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MASTER ERASMUS MUNDUS

«LATIN AMERICA AND EUROPE IN A GLOBAL WORLD» - LAGLOBE

TRABAJO DE FIN DE MÁSTER

The Governance of Cities: A Comparative Proposal.

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Salamanca, Mayo 2021



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Agradecimientos.

Si bien este TFM está escrito en la lengua utilizada por la mayor parte de la bibliografía y en la cual se realizó un artículo académico a partir de la misma investigación. Los agradecimientos serán, y deben ser, en castellano, en virtud de ser mi lengua materna como de la mayor parte de la gente aquí mencionada. De la forma más concisa posible, ya que esta parte se trata de un detalle simbólico dentro de este trabajo. Además, habiendo conocido tanta gente durante estos casi 2 años (a pesar del COVID-19), siempre está presente ese temor de dejar alguien fuera, a esas personas les pido disculpas además de agradecerles.

Me gustaría agradecer ante nada a mi familia: Florencia, Rosa, Alfonso, Emilia, Blanca y Adolfo. Que tanto han ayudado y aguantado, no solo durante 2 años sino décadas. Se llevaron la peor parte y la aceptaron con gratitud. Junto a mi familia directa vale la pena también agregar a Silvia, Esteban, Jorge, Anita, Carlos, Marta y Alberto, quienes siempre, también durante décadas siempre preguntaron algo tan básico, pero tan importante y a veces perdido en el dinámico mundo actual: “¿Cómo andas?”

Por supuesto no puede faltar la mención más importante con relación a este TFM. A quienes más han leído y escuchado sobre instituciones, gobernanza y mis planes. María de los Ángeles Huete, “Marian”, que con total gentileza leyó parte de mi TFG siendo docente de un PEA, y desde ese momento me incentivó, orientó y ayudó en este proceso. Siempre aportando, de una manera increíble a pesar de estar en cientos de asuntos. Con una capacidad de incondicionalidad que me asombra. A Francisco Sánchez, co-tutor, un estratega nato, su constante desafío me sirvió para mejorar mi trabajo. Todo esto hecho también de forma constructiva, constantemente aportando. Finalmente, a Antonio Cardarello siempre dispuesto a aclarar dudas y dar consejos, nuevamente desde esa virtud tan linda que es la incondicionalidad. De más está decir que los errores y omisiones corren por cuenta del autor, que bastante les pidió y repreguntó.

Pero tampoco puedo dejar de hacer mención general al Instituto de Iberoamérica donde pasé 2 semestres y me han tratado genial. Sin ánimo de ofender ni olvidar a nadie, ya que como digo mi experiencia aquí ha sido muy buena. Pero hay tres de sus miembros que debo nombrar, porque bastante me “aguataron”: Guillermo Mira con charlas y propuestas, un fuera de serie. Luego Tomás Manzano y Héctor Sevillano a quienes como dicen aca “les he dado guerra”.

De mi anterior casa de estudios, la Facultad de Ciencias Sociales de la querida UDELAR, donde empecé a “querer” hacer esto. Un ambiente tanto duro como amigable, que en mi opinión, habiendo visitado ya 6 universidades, no tiene similar. También tengo agradecimientos que extender, ya que hemos mantenido un cierto vínculo y varios docentes me han ayudado u ofrecido su ayuda en estos dos años. Sin ningún orden en particular: Antonio Cardarello, Lucía Selios, Camilo López, Wilson Fernandez y Diego Luján.

A su vez, quiero extender otro saludo a todos mis compañeros del máster, es un grupo increíble que no me esperaba para nada. Específicamente, voy a nombrar a quienes han estado presentes estos últimos meses durante la elaboración de este TFM y durante un confinamiento en París. También “haciendo el aguante”: Sarah con quien empezamos el proceso de TFM en París; Bram y “el” Edu con quienes compartimos mucho más que un último semestre, Yoseph, , Orane & Mathieu y Fabi.

En cuanto a amigos, no puedo olvidarme de mis amigos de toda la vida, previos a esta jornada en Europa. Aquí si no puedo ir uno a uno, por suerte el espacio no me lo permite, y eso es una buena señal. Amigos, algunos que me acompañan desde los 6 años, y también les toca la parte más fea de tener que “pausar” un contacto, más con la situación que hemos venido viviendo desde el año pasado. A ellos, sepan que no extraño nada más que verlos ocasionalmente en el club o en la calle. Esas pequeñas cosas, que no se valoran hasta que no se pueden hacer más.

Abstract

The aim of this monograph is to revisit the importance of institutions, particularly the relationship between the adopted institutional arrangement and local governance. Specifically, an arrangement considered crucial: the form of government. This work analyses the relationship between the form of government and local governance, by focusing on a specific public policy: the urban agenda. To that end, an original analytic framework will be proposed, alongside an original measurement proposal. This framework will subsequently be tested in a comparative analysis of four different urban agendas, elaborated by four different municipalities.

This monograph intends to contribute to the literature as it combines the consolidated theoretical tradition of institutionalism, with the relevance of governance studies and the novelty of the urban agenda research.

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo de fin de máster (TFM) es revalorizar la importancia del análisis institucionalista. Específicamente la relación entre un determinado arreglo institucional y la gobernanza a nivel local (municipal), en este caso enfocándose en un arreglo institucional primordial: la forma de gobierno. El análisis propuesto entre la forma de gobierno y la gobernanza a nivel local se realizará enfocándose en una política pública en específico: la agenda urbana. Para lograrlo, se propone un marco analítico original, que incluye una propuesta de medición también original. A su vez, su utilidad será comprobada a través del análisis comparado de cuatro agendas urbanas realizadas en cuatro ciudades distintas.

Este TFM busca contribuir a la literatura al combinar los aportes de una escuela teórica consolidada como el institucionalismo, con la relevancia actual que tienen los estudios sobre la gobernanza. Sumado al análisis práctico de un instrumento innovador como lo es la agenda urbana.

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Abbreviations List

Avanza Sevilla: AS

Business Actor: B

Chief Economic Officer: CEO

Civil Society Actor: CS

European Union: EU

First Past the Post: FPTP
Form of Government: FGvt
Frente Amplio: FA
Government: gvt
Hypothesis: H
International City Manager Association: ICMA
Moderate Party: M
New Public Management: NPM
Partido Independiente: PI
Partido Popular: PP
Partido Nacional: PN
Partido Socialista Obrero Español: PSOE
Proportional Representation: PR
Social Democrats: S
Sustainable Development Goals SDGs
United Nations: UN
United States: US
Urban Agenda: UA

1. Introduction.

In a well-known article, Terry Moe referred to institutions as “the neglected side of the story”, because of their far reaching and long-lasting impact being sometimes underestimated (1990,214). The current work considers that this “neglect” seems to persist regarding local government studies, particularly concerning local governance. This work is interested in the comparative analysis of these effects, this is, the differences product of the adoption of different institutional arrangements. Especially, a preeminent arrangement: the form of government (FGvt). It all started during the literature review, when this neglect concerning the FGvt at the subnational level was noticed. Most work on the subject is dedicated to the national level, chiefly concerning the now classical (and unfinished), presidentialism-vs.-parliamentarism debate. Nonetheless, the matter is practically inexistent at the local level, with the important exception of the book that inspired this work: Mouritzen and Svava’s *Leadership at the Apex* (2002). The aim of this work is to “bring institutions back in”, and to revisit their importance concerning local governance, and local government politics. The specific goal is to contribute to the study of the effects that the institutional arrangements have on local governance. Which, paraphrasing Moe, appears to be “the neglected side of the story”, even considering that institutional design is a decisive structural choice with long lasting repercussions (Moe and Caldwell 1994; Tsebelis 1995; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).

Additionally, the interest is comparative, thus the plan for a comparative study of local governments, which is not only relevant academically but politically, as more and more countries have newly established local governments (Subirats et al. 2016). Particularly, in Latin America, where most countries of the region have formally established the municipal level of government, or its direct election from the late 1980s¹ (Cardarello 2010). Furthermore, this work is attentive to the trending matter of governance, as the study of local governance is growing, however also neglecting the FGvt institutional arrangement as determinant. Very related to local governance studies, and its issues, is urbanization. Once again, a pressing matter specifically for Latin America, a region where 80% of its population now resides in cities (CEPAL, 2018). Thus, increasing the current knowledge about “how cities work” and how they are governed is considered very relevant.

This work also intends to bring institutionalist analysis back into governance studies, as the next section even intends to create a working definition of governance that cannot be

¹ The main exception being Mexico, that established directly elected local governments in 1917.

completely separated from the institutional design. The framework examines the proposed relationship, by analyzing a specific public policy: the Urban Agenda (UA). A novel, but increasingly important policy instrument, that has not been reached yet by the institutionalist analysis. It is estimated that the current analysis will be fruitful, contemplating it combines the consolidated theoretical tradition of institutionalism, with the relevance of governance studies and the novelty of the urban agenda research. The question guiding the investigation is direct and unambiguous:

How does the local form of government affect the governance of the urban agenda?

This appears to be a pertinent question, concerning both the study of governance and of the UA. Considering that sub-disciplines, such as urban studies, have advanced considerably in the explanation of the composition, elaboration, and the objectives of the UA, yet we do not know much about its political determinants. In turn, urbanization is mainly a municipal (city) issue (UN 2014; CEPAL 2018; Huete and Merinero 2021). The proposed analytical framework aims to contribute to this understanding, by considering the FGvt, a paramount institutional arrangement, as the independent variable, that is expected to determine the opportunities for a certain governance to materialize instead of another. Which will be empirically tested by applying an original synthetic indicator created for this work: the governance *amplitude* indicator. This indicator has as its main aspiration to be able to measure such an elusive, but popular, concept. This novel measurement will be subsequently tried in four practical case studies, analyzing four different UA, elaborated within four different institutional settings.

This monograph is structured as follows, first a literature review will advance the main concepts to be developed by the current proposal, with the additional feature that during this review the main concepts will be built, as the work's posture discusses with the previous literature, not simply exposing it. Next, the analytical framework will be outlined, specifying how the concepts are to be operationalized, their relationship and their measurement. This is the central part of the monograph and is expected to represent its main contribution. Then the coming section is devoted to further detail on the measurement of the analytical framework, and the presentation of the empirical cases. Section five, is devoted to the analysis of these cases, ending with a discussion of the empirical reach of the framework. Finally, ending with a brief conclusion on the matter.

2. Literature Review.

This section will follow a standard structure, starting with the independent variable, then moving to governance, our dependent variable, later the unit of analysis and observation: the urban agenda (UA), but finishing with a subsection mostly concerned with public administration and its intersection with political science. The inclusion of this review of “the politics vs. administration divide” contributes to better apprehending the importance of the form of government (FGvt) with respect to local politics, even if it is, as remarked, often neglected. This section is envisaged to be more interactive than a conventional exposition of important concepts, for working definitions and explicative relationships will be built from these concepts.

A universal working definition of the concept of *institution* does not exist. Nevertheless, most scholars use similar definitions and seem to have reached a common understanding. Making it much easier to provide one for this work; there are however within institutionalist theory different approaches or *institutionalisms* (Hall and Taylor 1996). Here, this is not a problem but an advantage as this analysis will build on contributions from all of them, although with an inclination towards rational-choice institutionalism. Probably the most widespread definition of what institutions are comes from North; he presents them as “the rules of the game in a society”, consequently, as “the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (1990,3). Thus, this definition also features the main function of institutions: *they structure human exchange*.

A second feature of institutions, conceived as a collection of rules, is that they prescribe behavior, inducing -through incentives- actors to conform with some values and actions while constraining others (Shepsle 1983; March and Olsen 2009). Additionally, these rules happen to be very resilient, in the words of Shepsle “it is the institutions that persist and provide the script for political processes” (2009,24) Thus, beyond resilient, rational-choice theorists see them as *scripts*, we find this conceptualization insightful, as it refers to their rulemaking dimension *influencing* human interaction, hence institutions shape interdependent relationships (Ostrom 1986,5; Shepsle 2019,1). Thus, seen as a frame that constraints actors to *structure allowable* actions, permitting certain outcomes while proscribing others, this is referred, by rational-choice institutionalists, as a *structure induced equilibrium* (Shepsle 1983).

Considering that this proposal analyzes governance, we are attentive to the role of institutions concerning interdependent relationships. Institutions will then mediate these

interdependent relationships by conditioning the behavior, or strategy as referred by Shepsle, of actors. It inevitably brings us back to North's classical definition, "the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction". Both Ostrom and Shepsle further specify this process with useful examples. Theoretically, Ostrom describes this rule structure through 6 different types of rules, some of them essential for the proposed framework's logic:

"Position rules that specify the set of positions and the positions to be held by participants. Boundary rules that specify how participants are chosen. Scope rules that specify the set of outcomes that participants jointly affect through their actions. Authority rules that specify the set of actions assigned to a position at a particular node. Aggregation rules that specify the decision functions to be used at a particular node to map action into intermediate or final outcomes. Information rules that specify the channels of communication among participants" (1986,17 emphasis added).

From Shepsle's work we adopt the argument that institutions constrain not only potential alternatives but "the set of choosing agents" (1983,2). Thus, institutional arrangements influence outcomes mainly by vetoing or blocking some possibilities but concerning this work the most important feature is the arrangement's influence on participation. As indicated, institutions determine "the set of choosing agents", in short: *who participates*.

Other *institutionalisms* give less emphasis to script-like rules and focus more on power struggles at the genesis of an institution, and its inherent *path-dependency* (Steinmo et al., 1992; Pierson 2000). Which is also relevant for the analysis of the governance of policymaking, as institutions resiliency reproduces asymmetries of power, and path-dependency involves the persistence of choices (and its consequences). Moreover, concerning power struggles, Moe remarks that there are winners and losers resulting from the institutional design, even if institutions are created to allow cooperation, particularly political cooperation (1990, 213-14). While North marks that institutions determine the costs of acting in both the political and economic context alike (1990,4). This dispute over the institutional design is summarized as the politics of the *structural choice* (Moe and Caldwell 1994).

Along these lines, the study of institutions by political scientists mainly concentrates on three interrelated questions, a normatively dominant strand addresses the question: "Which institutions are best suited for creating good government?" While the more empirical approaches focus on the variation of institutional arrangements comparatively and their effects: "what difference does it make?" (Rothstein 1996). This work is located in the latter, for this institutionalist analysis will investigate the relationship between institutional

arrangements and a specific outcome: local governance. Tsebelis provides us with a notable summary of why institutions matter:

“Since institutions determine the choices of actors, the sequence of moves, as well as the information they control, different institutional structures will produce different strategies of the actors, and different outcomes of their interactions” (1999,4).

Even if this approach is emblematic of rational-choice institutionalism, particularly related to the functioning of legislatures, all the indicated stages are also crucial in the governance/governing process. Concerning this monograph’s proposal, the selection of the participating actors: *who participates* is conceived as the elemental institutional determinant. In sum, it is necessary to emphasize that institutions are to be seen as the architecture of a political structure, therefore they determine not only opportunities *but also the inclusion and exclusion of potential players* (Shepsle 1983; Ostrom 1986; Rhodes et al. 2009). Different institutional arrangements will expand the set of participants, while others are expected to reduce it (Clingermyer and Feiock 2001,5). Hence, if institutions determine the inclusion and exclusion of certain actors, then they are decisive concerning participation, and as will follow, participation is the key component to governance.

The selected institutional arrangement is the form of government (FGvt), because this arrangement addresses two of the main questions on political institutions: “Who has the power to decide?” and “What rules and procedures will be followed?” (Mouritzen and Svava 2002,2). Therefore, it is a fundamental institution, when adhering to the *rules of the game* conceptualization. Mouritzen and Svava define the FGvt as “*the formal rules that affect the way power is gained, maintained, expanded and shared*” (p.5).

The contribution of these authors goes beyond defining, for they also present an ideal-type typology of the different FGvt at the local level. Moreover, despite this typology being made for the analysis of solely Western Industrialized countries, it is found useful for the analysis of Latin America. According to these authors the local FGvt may be described by its proximity to the following pure types (2002,15):

(1) *The strong mayor form*, based on an elective executive as the central figure of the government. We may add that in their classification, the authors do not differentiate whether the mayor is directly or indirectly elected², even if this will certainly determine how strong it is. In turn,

²An indirectly elected mayor is elected by the council. In Europe this is the most frequent. However, in Latin America the most frequent is for the mayor to be either directly elected or even appointed by the national government. For a comprehensive account see Molina & Hernández (1995), Cardarello (2010).

this depends not only on the FGvt but on the electoral result: if the mayor controls owns a majority of the city council. Additionally, in a polity where parties are strong, the party plays a central role (Chasquetti & Micozzi, 2014).

Examples: Spain, France, Argentina, Brazil (most of Latin America).

(2) *The committee-leader form*, based on the shared executive power between a unipersonal political leader and different standing committees. These committees are also composed of elected politicians, as the city councilmembers elect both the leader and the composition of the committees, mostly by proportional representation (PR). Thus, the power distribution varies from case to case along this ideal-type continuum, for instance the Swedish case stresses a consensual style of decision making and broad involvement by creating several committees (Mouritzen and Svava 2002,61).

We may add that this FGvt presents similarities to the parliamentary form, despite not being a kind of local government parliamentarism. For instance, there is no cabinet and premier but a structure of a weak premier and multiple policy committees that share the executive power.

Examples: Sweden, Denmark, Norway, part of Finland.

(3) *The Collegial form*, based on a collective executive power (instead of unipersonal). Thus, a shared body, with the possibility of being composed by one or more parties, is the main actor and has the executive functions. However, one of the elected politicians presides the body and it might be called the mayor. We add an important feature of this FGvt that should not be overlooked: there is no city council as a different branch of government (legislative). Thus, the executive and legislative functions are merged.

Examples: Uruguay, Belgium, Netherlands³.

