 2007 VL 7 IS 1 AR 59 PG 23 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 307FC UT WOS:000256302600054 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Alm, J Wallace, S AF Alm, James Wallace, Sally TI Are Jamaica's Direct Taxes on Labor "Fair"? SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; vertical equity; horizontal equity; micro-simulation model AB The Government of Jamaica imposes a variety of taxes on the earnings of labor. Jamaica's direct taxes and charges on labor income include the pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) income tax and five payroll taxes. In total, these taxes generate nearly one-third of the total tax revenues of the government in fiscal year 2002-2003, with the PAYE itself responsible for more than one-fifth of total revenues. This article uses unique micro-level data to analyze the vertical and, especially, the horizontal equity of these taxes. The authors find that the taxes are generally progressive in their overall pattern of incidence but that they also introduce significant horizontal inequities due to their uneven coverage and their many special provisions. C1 [Alm, James] Georgia State Univ, Dept Econ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. [Wallace, Sally] Georgia State Univ, Econ, Dept Econ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. RP Alm, J (corresponding author), Georgia State Univ, Dept Econ, Andrew Young Sch Policy Studies, Atlanta, GA 30303 USA. CR Alleyne Dillon, 2004, 9 GEORG STAT U A YOU ALM J, 1991, ECON DEV CULT CHANGE, V39, P849, DOI 10.1086/451912 Alm James, 2004, 6 GEORG STAT U A YOU Angrist JD, 1996, J LABOR ECON, V14, P425, DOI 10.1086/209817 Auerbach Alan J., 1999, 7035 NBER BAHL R, 2004, COMPREHENSIVE TAX RE BAHL R, 1991, JAMAICAN TAX REFORM BIRD RM, 1989, ECON DEV CULT CHANGE, V37, P393, DOI 10.1086/451729 Gruber J, 1997, J LABOR ECON, V15, pS72, DOI 10.1086/209877 KAPLOW L, 1989, NATL TAX J, V42, P139 KAPLOW L, 2000, 7649 NBER Kugler Adriana, 2002, EFFECTS PAYROLL TAXE Kugler Adriana, 2001, IMPACT FIRING COSTS Marrufo Grecia M., 2001, INCIDENCE SOCIAL SEC Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2003, EM SURV 2001 Musgrave R. A., 1959, THEORY PUBLIC FINANC MUSGRAVE RA, 1990, NATL TAX J, V43, P113 Pechman Joseph A., 1985, WHO PAID TAXES 1966 Wallace Sally, 2004, 5 GEORG STAT U A YOU NR 19 TC 2 Z9 2 U1 0 U2 0 PU SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC PI THOUSAND OAKS PA 2455 TELLER RD, THOUSAND OAKS, CA 91320 USA SN 1091-1421 EI 1552-7530 J9 PUBLIC FINANC REV JI Public Financ. Rev. PD JAN PY 2007 VL 35 IS 1 BP 83 EP 102 DI 10.1177/1091142106293443 PG 20 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA VF6DM UT WOS:000443249100004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Alleyne, D AF Alleyne, Dillon TI The Evolution of Jamaica's Tax Burden SO PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; definition of income; progressivity ID DEVELOPING-COUNTRIES; TAXATION; LIFETIME AB This study reviews four tax incidence studies, done in Jamaica since 1983, to determine the evolution of Jamaica's tax burden. It identifies several limitations in the methodologies used that make it difficult to interpret the results without due care. For example, income bases were different, adjustment for evasion was not always satisfactory due to data limitations, and several nontax institutional features of the economy did not inform the incidence assumptions. The general conclusions are twofold: the overall tax burden has declined since 1983, and the degree of progressivity in the distribution of tax burdens increased over time. Several factors account for the change in progressivity. First, increases in the standard deduction have removed many low-income households from the direct tax net. Second, the removal of several allowances has increased the burden on high-income earners. Third, perhaps surprisingly, the indirect tax burden has tended to be proportional or even slightly progressive. C1 [Alleyne, Dillon] Univ West Indies, Dept Econ, Mona, Kingston, Jamaica. RP Alleyne, D (corresponding author), Univ West Indies, Dept Econ, Mona, Kingston, Jamaica. CR Alleyne Dillon, 1997, CENTRAL BANK BARBADO, V1 Alleyne Dillon, 2004, 9 GEORG STAT U ANDR Alleyne Dillon, 1999, TAXATION EQUITY JAMA Alleyne Dillon, 1992, THESIS Alm J, 2004, CONTRIB ECON ANAL, V268, P11 Alm James, 1990, JAMAICAN TAX REFORM, P181 Alm James, 2004, 6 GEORG STAT U ANDR Altig D, 2001, AM ECON REV, V91, P574, DOI 10.1257/aer.91.3.574 Bahl Roy, 1992, 1 GEORG STAT U POL R BARTHOLD TA, 1993, NATL TAX J, V46, P291 BIRD RM, 1989, ECON DEV CULT CHANGE, V37, P393, DOI 10.1086/451729 BIRD RM, 1973, INT MONET FUND S PAP, V20, P639 BROWNING EK, 1978, J POLIT ECON, V86, P649, DOI 10.1086/260703 BROWNING EK, 1985, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V13, P227, DOI 10.1177/109114218501300301 DAVIES J, 1984, AM ECON REV, V74, P633 DELIPALLA S, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V49, P351, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O DEWULF L, 1975, INT MONET FUND S PAP, V22, P61 DICKERT S, 1994, NATL TAX J, V47, P621 Doyle M. P., 1997, EFFECTS INTEREST RAT Dufour Jean-Marie, 1982, TAX POLICY OPTIONS 1, P408 Edmiston Kelly, 2004, 9 GEORG STAT U ANDR Follain James R., 1984, 13 SYR U BOARD REV G FULLERTON D, 1991, NATL TAX J, V44, P277 Fullerton Don, 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V4 Gale WG, 1996, ECONOMIC EFFECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM, P281 HAMILTON BW, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P743 HAMILTON BW, 1975, URBAN STUD, V12, P205, DOI 10.1080/00420987520080301 Kotlikoff Laurence J., 1987, HDB PUBLIC EC, P943 Kotlikoff Laurence J., 2001, HDB PUBLIC EC, V3 Kugler AD, 1999, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V6, P389, DOI 10.1023/A:1008711819429 Kugler Adriana, 2001, 4046 CEPR I STUD LAB Light Miles K., 2004, 0433 GEORG STAT U IN MCLURE C, 1975, TAXATION URBAN POOR McLure Jr Charles E., 1987, J ECON PERSPECT, V1, P37 Ministry of Finance and Planning, 2001, EM SURV 2001 MUSGRAVE RA, 1974, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V2, P259, DOI 10.1177/109114217400200301 Pechman J. A., 1974, WHO BEARS TAX BURDEN PECHMAN JA, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P1 Pechman Joseph A., 1985, WHO PAID TAXES 1966 Planning Institute of Jamaica and Statistical Institute of Jamaica, 2002, JAM SURV LIV COND 20 POTERBA JM, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P325 SHAH A, 1991, WORLD BANK ECON REV, V5, P535, DOI 10.1093/wber/5.3.535 SHOVEN JB, 1984, J ECON LIT, V22, P1007 Sjoquist David L., 1992, 3 GEORG STAT U COLL Tirole Jean, 1988, THEORY IND ORG Venables A. J., 1986, IMPERFECT COMPETITIO Wallace Sally, 2004, 5 GEORG STAT U ANDR Wasylenko Michael, 1986, 30 SYR U BOARD REV G WHALLEY J, 1984, CAN J ECON, V17, P654, DOI 10.2307/135064 NR 49 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC PI THOUSAND OAKS PA 2455 TELLER RD, THOUSAND OAKS, CA 91320 USA SN 1091-1421 EI 1552-7530 J9 PUBLIC FINANC REV JI Public Financ. Rev. PD JAN PY 2007 VL 35 IS 1 BP 150 EP 171 DI 10.1177/1091142106293108 PG 22 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA VF6DM UT WOS:000443249100007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Guzman, TJLG de la Torre, GMV Canizares, SMS AF Lopez-Guzman Guzman, Tomas J. Vazquez de la Torre, Genoveva Millan Sanchez Canizares, Sandra Maria TI Financing Autonomous and fiscal incidence of ecological taxes. A reflection on the principle of SO REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS REGIONALES LA Spanish DT Article DE Ecological taxes; Distribution effects; Fiscal incidence; Polluter-Pays Principle AB The fight against the serious current environmental problems also has its answer in the use of different economic instruments to protect and to improve the natural environment, such as the ecotax. This paper approaches the study of the fiscal incidence of the ecological tax of agreement with the Polluter-Pays Principle. For it is presented it the tax incidence of the principal ecotax used in the european fiscal system and it is analyzed the direct and indirect economic effects that it would have on determined reference groups the introduction of a hypothetical tax that burdens the polluting emissions. C1 [Lopez-Guzman Guzman, Tomas J.; Vazquez de la Torre, Genoveva Millan; Sanchez Canizares, Sandra Maria] Univ Cordoba, Cordoba, Spain. RP Guzman, TJLG (corresponding author), Univ Cordoba, Cordoba, Spain. RI Sanchez-Canizares, Sandra/E-5745-2012 OI Sanchez-Canizares, Sandra/0000-0003-0705-3327 CR ALBI E., 1999, TEORIA HACIENDA PUBL BERNOW S., 1997, CARBON TAXES REDUCTI CASAHUGA A., 1982, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, P271 CASLER SD, 1993, NATL TAX J, V46, P197 Goulder L., 1995, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V2, P157, DOI DOI 10.1007/BF00877495 HAMOND J., 1999, EQUITY DISTRIBUTIONA HOERNER J. A., 2005, BURDENS BENEFITS ENV JORGENSON DW, 1992, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P393 LOPEZ-GUZMAN GUZMAN Tomas J., 2002, FISCALIDAD AMBIENTAL METCALF G. E., 1998, CAMBRIDGE MASS WORKI NR 10 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU ASOC UNIV PUBLICAS ANDALUCIA-AUPA PI CADIZ PA C ANCHA 16, UNIV CADIZ, CADIZ, 11001, SPAIN SN 0213-7585 J9 REV ESTUD REG JI Rev. Estud. Reg. PD JAN-APR PY 2007 IS 78 BP 401 EP 407 PG 7 WC Environmental Studies SC Environmental Sciences & Ecology GA V9K0R UT WOS:000422383200018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Fack, G AF Fack, Gabrielle TI Are housing benefit an effective way to redistribute income? Evidence from a natural experiment in France SO LABOUR ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Conference on Changing Social Policies for Low-Income Familes and Less-Skilled Workers in European Union and United States CY APR 07-08, 2005 CL Ann Arbor, MI SP Univ Michigan, Gerald R Ford Sch Public Policy, Natl Poverty Ctr, Univ Michigan, European Union Ctr DE housing subsidies; tax incidence ID TRANSFERS; KIND AB In this paper, I show that in-kind benefit such as a housing benefit program may have a significant impact on the price of the subsidized good. I use a French housing benefit reform to evaluate the impact of the subsidy on the level of rents. The results indicate that one additional euro of housing benefit leads to an increase of 78 cents in the rent paid by new benefit claimants, leaving only 22 cents available to reduce their net rent and increase their consumption. This large impact of housing benefit on rents appears to be the result of a very low housing supply elasticity. I show that the housing benefit reform induced additional demand, not only from low income households but also from students who used the benefit to become independent. Unfortunately, this increase in demand was unmatched