(4) *The Council-Manager form*, based on a directly elected city council that is led by a non-executive mayor and an appointed manager, the latter possessing the executive power. Thus, the executive functions are in the hands of a professional administrator instead of a politician. This FGvt emphasizes professionalism over political leadership (Mouritzen and Svava 2002,56; Rosanvallon 2015,115). Nevertheless, policy orientation is expected to come from the politically elected council as they appoint the manager and might discharge her/him

³ The Uruguay case appears to be the closest to a pure case among these examples. For instance, the Netherlands collegial body has an appointed mayor (Mouritzen and Svava 2002,62), working like a strong mayor form. Curiously, Switzerland municipalities do not possess a collegial FGvt.

accordingly. The figure of the mayor exists⁴ but is merely symbolic. A curious feature of the council-manager system is that the mayor forms part of the legislative instead of the executive.

Even if this form of government was meant to bar “politics” (Rosanvallon 2015,115), we argue that it does not escape the structural-politics scenario, the professional emphasis is just a manifestation of the structure. Moreover, this form has grown more political as several cities cradle of this system (the US), have abandoned this arrangement (Rosanvallon 2015).

Examples: United States (US), Australia, New Zealand.

Advancing to our other main concept: governance. To elaborate a working definition of the concept of governance comes as a daunting task, considering how popular its use has become in the last 20 years, in a wide variety of fields and disciplines (Levi-Faur 2012; Subirats et al. 2016). Specifically, there is no universally accepted definition of governance, not even a majoritarian one, leading to an overabundance of uses (Jordan et al. 2005). Hence, this concept is prone, following Sartori’s term, to *conceptual stretching*. Thus, some delimitation among the plethora of definitions will be the first task at hand, attempting to provide the reader with a working definition of governance through a summary of the existing literature. As a starting point, a useful observation to understand the governance process is not to focus on *what* the State does but on *how it does it* (Jordan et al. 2005, 479). Following Rhodes (1996) traditional definition: governance refers to the methods by which society is governed. Then the essence of the concept refers to the organization of government to produce public policies, or in short: governing; that is *how* policies are produced.

The term’s etymology provides an intuitive preview of what is understood by governance concerning the policymaking process (or government). The origins of the term come from the Greek “kybernan”, the action to steer, then translated to latin as “gubernare” (Levi-Faur 2012,i). Interestingly, the relationship with steering prevailed into the 20th century, for example in post-war Germany governance was conceived as the steering capacity of governments that “aspired explicitly to steer their nations’ social and economic development in the direction of defined goals” (Mayntz 1998,9). For others, steering implies orientation more than the whole task of achieving a determined goal, which the new public management jargon mentioned as *rowing* (Peters & Pierre 2005). More recent attempts to analyze governance have had this common focus on the policymaking capacity of governments, with

⁴ And it can also be either directly or indirectly elected, however in this case, this is not relevant.

the addition of the increasing importance of networks (Peters & Pierre 1998; Rhodes 2007; Kooiman 2003; Torfing 2012). Therefore, for this literature even if the State continues to hold the role of policymaker, the *how* has changed with the increasing importance of networks (Kooiman 2003; Rhodes 2007; Blanco et al 2011).

Then this definition also implies change, due to the increasing role of networks in this process (Torfing 2012). This increasing role relates to the limits (or failure) of the previous models of governance: the traditional *top-down hierarchical* model, or “command and control”, and the neoliberal ideal of introducing a *market-like logic* to public policy making (Peters & Pierre 2005; Torfing 2012). Nevertheless, this does not mean that the traditional command and control policies or the market have been replaced, as the literature indicates network governance, despite its competition with State action also supplements it, consequently governance is a product of a combinations of hierarchies, markets, and networks (Kooiman 2003; Peters & Pierre 2005; Torfing 2012).

Briefly, the need for these networks comes from the realization that no single actor has the capacity, that is knowledge and resources, for single-handedly governing modern societies (Kooiman 2003; Rhodes 2007). Authors debate on whether this comes from a lack of information, resources or even legitimacy but there is a common interpretation for the need of cooperation and partnerships between public and non-public actors (Papadopoulos 2007). Hence, the main features of governance are interdependence, diversity, and cooperation; as it represents the interactions of members of a network that share resources to achieve common purposes (Kooiman 2003). That is why governance is equated by some authors as network or relational government (Subirats et al 2016) or as interactive government (Kooiman 2003).

Taking the aforementioned into account, a concise working definition can be sketched: *governance as policymaking through interdependent networks of public and non-public⁵ actors*. Succinctly, a non-hierarchical and collaborative method for governing. Likewise, it can be conceived as the procedural dimension of policymaking.

Attention needs to be paid to the case that with respect to policy making governance refers to both a process and a structure (Mayntz 1998; Levi-Faur 2012). While, as a structure, governance takes into account the arrangement of formal and informal institutions created for policy making; as a process it means the already mentioned steering functions involved

⁵ Non-public can itself be decomposed by differentiating business and civil society actors.

in the processes of policymaking (Levi-Faur 2012, 8). Another finding of this literature review worth commenting, is that governance's primary interest lies in outputs, understood as the results or performance of the policy process (Peters & Pierre 1998,230). Hence it can be said that governance theory and its analysis focus on *output-legitimacy*, risking losing sight of the importance of *input legitimacy*, as will be discussed in the next subsection. This is best captured but what this work names as the *prescriptive side of governance*, the term popularly known as "good governance". The idea of good governance abandons positive analysis to become a prescription or normative objective of policy making, again centered on outputs, it teleologically relates to everything that is desired by society. As explained by Grindle, she warns of the "inflation" and "seduction" of the concept, particularly for it is very related to development assistance and the policy prescriptions for developing countries (2010,3).

Additionally, local governance, relevant by virtue of it being our level of analysis, has been related to the processes by which local governments search for the collaboration of public and private interests (Pierre 1999,374). Then, it is in line with our previous definition, which was expected because the same difficulty arises at the local level: governing is also a task too overwhelming to be single-handedly done by the State (Pierre 1999; Stoker 2009). Concerning the local governance process, we expect institutions to play a major role in the formation of these networks, chiefly because institutional arrangements influence *who is allowed* to partake in the network.

Direct antecedent works investigating the institutions-governance relationship are Huete (2010) analysis on Local Government–Business cooperation, for she operationalizes governance as this kind of cooperation. Following a similar explicative direction: the institutional design, comprised by the form of government among others, as the determinant of the existence of government-business cooperation. Gash and Ansell (2008) also embarked in this endeavor presenting a theoretical collaborative governance model. These authors also identified institutional design as a critical variable that will influence whether this mode of governance will produce successful collaboration or not(p. 544). An important conclusion of their work is that the institutional design affects the inclusion and exclusion of different actors in the collaborative governance (p. 550). These works would be the some of the antecedents, alongside Mouritzen and Svava (2002), yet although relevant none of them focuses on the effects of a specific institutional arrangement, governance, and a specific public policy. Here we will attempt to apprehend the influence of the FGvt concerning the governance process by focusing on a specific public policy.

Consequently, it was necessary to select a policy that adopts the governance process for policymaking. Thus, we selected the urban agenda (UA), considering it to be the archetypical governance policy.

The beginning of the 21st century has been characterized by a renewed interest in city-specific policies (yet not city politics), both at the international and national levels (Armondi & Hurtado, 2020). The UN-HABITAT report (2014) defines an urban policy as a “set of coherent decisions, derived from a deliberative process of coordination and bringing together various actors towards a common vision and objectives, which is to promote long-term, more transformative, inclusive and resilient urban development”. In coherence with this definition, public administrations at different levels of government have tried to respond not only to this renewed interest in cities, but, above all, to this new way of understanding the “urban issue” in terms of public policy. This has materialized in concrete instruments such as the urban agendas (Huete and Merinero 2021,3).

The UA is a planification policy encompassing medium to long-term planning with the aim of promoting urban development (Huete et al. 2016). Once again despite its label “urban”, it is not exclusive of the local level, as national governments⁶, and even supranational bodies⁷ have elaborated their UA before their subnational counterparts (Huete and Merinero 2021). However, in essence it is better suited for the local level as it deals primarily with urban issues. The UA comprises both a substantive (*what to do*) and procedural (*how it is managed*) dimension (Huete and Merinero 2021,63). Accordingly, its main features are being an integral (holistic) approach because urban society is a complex phenomenon, hence recognizing its multidimensional nature; as well as territorialized in its aim to adapt its content to the specific urban reality; strategic, due to its multilevel nature; and participative. In consequence, it aims at and needs the participation of the different societal actors to fulfil its holistic, territorialized, and strategic approach (Huete and Merinero 2020; Huete and Merinero 2021,34).

Finally, the literature review helped notice that urban studies have advanced considerably in the explanation of the composition, elaboration (good practices) and the objectives of the UA, yet we do not know much about the political determinants of the UA and its institutional features. It is our objective to expand the understanding of the effects of political institutions on this policy, by examining another novel subject: the governance of the UA at the local

⁶ In response to the United Nations New Urban Agenda initiative.

⁷ The European Union pioneered in the matter (European Commission, 2016).

level. But prior to presenting and explaining the proposed analytical framework, further review is useful, this time relating to public administration. Contemplating that when discussing the concept of governance, and its emergence in both the social sciences and the political landscape, one must consider its connection with public administration. Particularly, as suggested, concerning *how the State works* over *what it does*. Throughout the last century this matter was never agreed upon, instead it has been disputed and debated.

2.1 Administration vs politics: the other “difficult combination” and the origins of the council-manager form of government.

This sub-section, whose title is inspired from Mainwaring’s influential article⁸ despite being unrelated, will focus on the “politics vs administration divide”. Reviewing it, will help not only better apprehend the relationship between the aforementioned main concepts but also manifest the role the FGvt plays in local government, politics and public administration. For, the manager FGvt was born in midst of this divide. Finally, another reason for adding this debate is its connection to the local government level, for both the US progressive reform movement and the original new public management (NPM) discourse focused primarily on the local level (Osborne 1993,349, Rosanvallon 2011,47-48).

This debate, despite what some of the main NPM proponents might claim, is very related to democratic theory. However due to space constraints this will be summarized as much as possible, yet this link must be kept in mind. The debate does not originate over a dispute related to where power comes from, as explained by Rosanvallon (2011), the anointment by the people of those who govern is one of the few existent consensuses. However how the State should act, and its organization, is a different story. Moreover, any of the possible alternatives (paths) depends on institutional choices, and this was precisely in the minds of the early 20th century reformers. As will be presented, this debate did not end with these early reforms but resurged even stronger in the 80s under the banner of “New Public Management”.

2.1.1 The argument for bureaucratic power and the origins of the manager.

The question on how the State should be organized and function, originates alongside modern representative democracy (Rosanvallon 2011). Even if the cornerstone of democracy

⁸ “Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination” (1993).

is the sovereignty of the citizenry, hence all of government bodies derive from, and are responsible to, the people, someone must implement the decisions. The legislators of the first representative democracies thought that the “government chosen by the people at the polls was supposed to implement the decisions of the voters, and the bureaucracy was merely an arm of the elected government. In this context, the phrase bureaucratic power had no meaning, unless it was to suggest a culpable usurpation of power” (p.33). The author cites the example of the “Jacksonian” spoils system⁹ in the US, however even if at the birth of modern representative democracy opinion was in favor of what could be conceived as *integral political power*, the matter will rapidly change, and the case for bureaucratic power, in the form of a professional civil service bureaucracy will appear and rapidly triumph (Svara 1998, Rosanvallon 2011,2015).

Professionalism, will soon be another source of legitimacy, complementing (and competing) with the ballot box: “the legitimacy of generality” (Rosanvallon 2011), following Weber’s seminal account of the professional bureaucracy. Another advocate for professionalism was the British thinker Burke. Earlier than Weber, he argued that “Government and Legislation are matters of reason and judgement, and not of inclination” (1794). Nonetheless, he was not referring to an administrative power, but was closer to an aristocratic plea concerning the nature of the legislators. Regardless of who was the precursor of the debate, what is certain is that the “politics vs administration” divide is long-lasting¹⁰. Also, in contend is the spatial origin of the idea of bureaucratic power, and although recognizing the relevance of this idea in Prussia (Wilson 1897, Rosanvallon 2011) our focus will be in the US, because there it had substantial impact, leading to a complete overhaul of the State.

The so-called “progressive movement”, spearheaded by W. Wilson¹¹ and other prominent academics and politicians, aimed at “Reinventing the State”. The proposal was not academic or idealistic, it had its roots in the growth of the modern State and the acknowledgment of corruption in the political sphere¹² (Svara 1998, Rosanvallon 2011,36). Alongside this movement, public administration was also emerging as an academic discipline. “It is clearing the moral atmosphere of official life by establishing the sanctity of public office as a public

⁹ The spoils-system was the pejorative term used for the fact that the party that won the presidency appointed the whole federal bureaucracy (see Weber’s seminal account ([1921]1991 or Rosanvallon 2011).

¹⁰ Moreover, its origins can be traced back to Greek democracy, to the works of Plato (The Republic), however due to space constraints this interesting subject must be concisely presented and in relation with the manager FGvt.

¹¹ Prior to his successful political career, Wilson was a political science professor and president of Princeton University.

¹² The so-called “Machine politics”.

trust, and, by making the service unpartisan, it is opening the way for making it businesslike namely, that administration lies outside the proper sphere of politics” asserted Wilson (1887,210). Not far, was another prominent progressive, Goodnow (1900) claiming that “all governmental activities can be classified as either "politics" or "administration," and that each should be assigned to separate agencies.”. Both were motivated not by efficient calculation but by their rejection of corruption, attributed to the primacy of politics over administration (Rosanvallon 2015,118).

And reinvent they did, which brings us back to the main focus of this work: Institutions. The progressive movement’s advocacy was not mere discourse, as it led to an overhaul of the US State. This reform, their triumph over politics was institutionalized, leading to the birth of the council-manager FGvt, among other reforms. In line, with the previous arguments, the reformers found the necessity of new arrangements (the politics of structural choice), leading to a new FGvt. Hence, in the early 20th century US, the figure of the manager emerged: a professional in charge of government. Other prominent reforms also limited the influence of politics: the introduction of primaries, the nonpartisan ballot, and the introduction of direct democracy prerogatives: the local recall and referendum (Rosanvallon 2011,37). The politics/administration dichotomy is summed up as follows:

“* The city council does not get involved in administration.

* The city manager is not involved in shaping policies.

*The manager occupies the role of a neutral expert who efficiently and effectively carries out the policies of the council” (Svara, 1998,52)

Nonetheless, another dichotomy is thus displayed, the opposition between input-legitimacy and output-legitimacy, as the barring of politics is equated with efficiency. A more efficient and effective government will be legitimate for its results (outputs) (Rosanvallon 2011,8). As the reader might anticipate, this conception is vulnerable to problems concerning accountability and responsiveness, which will be addressed at the end of this section.

2.1.2 The revival of the debate: enter New Public Management.

The divide or dichotomy was not settled at the beginning of the last century. The divide took an important hold in the 20s but was substantially relaxed and even reversed in the post-war years (Svara 1998). However, a new line of State reform thought took up the divide and further pressed for the banishment of politics: enter NPM. As will be presented, NPM did press for the banishment of politics, unlike the progressives. The main proposals and features

of NPM will be succinctly presented, with objective of indicating that the tension politics/administration was not settled and to distinguish NPM from governance.

Rosanvallon for his part links the rise of NPM to a crisis of legitimacy of both elected and bureaucratic authorities (2011,66), however he adds a sociological factor product of the massification of education: “educated citizens in developed societies no longer accept the idea that civil servants embody a superior type of rationality [...] Hence the bureaucracy no longer has either the moral legitimacy” (2011,67). Others argue political and economic reasons, chiefly the budget crisis of the welfare state and the loss of political support (Rosenbloom 1993, Osborne 1993, Ramió 2001).

Proponents employed arguments that were not that distant from the preceding debate, one of its main advocates Osborne, co-author of “Reinventing the State”, referred to politics as “out of control...again”. Nevertheless, NPM, unlike the progressive movement or Prussian elites, idealized the market as the alternative. This is key, citizens will be equalized to customers; bureaucracies with companies, in the effort of assimilating the State to the market (Osborne 1993, Ramió 2001). Their main critic rested on the public bureaucracy and its top-down, one size fits-all logic (Osborne 1993,350). They devised the entrepreneurial through choice (1993,351). The principles of NPM can be summed up by Osborne & Gaebler’s famous catchphrase: “governments should steer rather than row”. NPM main features are the entrepreneurial state, the state as a provider that “sell” services in competition with other public bodies and the market; adopting the logic of the private sector; the citizen as a customer, who has the power to choose within a provider-customer relationship (Ramió 2001,3).

In sum, a result-oriented government, thus fully reliant on output-legitimacy. Consequently, in the context of the NPM’s ideal market ambience: Input-legitimacy was “shelved”¹³.

2.1.3 The case for politics: accountability & democracy

Nevertheless, input-legitimacy is important in a democratic regime, despite NPM’s banalization of democracy and politics. For NPM democracy equals choice and is brought by the market. Hence, the political regime is either unimportant or secondary as long as it is efficient and entrepreneurial¹⁴, all nations can implement NPM. This leads to the anticipated

¹³ Shelved is slang for articles that are not desired in stores.

¹⁴ International assessments of Hong Kong, Singapur and even China are good topics for this debate concerning democracy and efficiency.

discussion about accountability and responsiveness, and in the end: political theory, thus this section ends with the “case for politics”.

Are we guided just by results? Political theory tells a different story, even public choice, that is sometimes disregarded as pure rational choice. Inputs, despite ignored, matter for they are precisely one of the pillars of a democratic regime. Following Schmitter & Karl, a democracy is after all a procedure “for organizing relations between rulers and the ruled.” (1991,76). Additionally, they add this system has its (and definitory) rules or procedures, that they have to be institutionalized for democratic patterns must be known and practiced (1991,76). No matter how cumbersome NPM might find them, they cannot be discretionary or depend just on the qualifications of the leaders, rules are important, no matter how cumbersome. The elemental concept here is accountability, as the authors state:

“Like all regimes, democracies depend upon the presence of rulers, persons who occupy specialized authority roles and can give legitimate commands to others. What distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions” (Schmitter & Karl, 1991,76)

Accordingly, the key feature of a democracy are citizens, for any regime will have some ruling and most ruled, but democracies have citizens, not clients. Again, any regime can have clients, as long as the market exists, moreover currently some sort of market economy covers most of the planet. Another related elemental feature of democracy is the existence of representatives, whether they are professionals, managers or politicians, what makes it democratic is that they are accountable (1991,80). Thus, output-legitimacy is not enough, accountability and responsiveness are necessary, at least if a democratic regime is envisaged. Additionally, a democratic regime is expected to better perform because it is accountable and responsive (Przeworski et al 1999, Besley 2006).

For public choice theory, accountability mechanisms are crucial, elections being chief among them, for they help selecting, monitoring, and sanctioning of those in charge (Besley 2006,99). Democracy, through its many procedures (among them elections), promotes not only accountability but also responsiveness. This is: “A government is “responsive” if it adopts policies that are signaled as preferred by citizens” (Przeworski et al 1999,9). These are inputs, rules and regulations that matter in a democracy. They cannot be substituted by market principles, and as will be presented NPM principles are vulnerable when concerning them. To begin with, the rationality of managers or entrepreneurs has to be examined, following Simon’s seminal work on behavior, we as humans can at most aim for a bounded

rationality. Then perceptions, convictions, values, and limited ability concerning knowledge affect everyone, including professionals. But most importantly, now concerning just NPM, the “cure might be worse than the disease”, particularly for not so developed governments: “the flexibility that New Public Management brings and that allows, at a theoretical level, to configure a post-bureaucratic management model but that, in some occasions, can derive in pre-bureaucratic system.” (Ramió 2001,4).

Additionally, public services provided by private organizations may generate inequality by increasing the asymmetrical access of different citizens; accountability is blurred because politicians are in charge but do not control implementation; means are confused with ends, as indicators and modernizing actions are considered as ends in themselves (Ramió 2001, Pierre 2009). In sum accountability and responsiveness might be endangered as clients are not the same as citizens, just like the market is not the same as the State. Increasing inequality, in a non-accountability context could endanger the regime.

This is Svara’s main argument against the dichotomy- aberration in his words- the fact that is inexistent: politics and administration complement each other (1998,57). Precisely this is the strength, not weakness, of the manager FGvt according to this author: that it is able to combine “both worlds”. The other alternative of just responsibility, whether by professional administrators or market managers, is very similar to the plain “responsible government”, more associated with an aristocracy than democracy (Sartori 2016,18).

3. Analytical Framework Proposal.

The proposed framework rests on the procedural dimension of the UA. As these instruments aim to create integrated, territorialized, and strategic planning strategies, they must rely upon collaboration between a plurality of actors. Therefore, an UA implies the need for networks between public, private, and societal actors (Huete and Merinero 2021). This is the reason why the UA can be considered the ideal public policy for the analysis of governance. Having defined all the main concepts of the framework; before presenting the sketched hypotheses about the implications of the FGvt with respect to the local governance process, it is necessary to introduce the operationalization of these concepts.

The *independent variable* is the form of government (FGvt). This variable has four possible values, as noted: *strong mayor (1); committee-leader (2); collegial (3); or council-manager (4)*. Accordingly, first the city has a FGvt then it will produce different policies and a different governance for such policies. The FGvt of a city is mutually exclusive; it is displayed in each country's legislation¹⁵, subsequently comes the need to classify each analyzed case according to the employed typology. The *dependent variable* is the governance of the UA. As mentioned, central for any governance process, and particularly for the UA, is participation. Hence, the attention will be on the *composition of the network*. Therefore, local governance is operationalized focusing on the *morphology* (structure) of the policy network of the UA policy-unit of analysis and observation. This is, the actors that conform it, in other words: *how is the network composed?*

The morphology of the network, has 2 dimensions, considering the adopted working definition of governance and that “understanding governance is basically a matter of understanding the nature of state–society relationships in the pursuit of collective interests” (Peters and Pierre 2005,6). This means that alongside the *quantity of actors* that conform the network (its *density*), we need to know about the *nature* of such actors. Thus, the morphology of the network is measured by introducing a synthetic indicator of its *amplitude*.

¹⁵ Sometimes in the national Constitution.

Table 3.1. Measuring Governance: The Amplitude of the Network.

Concept	Dimensions	Measurement	Synthetic Indicator	Value
Governance morphology	Density	Number of actors	Amplitude of the network (density + nature)	Scale from 0 to 100
	Nature	Public vs Private nature of the actor		Dichotomy 0/100

Source: own elaboration

Through this process, initially, the number of participating actors (*density*) is appraised, subsequently the *nature* of each of the identified actors is described and classified as: “public actor” or “private actor”, using a 0/100 dichotomy. Thus, each actor regardless of its nature, must first be present, then its nature is reported and so on for every actor in the UA. The *density* indicator is calculated as the number of actors present in the network with respect to the total number of possible actors¹⁶, resulting in a value ranging from 0 to 100.

The analysis of the *nature* of the network, uses an intermediate indicator obtained by assigning a value of 0 or 100 as a dichotomous variable, where an actor takes this value in at least two variables, namely “public actor” (No=0; Yes=100) and “private actor” (No=0; Yes=100). Additionally, the framework adds more detail about the nature of the identified private actors, for they are not necessarily the same. Then, there are two more identical dichotomous variables indicating whether the private actor represents a “business actor” (B) or a “civil society actor” (CS). As an example, a municipality would take a value of 100 on the “public actor” variable and a value of 0 on the “private” variable. While a private business actor, for example a construction company, would take the opposite values (public = 0; private = 100), but additionally taking a value of 100 on the B variable and of 0 on the CS one. However, this is only measured for better description purposes, it is not a part of the *amplitude* indicator, that only cares for (and reflects) the public or private nature.

The *nature* indicator is obtained by subtracting “Public actor”- “Private actor”, and it can take as a value any real number (“R”). Thus, if the nature indicator adopts a negative value, it means a mostly private network. On the contrary, if it adopts positive values, it means mainly public¹⁷. The same procedure indicates what kind of private actors prevail in the network: “B - CS”. In this case, a positive value would mean a business predomination.

¹⁶ The totality of actors in the municipality.

¹⁷ A value of 0 would be the theoretically possible, indicating a perfectly balanced network.

The combination of both intermediate indicators results in the description of morphology of the network, through the proposed *amplitude* indicator, obtained by the summatory of the values: “*density + nature*”, that also takes as value any real number (“R”). Whose result is interpreted as follows: as values approximate 0 the amplitude is smaller¹⁸, while large values (of either sign) represent an ample network. This means that amplitude is measured as distance from 0, therefore values closer to 0 indicate a narrow amplitude. Moreover, values ranging from [0 to 100]¹⁹ represent an *inexistent network*, for it depicts a network composed only of 1 actor. In turn, the sign of the amplitude value describes the nature of the network, with negative values representing private predominance, while positive values a mostly public network. For example, an amplitude value of “-2000” is interpreted as an ample mostly private network.

Our *unit of analysis (and observation)* is the UA. Through the identification of the participants cited in any UA document we expect to apprehend the morphology of the network. Here it is where the institutional design and collaboration policymaking meet; we expect the former to have an influence in the morphology of network, conceived as *who participates*. Thus, a UA’s governance can be classified as ample or not, by analyzing its morphology. Interestingly, this also informs us about the quality of any UA instrument, as it evidences the importance of the *participation* procedural dimension and the extent of its integrality.

Table 3.2 Summary of the framework’s elements

Unit of Analysis: City X's Urban Agenda	Value	Example
Name	Employed nomenclature	"2050 initiative"
FGvt	Strong mayor Collegial Committee-leader Council-manager	Collegial
Density	Scale from 0 to 100	5
Nature	values: any "real number" Public, Private (civil society, business) or Balanced	mostly public (positive values) mostly private (negative values) balanced (-200 to 200)
Amplitude	values: any "real number" later qualified according to its distance from 0	-2000 ample mostly private network

¹⁸ It is meant as values approximate 0 from either sign, this is -2 is as close to 0 as 2, for the indicator can take as value any real number and arithmetically it cares about absolute values.

¹⁹ We mean [0 to 100] for as mentioned, if the UA exists then at least the municipality that created it is an existing actor, nevertheless it reflects an inexistent network. The value of -100 cannot apply to the analysis of an UA. But it would be a theoretically possible value following our governance amplitude indicator for another policy.

Source: own elaboration

3.1 The (expected) Effects of the FGvt on Local Governance.


In sum, four possible different FGvt are compared with respect to one dependent variable: the governance of the UA, operationalized as the morphology of the network, and measured through the amplitude indicator. Through the analysis of the actors participating in the UA we expect to showcase the influence of the institutional arrangements in local governance. Evidently, another policy could have been selected, like the city's budget, however, as mentioned, the UA seems to be a model example of network policymaking. Additionally, the selection of the FGvt as the independent variable appears to be plausible, considering that institutions determine: (1) who can legitimately act (2) the number of such actors; (3) what actions are allowed, incentivized, and/or constrained (4) what information the actors possess (Ostrom 1986; Steinmo et al. 1992). Here, most importantly, institutions affect the *inclusion/exclusion* of potential players. Applying Lasswell's classic formulation, if politics is "who gets what, when and how" (1936) then institutions can be seen as determinant of both the *how* and *who*.

The FGvt is expected to determine the opportunity for a certain governance to materialize instead of another (H_M). Correspondingly, the main hypothesis can be presented as follows:

H_M: The FGvt affects the morphology of the governance of the urban agenda.

Because the framework is institutionalist, it expects different institutional arrangements to produce different outcomes. Next, the expected relationships between the *FGvt* and the governance of the UA are presented to the reader through the following five hypotheses and their corresponding commentary. These are a precision of the broad H_M .

Figure 2.1 Explanatory Direction.



Source: own elaboration

H₁: Under the strong mayor form, the governance of the urban agenda will include fewer participants and of a more public nature.

Hence, anticipating the morphology of the network to have both less density and diversity, this means a smaller number of participants and less diverse in nature. Concerning the nature, we expect the included actor(s) to be mostly public actors. Even if the opposite is theoretically possible, for example with respect to service provision privatization. Concisely, the network would be less ample, because the political leader (the mayor) is in a stronger negotiating position, *which allows him/her to include his preferred participants* without much impediment. This is an institutional outcome, for this privileged position is institutionally induced, by the strong mayor FGvt. Let us remind that adhering to the conception of institutions as “rules of the game”, the *FGvt* dictates *who has the power to decide*. In this case, the power rests on the mayor, moreover these governing rules enable this outcome.

Still, some precisions are necessary considering we are portraying an ideal type. First, even if institutionally this *FGvt* is the one that gives more institutional power to the political leader, this power will variate from context to context. Some examples: in an institutionalized party system environment, the mayor’s party should be very influential, perhaps even more than the mayor itself. Especially if the party is disciplined, and this is essential, thus we expect case to case variation²⁰. Second, depending on the mayor’s control of the city council, whether he/she has a majority or not, and again in combination with whether this majority answers to the party leaders or personally to the mayor (Cardarello 2010). Thus, the ideal type of strong mayor will fluctuate from effectively strong mayors that have their own majority and are directly elected; to an ironically *weak-strong mayor* that has no majority (minority government), therefore forced to more negotiation and inclusion of other actors. A third context, depends once again on the institutional arrangement, here relating to the institutional “powers” of the mayor (the executive), following Carey and Shugart (1992) theory: this means differences in the discretionary power of the mayor position. Fourth, regardless of the following, complementing the stronger position of the mayor (and his party) will be his/her ideological position, for a right-wing leaning mayor is further expected to collaborate with economic actors, while a left-wing leaning mayor is expected to empower and include civil society actors (Huete 2010). In sum, despite variations this *FGvt* gives a mayor greater control on *who participates* in comparison to other forms.

H₂: governance of the urban agenda will be more ample under the committee-leader and collegial forms.

²⁰ For example, the mayor will be stronger in the poorly disciplined Brazilian party system compared to the institutionalized and disciplined Spanish case (Mainwaring and Torcal 2006; Kitschelt et al. 2010).

H₂ expects the morphology of the network to have both more density and diversity, this means more participants that are also more diverse in nature. This is due to the greater institutional incentive to negotiation. In these *FGvt*, the executive power is divided and shared. Accordingly, because both are power-sharing institutional arrangements²¹, more negotiation among more political actors is predicted, which in turn will bring more *amplitude* to the network. Contrary to the previous *FGvt*, in these cases the institutional design induces *inclusion* by dispersing power.

Once again, there will be case to case variations, for the electoral system should play a decisive role, and so does the conjuncture: that is the election results. Nevertheless, a *colegiado* combined with an absolute majority result in a disciplined party context could act similarly to a strong mayor²², regarding the winning party's preferences²³. This probably will not be the case in a committee-leader form, because of the institutional constraint of the multiple standing committees, that further disperse power. Once again, even if an overwhelming majority in the city council should give more power to the political winners, however, unlike a collegial executive, power will be more dispersed in this *FGvt*, because each committee has jurisdictional power over its corresponding issues. Once more, the party system context, chiefly institutionalization and discipline are again expected to matter and explain variation between the different local governments that adopted these *FGvt*.

Along these lines, considering the political power dynamics induced by the multiple standing committees' arrangement we add:

H₃: the committee-leader form leads to amplest governance compared to any other FGvt.

Concerning the last *FGvt* possible, two different but related effects are anticipated:

H₄: under the council-manager form, the urban agenda will include fewer participants and of a more private nature.

H₅: under the council-manager form, there will be more collaboration with business actors.

Then, the expected *FGvt* effects are divided in two hypotheses, as the first concerns the *density* of the network and the second is specifically related to its *nature*, especially when considering civil society actors are also private actors. The privileging of business actor's prediction conforms with the previous literature conclusions, and this can manifest in the

²¹ Specially the committee-leader form.

²² A multiparty collegial executive should be the more inclusive collegial form.

²³ Or even the leader, if provided with asymmetric institutional powers.

character of different kind of public-private ventures, or privatization of the provision (Goldsmith 1992; Pierre 1999; Huete 2010). Similarly, that for H₁, both less density and diversity are expected due to the leader's stronger negotiating position, likewise institutionally induced by the FGvt. However, the notorious difference is that under this form it is not a political but an administrative/professional leader. Additionally, it is expected that its apolitical nature reinforces this orientation.

The manager's position and discretionary capacity is perhaps stronger than a mayor's because in this form the party is not as influential²⁴. Even if the manager can be deposed by the politically conformed city council, she is the sole administrative leader, we argue that no other form concentrates as much power in a single person, making it the most unipersonal of all in terms of power-sharing. Hence allowing the theoretically expected pro-growth professional to align with business actors (Pierre 1999; Huete 2010). Therefore, the expected governance is not an ample one and most likely private in nature (H₄ & H₅).

Table 3.3 Summary of the expected relationship FGvt-Governance


FGvt	Density	Diversity	Amplitude
Strong Mayor	-	-	-
Committee-leader	+	+	+
Collegial	+	+	+
Council-Manager	-	-	-

Source: own elaboration

Consequently, different institutional arrangements, notably the FGvt, mean differences in the negotiating and discretionary power of the different actors. Particularly: they attribute different capacity to the political leaders to *include their preferred participants* in the governance network. Equivalently, the possibility to exclude or ignore other actors (Clingermayer and Feiock 2001,5). Thus, we expect that the FGvt affects the amplitude of the governance of the UA. Power-sharing arrangements should promote inclusion, hence a more diverse collaboration, as theoretically predicted (Colomer 2009). Additionally, according to the expected institutional effects, another theoretical prediction is that the strong mayor and council-manager forms have an *exclusionary effect* on local governance. Finally, the collegial and committee-leader forms are not expected to have a nature preference.

²⁴ Or even not influential at all, considering the apolitical aims of this FGvt (Mouritzen and Svava 2002; Rosanvallon 2015).

Figure 3.2 Mapping of the different FGvt according to the predicted morphology of the network.



Source: Own elaboration.

Table 3.4. Anticipated FGvt effect on participation.

Exclusionary effect	Inclusive effect
Strong Mayor	Committee-Leader
Council-Manager	Collegial

Source: own elaboration

In sum, the proposed framework is contemplated as a guide for the analysis of local governance across countries²⁵, aspiring that it allows for the formation of testable hypothesis. As declared, all along the section, these are all predicted effects, therefore they need to be empirically tested. Next, further detail on its measuring will be examined.

²⁵ Or within countries, for example in the case of the US where municipalities can adopt different FGvt.

4. Proposed Measurement.

Concisely, in the proposed framework local governance is apprehended through the analysis of *who participates*, for governance implies collaboration among interdependent actors, which is operationalized as the morphology of the network. Practically, our indicator of *amplitude* is intended as a representation of participation; it varies from minimal participation (any value from -100 or 100) and a density score²⁶ of 1, to a very ample network, this is a plural and diverse (great density, nature, and amplitude values, of either sign²⁷). This information is displayed in the UA document, thus rendering the UA as the ideal policy for the analysis of governance. For, the UA, as indicated, is paradigmatic of the governance process policymaking. Let us outline the proposed analysis step by step, finishing with the presentation of the selected empirical cases to be examined in section 5.

When selecting the cases, the first suggestion is to choose local governments possessing different FGvt, in order to be able to test all of the hypotheses, however an amplitude comparison can be done regardless of this, although this work intends to test institutions related hypotheses. Evidently, there are minimal conditions that a practical case must meet, regardless of the level of analysis²⁸, to be considered in the selection. First and foremost, the selected case must be, at least, a formally established tier of government, hence possessing an institutional design, thus its own FGvt. Secondly, it must have an UA policy, independent of how sophisticated its design. Some governments will have highly elaborated UA policies, others will not; however, the examination of the quality (or viability) of the UA is beyond the scope of the current framework, that only requires its existence. Thus, any government unit with a UA can be selected for analysis, here any local government of the world,

²⁶ The scale ranges from 0 to 100, but if the UA exists, at least the municipality participates, then the density value can never be smaller than 1. Nevertheless, a value of 1 equals an inexistent network.

²⁷ Let us remember that the nature and amplitude values can be any real number (“R”), moreover the sign indicates whether the network is mostly public or private, but not an arithmetic property, there the sign itself is not accounted, for values are absolute values. This is, we only care about the distance from zero. -300 is as large as 300, thus taken as |300|

²⁸ Even if the proposed approach concerns local governments, this framework could be adapted for the national and regional level.

preferably cases that have adopted different FGvt. Minimally, municipalities that are different with respect to the exclusionary/inclusive forms.