by increasing housing supply in the short and middle term. The only possible effect of the reform is a small increase in housing quality. These results raise questions about the use of such in-kind transfers when the supply of the subsidized good is almost inelastic. It is therefore very important to estimate the incidence of the subsidy when assessing the efficiency of such welfare programs. (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V. All fights reserved. EM gabrielle.fack@ens.fr CR Bertrand M, 2004, Q J ECON, V119, P249, DOI 10.1162/003355304772839588 BLACKORBY C, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P691 Currie J, 2000, J PUBLIC ECON, V75, P99, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00065-1 Fack G., 2005, EC STAT, V381, P17 GIBBONS S, 2002, 597 CEP Goolsbee A, 1998, Q J ECON, V113, P121, DOI 10.1162/003355398555540 Goux D, 2005, J PUBLIC ECON, V89, P797, DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.06.005 Laferrere A., 2004, CESIFO ECON STUD, V50, P451 Le Blanc D., 2002, EC STAT, V351, P3 MOFFITT R, 1989, ECONOMETRICA, V57, P385, DOI 10.2307/1912560 NICHOLS AL, 1982, AM ECON REV, V72, P372 OLSEN EO, 2001, 8208 NBER POTERBA JM, 1984, Q J ECON, V99, P729, DOI 10.2307/1883123 Slesnick DT, 1996, ECON J, V106, P1527, DOI 10.2307/2235199 STECK P, 1995, REV FRANCAISE FINANC, V49, P119 Susin S, 2002, J PUBLIC ECON, V83, P109, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00081-0 NR 16 TC 22 Z9 22 U1 0 U2 8 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV PI AMSTERDAM PA PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0927-5371 J9 LABOUR ECON JI Labour Econ. PD DEC PY 2006 VL 13 IS 6 BP 747 EP 771 DI 10.1016/j.labeco.2006.01.001 PG 25 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 108UF UT WOS:000242264000005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Tokarick, S AF Tokarick, Stephen TI A simple rule for assessing tariff and tax incidence SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE tariffs; excess burden; tax incidence; offer curves AB This paper demonstrates that, with constant elasticities, the marginal burden that arises from a tariff increase by the home country is shared equally between the home and foreign country at a tariff rate equal to twice the optimal tariff for the home country. Even if elasticities are not constant, this rule provides an upper bound on the size of the "burden sharing" tariff (c) 2006 Elsevier B.V All rights reserved. C1 Int Monetary Fund, Res Dept, Washington, DC 20431 USA. RP Tokarick, S (corresponding author), Int Monetary Fund, Res Dept, 700 19th St NW, Washington, DC 20431 USA. EM stokarick@imf.org CR BHAGWATI J, 2002, ECONOMIST, P24 Caves R. E., 1973, WORLD TRADE PAYMENTS GORMAN WM, 1958, REV ECON STUD, V25, P133 HAMILTON B, 1983, J INT ECON, V15, P323, DOI 10.1016/S0022-1996(83)80009-9 HINES JR, 1995, J PUBLIC ECON, V58, P417, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01489-B Johnson HG, 1953, REV ECON STUD, V21, P142, DOI 10.2307/2296006 MARKUSEN J, 1981, J INT ECON, V115, P553 STOECKEL A, 2001, RIRDC PUBLICATION CA NR 8 TC 4 Z9 4 U1 0 U2 2 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD OCT PY 2006 VL 93 IS 1 BP 116 EP 120 DI 10.1016/j.econlet.2006.03.044 PG 5 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 095KO UT WOS:000241306800020 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lockwood, B Makris, M AF Lockwood, B Makris, M TI Tax incidence, majority voting and capital market integration SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE capital tax competition; capital market integration; majority voting; tax incidence ID LOCAL PUBLIC-GOODS; PROPERTY TAXATION; COMPETITION; UNDERPROVISION; POLITICS; ECONOMY; TIEBOUT; POLICY; PIGOU AB We re-examine, from a political economy perspective, the standard view that higher capital mobility results in lower capital taxes - a view, in fact, that is not confirmed by the available empirical evidence. We show that when a small economy is opened to capital mobility, the change of incidence of a tax on capital-from capital owners to owners of the immobile factor-may interact in such a way with political decision-making so as to cause a rise in the equilibrium tax. This can happen whether or not the immobile factor (labour) can be taxed, and whether or not savings can be subsided under capital mobility. (c) 2005 Published by Elsevier B.V. C1 Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England. Univ Warwick, CSGR, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England. Univ Exeter, Dept Econ, Exeter EX4 4QJ, Devon, England. Univ Bristol, CMPO, Bristol BS8 1TH, Avon, England. Athens Univ Econ & Business, IEPS, EMOP, Athens, Greece. RP Lockwood, B (corresponding author), Univ Warwick, Dept Econ, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England. EM b.lockwood@warwick.ac.uk CR BESLEY T, 2001, GLOBALISATION ELECTO Chirinko RS, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V74, P53, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00024-9 DEPATER JA, 1994, J URBAN ECON, V36, P66 DEVEREUX MP, 2003, 03180 INT MON FUND DIAMOND PA, 1971, AM ECON REV, V61, P8 Garrett G, 1998, PARTISAN POLITICS GL GOODMAN A, 1997, INEQUALITY UK GORDON RH, 1986, AM ECON REV, V76, P1086 GRAZZINI L, 1999, FISCAL COORDINATION Hallerberg M, 1998, COMP POLIT STUD, V31, P321, DOI 10.1177/0010414098031003003 HALLERBERG M, 2001, UNPUB COMPETING CAPI Huizinga H, 1997, J INT ECON, V42, P149, DOI 10.1016/S0022-1996(96)01449-3 Keen MJ, 2002, AM ECON REV, V92, P363, DOI 10.1257/000282802760015784 Kessler AS, 2003, J PUBLIC ECON, V87, P847, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00155-4 Kessler AS, 2002, REV ECON STUD, V69, P899, DOI 10.1111/1467-937X.00230 MAKRIS M, 2003, REV INT ECON, V11, P555 NOISET L, 1995, J URBAN ECON, V38, P312, DOI 10.1006/juec.1995.1035 PERSSON T, 1992, REV ECON STUD, V59, P689, DOI 10.2307/2297993 Persson T, 2000, POLITICAL EC EXPLAIN Quinn D, 1997, AM POLIT SCI REV, V91, P531, DOI 10.2307/2952073 RAZIN A, 1991, ECON LETT, V37, P69, DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(91)90245-G Rodrik D., 1997, HAS GLOBALIZATION GO Swank D, 2002, AM J POLIT SCI, V46, P642, DOI 10.2307/3088405 Wilson JD, 2004, J PUBLIC ECON, V88, P1065, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00057-4 WILSON JD, 1986, J URBAN ECON, V19, P296, DOI 10.1016/0094-1190(86)90045-8 WILSON JD, 2000, THEORIES TAX COMPETI WILSON JD, 1987, J POLITICAL EC, V95, P831 WOODERS M, 2001, 622 WARW EC RES ZODROW GR, 1986, J URBAN ECON, V19, P356, DOI 10.1016/0094-1190(86)90048-3 NR 29 TC 16 Z9 16 U1 0 U2 4 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD AUG PY 2006 VL 90 IS 6-7 BP 1007 EP 1025 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.06.005 PG 19 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 049DX UT WOS:000237997100003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gibbons, S Manning, A AF Gibbons, S Manning, A TI The incidence of UK housing benefit: Evidence from the 1990s reforms SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE housing subsidies; tax incidence AB This paper estimates the incidence of the most important UK rent subsidy, housing benefit (HB). It exploits changes to housing benefit in 1996 and 1997 that reduced the maximum subsidy payable. The research design is based on the fact that the changes only applied to new claimants and not to pre-existing claimants. We use difference-in-differences to estimate the size of the treatment effect. We show that the changes did have an effect on the level of housing subsidy with all estimated fall of 10-15% in benefit receipt in the treatment group relative to the control group. There is also evidence that rents paid fell by 6-11%. We find no evidence this can be explained by a fall in housing consumption by the treatment group. Our estimates imply that between 60% and two-thirds of the incidence of the subsidy reduction was on landlords. (c) 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Econ, London WC2A 2AE, England. Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Ctr Econ Performance, London WC2A 2AE, England. Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Geog, London WC2A 2AE, England. RP Manning, A (corresponding author), Univ London London Sch Econ & Polit Sci, Dept Econ, Houghton St, London WC2A 2AE, England. EM s.gibbons@lse.ac.uk; a.manning@lse.ac.uk OI Gibbons, Stephen/0000-0002-2871-8562 CR Bingley P, 2001, ECON J, V111, pC86, DOI 10.1111/1468-0297.00621 Borsch-Supan A., 1986, J INST THEOR ECON, V142, P380 DETR, 2000, QUAL CHOIC DEC HOM A *DWP, 2002, BUILD CHOIC RESP RAD *DWP, 2002, HOUS BEN COUNC TAX B FACK G, 2004, POURQUOI MENAGES PAU GIBBONS S, 2003, 597 LOND SCH EC CTR KEMP P, 2000, SHOPPING INCENTIVES Olsen EO, 2003, NBER CONF R, P365 SINAI T, 2002, NBER WORKING PAPER, V879 Susin S, 2002, J PUBLIC ECON, V83, P109, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00081-0 WHEATON WC, 1990, J POLIT ECON, V98, P1270, DOI 10.1086/261734 WILCOX S, 2001, FINDINGS APRIL 2001 NR 13 TC 21 Z9 21 U1 0 U2 4 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD MAY PY 2006 VL 90 IS 4-5 BP 799 EP 822 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.01.002 PG 24 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 037NH UT WOS:000237153200011 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Combs, KL Kim, J Spry, JA AF Combs, Kathryn L. Kim, Jaebeom Spry, John A. BE Diamond, J TI The relative regressivity of seven Minnesota lottery games SO 98th Annual conference on Taxation, Proceedings LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 98th Annual Conference on Taxation CY NOV 17-19, 2005 CL Miami, FL ID TAX INCIDENCE CR Anderson JE, 2003, NATL TAX J, V56, P81, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2003.1.05 CLOTFELTER CT, 1979, NATL TAX J, V32, P543 CLOTFELTER CT, 1987, NATL TAX J, V40, P533 CORNWELL C, 2001, DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPAC *ESRI BUS INF SOL, 2003, 2003 SOURC AM Hansen A, 2000, J CONSUM AFF, V34, P182, DOI 10.1111/j.1745-6606.2000.tb00090.x HANSEN A, 1995, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V23, P385, DOI 10.1177/109114219502300305 MIKESELL JL, 1994, NATL TAX J, V47, P165 *MINN STAT LOT, ANN REP 2004 Oster E, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P179, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.2.02 Price DI, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P741 Price DI, 2000, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V28, P82, DOI 10.1177/109114210002800105 Scott F., 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V54, P57 SPIRO MH, 1974, NATL TAX J, V27, P57 SPRY JA, 2004, P 96 ANN C TAX CHIC Steinnes D, 1998, J REGIONAL ANAL POLI, V28, P18 STURDEVANT L, 2004, STAR TRIBUNE 0425, pAA4 SUITS DB, 1977, AM ECON REV, V67, P747 Tosun MS, 2004, NATL