Then, *Step 1* is the identification of the existent FGvt and its corresponding classification according to Mouritzen and Svara's typology. Again, the analysis will be done using an ideal-type classification, thus pure cases will be rare, nevertheless each selected city should be closer to one of the four possible categories of the typology. Except for the US and Australian local governments, that explicitly state the council-manager nomenclature, most cities do not refer themselves as, for example: 'strong mayor'. Hence, the first step is the legislative analysis to identify the FGvt of the selected local governments.

Next comes, the elemental step of the framework: the revision of the UA documents to identify the cited participants, hence also a product of documental analysis, for each selected case. In this respect, the procedure is straightforward, as indicated 2 simple questions and their corresponding measurement guide this analysis: *How many actors?* and *Who are they?* Notwithstanding, additional municipality public documents could be needed for the identification of the participants, for in practice cities publish their final UA document in a special website, this website contains additional documents and information that can be useful for this task. Then, the framework proposes a *direct observation* of the data because ideally the participants are listed in the UA document; while in practice the ideal scenario might not occur, therefore these additional documents might need to be consulted to identify the number of actors and their nature.

Thus, first the participants are identified, subsequently their nature is assessed. Once the density and nature intermediate indicators are built, the amplitude value can be calculated (appendix²⁹). Thus, the proposed amplitude indicator provides an approximation of the governance of the UA. Additionally, the intermediate indicator 'private actor' provides further detail about the nature of the network, for a private network can be balanced, business, or civil society predominant. Even an *inexistent governance* morphology (values of -100 or 100) would also have a specific nature, interestingly it would be the polar case of a public or private monopoly provision.

Before addressing the final step of the framework, a valid methodological alternative for step 2 is noteworthy. If the UA document is not found or has imperfect data, then the previous strategy can be either complemented or completely substituted with elite interviews. These

²⁹ The current calculation of all these indicators is added as an annex, due to space constraints. Next section will only display the amplitude values and a summary for each analyzed UA.

interviews should be done to policy experts, policy practitioners and politicians. These could enrich the qualitative data, if the UA document lacks relevant information on the number of actors and their nature. Moreover, this was initially considered for this work but the distortion effects on work-life caused by the COVID-19 pandemic forced the reliance on only documental analysis. Ideally documental analysis alone should be enough, but fieldwork shows that most times conditions are not ideal³⁰.

The final step is the comparative component of the analysis. Considering the aim of this framework is both institutionalist and comparativist: intended to compare across different countries³¹ to evaluate the impact of the FGvt on the governance of the UA across cases. Hence, once the actors for each agenda are described, providing the morphology of N-agendas, then the analysis proceeds to contrasting them. The aim is to check the validity of the hypotheses, that predict variation between the different cases. Interestingly, the very analysis of the morphology of the network can be of relevance, as a descriptive endeavor. This is considered an additional value or contribution of the proposed framework. Nevertheless, contrasting them, appears to be the best suited procedure for realizing the intended objective: to test the expected relationships between the possible different FGvt. Initially, this seems to be a small-N task, however only the capacity and scope of the intended research places a limit on the number of cases an investigation can take.

4.2 Suggested Cases

Here four cases were selected for an initial³² round of empirical analysis. Concerning the selected countries and corresponding cities, the intention was to choose cities with their FGvt being as close as possible from the pure type – also known as exemplar-cases (Collier & Collier 1991). All four chosen cases possess a near pure FGvt according to the employed typology. An additional suggestion, that was taken into account, is the selection of similarly sized cities, following Mouritzen and Svava's argument that the city's size is a relevant intervening variable in comparative local government analysis (2002,49). Likewise, the city's size is operationalized through its population. The reader will note, the previous warning about the naming of the different cities' UA, for example Sevilla's is called *Plan Estratégico*

³⁰ As occurred with the selected UAs, luckily all of them had complementary documents in very comprehensive websites dedicated to the UA.

³¹ We refer to different countries, because apart from the US, local governments within a same country use the same FGvt. Nevertheless, in the situation of a country that uses different FGvt for its local governments, the comparison could be intra-country.

³² The author acknowledges that this selection does not represent a large-N analysis, that despite ideal, would be honestly imposible in a work of this nature (TFM).

Sevilla 2030. Each city will either have a specific site devoted to this policy or it can be found within an existing administrative department, usually: the urban planning department.

Sevilla, Spain; Montevideo, Uruguay; Stockholm, Sweden and Austin, United States are the four cities to be analyzed in the next section. The fact that they have a different FGvt is then already advanced, even if the case analysis will explain how they were classified, through legislative analysis. Thus, the main reason for their selection was the FGvt criterium; second was their similar size; while the third reason comes from a non-probabilistic sampling (judgement sampling) (Corbetta 2007, 287) done by the author: for 3 of them have a LAGLOBE³³ partner institution, with the exception of Austin, the capital of Texas, that was selected completely out of technical reasons (manager FGvt and city size). Admittedly, convenience selection might sound inappropriate, but while initially cities were to be selected only with respect to their FGvt and size³⁴. The convenience and symbolic factor of being “LAGLOBE countries” must be mentioned because it weighted in. Moreover, this kind of selection is defended by one of the most prominent authors in political science: Robert Dahl. In his seminal work “Who Governs? Democracy and Power in an American City”, the author choses as a case-study the city of New Haven where he resides and defends this choice by claiming it was convenient for his work for Yale University is located in that city (2005: ii). Dahl (2005) argues in favor of doing work that is “manageable.”

Table 4.1. Selected cases.

Local governments of the following countries	City	FGvt	Local UA	Population (approx)
United States*	Austin	city-manager	Exists	0,8 Million
Uruguay	Montevideo	collegial	Exists	1,3 Million
Spain	Sevilla	strong mayor	Exists	0,7 Million
Sweden	Stockholm	committee-leader	Exists	0,97 Million

Source: Own elaboration

³³ The author’s master’s program: <https://www.masterlaglobe.eu>.

³⁴ And mostly they were, for the four cities have similar size and are exemplar-cases of their FGvt.

5. Case Analysis and Discussion.

The objective of this section is to apply the proposed analytical framework to the analysis of practical cases, additionally the formulated hypotheses will be tested. This is to be done through the documental analysis of 4 different UA, from 4 different cities each possessing a different FGvt. Nonetheless, this section, and subsequently, each case analysis will start with a brief contextualization of the city in order to make it more amenable to the reader and to better expose the specificities of each case. Moreover, it is believed a brief general account of the evolution and structure of the decentralization and political system of each city is useful for the main analysis. As the framework contends: context matters. A strong mayor might not be as strong in a determinate party and/or electoral system or might be completely so in another.

Consequently, the following features will be introduced for each case: a brief review of the subnational structure and history; of the local government level main responsibilities and attributions; a summary of the current subnational politics, this is specifying the current party system and the latest electoral result; and finally, the organization of the city government, that will consecutively lead to the description and classification of each city's FGvt (step 1: classification of the independent variable). Table 5.1 illustrates some key indicators about the selected cities that will also help the reader's familiarization.

Table 5.1. Key indicators of the selected cities.

Indicator	Montevideo*	Sevilla	Stockholm	Austin
Urban Area Population (million Habitants)	1,3	0,7	0,97	0,8
Population variation 2000-2019	6,83%	1,90%	33%	22%
Share of national GDP (%)	50,50%	3,30%	32,90%	>0,1%
GDP per capita (USD)	22 525	29 553	63 258	64 000
Gini coefficient	0,46	0,36	0,3	0,46
Unemployment (%)	8,78%	22,40%	6,10%	5% ^b
Global Business Cities rankings	49,33	36,04	78,88	69,31
Party in Government (executive)	FA (center left)	PSOE (center left)	Moderate Party (center-right)	Democrats (centrist)
Politically aligned with superior level	NO	NO	NO	NO

*Refers to the whole subnational government.

b: only city measured for 2021, the rest are 2020 figures.

Source: Own elaboration from data from INE Uruguay, INE Spain, US census, Stockholm Stad- statistik; Dallas Fed; UN population; STATISTA Global Business Cities Report for each city³⁵.

Two final considerations before advancing to the case-by-case analysis. First, when referencing political parties, it is necessary to note that parties interact (“operate”) with each other in a determinate environment (or polity), thus having patterns of interaction, this is known as a *party system* (Sartori, 2016). Sartori suggests that the focus should be on relevant parties, that is parties usually in government, needed for a government coalition, or those that are capable of “blackmail”, understood as bargaining strength for government formation or policy success (p.108). Here, the focus will not necessarily be on Sartori’s relevant parties, but close enough, as the following description focuses just on the parties present in the legislature: the government (or coalition government) and its main opposition.

Second concerning the agendas, this work does not intend a detailed analysis of the UA, for it is not focused on that specific policy but on its governance. The UA is our unit of analysis and observation, for the local governance analysis. Hence, the objective of the documental analysis is to build the *amplitude* indicator to specify the *morphology of the network* and to test the 5 hypotheses comparatively. The focus is on the participants over the document itself, even if the broad features of each agenda will definitively be presented for each case analysis, and briefly compared (section 5.5). The reader should not expect an in-depth agenda analysis that exceeds the scope of this work.

5.1 Municipality of Sevilla (Spain)

The Spanish local level has as its main feature being very fragmented. To begin with it has multiple tiers, not only municipalities, but also *provincias*, *mancomunidades* and *islas* this is due to both the country’s geography but chiefly because of its fragmentation. A *provincia* is no different than a municipality, however it is a group of municipalities that due to scarce population are grouped together with a bigger city (ex: “Provincia de Salamanca”). Spain is a unitary yet decentralized State, with its subnational level having extensive attributions and responsibilities, nevertheless the main subnational units are the regional *Comunidades Autónomas*; while municipalities, also known for their political unit the *ayuntamiento*, have considerable attributions but are very dependent from the upper level (De la Fuente 2016,201). Interestingly, municipalities, unlike the *comunidades*, are not established in the Constitution but through ordinary legislation, law no. 7/1985 of 1985 (*Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local*) being the main charter. This law emphasizes on democracy and

³⁵ The cited sites and organizations are listed in the references (consulted websites).

participation, which is reasonable considering the law was enacted not long after the end of Franco's dictatorship.

Spain has over 8100 municipalities, with 84 % of them under 5000 habitants, moreover only 62 of these municipalities (cities) have over 100.000 habitants (thus the 0,76%). Hence, a very fragmented local level. Consequently, according to the legislation municipalities attend to responsibilities depending on their size, which makes the panorama more heterogeneous, with big cities having considerable responsibilities and smaller ones being completely dependent to the regional level (De la Fuente 2016,204). According to the legislation at minimum they are in charge of public lighting works, thrash disposal; while bigger ones have more responsibilities like public transportation, creating and preserving diverse public facilities, roadworks, etc. Although the law explicitly grants them autonomy being the "basic unit" of the national administration, thus in charge of all local matters (art. 4-7), in practice this depends on their size. Another size dependent capability is their tax authority, which they have, but this capacity is very dependent on size and magnitude as well, as De la Fuente (2016) aptly explains.

The same electoral system regulates all levels in Spain, including the election of the Eurodeputies (law no. 5/1985 *Régimen Electoral General*). Unlike the US it means that the whole country uses the same rules with the design not depending on the regional level. Additionally, the Spanish local party system is relatively nationalized, but not as much as the other selected cases, some with complete nationalization (Uruguay and US). Following Carillo's (1989) this concept means that the same political parties operate at the national and local level. In Spain there is a clear existence of subnational parties, but heterogeneously strong, depending on the region. The case of Sevilla does reflect a nationalized local party system, with the presence of the main national parties in the city-council. With the "Partido Socialista Obrero de España" (PSOE) and "Partido Popular" (PP) as the main partisan actors, like at the national level. After the 2019 election, during the first session of the newly elected city-council, all parties voted for their own candidate, making PSOE's Espadas, the mayor despite lacking an absolute majority (3 seats short), thus likely needing cooperation to approve legislation in the city-council. Then, the leftist coalition "Avanza Sevilla" (AS), composed among others by "PODEMOS", appears to be the natural ally for most

legislation. A final consideration with respect to local politics, is commenting that Sevilla is the most important municipality under the PSOE's control³⁶, for it is Spain's 4th largest city.

Table 5.2. Latest electoral results in Sevilla

Party	Coalition gvt	Mayor	Vote share (%)	Council seats (legislative)	% of council seats
PSOE	minority gvt	Juan Espadas	39,24	13	42
PP			23,15	8	26
AS			14,1	4	13
Ciudadanos			12,45	4	13
Vox			7,95	2	6

Source: Own elaboration from *Diario de Sevilla* report of the electoral results.

Sevilla's municipal organization is mostly provided by the *Reguladora de las Bases del Régimen Local (no. 7/1985)* constitutive law, and its organization is standard of the strong mayor FGvt, composed of a mayor and a city council (art19). Accordingly, the mayor is the chief executive, in charge of both administrative and political matters; through several ministries or directorates (*tenientes*). Together with both a city-council (*Concejo*) and a Spanish particularity the *Pleno*, composed of the mayor and the council, acting as the legislative power. Additionally, the city of Sevilla operates municipal companies and has deconcentrated some functions into 11 *Distritos municipales*, mostly citizen participation, nonetheless these districts do not have extensive functions and are appointed by the municipal government.

The same law describes the municipality's FGvt and political structure. Even if the legislation does not state the FGvt as "strong mayor", through the description of the functions and attributions of each body the classification becomes evident. Art.21 details them, evidencing a clear primacy of the mayor as the unipersonal executive officer, who is also in charge of the administration of the municipality, suiting the "strong mayor" qualificative. The mayor among other prerogatives, presides the *Pleno*; represents the city in front of other institutions and authorities, even internationally; directs the municipality administratively; and appoints all the *tenientes* (deputies) without the need of the council's approval. The latter gives the mayor great political and administrative power, for he does not need the legislative acceptance, unlike a parliamentary system or the local committee-leader FGvt where the council appoints all committees. Hence the *tenientes* answer to the mayor not to the council. Notwithstanding, the council does have some power, to begin with its majority is needed to approve any proposal and any councilor can introduce a motion of no-confidence or censure.

³⁶ By control it is meant that the party governs it. Not necessarily it is the most voted party, for example in 2019 and 2021 the PSOE was the most voted party in Madrid and Barcelona respectively but failed to be invested.

However, this is more difficult in the Spanish case than others, for the motion needs the signature of an absolute majority just to be introduced, and it needs to be, what is called, constructive: an alternative candidate that will be successful in the mayoral investiture needs to be stated. This means, the council cannot depose of the mayor if there is not a viable alternative ready, therefore they cannot depose and then decide over a new investiture vote.

On election day, Sevilla's electors vote the composition of a 31-member city council, that will enjoy a 4-year term. Unlike the national and regional level, municipalities have a 5% vote share threshold³⁷ for accessing the city council (art.180). Surprisingly, it is at the local level where representation is curtailed the most. Spanish mayors are indirectly elected, with a curious system (art.196): mayors are selected among councilmembers, and any of them could be a mayoral candidate, this happens in their first session. What is curious is that the investment requires an absolute majority, however if no proposed candidate obtains an absolute majority, then a plurality is enough, with the most voted candidate invested as mayor. This institutional arrangement induces minority governments and contradicts some of the PR system premises³⁸.

Summing up, the Spanish municipal government, hence Sevilla's, presents a near pure strong mayor FGvt, within a local government institutional arrangement that mixes presidentialist and parliamentarist features. Next the city's urban agenda is assessed.

Conceived as a strategic plan aimed at generating "consensus and agreements on the city's main challenges and how to address them" (Estrategía Sevilla2030). The elaboration of this UA began in October 2016 with the creation of an executive commission in charge of producing sectorial analysis, that will later be the corner stone of the UA. Then, a process that originates within the municipality's professional bureaucracy and led by its strategic planning department. With its foundations: the sectorial studies, being the most technocratic phase. Even if the third stage named "city model" implied the development of several participative workshops, this UA's origin can be qualified as technocratic. Nonetheless, the UA's executive summary indicates that the main goal of the project is the "shared-city" concept. Additionally, the Sevilla UA makes several references in its intention to align with the UN's 2030 agenda and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs³⁹), thus reflecting an international scope, although technocratic as well.

³⁷ In the upper levels the threshold is 3%.

³⁸ And it contradicts its very own absolute majority requirement, being in practice a plurality vote.

³⁹ The city elaborated 2 additional documents devoted to this alignment.

It follows the prospective analysis style⁴⁰, to have as goals both to diagnosticate the city's current situation and to elaborate a "city plan for the future" ("propuesta de futuro"), with 2030 as a time horizon. Following the prospective analysis essence: to plan the future. This UA has 6 general objectives responding to the 6 main dimensions of the aspired "city model". These are first introduced in the UA document with great abstraction and can all be considered valence issues. Particularly broad and desirable issues such as the fight on poverty and economic development, however, as was seen in table 5.1, this must be understood in the context of high unemployment. The 6 main objectives are (in the document's listed order):

1. employment generation and economic development.
2. the fight on poverty.
3. climate sustainability.
4. governance development and citizen participation.
5. fostering community life and civic values.
6. promoting culture and diversity.

The first appraised variable concerns each UA's accessibility. With respects to this matter, the proposal is simple and straightforward: the agenda accessibility variable is an ordinal variable indicating through its 3 possible values if citizen access to the UA is *easily*; *accessible*; or *difficult* (section 5.5 and table 5.14). In this case, the agenda is easily accessible, as it has its own website that can be quickly found on the city's website⁴¹

Even if the document reports the participation of over 300 individuals, these participants are counted on individual basis, plus they are not even identified. Then through the main UA document's analysis, the participants could not be identified, however thanks to the existence of a very comprehensive UA's website their identification was possible, since this site details the 10 thematic areas of participation⁴². Limited participation was partially expected, as H₁ goes, strong mayor municipalities are expected to be less inclusive, additionally this process was signaled as very technocratic (despite the politically amenable references). Additionally, although the multiple references to international alignment, there are no international actors, such as Eurocities or UN representatives listed.

Therefore, Sevilla's *density* value equals 25, even if the density value ranges from 0 to 100, this could also be read as 25% out of the possible participants in the municipality (table 5.3).

⁴⁰ The very definition of the term "prospective".

⁴¹ <https://www.sevilla.org/planestrategico2030>

⁴² <https://www.sevilla.org/planestrategico2030/participa/grupos-tematicos-mesas-de-trabajo>

Ironically, the document has a whole section devoted to governance and citizen participation, nevertheless that dimension does not appear to be in line with the document elaboration. It exceeds the scope of this work to analyze this phenomenon, yet it is relevant to report it.

The intermediate indicator of *nature* of the network’s result displays a balanced yet public composed network (value of 300). The use of intermediate indicators enables us to detail the nature of the participants, particularly in the case of a mostly private network, which is not the current situation. As stated, a score of 300 indicates a public network, however a low score also exhibits balance. The composition of the nature indicator helps further portray this: for it is the result of “public - private actors”, this summatory reveals that there are only 3 more public than private actors. Additionally, the extra indicator of nature of private actors, displays a balance between B and CS participants.

The *amplitude* value is 325, as explained, values closer to 0 indicate a narrow amplitude, for values ranging from -100 to 100 represent an inexistent network. Sevilla’s low amplitude value suggests a narrow governance of the UA. Therefore, H₁ appears to almost predict the existent governance of this UA. For this hypothesis anticipates a narrow governance and of a public nature. It is granted that it the hypothesis does not fully apply as the nature of this network that appears to be quite balanced, and not overwhelmingly public as was expected. Nonetheless the FGvt seems *exclusionary* by institutionally allowing a more technocratic process, or by tolerating lesser inclusion. As argued, the strong mayor is considered an exclusionary form because “the rules of the game” (the institutional arrangement embodied in the FGvt) enable the executive decision maker to *include* (or *exclude*) his preferred participants without much impediment. The current analysis cannot display other indicated qualities such as the degree of technocracy, which would be interesting, although it does display amplitude.

Table 5.3 Summary of the framework’s elements.

Sevilla	Value
Name	Estrategía Sevilla 2030
FGvt	Strong Mayor
Density	25 (25%)
Nature	public yet balanced
Amplitude	narrow governance

Source: own elaboration

5.2 City of Montevideo (Uruguay)

The main feature of the Uruguayan State structure, thus including the recently established municipalities, is centralization. Moreover, in Uruguay, the tendency towards the elimination of local autonomies was recurrent, as the State and the political system consolidated themselves under significant centralism (Cardarello 2011,65). Moreover, the lack of cooperation and coordination among the central state's departments was the feature of the country during the 20th century, however this began to change from the 90s onwards (Cardarello 2011,66). Particularly with the 1996 constitutional reform, that introduced for the first time the possibility of a local level of government, but without implementing it. Therefore, this case presents some complexities compared to the rest of the cases, which is added to the difficulty of finding a pure collegial local FGvt⁴³. Particularly in Latin America, where all local governments, but Uruguay, adopted the strong mayor FGvt.

Nevertheless, for the UA analysis most attention will be on the *departamental* government (regional) instead of the local level. Granted, they are grouped together concerning this planning policy, as municipalities are a cited actor in the UA and some of the planned actions will be their responsibility. However, it is not possible to only focus on the local level because of its lack of autonomy (Magri 2016). Another view is that they are “forced” into this UA that was elaborated by the *departamental* level. Next a brief chronology of the Uruguayan decentralization and of the responsibilities and attributions of Montevideo's 8 municipalities will be detailed, and this will help understand the selection decision. This is a case closer to functional decentralization or deconcentrating than to proper decentralization (Veneziano 2005), thus the reference is to Montevideo city as a whole, which encompasses the *departamental* and municipal governments.

Even if Uruguay now has a third tier of government with elected authorities like most of the region, it was nevertheless the last country in Latin America to do so (Cardarello 2011). Decentralization took impulse with the 1996 constitutional reform, but their establishment had to wait an extra decade until president Tabaré Vázquez's policy initiative that created them (Magri 2016,1). Law n. ° 18567 (“Ley de Descentralización Política y Participación Ciudadana”) was approved in 2009, creating the country's first 89 municipalities; this law was later revised in 2014 and 2020 further creating 36 additional municipalities. Montevideo was

⁴³ As argued earlier, the Netherlands local level is collegial in nomenclature only, for it presents none of its features.

the first subnational government to define and create its *municipios*, establishing 8 local governments (decree *no.33209*). This is not surprising for the local government initiative starts in Montevideo in 1990 under the government of Vázquez, with the creation of deconcentrated administrative units (Veneziano 2005, Magri 2016).

Table 5.4 Comparative Local Government Creation Year.

Country	Type of State	Direct election of local government executive from year
Argentina	Federal	1983
Brazil		1985
Mexico		1917
Venezuela		1989
Bolivia	Unitary	1987
Chile		1992
Colombia		1988
Ecuador		1983
Paraguay		1991
Perú		1981
Uruguay		2010
Costa Rica		1970
Nicaragua		1990
Honduras		1981
Guatemala		1985
Panamá		1994

Source: own elaboration from Cardarello 2010 p.71

Therefore, decentralization is a recent phenomenon in Uruguay, and this has consequences on the attributions and responsibilities of the newly created local governments. The country possesses 136 municipalities, which might seem like a small number, comparable to Sweden and different from Spain’s highly fragmented local level. However Uruguayan municipalities are very heterogenous, with Montevideo having enormous municipalities, averaging over 150.000 habitants and the rest of the country having very small municipalities (Cardarello & Freigedo 2016). The principle of gradualism stands out in the constitutive law and is very pertinent for it implies an uncomplete transfer of capacities and resources. As mentioned, these municipalities are very dependent of the upper levels of government, unlike their counterparts in the rest of the selected countries. In fact, in Uruguay municipalities do not even have the capacity to hire personnel, all their human resources come from the upper level (Puig 2018). Another factor that subtracts importance to local governments is that their election is linked to the above level’s election, not only taking place on the same day but adding the restriction that voters must select the same party for both levels (Cardarello 2011).

This contrasts with *Departamental* governments, that in turn, have important attributions and responsibilities, that have been growing from the 80s until the present (Cardarello & Freigedo 2016). Most relevant here, they are in charge of land use, thus urban planning is their responsibility, alongside they have some tax collection authority, particularly concerning land, property and vehicles, however they remain very dependent on the national government that centralizes most of the tax authority, even if Montevideo is somewhat of an exception due to its size (Viñales 2019). In turn, municipalities are in charge of the tasks already carried out by the previously deconcentrated bodies⁴⁴ (lighting, sweeping); plus the coordination and promotion of local development, training for their officials; preparation of draft decrees and resolutions to be submitted to the mayor; preparation of area programs; hygiene and environmental protection; promotion of social participation⁴⁵; annual accountability to the departmental government and a minimum of one annual municipality public hearings (Cardarello 2011,68). These are the general attributions for the whole country, additionally Montevideo's *municipios* take charge of all the administrative functions previously deconcentrated (decree *no.33209*), however their bureaucracy continues to be under the upper level's control (and appointment), hence displaying the municipalities lack of autonomy, even at administrative level. Concerning their financial resources, they come from three different sources: those transferred by the departmental government (main); those coming from the Incentive Fund for the Management of Municipalities provided by the national government; finally whatever donations they might receive (Puig 2018,24). It is crucial to note that Uruguayan municipalities are what administrative law in the country denominates as "ordenadores de gasto", these are units that do not have their own budget or resources, although they have planification authority, thus they plan actions within the parent unit's budget, in this case, the *departamento de Montevideo*. Then, the combination of very asymmetric subnational units exists in Uruguay: relatively strong regional governments with weak local governments.

Concerning the subnational party system, the main feature is the nationalization of the party system, with the same parties dominating each level, however in Uruguay this is in great part institutionally induced (Cardarello & Freigedo 2016). For example, a party is not allowed to compete only in subnational elections, to do so it must register nationally and compete in

⁴⁴ As mentioned in 1990 mayor Tabaré Vázquez initiated a decentralization process that involved deconcentrating of several of the city's functions to 18 *centros comunales zonales (CCZ)*. Except for their direct election, this is similar to Stockholm's districts, established in 1997.

⁴⁵ However, the upper level retained the control of Montevideo's participatory budget (also established during the Vazquez administration).

the national election and have a certain number of votes. Thus, the subnational party system resembles the national one, with moderate pluralism when counting the number of parties. At the local level the small 5 seat magnitude of the municipal government leads to a high threshold, therefore most municipalities in the country only have the Partido Nacional (PN) and Frente Amplio (FA) in government (Cardarello & Freigedo 2016). Specifically, in the case of Montevideo, there are only 2 parties with legislative representation at the upper level (*junta departamental*), due to the 5-party right-wing alliance under the Partido Independiente (PI) *lema*, for the latest Montevideo elections in 2020. While the regional executive was retained by the FA, only 5 of the 8 municipalities are controlled by the FA, with the rest under the PI alliance. Montevideo has been a leftist stronghold from their first victory in 1989, and in 2020 despite the right-wing alliance efforts the FA retained most local governments and the preminent capital city government, by almost the same margin of victory. Table 5.6 chooses as an example Montevideo’s most central *municipio*, that is curiously led by the former urban development director.

Table 5.5. Latest electoral results in Montevideo*.

Party	Coalition gvt	Mayor	Vote share (%)	Council seats (legislative)	% of council seats
FA	own majority	Carolina Cosse	54,7	18	58
Partido Independiente			42	13	42

* *departamental* government and only parties with legislative representation.

Source: Own elaboration from the Corte Electoral del Uruguay’s data.

Table 5.6. Latest electoral results in Municipio B.

Party	Coalition gvt	Mayor ^a	Vote share (%)	Colegiado seats	% of executive seats
FA	own majority	Silvana Pissano	52,3	3	60
Partido Independiente			46,8	2	40

^a president of the *colegiado*

Source: Own elaboration from the Corte Electoral del Uruguay’s data.

Considering the previously exposed, one could argue that centralization persists and is shifting to the subnational level, with regional governments (*departamentales*) centralizing their own territory’s administration. Following comes a more detailed description of the organization of Montevideo’s subnational governments.

Montevideo city’s organization does not present eccentricities and has a standard organization, with the executive body being the *intendente* (governor) and a 31-member legislative body: the *junta departamental* in charge of approving legislation and checking on the

executive. The city does not own any public companies, that might have a special status. There is no subnational judiciary, as in the case of Spain or the federal case of the US. Although, particularities appear in the local government organization, as it is a collegial body, thus the executive and legislative powers are fused. This is, the 5-member *concejo municipal* oversees both functions. Uruguay is the only country in the region that does not adopt the strong mayor FGvt at the local level. As observed, it is composed of 5 members elected through PR, with the whole municipality counting as one district (*multimember district*). The most voted candidate of the most voted party⁴⁶ has the position of *alcalde/sa* (mayor), conceived as the president of the body. The rest are named *concejales*, with their role being honorary, however they all have an equal vote, and an absolute majority is needed for the *colegiado*'s decisions. All of Montevideo's current municipalities have a "3-2 landscape", meaning that the winning party has its own majority, thus able to approve any initiative on its own.

The collegial FGvt is explicit in the legislation, however its purity, can be debated⁴⁷, nevertheless Montevideo's municipalities are formally and legally under the collegial FGvt. Next the city's UA is presented and analyzed.

The government of Montevideo "aims at the collective construction of long-term strategies" elegantly introduces the 79-page main report of "Montevideo del Mañana". Conceived as a "vision towards 2050". The UA's elaboration process started in 2017; subsequently in 2018, the "urban dialogs" process was constructed as a complement of "Montevideo del Mañana", but only another edition was held in 2019. Considering the context of the covid-19 pandemic and 2020 being a subnational election year, the assessment about the urban dialogs should wait until 2022.

Montevideo's UA was not politically led, and curiously it was not initiated by the urban development department, although its important participation (and currently the department in charge). Instead, the policy was led by the central figure of Ramon Mendez, who occupied the ad-hoc position of advisor⁴⁸ of strategic planning, thus informally in charge of strategic planning, despite the existence of the corresponding department. Mendez obtained this role

⁴⁶ In the Uruguayan electoral system, the attention must also be on lists (*listas*) and groups of lists (*sublemas*), alongside the most voted party. It is a very fractionalized system (Cardarello 2011; Chasqueti & Micozzi 2014; Sartori 2016). As an example, the mayor can be the 2nd or 3rd most voted candidate from the most voted party, if his/her *sublema* has the most votes.

⁴⁷ However, it exceeds the scope of this paper to examine the purity of the local FGvt. I personally discussed this matter in my bachelor monograph.

⁴⁸ Advisor to the *intendente* (governor), at that moment Daniel Martinez.

for his renowned career leading Uruguay's electrical "revolution" as the climate change director. Then, under Mendez leadership (as the document explicitly states) with the cooperation of 2 Faculties of the public university (social sciences and economics) alongside the city's urban planning team, the UA process was commenced, and the document elaborated. Therefore, this UA's origin can be qualified as technocratic, with the particularity of being originally led by an ad-hoc advisor, while later assigned to the urban planning department. Despite its origin, the UA gained some political salience, for the following stage broadened the participation scope (and mediatic scope), including the municipal governments and several other actors, under the name "Diálogos Urbanos" (Diálogos Urbanos 2018). However, it is elemental to keep in mind the chronology of the process: first the "Montevideo del Mañana" prospective effort is done, then the most participative events were held. Thus, a technocratic policy process, despite all the politically amenable adjectives assigned to this document⁴⁹, which could be unexpected under the collegial FGvt, although it is not the intention of the employed hypotheses (and framework) to anticipate this quality.

Unsurprisingly, for a prospective effort it sets objectives and proposed lines of work associated with the desired city vision. These are (in the document's listed order):

1. International projection of the city: "Montevideo capital proyectada al mundo".
2. The promotion of sustainability, circular economy, and creative economy.
3. The promotion of inclusion and equity.
4. Citizen participation.
5. Improvement of waste management.
6. Improving connectivity and sustainability of urban transport.

Concerning the agenda accessibility, it is deemed as difficult to find. While the website concerning the news and the organized events is easy to find; on the contrary the documents are difficult to come about one must google the exact document name⁵⁰. Despite the existence of abundant information, such as documents, google-drive links to files and workshop presentations; that are free to access but difficult to come about.

Concerning the *density* indicator, the executive summary document emphasizes on the collective and associative spirit of this policy elaboration, explicitly aiming at an ample participation. Consequently, the document intends a high density. Accordingly, one of the advantages of the amplitude synthetic indicator is the inclusion of intermediate indicators

⁴⁹ The document is defined as participative and associative in the city's site and every document. It indeed has some participative traits, but the technocratic imprint is evident.

⁵⁰ <https://montevideo.gub.uy/montevideo-del-manana> The link to the city's site was shared with me by Dr. Pittaluga, a member of the prospective team.

such as *density* that have value on their own. This density value allows to contrast the document's intention with reality. Montevideo's density value equals 59, consequently this can be considered a moderate value of density, being above 50.

Like in the European municipalities, international organizations participated, highlighting the presence of MERCOCIUDADES, that plays a similar role to the EU's Eurocities, the German and Spanish international cooperation agencies, and the prestigious multinational GEHL consultancy. On the other hand, the absence of the 18 neighborhood councils (*concejos vecinales*) was surprising considering their participatory allure; even if it can be argued that they participate through each municipality, but they are not explicitly cited in any document. Additionally, surprising was the absence of representatives from most private universities (only 1 out of 5).

The intermediate indicator of *nature* of the network's result displays a markedly public nature of the network (value of 1800). Strong involvement from the national public university, particularly the *Facultad de Ciencias Sociales*, that was the hired consultant for the process, is the highlight of this public oriented UA. One more time, it is necessary out of academic integrity to display the shortcomings of the measurement mapping. In this case, the identification of all private actors was difficult. For public actors are explicitly mentioned in both the document and the minutes (*relatorías*), especially the academic advisors, but private actors are barely declared. Probably, in the case of business actors is because they were not present, but civil society actors were emphasized, due to the associative spirit of the project. However, they are barely mentioned. Helpfully, every document has its minutes⁵¹, that detail the most important actors and how many individual participants were there, but we cannot know their nature. Then density indicator could be underrepresenting all private actors, while public actors are certainly accounted for.

Montevideo has an *amplitude* value of 1859, this is not as high as the document aims, yet it is considerable, for it is far from 0, and its disaggregation details the participation of 59 actors. This value also reveals the public predominance, with the "public actor" intermediate indicator being very high (value of 3600). Moreover, the "private actor" indicator is not neglectable, a value of 1800, this equals 18 private actors included. Their nature (B-CS) reflects a balanced number with a score 100, that is read as only 1 more B than CS actor.

⁵¹ As an additional source, the minutes of the 3 organized workshops were analyzed for identification of the participants. They even indicate invited participants that were never present.

Hence, H₂ captures partially the existent governance of this UA, for it is inclusive enough, but not presenting a large value, as was expected. The nature of the network is not relevant for this assessment because H₂ and H₃ do not anticipate a nature preference. The lower-than-expected density might be explained by because this UA is led by the regional level, a strong mayor like unit. Additionally, another explanation might come following Huete (2010) hypothesis: a left leaning government is to be oriented towards either public actors or civil society. This appears to be the case displaying a strong public orientation and participation, that is ample enough to reject H₁, even if Montevideo combines both FGvt.

Table 5.7 Summary of the framework's elements

Montevideo	Value
Name	Montevideo del Mañana
FGvt	Collegial
Density	59 (59%)
Nature	Mostly Public
Amplitude	moderate of public nature

Source: Own elaboration

5.3 Municipality of Stockholm (Sweden)

Succinctly, magnitude, size and extensive responsibilities are the defining traits of Swedish municipalities. Swedish local governments are strong despite the unitary structure of Sweden. This is not a paradox, as subnational studies show, for the Swedish case that local governments are in charge of most of the welfare State, thus having great responsibilities and resources (Lidström 2016). According to Lidström (2016), this originates in the need for territorial adjustment of the national welfare services. Thus, having not only great responsibilities but also attributions and capacities, for example fiscal powers, they decide on local income tax rates without having to consult any other level of government (Lidström 2016,365). This decentralization within a cohesive and important central government might very well be another “Swedish way or model”. Similarly, as the world conceives the Swedish national political economy as unique (Pierre 2016). Other particularities of Swedish local governments are a nationalized local party system (Lidström 2016,414). The fact that local and national elections are concurrent on the same date, nurtures this situation.