TAX J, V57, P163, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2004.2.01 *US CENS BUR, 2004, STAT ABSTR US 2004 2 NR 20 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU NATIONAL TAX ASSOCIATION PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA PY 2006 BP 237 EP 243 PG 7 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA BFQ68 UT WOS:000243877400029 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Lahuerta, MAB AF Barberan Lahuerta, Miguel Angel TI Redistribution and progressivity of taxes on inheritances and donations and analysis with data of panel SO HACIENDA PUBLICA ESPANOLA LA Spanish DT Article DE tax incidence; progresivity; wealth redistribution; fiscal system optimum ID INTERGENERATIONAL TRANSFERS; INTER VIVOS; ESTATE; WEALTH; TAXATION; BEQUESTS AB Nowadays, there is an interesting discussion about the utility of keeping the taxes on heritage in modern fiscal systems. Nevertheless this controversy has not been properly reflected yet in the acedemic research and there is not enough investigation into the reasons that justify their existence and their real situation in our tax system. The aim of this investigation is to quantify the main support of this tax: its contribution to wealth distribution. Apart from the metodology explained, we make an estimation based on the real data of tax-payers as well as the theoretical progressiv its of the tax's design on the overall redistributive impact, separating the deferent tax elements and between groups of family relationship. C1 Univ Zaragoza, Fac Derecho, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain. RP Lahuerta, MAB (corresponding author), Univ Zaragoza, Fac Derecho, E-50009 Zaragoza, Spain. CR Albi Ibanez E., 1974, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V28, P153 ARCARONS J, 2003, 10 ENC EC APL TEN ARNAIZ G, 1987, PAPELES EC ESPANOLA, V30, P249 Arrondel L, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V79, P3, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00093-1 Arrondel L, 1997, ST ECON ETHIC PHILOS, P89 Atkinson A., 1981, EC DESIGUALDAD Atkinson A., 1977, HACIENDA PUBLIA ESPA, V45, P156 Auten G, 1996, J PUBLIC ECON, V59, P55, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)01475-2 AUTEN G, 1996, J PUBLICS EC, V59, P89 BADENES N, 2001, EFECTOS REDISTRIBUTI Barberan M. A., 2005, REV ASTURIANA EC, V32, P95 Barberan M. A., 2005, IMPOSICION HERENCIAS BARBERAN MA, 2003, CUADERNOS INFORMACIO, V173, P73 BARRERO FD, 2001, PLANIFICACION FISCAL BARRO RJ, 1974, J POLIT ECON, V82, P1095, DOI 10.1086/260266 BARTLETT B, 1997, TAX NOTES, P105 BERBERAN MA, 2005, FUNCAS DOCUMENTOS TR, V233 Blinder A, 1977, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V45, P174 BRENA F, 1982, IMPUESTO EXTRAORDINA CASTANER JM, 1999, EFECTOS REFORMA IRPF CHECA GONZALEZ C., 1996, SUPRESION IMPUESTO S DEPABLOS L, 1990, VALORACION IMPUESTO DEPABLOS L, 2001, AHCIENDA PUBLICA ESP, P281 DEPABLOS L, 1985, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V96, P201 ELLER MB, 1997, STAT INCOME B, V16, P43 FRANK RH, 2000, DOES ATLAS SHRUG EC, V15, P490 GALE W, 2001, RETHINKING ESTATE GI GALE WG, 1994, J ECON PERSPECT, V8, P145, DOI 10.1257/jep.8.4.145 GARCIA A, 2003, REV ARAGONESA ADM PU, V22, P231 Harbury C, 1974, HACIENDA P UBLICA ES, V28, P163 Haslett DW, 1997, ST ECON ETHIC PHILOS, P133 HU SC, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V40, P217, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90004-2 IBANEZ EA, 1977, HACIENDA PUBLIA ESPA, V45, P143 IBANEZ EA, 1986, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V100, P185 Ihori T, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V79, P129, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00098-0 Joulfaian D, 2000, NATL TAX J, V53, P743, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2000.3S.07 Joulfaian D, 1998, 80 US DEP TREAS OFF KAKWANI NC, 1977, ECON J, V87, P71, DOI 10.2307/2231833 KOPCZUK W, 2000, WORKING PAPER SERIES, V7960 LAGARES M, 1972, IMPUESTO PATRIMONIO Lagares M., 1975, HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP, V33, P141 Laitner J, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V79, P205, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00101-8 Marin J, 1987, PAPELES EC ESPANOLA, V30-31, P138 McGarry K, 2000, NATL TAX J, V53, P913, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2000.4.08 McGarry K, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V73, P321, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00017-1 MELGUIZO M, 2005, 12 ENC EC PUBL PALM MELGUIZO M, 2005, THESIS U ZARAGOZA Musgrave RA, 1948, J POLIT ECON, V56, P498, DOI 10.1086/256742 ONRUBIA J, 2000, PAPELES TRABAJO I ES, V9 Pfahler W., 1990, B ECON RES, V42, P121 Poterba J, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V79, P237, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00102-X POTERBA JM, 2000, STATE TAX TAX INVEST SLEMROD J, 2000, DOES ATLAS SHURUG EC Stiglitz J, 1977, HACIENDA PUBLIA ESPA, V45, P145 Zilcha I, 2003, J PUBLIC ECON, V87, P489, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00142-0 NR 55 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 1 PU INST ESTUDIOS FISCALES PI MADRID PA AVDA CARDENAL HERRERA ORIA, 378, MADRID, 28035, SPAIN SN 0210-1173 J9 HACIENDA PUBLICA ESP JI Hacienda Publica Esp. PY 2006 IS 177 BP 25 EP 55 PG 31 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 171OI UT WOS:000246744900002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT S AU Auerbach, AJ AF Auerbach, Alan J. BE Poterba, JM TI Who bears the corporate tax? A review of what we know SO TAX POLICY AND THE ECONOMY, VOL 20 SE Tax Policy and the Economy LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 20th Tax Policy and the Economy Conference CY SEP, 2005 CL Washington, DC ID INCOME-TAX; TAXATION; INVESTMENT; EFFICIENCY; REFORM; COSTS; MARKET; POLICY AB Who bears the corporate income tax? The answer to this question is important to our understanding of the distribution of tax burdens, but it has been elusive. Although the tax accounts for a small share of federal revenues, changes in the corporate income tax and its associated revenues have often been a significant part of revenue legislation. Moreover, because its incidence is often perceived to fall on the affluent, assignment of the corporate tax burden can have a significant impact on the assessed progressivity of the tax system as a whole. This paper reviews what we know from economic theory and evidence about the burden of the corporate income tax. While the ultimate incidence of the tax remains somewhat unresolved, there have been many advances over the years in our thinking about how to assign the corporate tax burden. Among the lessons from the recent literature are the following: 1. For a variety of reasons, shareholders may bear a certain portion of the corporate tax burden. In the short run, they may be unable to shift taxes on corporate capital. Even in the long run, they may be unable to shift taxes attributable to a discount on "old" capital, taxes on rents, or taxes that simply reduce the advantages of corporate ownership. Thus, the distribution of share ownership remains empirically quite relevant to corporate tax incidence analysis, though attributing ownership is itself a challenging exercise. 2. One-dimensional incidence analysis-distributing the corporate tax burden over a representative cross-section of the population-can be relatively uninformative about who bears the corporate tax burden because it misses the element of timing. 3. It is more meaningful to analyze the incidence of corporate tax changes than that of the corporate tax in its entirety because different components of the tax have different incidence, and incidence relates to the path of the economy over time, not just in a single year. C1 Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA 94720 USA. CR Aizcorbe A. M., 2003, FEDERAL RESERVE B, V89, P1 Auerbach A. J., 1991, TAX POLICY EC, P55, DOI [10.1086/tpe.5.20061801, DOI 10.1086/TPE.5.20061801] AUERBACH A. 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A., 1977, PUBLIC POLICY CORPOR Kotlikoff Laurence, 1987, HDB PUBLIC EC, V2, P1043, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(87)80011-3 Krzyzaniak Marian, 1963, SHIFTING CORPORATION LUTTRELL K, 2005, STAT INCOME B, V24, P59 MackieMason JK, 1997, J FINANC, V52, P477, DOI 10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04810.x MCLURE CE, 1980, EC TAXATION MILLER MH, 1977, J FINANC, V32, P261, DOI 10.2307/2326758 NGUYEN EL, 2005, SURVEY CURR BUS, V85, P30 Pechman Joseph A., 1985, WHO PAID TAXES 1966 SHOVEN JB, 1976, J POLIT ECON, V84, P1261, DOI 10.1086/260511 SLEMROD J, 2004, NBER WORKING PAPER Slemrod Joel, 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V3, P1423, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80026-X STIGLITZ JE, 1973, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90008-X SUMMERS LH, 1981, BROOKINGS PAPERS EC, V1, P67, DOI DOI 10.2307/2534397 Tobin J., 1969, J MONEY CREDIT BANK, V1, P15, DOI [DOI 10.2307/1991374, 10.2307/1991374] TREUBERT PE, 2004, STAT INCOME B, V24, P118 WHEELER T, 2004, STAT INCOME B, V24, P46 NR 56 TC 36 Z9 36 U1 0 U2 2 PU M I T PRESS PI CAMBRIDGE PA FIVE CAMBRIDGE CENTER, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 USA SN 0892-8649 BN 978-0-262-66198-0 J9 TAX POL EC PY 2006 VL 20 BP 1 EP 40 PG 40 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA BFW59 UT WOS:000245106200001 OA Bronze, Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Riedl, A Tyran, JR AF Riedl, A Tyran, JR TI Tax liability side equivalence in gift-exchange labor markets SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; efficiency wages; gift exchange; experiments AB Tax Liability Side Equivalence (tax LSE) claims that the statutory incidence of a tax is irrelevant for its economic incidence. Tax LSE is predicted to hold in gift-exchange labor markets if workers' effort choices exclusively depend on the net wage, but breaks down if they partially depend on the gross wage paid to workers. This is the case if the tax is perceived to be external to the gift-exchange relationship. We experimentally test tax LSE in a gift-exchange labor market and find that it holds very well. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark. Tinbergen Inst, IZA, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands. Univ Amsterdam, Dept Econ, CREED, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, Netherlands. RP Tyran, JR (corresponding author), Univ Copenhagen, Inst Econ, Studiestr 6, DK-1455 Copenhagen, Denmark. EM a.m.riedl@uva.nl; Jean-Robert.Tyran@econ.ku.dk RI Riedl, Arno/D-1007-2012; Tyran, Jean-Robert/C-5736-2017 OI Tyran, Jean-Robert/0000-0002-2958-667X CR AKERLOF GA, 1982, Q J ECON, V97, P453 Bewley Truman, 1999, WHY WAGES DONT FALL BLINDER AS, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1 Boeri T., 2001, ECON POLICY, V16, P8, DOI [10.1111/1468-0327.00069, DOI 10.1111/1468-0327.00069] Borck R, 2002, SOUTH ECON J, V68, P672, DOI 10.2307/1061725 Brandts J, 2004, ECON J, V114, P684, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2004.00237.x Campbell CM, 1997, Q J ECON, V112, P759, DOI 10.1162/003355397555343 Dalton H., 1922, PRINCIPLES PUBLIC FI ENGELMANN D, 2002, ROBUSTNESS LAB GIFT Fehr E, 1998, J LABOR ECON, V16, P324, DOI 10.1086/209891 Fehr E, 1998, EUR ECON REV, V42, P1, DOI 10.1016/S0014-2921(96)00051-7 FEHR E, 1993, Q J ECON, V108, P437, DOI 10.2307/2118338 Goerke L, 2002, APPL ECON LETT, V9, P17, DOI 10.1080/13504850110048497 Hannan RL, 2002, J LABOR ECON, V20, P923, DOI 10.1086/342894 Kachelmeier Steven J., 1994, CONTEMP ACCOUNT RES, V10, P505 Kerschbamer R, 2000, ECON THEOR, V16, P719 LOCKWOOD B, 1993, J PUBLIC ECON, V52, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90102-Y Musgrave R. A., 1959, THEORY PUBLIC FINANC Picard PM, 2001, SCOT J POLIT ECON, V48, P461, DOI 10.1111/1467-9485.00209 PISAURO G, 1991, J PUBLIC ECON, V46, P329, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(91)90011-P RENNER E, 2004, J ECON BEHAV ORGAN, V54, P337 RUFFLE BJ, 2004, IN PRESS J PUBLIC EC Stiglitz J, 1988, EC PUBLIC SECTOR NR 23 TC 14 Z9 14 U1 0 U2 4 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD DEC PY 2005 VL 89 IS 11-12 BP 2369 EP 2382 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.007 PG 14 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 982SR UT WOS:000233182400016 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Sandmo, A AF Sandmo, A TI The theory of tax evasion: A retrospective view SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Nordic Workshop on Tax Policy and Public Economics CY NOV, 2004 CL Helsinki, FINLAND ID INCOME-TAX; TAXATION; ENFORCEMENT AB The paper gives an overview of some main themes in the theory of tax evasion, starting from Allingham and Sandmo (1972). It reviews the comparative statics of the original model of individual behavior where the tax evasion decision is analogous to portfolio choice, and its extensions to incorporate socially conscious behavior, participation in the black labor market and tax evasion by firms. It also discusses the analysis of tax incidence and the problems involved in moving from individual to aggregate analysis. Finally, it reviews the issues that arise in formulating models of optimal taxation in the presence of tax evasion. C1 Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Dept Econ, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. RP Sandmo, A (corresponding author), Norwegian Sch Econ & Business Adm, Dept Econ, N-5045 Bergen, Norway. RI Osuna, Luis E/A-5858-2010 CR Allingham M.G., 1972, J PUBLIC EC, V1, P323, DOI [DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2, 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2] Andreoni J, 1998, J ECON LIT, V36, P818 ANDVIG JC, 1990, J ECON BEHAV ORGAN, V13, P63, DOI 10.1016/0167-2681(90)90053-G ARROW KJ, 1974, ESSAYS THEORY RISK B BALDRY JC, 1979, ECON LETT, V3, P53, DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(79)90070-3 BARTH E, 2005, UNPUB FAIR FAX EVASI BECKER GS, 1968, J POLIT ECON, V76, P169, DOI 10.1086/259394 Bernasconi M, 1998, J PUBLIC ECON, V67, P123, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00051-0 Boadway R, 2000, INT TAX PUBLIC FINAN, V7, P641, DOI 10.1023/A:1008777309680 BORDIGNON M, 1993, J PUBLIC ECON, V52, P345, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90039-V Chander P, 1998, REV ECON STUD, V65, P165, DOI 10.1111/1467-937X.00040 CHEN KP, 2002, UNPUB INTERNAL CONTR CHRISTIANSEN V, 1980, J PUBLIC ECON, V13, P389, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(86)90012-5 CLOTFELTER CT, 1983, REV ECON STAT, V65, P363, DOI 10.2307/1924181 COWELL FA, 1990, CHEATING GOVT COWELL FA, 2002, UNPUB STICKS CARROTS CREMER H, 1993, J PUBLIC ECON, V50, P261, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90052-U CREMER H, 1994, SCAND J ECON, V96, P219, DOI 10.2307/3440600 CROCKER K, 2003, UNPUB CORPORATE TAX Frey Bruno S., 2002, 760 CESIFO GORDON JPF, 1989, EUR ECON REV, V33, P797, DOI 10.1016/0014-2921(89)90026-3 KESSELMAN JR, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V38, P137, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90023-6 KOLM AS, 2004, 4 UPPS U I LAB MARK Kolm Serge-Christophe, 1973, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P265 Marhuenda F, 1997, SCAND J ECON, V99, P61, DOI 10.1111/1467-9442.00047 MARRELLI M, 1988, J PUBLIC ECON, V37, P55, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(88)90004-7 MARRELLI M, 1984, J PUBLIC ECON, V25, P181, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(84)90050-1 MCCAFFERY EJ, 2004, CLEO RES PAPER SERIE MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, V38, P175, DOI 10.2307/2296779 PENCAVEL JH, 1979, J PUBLIC ECON, V12, P115, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(79)90059-8 PERSSON M, 1984, SCAND J ECON, V86, P131, DOI 10.2307/3439686 PESTIEAU P, 1991, J PUBLIC ECON, V45, P107, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(91)90050-C REINGANUM JF, 1985, J PUBLIC ECON, V26, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(85)90035-0 REINGANUM JF, 1986, INT ECON REV, V27, P739, DOI 10.2307/2526692 Sandmo A, 2002, ENVIRON RESOUR ECON, V23, P85, DOI 10.1023/A:1020236324130 SANDMO A, 1981, J PUBLIC ECON, V16, P265, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(81)90001-3 Schelling TC, 1978, MICROMOTIVES MACROBE SCHNEIDER E, 2004, 1167 CESIFO Schneider F, 2000, J ECON LIT, V38, P77, DOI 10.1257/jel.38.1.77 Schroyen F, 1997, J PUBLIC ECON, V65, P343, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(97)00020-0 SLEMROD J, 1998, SWEDISH EC POLICY RE, V5, P87 Slemrod Joel, 2002, HDB PUBLIC EC, V3, P1423, DOI DOI 10.1016/S1573-4420(02)80026-X Smith Adam, 1776, INQUIRY NATURE CAUSE Srinivasan T.N., 1973, J PUBLIC ECON, V2, P339, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(73)90024-8 STERN N., 1978, EC MODELS CRIMINAL B, P123 Yitzhaki S, 1974, J PUBLIC ECON, V3, P201, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1 NR 46 TC 171 Z9 171 U1 2 U2 29 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PD DEC PY 2005 VL 58 IS 4 BP 643 EP 663 DI 10.17310/ntj.2005.4.02 PG 21 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 009OL UT WOS:000235121500002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Freund, EA Morris, IL AF Freund, EA Morris, IL TI The lottery and income inequality in the States SO SOCIAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY LA English DT Article ID UNITED-STATES; TAX INCIDENCE; POLICY; TIME AB Objective. Since the early 1970s, income inequality in the United States has increased dramatically. We examine the impact of state lotteries on income inequality in the American states from 1976-1995. Methods. We use cross-sectional time-series data to evaluate the effect of lotteries as well as those of other state tax policies, redistributive programs, and demographic factors on income inequality. Results. We find that state lotteries foster income concentration. Ceteris paribus, states with lotteries have higher levels of income inequality than those states without a lottery. We also find that additional demographic and policy factors have an impact on income inequality in the states. Conclusions. One of the most important policy-oriented determinants of income inequality is the lottery and a significant portion of the increase in income inequality over our two-decade time period is attributable to the increasing prevalence and popularity of state lotteries. C1 Univ Maryland, Dept Govt & Polit, College Pk, MD 20742 USA. RP Morris, IL (corresponding author), Univ Maryland, Dept Govt & Polit, 3140 Tydings Hall, College Pk, MD 20742 USA. 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Sci. Q. PD DEC PY 2005 VL 86 IS 5 BP 996 EP 1012 DI 10.1111/j.0038-4941.2005.00333.x PG 17 WC Political Science; Sociology SC Government & Law; Sociology GA 983AG UT WOS:000233202900004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ablett, J Hart, N AF Ablett, John Hart, Neil TI CORPORATE INCOME TAX REFORM: THE NEGLECTED ISSUE OF TAX INCIDENCE SO ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND POLICY LA English DT Article AB The 'double taxation' of corporate income is often used as an argument in support of the integration of company and shareholder taxes, as occurred with the introduction of tax imputation in 1987 in Australia. These arguments are based, often implicitly, on the premise that the economic incidence of company taxes falls on shareholders receiving dividend income. However, a review of the available theoretical and empirical literature fails to provide an unambiguous answer to the corporate income tax incidence question. Empirical results presented in this paper suggest the existence of significant forward shifting of the tax on to consumers though higher prices in the case of Australian manufacturing corporations. A more informed discussion of tax reform must therefore consider more carefully the implications arising from the likely existence of significant forward shifting of the corporate income tax. C1 [Ablett, John; Hart, Neil] Univ Western Sydney, Penrith, NSW, Australia. RP Ablett, J (corresponding author), Univ Western Sydney, Penrith, NSW, Australia. CR Agapitos G., 1979, B ECON RES, V31, P14 ASIMAKOP.A, 1974, ECON J, V84, P267, DOI 10.2307/2231255 Atkinson A., 1980, LECT PUBLIC EC Auerbach A.J., 2005, NBER WORKING PAPERS BEATH J, 1979, REV ECON STUD, V46, P513, DOI 10.2307/2297017 Bhatia K. 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Policy PD SEP PY 2005 VL 35 IS 1-2 BP 45 EP 60 DI 10.1016/S0313-5926(05)50003-1 PG 16 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA V96KJ UT WOS:000213262800003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ruffle, BJ AF Ruffle, BJ TI Tax and subsidy incidence equivalence theories: experimental evidence from competitive markets SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence equivalence; subsidy; competitive markets; experimental economics; framing effects ID TRADE AB A basic tenet in microeconomics is tax incidence equivalence, which holds that the burden of a unit tax on buyers and sellers is independent of who actually pays the tax. By contrast, policymakers and the public often mistake statutory incidence for economic incidence. Using competitive laboratory markets, I test both tax incidence equivalence and an analogous theorem for subsidies. For sufficiently large markets, the results show strong support for both theories; there is little to no evidence, even in the short run, of the popular misperception that statutory incidence equals economic incidence. In smaller markets in which competitive forces are weaker and relative bargaining strengths may play a role, the evidence for tax incidence equivalence is weaker as minor price discrepancies may persist between markets. (c) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel. RP Ruffle, BJ (corresponding author), Ben Gurion Univ Negev, Dept Econ, IL-84105 Beer Sheva, Israel. 