Size was indicated as a trait because Sweden, contrary to other countries, has reduced the number of municipalities, by merging them, in the last decades the number of municipalities was reduced from 2500 to 290 (Lidström 2016,418). Once again, this is a difference when comparing to most of Europe and to the other selected countries. Concerning governance and public administration, a large, professional, and depersonalized bureaucracy combined with political leadership is the distinctive Swedish feature (Lidström 2016,423). This can be seen as distinctive to the other cases that are either more political or more managerial (the US), for example a Swedish municipal executive shares management not only with several standing committees but with a bureaucratic body, created to assist them (the City Management Office in Stockholm city).

Nationally, the party system has the following features: it usually had five parties; clearly demarcated in two blocs: left and right; the predominance of the Social Democrats (S) (Aylott 2016,1), thus a moderate pluralism following Sartori's classification. Stockholm's local party system shares these characteristics, even if the S are the main party, it is fragmented enough in to allow a center-right coalition of 5 partners, led by the Moderate Party to govern. Even if there are 9 parties in the fragmented city-council, none of them big enough for a minority government or a minimal-winning coalition. Precisely no party reaches a quarter of the electorate, which surpasses Sartori's definition of moderate pluralism but does not quite reach a polarized pluralism scenario. In the latest elections (2018), the center-right coalition replaced a previous center-left coalition led by the S, the county's historical main party that governs the national and the regional level. Anna König, was elected chairperson of the executive-council by the winning coalition, representing a slight absolute majority (52%).

Table. 5.8 Latest electoral results in Stockholm.

Party	Coalition	Mayor	Vote share %	Council seats (legislative)	% of council seats
Moderates (M)		Anna König	22	22	21,8
Liberals (L)			10	10	9,9
Green Party (MP)	yes (ad hoc)		9	9	8,9
Center Party (C)			8	8	7,9
The Christian Democrats (KD).			5	5	5,0
Social Democrats (S)			23	23	22,8
Left Party (V)			13	13	12,9
Sweden Democrats (SD)			8	8	7,9
Feminist Initiative (FI).			3	3	3,0

Source: own elaboration from <https://start.stockholm/om-stockholms-stad/> data

Curiously, in comparison with the other selected cases, the Social Democratic Party is also the main municipal force (Sevilla & Montevideo⁵²), but in this case is not in government after the 2018 elections.

A concise description of the municipality's organization helps to better grasp the city's FGvt. The municipality's organization also has its particularities when comparing to the other selected cases or with the rest of Europe. It is divided in 4 main bodies: its main representative body the City Council; the Municipal Board (named by the council); the City Management Office and a Stockholm particularity: its 13 administrative districts. The districts are themselves a combination of elected politicians and administrative professionals, their function is the management of the welfare state⁵³, once again due to the city's size the idea appears to be another territorial adjustment.

The reader might have already noted a managerial feature, closer to the US model than continental Europe, what will be named here as: *the assisted executive*. But the principle is not the same as the US progressive movement or NPM, it comes from the fact that local politicians, although paid, might not take this salary and continue with their previous jobs⁵⁴ while giving part-time dedication to the city council, thus they are assisted by the Management's office professional bureaucracy. However, this office is politically led (unlike an US or Australian manager). As described by the city's: "The city management office is the municipal board's administration. The office assists the municipal board and the council".

The Municipal Board, in charge of implementing the council's decisions, economic planning and leading the city's administration, is in turn a politically conformed body. It has 13 members, composed of both the majority and the opposition, and led by the council's chairperson, with the vice chairman coming from the main opposition party. Nonetheless, the municipality's principal political body is the city council, composed of 101 members elected through PR⁵⁵ and with no threshold. The council, elected every 4 years, is the preeminent body for it appoints all others and approves all legislation, as will be presented next.

⁵² Technically in Montevideo, the leftist (or center-left) party is not called Social democrat, it is the Frente Amplio, in turn composed of the Uruguayan Socialist party as one of its main fractions. Despite branding differences. The similarities with the Swedish and Spanish case are greater than to any other party in those systems.

⁵³ This presents similar characteristics to Montevideo's decentralization process and current municipalities. Sadly, beyond the scope of this work.

⁵⁴ Except public employees that cannot be elected.

⁵⁵ Close to perfect PR, less than 1% vote share equals a seat. However, that number might change for each municipality determines its council size (Ch5section1), Stockholm chose the minimal number possible.

The “Local Government Act”⁵⁶ describes the municipality’s FGvt and political structure. Evidently the legislation does not mention the FGvt as “committee-leader”, it merely describes the composition, functioning, powers, and structure. Through its differentiation of the assembly (city council), committees, an executive committee, and their respective prerogatives, the local FGvt is classified as committee-leader following the aforementioned typology. The main argument for this is that the City Council has the most important competences, namely, to appoint all other elective bodies. Despite not naming the bureaucratic office, like in most consolidated democracies, it is important to remember that the municipal board directs the management office. Stockholm’s particular FGvt does not have an executive power in the form of a mayor, but multiple standing committees that are in charge of a policy area; these councils have jurisdictional autonomy over their area; however, the approval of legislation depends on the council as a whole. The number of committees depends on the council that must have at least an executive committee, in the case of Stockholm named “Municipal Board”. What is commonly called mayor refers to the municipal board’s chair, that is elected by the council, thus indirectly elected and it need not be the most voted candidate, for it could be any councilmember. Thus, the council names the political leader of the municipality alongside the composition of every committee. Interestingly, there is no recall or vote of no-confidence for the leader, but the composition of the committees might be modified. This displays the importance of the council, and the collective nature of this FGvt, for it is more important to alter the committees, due to their policy jurisdiction, than switching the leader. Notably, the council has the power to create another committee in charge of executive activities.

Finally, concerning this institutional design a remark is needed: the City Council is not the equivalent of a legislative body in this FGvt (unlike in the mayor or manager form). It shares the executive functions, first because it names all the executive bodies: chairperson and all the standing committees. But most importantly because policy decisions are divided among the standing committees, that are not the equivalent of a cabinet, they are not led by the executive chairperson, that only leads his/her committee. Additionally, the existence of this *assisted executive*, that divides governing between bureaucratic professionals and politicians cannot be considered similar to a formal manager. As argued in the previous sections, the committee-leader form is truly a power-sharing arrangement, with a clear emphasis on collective decision making. Next the city’s UA will be analyzed.

⁵⁶ Latest modification from January 1992, (latest version in English of 2004).

Stockholm's UA, entitled "Vision 2040" and subtitled "A Stockholm for Everyone" aims at

"Our vision is the road to the Stockholm of the future. It gives the entire organization a common direction and helps the businesses to create tomorrow's welfare together." (Stockholm Stad)

The elaboration of the policy was voted in 2014; however, the document was revised by the city council in June 2020, mostly because the city's government changed during this period. It is under the committee of Urban Development; thus, it does not have its own committee or department. The difference is that in this FGvt a committee is politically much stronger than a department, for a department is under the authority of the city's bureaucracy, and the committee is not. Contrary to the previous, this document has a political origin, for it was an initiative of the city council. However, it is relevant to keep in mind that unlike the rest of the cases, this UA was started in 2014 by a different party-government majority than the current one, that as indicated decided to revise it in 2020. Hence, the bureaucratic implementation could be amplified by this fact. Because of this, the UA's main working objectives are picked from the revised 2020 document, while participants either accumulate or repeat, the goals are subject to change after the revision. Although both documents share the "Stockholm for everyone" motto or vision. 4 core "city planning goals" are listed in this 172-page report:

1. "A growing city", conceived as the need for rapid urban development.
2. "A cohesive city", conceived as integration and accessibility.
3. The development of public spaces to ensure a decent community life.
4. The advancement of a "climate-smart and resilient city".

With respect to the agenda accessibility variable, this UA is easily accessible. It has its own website that is easily found under the "city's vision" tab located in the main "about Stockholm" page⁵⁷, furthermore complementary information and sources are also displayed in these tabs.

Stockholm's *density* value equals 67. As this indicator ranges from 0 to 100, this can be considered close to a high value of density. Then already advancing an ample network. A great deal about the density, that will also impact the nature of the network, comes from the mentioned 13 district committees' administrators, although why count them separately from the municipality? Because they are separate, they were created by the city (in 1997), however they are separately elected, directly by the residents (while existent⁵⁸) and responsible for important services, like preschool and elderly care. Hence, they are counted as a public actor,

⁵⁷ <https://start.stockholm/om-stockholms-stad/>

⁵⁸ Theoretically the city council could decide their dissolution, however this will come at a high political price as they have been created in 1997 and residents have become accustomed.

influencing the local governance, for they reflect the Swedish conception of governance, as the document affirms “Good urban development requires collaboration” (2017,41).

Concerning its nature, the business orientation is evident, nevertheless, it must be considered that public⁵⁹ enterprises are very common in the Swedish model. Then, additionally present are the municipality owned 16 companies (Stockholms Stadshus AB). As detailed in Sweden’s “Local Government Act”, these companies are not politically controlled yet they are state owned, nevertheless they are professionally managed, thus participating with their own posture in the city’s planning (as the UA expresses). Hence, when conceiving business as an engine for welfare in the Swedish sense it need not necessarily mean private actors. Moreover, concerning public actors, as is the case with the “National Negotiation on Housing and Infrastructure” objective, collaboration with the upper levels was to be expected, particularly in a unitary and centralized country, and considering that in Sweden healthcare is a regional responsibility. Furthermore, in the context of EU member countries, international collaboration exists, for example collaboration with Eurocities. Surprisingly, the document makes no reference to the 17 trade unions listed in the city’s site as existent and consulted by the municipal government: or to the 3 main universities in the city, despite mentioning Stockholm as a “university city”. Once again, a shortcoming of the present mapping is the identification of the referred private business actors, for this UA document emphasizes on public-private collaboration and its importance, however it does not even list the business associations existent in the city. Then further sources⁶⁰ were needed to identify them, contrary to public and private CS actors’ participants that are even listed in the city’s site, as cooperation with them appears to be extensive.

Then, the intermediate indicator of *nature* of the network’s result displays a mostly private network (value of -3300). However, very important concerning the nature is to be able to differentiate private actors, for they are not the same. Moreover, this is the reason why the nature of the private actors’ indicator was added, even if it does not affect the *amplitude* indicator. Stockholm provides a great example of the practicality of this additional indicator. In this case, we have an ample mostly private nature, however it is a mainly civil society private network, with almost no reference to business actors.

The *amplitude* value is very high, as explained, if values closer to 0 indicate low amplitude, then Stockholm’s value of -3233, indicates substantial amplitude. It is important to note, that

⁵⁹ By public we understand State-owned not publicly listed as in the US stock market lexicon.

⁶⁰ Stockholm’s Chamber of Commerce; STATISTA Global Business Cities Report; and Stockholm Intelligence Community forum (association of “start ups”).

despite the private predominance, both nature intermediate indicators are very high, as the public actors score 3500. Therefore, the morphology of the network exhibits a very ample mostly private network.

This means that H₂ and H₃ anticipated effects appear to capture Stockholm UA’s governance accurately. The private predominance should not be a surprise considering the briefly described Swedish context, however it is not considered by these hypotheses. Inclusion is also appreciated by the strong presence of civil society actors. In turn for H₃, the comparative analysis is needed, but Stockholm’s high amplitude might already anticipate this result.

Table 5.9 Summary of the framework’s elements

Stockholm	Value
Name	Vision 2040
FGvt	Committee leader
Density	67 (67%)
Nature	mostly private but predominantly CS private actors
Amplitude	very ample of private nature

Source: own elaboration.

5.4 Municipality of Austin (US)

One of the first accounts of the life of US local government is over 200 years old, Tocqueville’s well known “Democracy in America”, where the author exalts the US’s local self-government. However, several references were made in section 2.2 of this work with regards to their administration reform, detailing how Tocqueville’s compliments turned sour, through the extensive critic of local politics made by the progressive movement (Wilson 1897; Svava 1998; Rosanvallon 2011, 2015). Hence, in this section a depiction of the system evolution will be skipped to avoid redundancy, proceeding to briefly comment on their structure, size, and particularities.

It can be argued that the US is the closest case to pure federalism, additionally it has a strong advocacy for self-government. Accordingly, the subnational level in the US is composed by the States, or “members of the union”; while the local level has 2 tiers: counties and municipalities or cities, with the cities accumulating all local government functions. The US

also has a very fragmented and heterogenous local government landscape, with over 35.000 municipalities according to the US census and the National League of Cities organization. Alongside the great number of municipalities comes its heterogeneity as there are huge cities like New York and small municipalities of less than 100 habitants, like Akhiok, Alaska (US Census). Additionally, the International City Manager Association (ICMA) explains, that another particularity of the US is that each State, and furthermore later each city, has its own regulation. Consequently, first each State, in this case, Texas, has its constitution providing some regulations of the different units, then each city in the State has its own charter. Charter that gives them extensive attributions, possessing all the provisions that are not limited by the upper levels (Texas State and federal US). Thus, a negative style of duties assignation. US municipalities enjoy a relative autonomy and have responsibilities, yet they do not have extensive tax authority like the States. They have similar tax authority than Spanish municipalities with the property tax and vehicle tax under their administration. Additionally, in this respect, they set the local sales tax in addition to the State's determined minimum. Finally, their income also comes from public services fees if existent. According to the Brookings Institute local governments are relatively dependent on intergovernmental transfers, which represent on average 35% of their income.

Another relevant feature of US local government, also present in Austin, is the existence of extensive direct democracy instruments: referendum, recall and initiative, moreover the number of required signatures to introduce any of them is only 10% of registered voters (City Charter article 5).

Table 5.10 US cities Mayor's political party by size.

City	Population (2013)	Mayor	Party (or affiliation)
New York, New York	8,405,837	Bill de Blasio (D)	Democrat
Los Angeles, California	3,884,307	Eric Garcetti (D)	Democrat
Chicago, Illinois	2,718,782	Lori Lightfoot (D)	Democrat
Houston, Texas	2,195,914	Sylvester Turner (D)	Democrat
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania	1,553,165	James Kenney (D)	Democrat
Phoenix, Arizona	1,513,367	Kate Gallego (D)	Democrat
San Antonio, Texas	1,409,019	Ron Nirenberg (I)	Democrat
San Diego, California	1,355,896	Todd Gloria (D)	Democrat
Dallas, Texas	1,257,676	Eric Johnson (D)	Democrat
San Jose, California	998,537	Sam Liccardo (D)	Democrat
Honolulu, Hawaii	983,429	Rick Blangiardi (I)	Independent
Austin, Texas	885,4	Stephen Adler (D)	Democrat
Indianapolis, Indiana	843,393	Joseph Hogsett (D)	Democrat
Jacksonville, Florida	842,583	Lenny Curry (R)	Republican
San Francisco, California	837,442	London Breed (D)	Democrat
Columbus, Ohio	822,553	Andrew J. Ginther (D)	Democrat

Charlotte, North Carolina	792,862	Vi Lyles (D)	Democrat
Fort Worth, Texas	792,727	Betsy Price (R)	Republican
Detroit, Michigan	688,701	Mike Duggan (D)	Democrat
El Paso, Texas	674,433	Oscar Leeser (D)	Democrat

Source: <https://ballotpedia.org/>

Concerning the local party system, several US cities, as described, followed the 20th century progressive movement reforms, and adopted among others, the aforementioned direct democracy instruments together with the *non-partisan ballot*. This means not only that candidates do not need to be affiliated with a political party, but the election discards them, this is candidates present themselves individually through signature collection. Regardless of this, most candidates are affiliated⁶¹ with one of the main parties, as table 5.10 displays. With the main parties being completely nationalized. The latest Austin elections were held in November 2018, however not all districts are elected simultaneously, with half of them and the mayor elected in 2018 and the remaining 5 in 2020. Steven Adler, the incumbent mayor, was reelected in this non-partisan election, although he is affiliated with the Democratic part. Consequently, Austin joins the rest of Texas big municipalities in being governed by the democrats in the republican stronghold of Texas.

Austin has a complex electoral system and schedule, combining characteristics of the traditional *first past the post* (FPTP) method employed in most US elections, with other elements that relax its premises like the need of an absolute majority for the mayoral and council member election, with the existence of a run-off election if needed (article 2). Further complexity is added with the separation of the mayoral election from the remaining 10 seats allocated to each of the 10 electoral districts of the city. Additionally, these elections use different systems, on the one hand the mayor is elected *at-large*. In brief, this means he/she is directly elected with the whole municipality counting as a single-member district. On the other hand, councilmembers are elected in specific districts; each of the city's 10 districts elects 1 councilmember, with an absolute majority needed. Thus, relaxing the FPTP essence, but maintaining the "winner takes all" logic, for the rest of the candidates no matter how many votes earns no representation. One more local particularity is that this district elections do not follow the same rules as the upper-level elections of the US legislators. All of this is

⁶¹ This is easy to corroborate, in this case press articles were consulted, but additionally the endorsements of the candidacy can be checked. Adler was supported by the Democratic party and by all democrat state and federal legislators. While his main opponent was likewise supported by Republicans. These affiliations cast doubt on the continued use of non-partisan elections.

done under the non-partisan ballot, therefore it is not possible to account the party or the mayor's domination of the council, for each council member is elected representing a district.

Table 5.11. Latest mayoral race results in Austin.