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PD AUG PY 2005 VL 89 IS 8 BP 1519 EP 1542 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.04.009 PG 24 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 943SO UT WOS:000230374800009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Warren, N Harding, A Lloyd, R AF Warren, Neil Harding, Ann Lloyd, Rachel TI GST and the changing incidence of Australian Taxes: 1994-95 to 2001-02 SO EJOURNAL OF TAX RESEARCH LA English DT Article AB The past decade has seen major reforms to the design of Australia's tax system. This paper outlines these reforms and examines their distributional impact across the household income spectrum. While the authors estimated tax incidence in Australia prior to the July 2000 (ANTS) reforms (which included the introduction of a 10% GST), no comprehensive estimates of the impact of these tax reforms have been made since that date. This paper addresses this deficiency. It finds that the personal income tax has become more income redistributive and more progressive over the period 1994-95 to 2001-02. However, the broad-based indirect tax reforms implemented over this period have become marginally more regressive and, because they have become more important as a revenue source, they now impact more adversely on post-tax income distribution. In the case of taxes other than the personal income tax and the reformed indirect taxes, they have become less regressive and have increased in importance. Overall, the progressivity of the Australian tax system and the distribution of post-tax income appears to have remained remarkably stable over the period. C1 [Warren, Neil] UNSW, Fac Law, Australian Taxat Studies Program, Sydney, NSW, Australia. [Harding, Ann; Lloyd, Rachel] Univ Canberra, NATSEM Natl Ctr Social & Econ Modelling, Canberra, ACT, Australia. RP Warren, N (corresponding author), UNSW, Fac Law, Australian Taxat Studies Program, Sydney, NSW, Australia. CR ABS, 1992, HOUS EXP SURV AUSTR ABS, 1996, HOUS EXP SURV AUSTR ABS, 2001, GOVT BEN TAX HOUS IN ABS, 2005, AUSTR EC IND ABS, 2004, HOUS INC INC DISTR ABS, 2003, HOUS INC ITS DISTR A ATKINSON AB, 1970, J ECON THEORY, V2, P244, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(70)90039-6 Bremner K, 2002, 27 U CANB NAT CTR SO Commonwealth of Australia Treasurer, 1998, TAX REF NEW TAX NEW Commonwealth Treasury, 2003, PREL ASS IMP NEW TAX Harding A, 2001, FINANCIAL DISADVANTA Harding A, 2004, C DISTR EFF GOVT SPE Harding A, 1998, WHO BEARS TAX BURDEN Harding A, 1999, 39 U CANB NAT CTR SO Harding A., 2005, C TRANS RISK NEW DIR Office of National Statistics (United Kingdom), 2003, EFF TAX BEN HOUS INC Saunders P., 2001, AUSTR EC INDICATORS, P33 Smith J. P., 2001, AUSTR EC REV, V34, P263 UK Office of National Statistics, 2003, EFFECTS TAXES BENEFI Warren N., 1989, AUSTR TAX REFORM RET, V8, P445 Warren N., 1997, C SERIES AUSTR TAX R, V19 Warren N. A., 2004, TAX FACTS FICTION TA, V41, P287 Warren N. A., 2002, AUSTR EC REV, V35, P325 Warren N. A., 2000, AGENDA, V7, P17 Warren N. A., 2005, AUSTR TAX FORUM, V20 NR 25 TC 10 Z9 10 U1 0 U2 0 PU UNIV NEW SOUTH WALES, FAC LAW PI KENSINGTON PA PO BOX 1, KENSINGTON, NSW 2033, AUSTRALIA SN 1448-2398 J9 EJOURNAL TAX RES JI EJournal Tax Res. PD JUN PY 2005 VL 3 IS 1 BP 114 EP 145 PG 32 WC Law SC Government & Law GA V24FO UT WOS:000215143100005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Anderson, JE AF Anderson, JE TI Casino taxation in the United States SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article ID TAX INCIDENCE; LOTTERIES; REVENUES; DEMAND; IMPACT AB This paper provides an overview of the forms of taxation that are applied to casinos by state and local governments, and analyzes those taxes and fees from a policy perspective. First, the paper contains a comprehensive review of the taxes and fees applied to commercial casinos in the 11 states where casinos are legal. The two most common forms of taxation include a tax on the net amount gambled (AGR, adjusted gross receipts, or gross receipts minus prizes paid) and admission taxes charged on riverboat casinos. A wide range of tax rates are applied to AGR by the states. Second, economic analysis of the efficiency and equity issues related to casino taxes is presented. Included in the analysis is consideration of the revenue offsets involved with other state and local taxes and the uses of the funds. Finally, a summary of our current knowledge of casino taxation and suggestions for needed research are presented. C1 Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA. RP Anderson, JE (corresponding author), Univ Nebraska, Dept Econ, Lincoln, NE 68588 USA. RI Anderson, John/AAN-1893-2020 OI Anderson, John/0000-0002-4944-7300 CR *AM GAM ASS, 2004, 2004 STAT STAT AGA C *AM GAM ASS, 2003, IND INF STAT INF STA Anders GC, 1998, CONTEMP ECON POLICY, V16, P347, DOI 10.1111/j.1465-7287.1998.tb00524.x BORG MO, 1991, AM J ECON SOCIOL, V50, P323, DOI 10.1111/j.1536-7150.1991.tb02299.x BORG MO, 1990, J ED FINANCE, V15, P289 Eadington WR, 1999, J ECON PERSPECT, V13, P173, DOI 10.1257/jep.13.3.173 ELLIOTT D, 2002, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V30, P235 *EUR LOTT, 2004, CONS NEW LEG FRAM PA EVANS WN, 2002, NBER WORKING PAPER, V9198 Fink SC, 2004, APPL ECON, V36, P2357, DOI 10.1080/0003684042000271387 Garrett T. A., 2001, J ED FINANCE, V26, P219 GARRETT TA, 2003, CASINO GAMBLING AM I Gerstein D. 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PD JUN PY 2005 VL 58 IS 2 BP 303 EP 324 DI 10.17310/ntj.2005.2.09 PG 22 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 941IJ UT WOS:000230208200009 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Chernick, H AF Chernick, H TI On the determinants of subnational tax progressivity in the US SO NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL LA English DT Article ID LOCAL-TAXES; STATE; COMPETITION; GOVERNMENT; DEDUCTIBILITY; BURDENS AB An instrumental variables model of state and local tax incidence is estimated for the years 1977, 1985, and 1991. Tax exporting through deductibility of state and local taxes has a significant positive effect on tax progressivity. I find a negative neighbor effect, with more progressive states geographically contiguous with more regressive states. Party control by Republicans is associated with a more regressive tax structure. Expenditure and tax progressivity are not closely related to one another, with higher welfare spending financed by proportionally higher tax burdens throughout the income distribution. Greater inequality in pre-tax income distributions is offset by more progressive tax systems, but the degree of offset is small. C1 CUNY Hunter Coll, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10021 USA. CUNY, Grad Ctr, New York, NY 10021 USA. RP Chernick, H (corresponding author), CUNY Hunter Coll, Dept Econ, New York, NY 10021 USA. CR *ADV COMM INT REL, 1993, SIGN FEAT FISC FED Bahl R, 2002, NATL TAX J, V55, P723, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2002.4.04 BERCH N, 1995, POLIT RES QUART, V48, P629, DOI 10.1177/106591299504800309 BERRY FS, 1994, AM J POLIT SCI, V38, P855, DOI 10.2307/2111610 BESLEY T, 1995, AM ECON REV, V85, P25 Brueckner JK, 2001, NATL TAX J, V54, P203, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2001.2.02 CASE A, 1993, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V12, P136, DOI 10.2307/3325468 CHERNICK H, 1982, NATL TAX J, V35, P149 Chernick H, 1997, NATL TAX J, V50, P233 CHERNICK H, 1992, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V20, P572, DOI 10.1177/109114219202000412 *CIT TAX JUST I TA, 1996, DISTR AN TAS SYST Citizens for Tax Justice, 1991, FAR CRY FAIR CTJS GU DAVIDSON R, 1993, EST INF EC EIBNER CE, 2004, POP HET VOT TURN RAN Evans WN, 1997, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V16, P10, DOI 10.1002/(SICI)1520-6688(199724)16:1<10::AID-PAM2>3.0.CO;2-L FEENBERG D, 1977, STUDIES STATE LOCAL, P135 FELDSTEIN MS, 1987, J POLIT ECON, V95, P710, DOI 10.1086/261482 GADE MN, 1990, NATL TAX J, V43, P39 GRAMLICH EM, 1985, AM DOMESTIC PRIORITI, P34 HETTICH W, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P701 Hussar W, 2000, TRENDS DISPARITIES S JACOBS D, 1983, SOCIAL SCI Q, V63, P550 KAROLY L, 1994, UNEVEN TIDES RISING KIEFER DW, 1984, NATL TAX J, V37, P497 LADD HF, 1992, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V20, P450, DOI 10.1177/109114219202000404 LOWERY D, 1987, WESTERN POLIT QUART, V40, P137, DOI 10.2307/448558 MCCLURE C, 1962, NATL TAX J, V20, P49 MELTZER AH, 1981, J POLIT ECON, V89, P914, DOI 10.1086/261013 METCALF GE, 1994, TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY, P59, DOI 10.1017/CBO9780511571824.005 METCALF GE, 1993, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V12, P109, DOI 10.2307/3325465 Morgan David R, 1995, SOCIAL SCI Q, V75, P510 ORR LL, 1976, AM ECON REV, V66, P359 PELTZMAN S, 1980, J LAW ECON, V23, P209, DOI 10.1086/466962 PHARES D, 1980, PAYS STATE LOCAL TAX Rork JC, 2003, NATL TAX J, V56, P775, DOI 10.17310/ntj.2003.4.04 US Census Bureau, 1994, STAT ABSTR US *US HOUS REPR COMM, 1991, OV ENT PROGR 1991 GR *US HOUS REPR COMM, 1991, BACKGR MAT DAT PROGR WINER SL, 1999, DEM CHOICE TAXATION YINGER J, 1989, NATL TAX J, V42, P413 NR 40 TC 30 Z9 32 U1 0 U2 3 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST, N W #600, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA SN 0028-0283 J9 NATL TAX J JI Natl. Tax J. PD MAR PY 2005 VL 58 IS 1 BP 93 EP 112 DI 10.17310/ntj.2005.1.05 PG 20 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 910GQ UT WOS:000227919300005 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Ihlanfeldt, KR Shaughnessy, TM AF Ihlanfeldt, KR Shaughnessy, TM TI An empirical investigation of the effects of impact fees on housing and land markets SO REGIONAL SCIENCE AND URBAN ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT Conference on Analysis of Land Markets and the Impact of Land Market Regulation CY JUL, 2002 CL Lincoln Inst Land Policy, Cambridge, MA HO Lincoln Inst Land Policy DE impact fees; tax incidence; housing market estimation ID SITE CHARACTERISTICS; PROPERTY VALUES; AIR-POLLUTION; PRICE AB This paper presents the results from estimating the effects of development impact fees on the prices of new and existing single-family homes and undeveloped residential land using unique data for Dade County, FL. The results show that an additional US$1.00 of fees increases the price of both new and existing housing by about US$1.60 and reduces the price of land by about US$1.00. These findings are shown to be consistent with the new view but not the old view theory of impact fee incidence. (C) 2004 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Florida State Univ, Coll Social Sci, DeVoe L Moore Ctr, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA. Florida State Univ, Coll Social Sci, Dept Econ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA. Louisiana State Univ, Dept Econ & Finance, Shreveport, LA 71115 USA. RP Ihlanfeldt, KR (corresponding author), Florida State Univ, Coll Social Sci, DeVoe L Moore Ctr, 150 Bellamy Bldg, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA. EM kihlanfe@mailer.fsu.edu; tshaughn@pilot.lsus.edu CR ALTSHULER AA, 1993, REGULATON REV POLITI BADEN BM, 2002, 9920 U CHIC HARR GRA BOUSQUET S, 1999, MIAMI HERALD 0322, pB4 CHARLES J, 2000, MIAMI HERALD 0417, pB3 CHESHIRE P, 2002, LINC I LAND POL C AN COBB S, 1984, J URBAN ECON, V15, P26, DOI 10.1016/0094-1190(84)90021-4 DELANEY CJ, 1989, GROWTH CHANGE, V20, P1, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-2257.1989.tb00499.x DELANEY CJ, 1989, AREUEA J, V17, P41 DEYAK TA, 1974, Q REV ECON BUS, V14, P93 DIPASQUALE D, 1994, J URBAN ECON, V35, P1, DOI 10.1006/juec.1994.1001 DiPasquale D., 1996, URBAN EC REAL ESTATE Downing Paul B., 1987, DEV EXACTIONS, P42 Dresch M, 1997, WHO PAYS DEV FEES EX GATZLAFF DH, 1994, J URBAN ECON, V35, P221, DOI 10.1006/juec.1994.1014 GIBBONS S, 2002, LINC I LAND POL C AN Goodman AC, 1998, REAL ESTATE ECON, V26, P151, DOI 10.1111/1540-6229.00742 HUFFMAN FE, 1988, J AM PLANN ASSOC, V54, P49, DOI 10.1080/01944368808977152 IRWIN E, 2002, LINC I LAND POL C AN LINNEMAN P, 1981, J URBAN ECON, V9, P129, DOI 10.1016/0094-1190(81)90036-X LINNEMAN P, 1980, J URBAN ECON, V8, P47, DOI 10.1016/0094-1190(80)90055-8 Macpherson DA, 2001, J REAL ESTATE FINANC, V22, P81, DOI 10.1023/A:1007831410843 McMillen DP, 2001, REAL ESTATE ECON, V29, P207, DOI 10.1111/1080-8620.00008 MULLER PO, 1991, WINDS CHANGE S FLORI, P62 Nelson Arthur C., 1992, TRANSPORT RES REC, V1305, P36 Palmquist R.B., 1991, MEASURING DEMAND ENV, P77 Palmquist Raymond B., 2004, HDB ENV EC, V2 RASMUSSEN DW, 1990, APPL ECON, V22, P431, DOI 10.1080/00036849000000002 RASMUSSEN DW, 1988, REV REG STUD, V18, P47 SHOUP D, 2002, LINC I LAND POL C AN SINGELL LD, 1990, LAND ECON, V66, P82, DOI 10.2307/3146685 SKABURSKIS A, 1992, URBAN STUD, V29, P653, DOI 10.1080/00420989220080611 SMITH VK, 1975, J REGIONAL SCI, V15, P277, DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9787.1975.tb00931.x SNYDER TP, 1986, PAYING GROWTH USING Yinger J, 1998, NATL TAX J, V51, P23 Yinger J., 1998, LOCAL GOVT TAX LAND Yinger J., 1988, PROPERTY TAXES HOUSE NR 36 TC 71 Z9 71 U1 0 U2 14 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV PI AMSTERDAM PA PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS SN 0166-0462 EI 1879-2308 J9 REG SCI URBAN ECON JI Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. PD NOV PY 2004 VL 34 IS 6 BP 639 EP 661 DI 10.1016/j.regsciurbeco.2003.11.002 PG 23 WC Economics; Environmental Studies; Urban Studies SC Business & Economics; Environmental Sciences & Ecology; Urban Studies GA 856BW UT WOS:000224019600002 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Gruber, J Koszegi, B AF Gruber, J Koszegi, B TI Tax incidence when individuals are time-inconsistent: the case of cigarette excise taxes SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE cigarettes; excise tax; self-control function ID SMOKING AB One of the most cogent criticisms of excise taxes is their regressivity, with lower income groups spending a much larger share of their income on goods such as cigarettes than do higher income groups. We argue that traditional quantity-based measures of incidence are only appropriate under a very restrictive "time-consistent" model of consumption of sin goods. A model that is much more consistent with existing evidence on smoking decisions is a time-inconsistent formulation where excise taxes on cigarettes serve a self-control function that is valued by smokers who would like to quit but cannot. This self-control function benefits lower income groups more, since they have a significantly higher price sensitivity of smoking. Calibrations show that, as a result, cigarette taxes are much less regressive than previously assumed, and are even progressive for a wide variety of parameter values. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 MIT, Dept Econ, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. NBER, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. Univ Calif Berkeley, Berkeley, CA USA. RP Gruber, J (corresponding author), MIT, Dept Econ, E52-355,50 Mem Dr, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. EM gruberj@mit.edu CR Ainslie G., 1992, PICOECONOMICS STRATE Ainslie George, 1992, CHOICE TIME, P57 ANGELETOS GM, 2001, UNPUB HYPERBOLIC CON Barro RJ, 1999, Q J ECON, V114, P1125, DOI 10.1162/003355399556232 BECKER GS, 1988, J POLIT ECON, V96, P675, DOI 10.1086/261558 BERNHEIM BD, 2001, UNPUB ADDICTION COND BERNSTEIN DA, 1970, LEARNING MECHANISMS, P3 BURNS J, 1992, SPECIAL REPORT BUSIN, P21 *CDC, YOU CAN QUIT SMOK Chaloupka FJ, 2000, HANDB ECON, V17, P1539 Cutler DM, 2002, J POLICY ANAL MANAG, V21, P1, DOI 10.1002/pam.1037 DELLAVIGNA S, 2001, UNPUB SELFCONTROL MA DIAMOND P, 2002, IN PRESS J PUBLIC EC Evans William N., 1999, TAX POLICY EC, V13, P1, DOI DOI 10.1086/TPE.13.20061866 Evans WN, 1999, AM ECON REV, V89, P728, DOI 10.1257/aer.89.4.728 Grabowski J, 1985, NIDA Res Monogr, V53, P1 Gruber J, 2001, J ECON PERSPECT, V15, P193, DOI 10.1257/jep.15.2.193 Gruber J, 2001, Q J ECON, V116, P1261, DOI 10.1162/003355301753265570 GRUBER J, 2000, NBER WORKING PAPER, V7507 GRUBER J, 2001, UNPUB DO CIGARETTE T GRUBER J, 2002, NBER WORKING PAPER, V8777 Gruber Jonathan, 2001, RISKY BEHAV YOUTHS E, P69, DOI DOI 10.7208/CHICAGO/9780226309972.003.0003 Gul F, 2001, ECONOMETRICA, V69, P1403, DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00252 Laibson D, 1997, Q J ECON, V112, P443, DOI 10.1162/003355397555253 Laibson DI, 1998, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P91 MANNING WG, 1989, JAMA-J AM MED ASSOC, V261, P1064 MANNING WG, 1991, COSTS POOR HLTH HABI O'Donoghue T, 1999, AM ECON REV, V89, P103, DOI 10.1257/aer.89.1.103 O'Donoghue T., 1999, BEHAV DIMENSIONS RET, P125, DOI DOI 10.1037/A0019486 ODONOGHUE T, 2003, STUDYING OPTIMAL PAT PESENDORFER W, 2000, THEORY ADDICTION POTERBA JM, 1989, AM ECON REV, V79, P325 PROCHASKA JO, 1982, PSYCHOL REP, V51, P983, DOI 10.2466/pr0.1982.51.3.983 THALER R, 1981, ECON LETT, V8, P201, DOI 10.1016/0165-1765(81)90067-7 *US DEP HHS, 1994, PREV TOB YOUNG PEOPL VISCUSI WK, 1993, J ECON LIT, V31, P1912 Viscusi WK, 2001, REV ECON STAT, V83, P269, DOI 10.1162/00346530151143806 VISCUSI WK, 1995, POLICY EC, P51 VISCUSI WK, 2003, NATL BUREACH EC RES, V9487 NR 39 TC 151 Z9 155 U1 0 U2 13 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD AUG PY 2004 VL 88 IS 9-10 BP 1959 EP 1987 DI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2003.06.001 PG 29 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 831HK UT WOS:000222185300014 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Sinai, T Gyourko, J AF Sinai, T Gyourko, J TI The asset price incidence of capital gains taxes: evidence from the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 and publicly-traded real estate firms SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; tax capitalization; REITS ID MARKET; EQUILIBRIUM; INVESTMENT; INCENTIVES AB We provide new evidence on the asset price incidence of corporate-level investment subsidies by examining the relative stock price performance of publicly traded companies in the real estate industry that should have been differentially affected by the capital gains tax rate reduction enacted in the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997. By comparing real estate firms that have an organizational structure that allows entities who sell property to it to defer capital gains taxes and that plan to use the structure to acquire property with those that do not, we isolate the effect of the tax cut from industry trends and firm-level heterogeneity. When we examine the time period surrounding the reduction in the capital gains tax rate, our results suggest the tax change was substantially capitalized into lower share prices for these firms and the benefit of the seller's capital gains tax deferral accrued mainly to the buyer of an appreciated property. (C) 2003 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA. NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA. RP Sinai, T (corresponding author), Univ Penn, Wharton Sch, 308 Lauder Fischer Hall,256 S 37th St, Philadelphia, PA 19104 USA. EM sinai@wharton.upenn.edu CR AUERBACH AJ, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V47, P141, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90046-I CONSTANTINIDES GM, 1983, ECONOMETRICA, V51, P611, DOI 10.2307/1912150 CUMMINS JG, 1994, BROOKINGS PAP ECO AC, P1 CUTLER DM, 1988, AM ECON REV, V78, P1107 EISSA N, 1995, NBER WORKING PAPER, V5023 FAMA EF, 1993, J FINANC ECON, V33, P3, DOI 10.1016/0304-405X(93)90023-5 Gentry WM, 2003, J FINANC, V58, P261, DOI 10.1111/1540-6261.00524 Goolsbee A, 1998, Q J ECON, V113, P121, DOI 10.1162/003355398555540 GRUBER J, 1994, AM ECON REV, V84, P622 GRUBER J, 1994, Q J ECON, V109, P701, DOI 10.2307/2118419 HARRIS T, 1999, UNPUB SHARE PRICE EF HARRIS T, 1999, UNPUB DIVIDEND TAXAT Klein P, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V71, P355, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00080-2 LANDSMAN WR, 1995, NATL TAX J, V48, P245 Lang MH, 2000, J PUBLIC ECON, V76, P69, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00084-5 Poterba JM, 2001, J FINANC, V56, P353, DOI 10.1111/0022-1082.00328 POTERBA JM, 1984, Q J ECON, V99, P729, DOI 10.2307/1883123 Sagalyn L.B., 1996, REAL ESTATE FINANCE, V13, p34 SINAI T, 2000, NATL BUREAU EC RES W, V7893 STIGLITZ JE, 1983, J PUBLIC ECON, V21, P257, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(83)90051-8 SUMMERS LH, 1981, BROOKINGS PAPERS EC, V1, P67, DOI DOI 10.2307/2534397 NR 21 TC 15 Z9 15 U1 0 U2 11 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD JUL PY 2004 VL 88 IS 7-8 BP 1543 EP 1565 DI 10.1016/S0047-2727(03)00036-7 PG 23 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 806EQ UT WOS:000220417600014 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Barron, JM Blanchard, KH Urnbeck, JR AF Barron, JM Blanchard, KH Urnbeck, JR TI An economic analysis of a change in an excise tax SO JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC EDUCATION LA English DT Article DE Bertrand; Cournot; excise tax; gasoline tax; tax incidence AB The authors present an example of the effect a change in the excise tax can have on retail gasoline prices. The findings provide support for standard economic theory, as well as provide