Party	Coalition gvt	Mayor	Vote share (%)	Council seats (legislative)	% of council seats
Non-partisan (Democrat)	N/A	Steve Adler	59,15	N/A	N/A
Non-partisan (Republican)			19,4	N/A	

Source: Own elaboration from Ballotpedia.org data

Austin's government presents a capital difference compared to the previous cases: its structure, due to the adopted FGvt. As described the city's main representative body is the city council, presided by a directly elected mayor, however this body acts only as a legislative power. The executive functions are under an appointed manager. This is called the council-manager FGvt, moreover unlike the other cases it is named as such in the city charter (article 1). Again, its main features have been detailed and due to space constraints will not be repeated. Nevertheless, it will be emphasized that this comes from the "politics vs administration debate", the manager form being the apex of "professionals in charge". For the manager is appointed due to her/his merits not political stance, furthermore the manager is not expected to have such a stance (explicit in art.5 section 1). The city's site description captures this argument perfectly: "They [the council] appoint a professional City Manager who operates much like a CEO in private-sector businesses". Additionally, no member of the council can serve as manager during their office and this prohibition extends for 2 years after serving in the council (article 5). All city positions have a 2-term of 4 years limit, including the manager.

Interestingly, Austin was the first municipality in Texas to adopt the council-manager form, in 1924, moreover the city charter uses this nomenclature, making the independent variable classification simple. According to the ICMA's survey (2018) nearly half of the US municipalities use this FGvt, however that number was higher at the beginning of the 20th century, with more cities abandoning the manager form than adopting it.

In this FGvt the mayor, or the mayor with council, does not lead the executive and administrative functions of the municipality, but set the political orientation of the city. Hence the professional manager oversees all executive functions, namely the budget and public employment. Nevertheless, the manager is appointed by, and can be deposed, by the council. As explicitly stated in the charter (art 5-section 2), this aims to put professionalism

over politics. The manager is not expected to be partisan and has no fixed minimum term, with the possibility of change present at any council session. Nonetheless, the council is required to name a manager, consequently the executive functions cannot be under the politicians' domain. Then, the mayor is almost a symbolic or ceremonial figure, besides presiding the council (with no tie-breaker vote) and representing the city, she/he has no other significant attribution vis-à-vis a councilmember. Moreover, the manager could be appointed without the mayor's vote and the mayor lacks veto power, as opposed to some cases in the strong mayor form.

Nevertheless, the council remains important, even if the mayor position can be seen as symbolic, the city council is a relevant actor. For its approval is required for all legislation, among others the city budget; and ultimately it appoints and deposes the manager. However, with respect to the budget, the manager is decisive as he/she has power of initiative, using Shugart and Carey (1992) terms. The budget must be elaborated by the manager; the council only having the option of approving/rejecting it. An ironical feature of the council-manager system is that the mayor, a traditionally executive position, is part of the legislative instead of the executive. Furthermore, then the representative of the city to other institutions is the mayor not the manager, who runs the city. Another notable feature is that while Austin citizens have more direct democracy instruments than any of the other cases, they cannot recall the manager. Next comes the city's UA analysis.

The city's UA, entitled "Imagine Austin" is conceived as "A Vision for Austin's Future". Although, the origins of this UA are quite different from the others, it is very institutionalist combining both a political and technocratic origin, it is particular for it comes from the municipality's main institutional arrangement⁶²: The City Charter, that requires the elaboration of a comprehensive city plan (article 10). Their first kind of plan dates from 1928. One could argue that this is linked to the technocratic essence of the manager FGvt, additionally it is the manager's duty to elaborate the document, however the Charter's origin is political. It certainly was not a societal demand, by this it is meant coming from CS organizations that demanded it, which they theoretically could as Austin's citizens have the right of initiative instrument.

Started in 2009, but voted (unanimously), in 2012, this 348-page document adopts a different planning strategy compared to the other cases, by working through annual reports and modifications, hence goals are assessed yearly, along with new issues being added.

⁶² The municipal "Constitution".

Considering the existence of annual reviews, this work analyzes the original 2012 document plus the latest 2020 report. Imagine Austin is a long-term plan that does not set a horizon date, unlike the other selected cases. The planning department oversees the documents creation, its yearly amendments and implementation, nevertheless this department is under the manager's supervision and appointment. Even if the UA (like any initiative) must be approved by the council, the latter has no serious involvement in its design and implementation phase, therefore it seems to be a technocratic or professionally led policy. Nonetheless, the elaboration process was accompanied by the realization of the "Forum Series" (and 21 public meetings) and a citizen advisory task force, where residents of the city were invited to express their opinions, however as stated this does not necessarily lead to influence in the policy cycle that is dominated by the city's bureaucracy supported, as will be presented, by private consultancy firms.

Like its other selected counterparts, "Imagine Austin" sets some prioritized policy dimensions (in the document's listed order):

1. A public health initiative: "Healthy Austin", aimed at diet-related diseases.
2. To propel culture related business.
3. Improving connectivity through public transportation.
4. The revision of the land-use code.
5. Water resources management.
6. Promoting environmental sustainability.
7. Tackling the housing accessibility crisis.
8. Promoting new business creation, particularly small-business.

Despite this UA having its own website, full of information with all reports available, it is difficult to find it. Unlike Sevilla or Stockholm's plan that has a visible link, to reach this UA, one first needs to manage to find the Planning&Zoning Department, then through that tab the "Imagine Austin" link is available. Nonetheless, a useful supplement of the site is its own statistics-site about the UA (also difficult to find).

Concerning its density, like the Sevilla's UA, this document thanks individual participants, here over 4000 individual participants, and even the 1,153 Twitter followers, but once again it is not possible to assess their participation on individual basis because they are not even identified. Despite admitting that this is the author's fault not the document's, being a vulnerability of the framework that was not intended for individual participants unless identified, and that social media could have been accounted in some way. Nonetheless, coherence demands the same analysis to all documents, and along coherence parsimony, following the "Ockham's razor" principle, parsimony must be applied at some point. Independent of this, the "Imagine Austin" document presents the best identification of

participants (partners) of all analyzed documents. Particularly because it is the longest and more complete document, that includes a long “monitoring and evaluation” chapter, alongside an indicators site⁶³.

The *density* value equals 58, meaning considerable participation, which was not expected for this FGvt. Thus, this density value already leads to a partial rejection of the manager related hypotheses (H₄&H₅). Limited participation was expected, as H₄ anticipates this FGvt to have an *exclusionary effect* on participation. Yet on the contrary, this UA is considerably inclusive, and as indicated it included several open workshops. The workshops and extensive citizen engagement were not expected as well, however as chapter 5 and appendix B of the document display, engagement is an objective of this UA.

A noteworthy feature of this UA is the extensive convocation to private consultancy firms, with 13 consultancy firms hired in the process. The *nature* value was in turn anticipated by H₅, for it evidences a predominantly private network (value of -3200). Furthermore, the nature of these private actors is, as expected, business predominant, even if the quantity of CS actors is considerable, the number of business actors almost doubles it.

The *amplitude* indicator value is -3100, indicating a very ample private network. Which was unexpected following hypothesis 4, consequently rejected. Nevertheless, despite H₄'s rejection, H₅ appears to hold, for it correctly captures the nature of this UA, anticipating more collaboration with business actors under the manager FGvt. Both nature and amplitude indicators seem to corroborate this cooperation, that was already advanced by the participation of several consultancy firms in the document's elaboration. The next subsection will further comment on the hypotheses, alongside a comparison between the selected cases.

Table 5.12 Summary of the framework's elements

Austin	Value
Name	Imagine Austin
FGvt	council-manager
Density	58 (58%)
Nature	mostly private (business predominant)
Amplitude	very ample of private nature

Source: own elaboration

⁶³ Also consulted as a source for the identification of participants, although it was not useful.

5.5. Agendas' Comparison.

This part offers a preliminary comparative analysis of the selected cases. It is labeled as preliminary because it is a brief comparative overview of some of the UA characteristics previously exposed. This work's principal comparison will come next, as section 5.6 will be dedicated to the comparative analysis of the framework and its hypotheses. Albeit it was thought interesting to succinctly present a comparative view of the general UA's features.

Table 5.13 Agenda's Origin Comparison.

Origin	Case (s)
Political	Stockholm
Technocratic	Montevideo, Sevilla & Austin
Societal	None

source: own elaboration

Comparatively most agendas have a technocratic origin, coming as an initiative of the urban planning/development departments. This is not surprising considering the strategic planning essence of this policy instrument. Additionally, for the European cases, there is the technocratic influence coming from the supranational level, as thoroughly detailed by Huete and Merinero (2021) this instrument is being promoted by the European Union from 2016. Austin once again displays some specificities, the former because the elaboration of strategic planning is mandated by the city charter, again not surprising contemplating that the manager form has a strong technocratic essence⁶⁴. For its part Stockholm's plan does have a political origin, with the initiative coming from the city council, even if most of the design rests on the city's bureaucracy. This was demonstrated by the fact that when the government changed, the newly elected city council decided to revise the document.

Table 5.14 Agenda Accessibility Comparison.

⁶⁴ See section 2.2. Sadly, further analysis exceeds the scope of this work.

City	Agenda Accessibility	Own website	Department in charge
Austin	DIFFICULT	YES	Planning and Zoning Department
Montevideo	DIFFICULT	YES	Urban development
Sevilla	EASILY	YES	Strategic Planning
Stockholm	EASILY	YES	Urban development

source: own elaboration

Another comparative aspect of the UA that was thought relevant⁶⁵ to compare is how accessible is the UA document. Then, yet another variable was created, named “agenda accessibility”, it is a *simple* ordinal variable with 3 possible values that describe how accessible the document is for non-participants. The possible values concerning accessibility are self-explanatory: “Easily”; “Accessible”; “Difficult”, thus ordinally ranked. Table 5.14 summarizes and compares the previously commented findings, evidencing that half of the selected agendas are easily accessible and the other half are difficult to find. Additionally, it was deemed useful to add another comparison in the table: the department in charge of the agenda. With respect to department placement all cases appear to be similar, with changes depending more on nomenclature than design.

5.6. Results Discussion.

In this section the proposed framework and hypotheses will be discussed by comparing the 4 case-studies. Recapitulating from section 3, if the employed working definition of governance: *polycymaking through interdependent networks of public and non-public actors*, holds; when adopting the FGvt as the independent variable: it is estimated that the FGvt determines the opportunity for a certain governance to materialize instead of another. This was considered plausible contemplating that institutions determine participation (who and how many); incentivize or constrain courses of action, and they regulate the information flow (Ostrom 1986,6). Therefore, due to the role of the FGvt as a preminent institutional arrangement, as proposed in section 3:

“Consequently, different institutional arrangements, notably the FGvt, mean differences in the negotiating and discretionary power of the actors. Particularly: they attribute different capacity to the political leaders to include their preferred participants in the governance network” (p.28).

This was tested through the, previously exposed, analysis of 4 different UA elaborated in 4 different cities possessing a different FGvt. The focus in these case studies was (is) on the

⁶⁵ It was also deemed important considering all municipalities refer to citizen involvement, then how easy it is for a citizen to access the documents and news, events, etc related to the policy is also considered important.

composition of the network, operationalized as the *morphology* (structure) of the policy network and measured through the synthetic indicator of *amplitude* and its intermediate indicators. The latter provide additional detail, particularly the *nature* indicator. Finally, it was argued that the choice of the UA, as the unit of analysis & observation, is ideal, because the UA policy implies the proposed definition of governance. As argued, if there is no *policymaking through interdependent networks of public and non-public actors*⁶⁶ there is no governance policymaking. Still, this framework and its proposed interactions are expected effects, therefore they need to be empirically tested. This was the principal intention of this section 5, with each case concluding with the test of its corresponding hypothesis. Following, the predicted effects will be evaluated, and the cases compared.

Summarized in table 5.15, the documental analysis data shows that the predictions are fairly accurate. To begin with, there is variation in the dependent variable, this should not be underscored, for it is the “first try” of the proposed framework, then to be able to argue that governance is not a constant is a result on its own. More importantly, the 4-case analysis supports most of the anticipated effects. Admittedly, while only 2 hypotheses are accurately predicted (3 and 5), hypotheses 1 and 2 are almost accurate, thus only one of them (H4) was rejected.

Table 5.15 Summary of the Hypotheses examination.

FGvt case		UA analysis	Ho & Data Correspondence
strong mayor	Expected	exclusionary and of public nature	Almost accurately
	Found	narrow governance but of balanced nature	
committee leader	Expected	inclusive with no nature preference	Accurately
	Found	the committee-leader form leads the amplest governance compared to any other FGvt very ample of private nature (civil society predominantly)	
collegial	Expected	inclusive with no nature preference	Partially
	Found	moderate governance of public nature	
council-manager	Expected	exclusionary and of private nature more collaboration with business actors.	amplitude prediction is rejected (H4)
	Found	inclusive of private nature (business predominant)	nature prediction is accurate (H5)

Source: Own elaboration

⁶⁶ Reflected by an amplitude value ranging from 0 to 100.

Returning to the comparative analysis, the first anticipated theoretical conclusion was an institutional effect: that two FGvt (manager and mayor) have an *exclusionary effect* on participation, thus narrowing policy governance (table 3.3). This was rejected by the data, for it only occurred in one of the expected cases (Sevilla), with H₄ being rejected. Concerning the other theoretically exclusionary FGvt: the strong mayor, the analysis of the Sevilla UA appears to confirm this feature, for H₁ appears to hold in this respect. Even considering that H₁ is said to almost predict the existent governance of Sevilla's UA, because despite governance being narrow, it is not as publicly oriented as expected. Sevilla UA's nature (then amplitude) value displays an almost balanced participation. This might be due to the exclusionary feature, as the low density balances the network's nature. All these findings are considered interesting, hence demanding a more in-depth assessment of the case.

Alternately, the forms predicted to be *inclusive* acted accordingly, with the Stockholm's UA being the most inclusive of them all, while Montevideo shows a higher density, therefore more participating actors, than the surprisingly inclusive Austin. Bearing in mind that the Montevideo case is not pure, despite its local governments adopting the collegial form, the city's UA is led by the regional level (*departamental*), that is not collegially governed. This could explain why H₂ only partially captures the existent governance of the UA. As indicated by Huete (2010) hypothesis stressing the relevance of the political party in government, this might have more explanatory power than the FGvt for this case. But that assessment is further nuanced by the fact that municipalities did participate in the UA's elaboration, thus considering the UA as their own, although they did so in an inferior position. In sum, the debate is open with respect to this case and to H₂, and it is acknowledged as a weakness of this work.


For its part, the municipality of Stockholm not only presents a pure version of the committee-leader FGvt, but it is the only case where both hypotheses accurately predict the governance of the UA. Both H₂ and H₃ hold, let us remember that H₃ is a comparative hypothesis, for it anticipates that *the committee-leader form leads the amplest governance compared to any other FGvt*. Hence, this can only happen in relation to other cases, and this 4-case comparison demonstrates its accuracy, for effectively Stockholm displays the amplest governance with the highest amplitude value (and density). All indicators for this municipality reflect diversity and inclusion, moreover it was acknowledged that private actors might have been underrepresented, thus the amplitude value could be even greater.

The other predicted to be *exclusionary* form, the council-manager, ended up being the only case of a complete hypothesis rejection. Considering that the analysis of the “Imagine Austin” plan displayed an unexpectedly high participation, with a density value almost equal to Montevideo’s and not much lower than Stockholm’s. Nonetheless, with a very different nature, as Austin’s UA governance is mostly composed of private actors, additionally these private actors are businesses. Thus, confirming H₅ prediction and most of the literature about the manager form (Goldsmith 1992; Pierre 1999; Mouritzen and Svava 2002). Once again, further analysis would be very enriching, for example a comparison among manager led cities under different party government.

Finally, this leads to another discussion about the framework: the amplitude value for this case was higher than Montevideo’s and almost as high as Stockholm’s. Then, one more time a vulnerability of the amplitude indicator needs to be exposed and explained for it is well captured by the framework, but not by the final indicator. Synthetic indicators capture complex elements, simplistically said, in a single value, thus complications and missed details are to be expected (Pena 2009,308). In this case, the amplitude synthetic indicator presents an almost similar value for Austin and Stockholm, the latter being only slightly larger, however when looking at the intermediate indicators: density and specially nature, one can see that the 2 cases are very different(appendix). The Stockholm UA’s governance is much more diverse and includes more actors, as reflected by the density score and a larger public and private actors’ value, nevertheless this is not correctly reflected by the amplitude indicator. Again, demonstrating the need for empirical analysis and testing of theoretical frameworks, this was not expected but the data analysis exposed it.

Summing up, the 4-case comparison supports that governance is not constant; while the pure strong mayor Sevilla presents the lowest density and amplitude values; the municipality of Stockholm, under the committee-leader form presents the amplest. Austin and Montevideo come in between, both not acting as expected, particularly the manager led Austin. A useful visualization of the comparison is to place the cases as points in a continuum. In this case, a *governance amplitude continuum*, elaborated from the values of the homonymous indicator for each municipality, taking “no governance” and “amplest governance” as the polar extremes.

Figure 5.1 Governance Amplitude Continuum



Source: own elaboration

Accordingly, the institutional arrangement (FGvt) incentives and attributions are expected to have explanatory power over these differences. Evidently, it is not assumed that the FGvt is the only causal variable, this was already specified after each hypothesis, variables such as the electoral outcome or the ideological position of the mayor and council have an important influence. Nevertheless, the FGvt can plausibly exert the argued influence. The comparative documental analysis appears to be in support of this, particularly as 3 of the 5 hypotheses hold, with another one partially predicting the UA's governance. Institutionally provided powers in the manager and mayor FGvt cases allow the decision makers to go along with a more technocratic process, if desired, even if Austin's UA displays an ample governance, it is very business oriented, with consultancy firms even participating in its design. Which would be unthinkable in another institutional setting, for example the committee-leader. In turn, the most power-sharing of all arrangements: the committee-leader, appears to lead to more inclusion as more actors are involved in the policymaking network. No unipersonal actor has the capacity to exclude others. This leads us back to an early presented premise, if politics is "who gets what, when and how" (Lasswell 1936) therefore the *how* is a crucial component, and the FGvt determines the *how*. Furthermore, concerning governance policymaking, the capacity to exclude or include actors is determinant as well. Some FGvt give the political leaders these capacities others do not, thus variation is expected. Granted, the previous is a theoretical mechanism, however the documental analysis endorses the aforementioned relationship, with most cases moving in the expected direction. Including Austin's case, for despite H₄ not holding, H₅ does anticipate the business participation. This participation is not randomly produced or a matter of fate, it is an institutionally induced outcome. Admittedly, as subsection 2.2 explains, this was purposefully designed for the manager form, however the proposed logical relationship remained when the actors changed, and that is the product (and essence) of institutions. The manager FGvt was designed to promote business participation, and apparently so it does by attributing a business-oriented leader (the manager) the capacity to include his preferred participants in the policymaking process. The same could occur under another form, but it will certainly be more difficult.

6. Conclusions.

The main idea conveyed in this work is that institutions matter with respect to local governance. Additionally, they influence the elaboration of the novel urban agendas, a policy instrument paradigmatic of governance policymaking. Contending that if institutions create an incentive structure, originating from the so-called *structural choice*, then outcomes should vary given the institutional framework (Moe and Caldwell 1994; Tsebelis 1995), thus the comparative proposal and analysis. This argument is not new in social sciences, D. North, and several other prominent authors, based their work on this premise. However, the current contribution concerns the not so explored analysis of local governance. Even if the same type of effect: institutions as an explicative variable is introduced. In this case, the form of government determines the opportunities for a certain governance to materialize instead of another. Nevertheless, the limits of the analysis are acknowledged, and this work does not intend to be reductionist in claiming that only institutions matter, or that within institutional arrangements only the form of government matters. Additionally, recognizing the risk of only looking at formal rules, section 2 warns about informal rules (also institutions) being also at play (North 1990,53). Plus, that other variables intervene is a warning that was stated during the analytical framework and the empirical analysis discussion.

Despite being left out in the core of the manuscript, the proposed institutional influence additionally poses normative concerns. Following Shepsle's seminal work: "If institutions matter, then which institutions are employed becomes a paramount concern." (1983,3); the issue of the ever-ending relationship between institutional design and *Good Government*. In this case, the concept of governance has been traditionally linked to normative arguments, the so-called *good governance* (Grindle 2010), so has been institutional design from the works of Plato up to our days. The latter is a centuries long debate, if not millenniums, and this proposed framework could eventually add yet another small argument to the subject. Along this line, a final, and more normative, intuition is introduced: a byproduct of inclusive governance is expected to be legitimacy, following Hirschman (1970) this would be linked to the *voice* mechanism that should have a legitimacy premium on a government working through an ample governance. Contrary to previous conceptualizations of local government planning that fostered the *exit* mechanism as dominant, such as Tiebout's (1956) well known "voting with their feet".

The intended contribution comes through the testing of institutionalist hypotheses. Later work would have the task of theorizing with respect to what network morphology and

amplitude is desired. The principal objective of this work lies in the created analytical framework; it additionally tests this framework empirically, thus a final word on the predictions' accuracy is appropriate here. Admittedly, the current 4 selected cases were a combination of qualitative case-study with the quantitative spirit of the elaborated indicators, evidently, limited to the possible means (both cognitive and material) of the present endeavor (and author). Granting that most likely, an adaptation, whether it is a large-N analysis or the addition of more in depth case studies could change the predictions results. Despite all of this, the predictions hold at least with respect to the expected direction, moreover 3 of the 5 accurately anticipate the agenda's governance. This is considered relevant and motivates further work on the subject.

Concerning this further work, an *interactive effect* product of the UA instrument's characteristics that would attenuate or magnify the FGvt's impact is theoretically anticipated. Recognizing that the institutional arrangement is analyzed in the context of a specific policy instrument, that has its own features, and could possibly lead to a bidirectional influence. This interaction is expected to influence governance as well, even if not as substantially as the FGvt, because the institutional arrangement, as presented, has a preeminent influence on *who* gets *what*, and specially *how*.

Finally with respect to future interests and work. As seen in the discussion section: this work leads to more questions than answers, but this is not necessarily considered a failure, on the contrary, it is what was expected from an exploratory, master's monograph level analysis: to lead to more research. It was never the objective of this work to come to any definitive answer, or irrefutable hypothesis. Accordingly, all along the case analysis section, the framework was critically employed, and its vulnerabilities were not concealed but exposed. This was done out of academic integrity but also in order to lead to suggestions from the commentators and eventual readers. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the framework is not appropriate, on the contrary, this work supports its creation and use. First considering that the principal objective of this work is attained: to revisit the importance of institutions in local policy making and to bring attention to the form of government as a crucial arrangement. To achieve this, governance had to be measured and this monograph's principal contribution is the framework's creation. Regardless of its deficits, every journey starts with a first step, here a journey towards an original academic proposal. Evidently limits and vulnerabilities were expected considering the nature of this work. The next step is the revision of this proposal by experienced academics, that in turn will lead to improvement. At this point there is nothing left to comment but to thank the reader for his/her patience.

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Appendix

Following are the details of the current analysis of each UA. The documental analysis was partially done using the Atlas.ti software, with the data coded and the indicators calculated in Excel spreadsheets. What follows are a copy of the excel spreadsheet, as text and pictures so it fits in the word margins, for each agenda. This can be provided if desired. An important note: these are not figures or tables of the monograph, but they are presented as such for simplicity purposes. All of them are an own elaboration of the author.

Recapitulating from section 3, our unit of analysis and observation is the urban agenda of each city. The analysis can be done either through documental analysis (direct observation) or indirectly through elite interviews (even elite surveys⁶⁷):

“The **dependent variable** is the governance of the UA. As mentioned, central for any governance process, and particularly for the UA, is participation. Hence, the attention will be on the composition of the network. Therefore, local governance is operationalized focusing on the morphology (structure) of the policy network of the UA policy- **our unit of analysis and observation**. This is, the actors that conform it, in other words: how is the network composed?” (p.21).

1- Sevilla

First the participants need to be listed and counted, this process results in the density value. Arithmetically this is very simple, but practically the difficulty rests in identifying the participants. Not only the present participants, but both: included and the total actors. Admittedly the “total number of actors” is always an approximation. UA documents⁶⁸ list both the included, the invited participants that were not present, and the participants they would like to have present. From that information the number of total participants is calculated. Again, recognizing it is an approximation.

In the case of Sevilla, 19 participants were identified out of a totality of 75. Thus, a density of 25. Next the *nature* indicator can be calculated, as explained assigning 100 and 0 to both public and private actors. Subsequently for private actors the same needs to be done for B or CS actors.

Actor	Public	Private	B	CS
municipality	100	0		
Innovación Social del Ayuntamiento de Sevilla	100	0		
Inés Rosales	0	100	100	0
Emergya	0	100	100	
desarrollo social	100	0		
Turismo Sevilla	100	0		
CSIC	100	0		
caritas sevilla	0	100	0	100
Centro Común de Investigación de la Comisión Europea	100	0		
Emvisesa	0	100	100	0

⁶⁷ Impossible in the case of a TFM but theoretically a very interesting method for collecting UA data.

⁶⁸ And supporting documents as explained.

Universidad de Sevilla	100	0		
Grupo CyG IT Solutions,	0	100	100	0
Consejo Andaluz del Deport	100	0		
Confederación Andaluza de Federaciones	100	0		
Asociación cultural ZEMOS98	0	100	0	100
Consejería de Educación de la Junta de Andalucía	100	0		
Fundación Persán	0	100	0	100
Consejo Social de la Universidad de Sevilla	100	0		
Alestis Aerospace	0	100	100	0

Finally, the *amplitude* value is calculated from the intermediate indicators' total values.

ature summat	Total public	1100
	Total private	800
	Total public - private	300
	Total B	500
	Total CS	300
	Total B-CS	200
Indicator	Value	Comment
Desnity	25	limited governance
Nautre	300	balanced public network
Amplitude	325	NARROW governance

Nature Private Actors	Value	Comment
	200	balanced

The same process is repeated for each case. Then to avoid redundancy only the values are listed for the next 3 cases.

2- Montevideo

54 participants were identified out of a possible of 92. Thus, a density value of 59

With respects to their nature

Actor	Public	Private	B	CS
subnational government of Montevideo	100	0		
Municipio A	100	0		
Municipio B	100	0		
Municipio C	100	0		
Municipio CH	100	0		
Municipio D	100	0		
Municipio E	100	0		
Municipio F	100	0		
Municipio G	100	0		
OPP National Gvt	100	0		
Facultad de ciencias economicas	100	0		
facultad de arquitectura	100	0		

facultad de ciencias sociales	100	0		
Cámara de Industrias	0	100	100	0
Secretaría de la infancia, adolescencia y juventud	100	0		
Museo de las Migraciones	100	0		
MVD lab	100	0		
Agencia de cooperación alemana	100	0		
Mercociudades	100	0		
Agencia de cooperación española	100	0		
Empresa Tres Vectores	0	100	100	0
agencia nacional de puertos	100	0		
Gehl	0	100	100	0
Cámara de Comercio y Servicios	0	100	100	0
intendencia de Canelones	100	0		
innodrive	0	100		
Ministerio de Industria, energía y minería	100	0		
UTE	100	0		
ANCAP	100	0		
Public health ministry	100	0		
CUTCSA	0	100	100	0
Coordinadora de Usuario de Transporte	0	100	0	100
PNUD	100	0		
UNIBICI	0	100	0	100
Defensoría de Vecinos y Vecinas	100	0		
SEG Ingenieros	0	100	100	0
BID	100	0		
PIT CNT	0	100	0	100
CAF	0	100	100	0
Intergremial Transportes de CARGA	0	100	0	100
COMESA	0	100	100	0
Universidad Católica	0	100	100	0
facultad de ingeniería	100	0		
Instituto de Derechos Humanos	100	0		
Alcalde Las Piedras	100	0		
Agesic	100	0		
Asociación General de Autores del Uruguay	0	100	0	100
Presidenta de la cámara de senadores	100	0		
Cotidiano Mujer	0	100	0	100
Coordinador Plan Juntos	100	0		
Colectivo reparación afro Uruguayos	0	100	0	100
FUCVAM	0	100	0	100
Parque Tecnológico Cerro	100	0		
MIDES	100	0		

Leading to an amplitude value of

Nature summator	Total public	3600
	Total private	1800
	Total public - private	1800
	Total B	900
	Total CS	800
	Total B-CS	100
Indicator	Value	Comment
Desnity	59	intermediate
Nautre	1800	mostly public
Amplitude	1859	moderate of public nature

Nature Private Actors	Value	Comment
	100	balanced

3- Stockholm

104 participants were identified out of a possible of 155. Thus, a density value of 67.

Actor	Public	Private	B	CS
Stockholm municipality	100	0		
Storstockholms Lokaltrafik (SL-public transport company)	100	0		
Bromma district administration	100	0		
Enskede-Årsta-Vantörs district administration	100	0		
Farsta district administration	100	0		
Hägersten-Ålvsjö district administration	100	0		
Hässelby-Vällingby district administration	100	0		
Kungsholmen's district administration	100	0		
Norrmalm's district administration	100	0		
Rinkeby-Kista district administration	100	0		
Skarpnäck district administration	100	0		
Skärholmen's district administration	100	0		
Spånga-Tensta district administration	100	0		
Södermalm district administration	100	0		
Östermalm's district administration	100	0		
Stockholms Stadshus AB	100	0		
AB Familjebostäder	100	0		
AB Stockholmshem	100	0		
AB Svenska Bostäder	100	0		
Bostadsförmedlingen i Stockholm AB	100	0		
Micasa Fastigheter i Stockholm AB	100	0		
Kulturhuset Stadsteatern	100	0		
St. Erik Försäkrings AB	100	0		
St. Erik Livförsäkring AB	100	0		
St. Erik Markutveckling AB	100	0		
SISAB - Skolfastigheter i Stockholm AB	100	0		
Stockholm Business Region AB	100	0		
Stockholm Globe Arena Fastigheter AB	100	0		
Stockholms Hamn AB	100	0		
Stockholms Stads Parkering AB	100	0		

Stockholm Vatten och Avfall AB	100	0		
Stokab	100	0		
National Government	100	0		
Regional Gvt	100	0		
Eurocities	100	0		
Eva Bonnier's Foundation	0	100	0	100
The Archipelago Foundation in Stockholm County	0	100	0	100
The Children's Day Foundation	0	100	0	100
Stiftelsen Hotellhem i Stockholm (SHIS)	0	100	0	100
The Stockholm County Elderly Center Foundation	0	100	0	100
The Stockholm Maritime Hotel Foundation	0	100	0	100
The Strindberg Museum Foundation	0	100	0	100
The Tyrestaskogen Foundation	0	100	0	100
Stiftelsen Vetenskapsstaden	0	100	0	100
Stockholm Water Foundation	0	100	0	100
Stockholm Concert Hall Foundation	0	100	0	100
Bromma pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Bromma advice for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Bromma social delegation	0	100	0	100
Enskede-Årsta-Vantörs Pensionärsråd	0	100	0	100
Enskede-Årsta-Vantör's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Enskede-Årsta-Vantör's social delegation	0	100	0	100
Farsta's democracy, integration and association council	0	100	0	100
Farsta's environmental council	0	100	0	100
Farsta's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Farsta's advice for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Farsta's social delegation	0	100	0	100
Farsta's development and business council	0	100	100	0
Hägersten-Älvsjö pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Hägersten-Älvsjö Council for Disability Issues	0	100	0	100
Hägersten-Älvsjö social delegation	0	100	0	100
Hässelby-Vällingby pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Hässelby-Vällingby council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Hässelby-Vällingby social delegation	0	100	0	100
Kungsholmen's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Kungsholmen's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Kungsholmen's Social Delegation	0	100	0	100
Norrmalm's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Norrmalm's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Norrmalm's social delegation	0	100	0	100
Rinkeby-Kista pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Rinkeby-Kista advice for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Rinkeby-Kista social delegation	0	100	0	100
Skarpnäck's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Skarpnäck's advice for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Skarpnäck's social delegation	0	100	0	100
Skärholmen's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Skärholmen's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Skärholmen's social delegation	0	100	0	100
Spånga-Tensta pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Spånga-Tensta advice for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Spånga-Tensta social delegation	0	100	0	100
Södermalm's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Södermalm's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Södermalm's social delegation	0	100	0	100

Östermalm's pensioners' council	0	100	0	100
Östermalm's council for disability issues	0	100	0	100
Östermalm's social delegation	0	100	0	100
The Executive Board of the Stockholm School of Economics	0	100	0	100
Film Capital Stockholm AB	0	100	100	0
Filmpool Stockholm-Mälardalen economic association	0	100	0	100
The association Spårvagnsstäderna	0	100	0	100
Good men according to the Real Estate Development Act	0	100	100	0
The Mälardalen Council's meeting	0	100	0	100
The National Committee of Sweden's National Day and Swedish Flag Day	0	100	0	100
The City of Stockholm Coordinating Association (FINSAM)	0	100	0	100
The Beauty Council's delegates in planning and building permit matters, nature conservation matters and cultural conservation matters	0	100	0	100
Stockholm Film Fund AB	0	100	100	0
Stockholm Region's European Association	0	100	0	100
Storsthlm (formerly KSL)	0	100	0	100
Greater Stockholm Fire Brigade	0	100	0	100
The meeting of the Svealand Coastal Water Management Association	0	100	0	100
Östra Sveriges Luftvärdsförbund	0	100	0	100

Nature summatory	Total public	3500
	Total private	6800
	Total public - private	-3300
	Total B	400
	Total CS	6400
	Total B-CS	-6000
Indicator	Value	Comment
Desnity	67	dense network
Nautre	-3300	mostly private
Amplitude	-3233	very ample of private nature

Nature Private Actor	Value	Comment
	-6000	mostly CS

4. Austin

51 participants were identified out of a possible of 90. Thus, a density value of 57

With respects to their nature

Actor	Public	Private	B	CS
city of austin (manager & burueacracy)	100	0		
city council	100	0		
Citizens Advisory Task Force	0	100	0	100
Austin energy	0	100	100	0
AngelouEconomics	0	100	100	0
Wallace Roberts & Todd	0	100	100	0
Canales-Sondgeroth & Associates	0	100	100	0

Carter Design Associates	0	100	100	0
Criterion Planners	0	100	100	0
Estilo Communications	0	100	100	0
ETC Institute	0	100	100	0
Group Solutions RJW	0	100	100	0
Kimley-Horn And Associates	0	100	100	0
Raymond Chan & Associates	0	100	100	0
Civic Collaboration	0	100	0	100
Hahn, Texas / Rifeline	0	100	100	0
Robyn Emerson	0	100	100	0
Capital Metro	0	100	100	0
texas transport agency	100	0		
federal transport agency	100	0		
Chambers of Commerce	0	100	100	0
Advocates for people with disabilities	0	100	0	100
cycling advocates	0	100	0	100
affordable housing advocates	0	100	0	100
transit users group	0	100	0	100
school districts	100	0		
UT austin	0	100	100	0
Travis county	100	0		
Austin Public Library	100	0		
Community College	100	0		
Community Action Network	0	100	0	100
Asian American Cultural Centre	0	100	0	100
Austin Board of Realtors	0	100	100	0
Austin Convention and Visitor's Bureau	0	100	100	0
Austin Independent Business Alliance	0	100	100	0
Austin Neighborhood Council	0	100	0	100
Concordia University	0	100	100	0
Downtown Austin Alliance	0	100	0	100
Del Valle Independent School District	100	0		
Meals on Wheels	0	100	0	100
Real Estate Council of Austin	0	100	100	0
St David's Community Health Foundation	0	100	0	100
Texas Nature Conservancy	0	100	0	100
Time Warner & Grande.	0	100	100	0
Austin Post	0	100	100	0
American Institute of Architects	0	100	0	100
Congress for the New Urbanism	0	100	0	100
Austin Chronicle	0	100	100	0
Austin Times	0	100	100	0
Hispanic Today "Live"	0	100	100	0

Leading to an amplitude value of

Nature summatory	Total public	900
	Total private	4100
	Total public - private	-3200
	Total B	2600
	Total CS	1500
	Total B-CS	1100
Indicator	Value	Comment
Desnity	57,77	moderate density
Nautre	-3200	predominantly private
Amplitude	-3142,23	very ample of private nature

Nature Private Actors	Value	Comment
	1100	business predominant