a vehicle for illustrating some of the subtleties of the analysis, including the implicit assumptions regarding the implications for the buying and selling prices of middlemen. C1 Purdue Univ, Krannert Grad Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA. RP Barron, JM (corresponding author), Purdue Univ, Krannert Grad Sch Management, W Lafayette, IN 47907 USA. EM barron@mgmt.purdue.edu CR Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 BARRON JM, 2003, EC SURVEY BAUMOL WJ, 1994, MICROECONOMICS PRINC Besley TJ, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P157 COLANDER DC, 1998, ECONOMICS Hamilton SF, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V71, P233, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(98)00066-8 Mankiw NG, 2001, PRINCIPLES MICROECON PARKIN M, 2000, MICROECONOMICS Poterba JM, 1996, NATL TAX J, V49, P165 RAVES PE, 1996, J ECON EDUC, V26, P229 2000, PR NEWSWIRES 0720 NR 11 TC 3 Z9 3 U1 0 U2 3 PU ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD PI ABINGDON PA 2-4 PARK SQUARE, MILTON PARK, ABINGDON OX14 4RN, OXON, ENGLAND SN 0022-0485 EI 2152-4068 J9 J ECON EDUC JI J. Econ. Educ. PD SPR PY 2004 VL 35 IS 2 BP 184 EP 196 DI 10.3200/JECE.35.2.184-196 PG 13 WC Economics; Education & Educational Research SC Business & Economics; Education & Educational Research GA 813KG UT WOS:000220905400006 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Devereux, MP Lanot, G AF Devereux, MP Lanot, G TI Measuring tax incidence: an application to mortgage provision in the UK SO JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; tax relief; endowment; repayment mortgages ID IMPERFECT COMPETITION; SALES TAXES; OLIGOPOLY; TAXATION; DEMAND; MODELS AB This paper derives measures of the average and marginal incidence of a tax or subsidy in imperfect competition, in the context of the UK housing market. We argue that one form of mortgage, common in the UK but not elsewhere (the endowment mortgage), exists primarily because of the structure of taxation in the UK. We estimate the determinants of the choice of the type of mortgage, and the size of mortgage conditional on the choice, using data from the Building Societies Association on 43 000 individual mortgages taken out between 1985 and 1989. The estimated parameters are an input to the incidence measures. Results suggest that between 70 and 80% of the additional subsidy to endowment mortgages is captured by lenders, rather than borrowers. (C) 2001 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England. Inst Fiscal Studies, London WC1E 7AE, England. Univ Keele, Keele ST5 5BG, Staffs, England. RP Devereux, MP (corresponding author), Univ Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, W Midlands, England. RI Lanot, Gauthier/M-3265-2013 OI Lanot, Gauthier/0000-0001-9244-7018 FU Economic and Social Research CouncilEconomic & Social Research Council (ESRC) [M544285003] Funding Source: researchfish CR BARNETT PG, 1995, J PUBLIC ECON, V57, P457, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80006-U BESLEY T, 1989, J PUBLIC ECON, V40, P359, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(89)90048-0 Besley TJ, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P157 Bowden R., 1984, INSTRUMENTAL VARIABL DEATON A, 1980, AM ECON REV, V70, P312 DELIPALLA S, 1992, J PUBLIC ECON, V49, P351, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(92)90073-O DELIPALLA S, 1998, UKC STUDIES EC Fershtman C, 1999, J PUBLIC ECON, V74, P151, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(99)00031-6 HALL S, 1989, 37 BANK ENGL KATZ ML, 1985, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V13, P3, DOI 10.1177/109114218501300101 LEE LF, 1982, REV ECON STUD, V49, P355, DOI 10.2307/2297361 LEECE D, 1995, OXFORD B ECON STAT, V57, P43, DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0084.1995.tb00026.x Leece D, 2000, APPL ECON, V32, P1121, DOI 10.1080/000368400404263 LEECE D, 1995, APPL ECON, V27, P1 MEAN GP, 1990, OXFORD B ECON STAT, V52, P1 NEWEY WK, 1990, AM ECON REV, V80, P324 *OFT, 1995, 131 OFT PESARAN MH, 1994, ECONOMETRICA, V62, P705, DOI 10.2307/2951666 POTERBA JM, 1984, Q J ECON, V99, P729, DOI 10.2307/1883123 Poterba JM, 1996, NATL TAX J, V49, P165 ROSEN HS, 1979, J PUBLIC ECON, V11, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(79)90042-2 SEADE J, 1980, J ECON THEORY, V23, P15, DOI 10.1016/0022-0531(80)90028-9 Seade J., 1985, 260 U WARW STERN N, 1987, J PUBLIC ECON, V32, P133, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(87)90009-0 WILCOX JB, 1985, 23 BANK ENGL NR 25 TC 9 Z9 9 U1 0 U2 4 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0047-2727 J9 J PUBLIC ECON JI J. Public Econ. PD AUG PY 2003 VL 87 IS 7-8 BP 1747 EP 1778 DI 10.1016/S0047-2727(01)00220-1 PG 32 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 711MM UT WOS:000184745700018 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Plesko, GA AF Plesko, GA TI An evaluation of alternative measures of corporate tax rates SO JOURNAL OF ACCOUNTING & ECONOMICS LA English DT Article DE corporate tax rate; effective tax rate; marginal tax rate; tax; measurement error ID MEASUREMENT ERROR; MANAGEMENT; TAXATION; REFORM; EXTENT AB This paper examines the ability of financial statement measures of average and marginal tax rates (MTR) to capture tax attributes utilizing firm-level tax and financial data. The results suggest commonly used average tax rate measures provide little insight about statutory tax burdens, and may introduce substantial bias into analyses of tax incidence. Financial statement-based proxies for MTR, particularly those based on simulation methods, are found to perform well in estimating current year tax rates. Both current year and present value MTR are found to be highly correlated with an easily constructed binary proxy of firms' tax status. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. C1 MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. RP Plesko, GA (corresponding author), MIT, Alfred P Sloan Sch Management, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA. EM gplesko@mit.edu RI Plesko, George A/B-5113-2013 OI Plesko, George A/0000-0002-4224-9088 CR Aigner D. J., 1973, J ECONOMETRICS, V1, DOI DOI 10.1016/0304-4076(73)90005-5 ALTSHULER R, 1990, Q J ECON, V105, P61, DOI 10.2307/2937819 Angrist J.D., 1999, HDB LABOR EC A, V3A Auerbach AJ, 1997, J ECON LIT, V35, P589 BOUND J, 1991, J LABOR ECON, V9, P1, DOI 10.1086/298256 BOYNTON CE, 1992, J ACCOUNTING RES, V30, P131, DOI 10.2307/2491198 Brealey R.A., 1996, PRINCIPLES CORPORATE Callihan D. 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PD JUN PY 2003 VL 35 IS 2 BP 201 EP 226 DI 10.1016/S0165-4101(03)00019-3 PG 26 WC Business, Finance; Economics SC Business & Economics GA 700UY UT WOS:000184130600004 OA Green Published DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Andrews, T Benzing, C AF Andrews, T Benzing, C BE Madhusudhan, R TI Tax incidence of the Pennsylvania lottery: The influence of retail outlet location SO 95TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON TAXATION, PROCEEDINGS LA English DT Proceedings Paper CT 95th Annual Conference on Taxation CY NOV 14-16, 2002 CL ORLANDO, FL SP Natl Tax Assoc ID REGRESSIVITY CR CLOTFELTER CT, 1979, NATL TAX J, V32, P543 CLOTFELTER CT, 1987, NATL TAX J, V40, P533 Hansen A, 2000, J CONSUM AFF, V34, P182, DOI 10.1111/j.1745-6606.2000.tb00090.x HANSEN A, 1995, PUBLIC FINANC QUART, V23, P385, DOI 10.1177/109114219502300305 Karcher Alan J., 1989, LOTTERIES Price DI, 1999, NATL TAX J, V52, P741 Price DI, 2000, PUBLIC FINANC REV, V28, P82, DOI 10.1177/109114210002800105 SUITS DB, 1977, AM ECON REV, V67, P747 VAILLANCOURT F, 1988, CAN TAX J, V36, P369 NR 9 TC 1 Z9 1 U1 0 U2 0 PU NATL TAX ASSOC PI WASHINGTON PA 725 15TH ST NW, WASHINGTON, DC 20005-2109 USA PY 2003 BP 383 EP 390 PG 8 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA BX91L UT WOS:000186812500050 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT B AU Salanie, B AF Salanie, Bernard BA Salanie, B BF Salanie, B TI Tax Incidence SO ECONOMICS OF TAXATION LA English DT Article; Book Chapter CR BALLENTINE JG, 1975, J POLIT ECON, V83, P633, DOI 10.1086/260344 FULLERTON, 1993, WHO BEARS LIFETIME T HARBERGER AC, 1962, J POLIT ECON, V70, P215, DOI 10.1086/258636 Shoven J. B., 1972, J PUBLIC ECON, V1, P281, DOI DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(72)90009-6 SHOVEN JB, 1984, J ECON LIT, V22, P1007 NR 5 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 0 PU M I T PRESS PI CAMBRIDGE PA FIVE CAMBRIDGE CENTER, CAMBRIDGE, MA 02142 USA BN 978-0-262-19486-0 PY 2003 BP 15 EP 34 PG 20 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA BSL86 UT WOS:000284876300003 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Siroky, J Kroulikova, I AF Siroky, J Kroulikova, I TI The analysis of a tax progressivity focused on an individual income tax progressivity in Slovakia in years 1993-2002 SO EKONOMICKY CASOPIS LA Czech DT Article AB Slovakia expects liberal reform of tax system next year. Probably the most visible turn represents implementation of ,flat tax", which withal means broad elimination of personal income tax progressivity. What effects brought last decade of ,,classic" personal income tax with its progressive scale of marginal taxes, tax brackets and tax allowances? This paper explores tax progressivity, the first part is aimed at theoretical terminations; and approaches to a tax progressivity, in the second part authors deals real estimates of income tax progressivity - employees progressivity - in Slovakia in years 1993 - 2002. Tax progressivity is investigated in two variants (with or without social and health insurance payments), because of similar incidence of obligatory insurance with personal income tax. Tax progressivity is analysed for. 3 types of taxpayers in regard of a size of tax allowances (taxpayer allowance, child allowance). Recency of this paper can be seen in elected technique of computation for interval progressivity where variable limits of investigated intervals are used. The theory of taxation discerns between local. a global progressivity. Local (in particular interval) progressivity measures changes in effective rate in one point or between two points of an income scale and is closely adherent to an effective taxation. Subject publications detail 3 ways of measuring interval progressivity: average rate progression, liability progression and residual income progression. Average rate of progression measures the ratio of change in effective rate to change in income, liability progression represents the ratio of percentage change in liability to percentage. change in income and residual income progression Measures the ratio of percentage change in after-tax income to percentage change in before-tax income. For practical requirements of economic policy is attention of economist aim at local progressivity estimation. The measures of global progressivity are aimed at the Lorenz method of income distribution analysis. Among the most popular in measures rank the Lorenz curve and the 'Gini measure, Musgrave-Thin index, Kakwani index, Suits index, Atkinson measure, Robin Flood index and Theil index. The second part of this paper turn to concrete estimations of interval progressivity taking an example by employee in Slovakia in years 1993 - 2002. Progressivity Was computed for 8 ranks of nominal wages. For better predictability were 3 types of taxpayers with variant social considered: taxpayer A claiming to basic tax allowance, taxpayer B claiming to basic tax allowance and into the bargain allowance for I child, taxpayer C with basic tax allowance and allowance for 2 children. Enumerations were realized in excel program environment gain values of progressivity were ranged into 8 tables which contain, 1740 numerical values. Computed values offers wide range of variant interpretations and particular conclusions: . tax progressivity indicators comparison in the event of social and health insurance inclusion . interval progressivity development in a relationship with taxpayer's social status . development of an individual income tax progressivity changes . wage and legislative factors influence upon tax liability . interval progressivity and efficient taxation relationship. The analysis of an individual income tax progressivity in Slovakia 1993 - 2002 detected several facts and there is some possibility to formulate certain recommendations for further analysis of a tax incidence (a theoretical conclusion of the analysis) and to characterize progressivity of an individual income tax in Slovakia (a practical conclusion of the analysis). The analysis detected broad insensitivity of the ratio of change in effective rate to change in income. Contrariwise the ratio of percentage change in liability to percentage change in income and the ratio of percentage change in after-tax income to percentage change in before-tax income response to on-going changes very sensitively. Both mark analogical process. In consideration of less sensitivity there is no reason to apply the ratio of change in effective rate to change in income. Farther finding was option to brake away from social and health insurance payments. Computations of a tax progressivity in a case of social and health insurance inclusion and for a case without these insurance payments lead toward similar results, for the ratio of change in effective rate to change in income are the results even identical. Neither changes in magnitudes of tax allowances nor their size had any essential influence on tax progressivity changes. Tax progressivity was affected - mainly in years 1993 - 1999, by average wage development. Later on - since 2000 - tax progressivity was determined chiefly by changes in a tax-legislation (indexing of tax brackets and tax rates in them). Effective tax rates compared with the ratios of interval progressivity imply that solitary growth of effective tax incidence had no fundamental influence on tax progressivity changes. Empirical computations verified that the index of tax incidence (effective tax rate) is static quantity on the other hand tax progressivity was investigated as a ,,stream" -quantity. This is one of the reasons why is not possible to replace these quantities. Probably there is no explicit relationship between them. In elected interval was remarked the most significant growth of tax progressivity for the interval I - 3 multiple of average wage, further for all types of tax-payers in income-. interval of 5 - 10 multiple of average wage. Tax burden had been rolling not only to high-income groups of tax-payers in these years but to those so-called,middle-class" as well. Values of effective taxation show continuous growth in years 1993 - 1999 which was caused by advance of an average wage. Lately in 2000 less tax incidence was succeeded however labour taxation in 2002 is still higher than in 1993. Though the changes in progressivity are probably not perceived by tax-payers, those can contribute to destimulation of working effort or to higher rate of substitution between work and leisure. Results of tax progressivity measuring should be counted at every decision-making in an event of tax legislation constitution. C1 Univ Brno, Ustav Ucetnictvi Dani, Mendelova Zemedelska Lesnicka, Brno 61300, Czech Republic. Ernst & Young, Prague 12000 2, Czech Republic. RP Siroky, J (corresponding author), Univ Brno, Ustav Ucetnictvi Dani, Mendelova Zemedelska Lesnicka, Zemedelska 1, Brno 61300, Czech Republic. EM jsiroky@mmo.cz RI Siroky, Jan/I-6346-2018 OI Siroky, Jan/0000-0001-9802-5801 CR CAMINADA K, 2001, PUBLIC FINANCE MANAG CREEDY J, 1994, TAXATION POVERTY INC JAHODA R, 2000, REDISTRIBUCNI FUNKCE KAKWANI N, 1976, EFFICIENT ESTIMATION KINKOR J, 1994, MERENI DANOVE PROGRE, V44 KROULIKOVA I, 2003, ANAL DANOVE PROGR KO KUBATOVA K, 2000, DANOVA TEORIE POLITI MIRRLEES JA, 1971, REV ECON STUD, P135 MUSGRAVE R, 1994, PREL V KAMENICKOVA A, pCH1 MUSGRAVE R, 1948, J POLITICAL EC, V56 Roemer JE, 1999, ECONOMETRICA, V67, P1, DOI 10.1111/1468-0262.00001 SCHNEIDER O, 2001, FIANCE UVER, V51 SIROKY J, 2003, DANOVE TEORIE PRAKTI SIROKY J, 2000, REDISTRIBUCNI FUNKCE SIROKY J, 2002, DANOVA HOSPODARSKA K, V10 SLEMROD J, 1994, TAX PROGR INCOME INE SLEMROD J, 2000, DOES GROWING INEQUAL THEIL H, 1979, MEASUREMENT INEQUALI TUOMALA M, 1990, OPTIMAL INCOME TAX R NR 19 TC 0 Z9 0 U1 0 U2 6 PU SLOVAK ACADEMIC PRESS LTD PI BRATISLAVA PA PO BOX 57 NAM SLOBODY 6, 810 05 BRATISLAVA, SLOVAKIA SN 0013-3035 J9 EKON CAS JI Ekon. Cas. PY 2003 VL 51 IS 8 BP 1011 EP 1035 PG 25 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 756JM UT WOS:000187462000007 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Sali, M Schneider, O Zapal, J AF Sali, M Schneider, O Zapal, J TI Labor and capital taxation: Theory and application in the Czech Republic SO FINANCE A UVER-CZECH JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS AND FINANCE LA Czech DT Article AB The paper deals with the theoretical and practical aspects of the taxation of labor and capital in the Czech Republic. The authors show that if the low flexibility of Czech labor is taken into account, progressive taxation could stimulate a higher supply of labor than would a linear tax. The paper then surveys arguments for and against capital tax and builds a tax incidence model inspired by the Harberger model. The authors demonstrate the theoretical possibilities of tax incidence and apply this to the Czech taxation system. The Czech system seems to tax capital more proportionally than labor, which, as the authors argue, reduces long-term capital accumulation by around 20 %: a substantial loss. The authors thus argue that an alternative tax system might stimulate higher economic growth. C1 FSV UK, Inst Ekon Studii, Prague, Czech Republic. RP Sali, M (corresponding author), FSV UK, Inst Ekon Studii, Prague, Czech Republic. EM martin.sali@seznam.cz; schneider@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz; zapal@mbox.fsv.cuni.cz RI Zapal, Jan/D-3390-2013 OI Zapal, Jan/0000-0002-5167-3788 CR AARON JH, 1981, TAXES AFFECT EC BEHA Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 Arrow K. 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Uver PY 2003 VL 53 IS 11-12 BP 539 EP 561 PG 23 WC Business, Finance SC Business & Economics GA 762VU UT WOS:000188003500004 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU Chae, S AF Chae, S TI Tax incidence with bargaining SO ECONOMICS LETTERS LA English DT Article DE tax incidence; bargaining; nash bargaining solution; bargaining power ID TAXATION; POWER AB The paper investigates tax incidence in a two-person bargaining model where one party is taxed. The condition under which the non-taxed party shares the burden of taxes (or benefit of subsidies) is characterized. Sufficient conditions for the tax burden to fall entirely on the taxed party are given. Also, a sufficient condition for the non-taxed party actually to benefit from taxation is given. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. C1 Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA. RP Chae, S (corresponding author), Rice Univ, Dept Econ, Houston, TX 77005 USA. CR AUMANN RJ, 1977, ECONOMETRICA, V45, P1137, DOI 10.2307/1914063 CHAE SC, 1999, UNPUB BARGAINING POW GOERKE L, 1998, B ECON RES, V50, P117 LOCKWOOD B, 1990, OXFORD ECON PAP, V42, P187, DOI 10.1093/oxfordjournals.oep.a041935 LOCKWOOD B, 1993, J PUBLIC ECON, V52, P1, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(93)90102-Y PEMBERTON J, 1992, ECON REC, V68, P318, DOI 10.1111/j.1475-4932.1992.tb01782.x SMITH E, 1994, J PUBLIC ECON, V54, P423, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(94)90044-2 NR 7 TC 4 Z9 4 U1 0 U2 5 PU ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA PI LAUSANNE PA PO BOX 564, 1001 LAUSANNE, SWITZERLAND SN 0165-1765 J9 ECON LETT JI Econ. Lett. PD OCT PY 2002 VL 77 IS 2 BP 199 EP 204 AR PII S0165-1765(02)00138-6 DI 10.1016/S0165-1765(02)00138-6 PG 6 WC Economics SC Business & Economics GA 605VQ UT WOS:000178698100008 DA 2021-01-05 ER PT J AU McCorriston, S AF McCorriston, S TI Why should imperfect competition matter to agricultural economists? SO EUROPEAN REVIEW OF AGRICULTURAL ECONOMICS LA English DT Article; Proceedings Paper CT 10th Congress of the European-Association-of-Agricultural-Economists CY AUG 28-31, 2002 CL ZARAGOZA, SPAIN SP European Assoc Agr Econ DE European food sector; imperfect competition; policy analysis ID MARKET POWER; SLOTTING ALLOWANCES; PRIVATE LABELS; TAX INCIDENCE; PRICES; TRANSMISSION; OLIGOPOLY AB In this paper it is argued that imperfect competition should be given more attention by agricultural economists as the characteristics of food markets in Europe (and elsewhere) suggest that these markets are more typically oligopolistic. Particularly important in this regard is the growing market power of food retailers in many European countries. The analysis of imperfect competition should not be confined to those solely interested in competition policy issues but should also be the concern of economists who undertake applied policy analysis more generally. C1 Univ Exeter, Sch Business & Econ, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England. RP McCorriston, S (corresponding author), Univ Exeter, Sch Business & Econ, Exeter EX4 4PU, Devon, England. EM S.McCorriston@exeter.ac.uk RI RASTOIN, Jean-Louis/F-3853-2011 CR Anderson SP, 2001, J PUBLIC ECON, V81, P173, DOI 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00079-7 Azzam AM, 1999, AM J AGR ECON, V81, P525, DOI 10.2307/1244012 BARNETT PG, 1995, J PUBLIC ECON, V57, P457, DOI 10.1016/0047-2727(95)80006-U BARSKY R, 2001, 8426 NBER BERRY S, 1995, ECONOMETRICA, V63, P841, DOI 10.2307/2171802 Berry S.,