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Extreme-Right in Portugal and Spain: Between Legacy and Rebirth

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The ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility are not opposites. They are complementary to one another.

Max Weber

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List of Abbreviations

AP   *Alianza Popular* (Spain: Popular Alliance)

CDS   *Centro Democrático Social* (Portugal. Social Democratic Center)

ELP   *Exército de Libertação de Portugal* (Portugal:

ETA   *Euskadi Ta Askatasuna* (Spain: Euskadi and Freedom)

FN   Fuerza Nueva (Spain: New Force)

MDLP   *Movimento Democrático de Libertação de Portugal* (Portugal: Democratic Movement for the Liberation of Portugal)

MFA   *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (Portugal: Armed Forces Movement)

PCE   *Partido Comunista de España* (Spain: Communist Party of Spain)

PP   *Partido Popular* (Spain: Popular Party)

PSD   *Partido Social Democrata* (Portugal: Social Democratic Party)

PSOE   *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (Spain: Spanish Socialist Worker's Party)

UCD   *Unión de Centro Democratico* (Spain: Union of Democratic Center)

Abstract

The 2019 legislative elections meant the return of the extreme-right to the parliaments of Portugal and Spain. The arrival of *Chega* and *Vox* in their respective parliaments put an end to the immunity of the Iberian Peninsula in relation to extreme-right political parties. This structural change in both political systems raised the scientific need to revisit the entire path of the extreme-right in the democratic period. To understand why the capacity of the extreme-right has returned decades later, we revisit the Portuguese and Spanish democratic transitions through a comparative historical analysis in order to decipher the exogenous and endogenous legacy left by the transitions on the extreme-right. After analysing the influence of the democratic transitions on the inability verified on the extreme-right for decades, we decipher the endogenous and exogenous changes that boosted *Chega* and *Vox*, with different strength, as parliamentary forces.

Keywords

Introduction

The 2019 elections in Portugal and Spain confirmed the loss of the immunity, frequently emphasized by the scholars, by the both political systems in relation to extreme-right parties. The extreme-right parties were incapable of achieving effective results after the transitions to democracy, with only one deputy from an extreme-right party elected in the Iberian Peninsula— Blas Piñar, who was elected in 1979 by the *Unión Nacional* to the Congress by Madrid.[1] Now the extreme-right seems to be recovering the capacity it had lost in the past. In Portgual, the first deputy of an extreme-right party since the transition, André Ventura, from the political party *Chega,* was recently elected.[2] In an even more marked example, the extreme-right party *Vox* in Spain, which was founded in 2013, managed to become the third-most voted political force in the November 2019 general elections, reinforcing its position by winning fifty-two seats in the national Congress. From this point, the difference of strength seems clear when comparing the Portuguese with the Spanish case.[3]

The countries of the Iberian Peninsula were politically connected in various dimensions throughout history as a result of the geographical proximity and cultural similarities. Spain and Portugal share one of the oldest borders of the international system. There are several political situations in the two countries that have influenced each other, such as the case of transitions to democracy in which the Portuguese transition influenced the Spanish transition due to factors such as the similarity between authoritarian regimes or the longevity of those regimes.[4]

There are countless comparative works carried out about Portugal and Spain, from cultural approaches to works about democratic transitions,[5] and a burgeoning body of recent literature focused on the lack of trust in political institutions. The present work seeks to go beyond the existing works about the Iberian democratic transitions by deciphering the extent to which the democratic transitions of these countries had in the disappearance of the extreme-right over more than four decades. By "disappearance", we refer to the fact that no extreme-right political party was capable of achieving relevant electoral results in either of the political systems, something we believe to be a legacy of the transitions to democracy. By examining the historical

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[1] The *Unión Nacional* was a coalition between various political parties that identified themselves with the authoritarian period.

[2] *Chega* achieved 1.29% in the legislative elections of October 2019.

[3] VOX achieved 15.09% in the general elections of November 2019.

[4] Josep Sanchez Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)* (Madrid, Editorial Nerea, 1995), 263.

[5] One example of a comparative work is the recent work authored by Robert Fishman, *Democratic Practice: Origins of the Iberian Divide in Political Inclusion* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2019).

trajectories following the transitions to democracy, this study also seeks to analyse the factors that explain the differences in strength in the acquisition of political relevance in the most recent electoral acts, in Portugal and Spain.

Until the 2019 elections, the inability of the extreme-right to gain an electoral foothold for decades made the Iberian space a unique context due to its apparent immunity to the growth of extreme-right political parties compared with other parts of Europe where extreme-right political forces demonstrated a capacity to achieve relevant results, as for example was the case with the Front National in France,[6] and the Lega Nord in Italy.[7] We consider that our understanding of the new generation of extreme-right political parties, which started to emerge mainly since the 1980's, can be optimized by analysing the condition of the extreme-right before and after some critical junctures. An example of the importance of critical junctures, in addition to our work, to understand the condition of the extreme-right during the time can be the period marked by regular terrorist attacks in Italy, known as *anni di piombo* between the 1960's and the 1980's.[8]

Regarding to our study, some events beyond the transitions, like both Spain and Portugal entering the European Economic Community in the same year[9] which is important to explain the stability during the late 80´s and during the 90´s, are helpful to understand the incapacity of the extreme-right in both countries during the period of democratic consolidation because in fact the entrance in the European Economic Community was only possible due to democratisation. The effects caused by these events influenced the construction of social and political stability that help us to understand the incapacity of the extreme-right to gain momentum for decades. *Chega* and *Vox* emerged in a context of more social and political instability, as proved by the gradual lack of trust in the political institutions. By emphasizing these distinct contexts we establish a solid basis to understand the different generations of the extreme-right.

With *Vox* already holding seats in the parliament before the elections of 2019, the entrance of the extreme-right on the Portuguese parliament ended the other "half" of the Iberian immunity. Both countries' elections have aroused interest on this object of study and introduces the need for a different scientific point of view—one that revisits both democratic transitions in order to

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[6] *Front National* is now designated *Rassemblement National*.

[7] *Lega Nord* is now designated *Lega*.

[8] About the Italian extreme-right after the "lead years" see Nicola Cristadoro, *Eversione di Destra negli Agni di Piombo: Dal "nuovo ordine" al "populismo armato" e l´influenza sulla destra extraparlamentarie del XXI secolo* (Collegno, Roberto Chiaramonte Editore, 2006).

[9] Portugal and Spain joined the European Economic Community in 1986.

understand how these transitions contributed to the prolonged disappearance of the extreme-right as relevant political force.

 The Spanish "pacted transition" was different from the revolutionary Portuguese transition initiated by non-hierarchical military. In Spain one of the mains tasks was to find a way to dismantle the nondemocratic regime and its institutions and to gain democratic legitimacy,[10] in a process strongly marked by the inclusionary decision to allow all political forces to participate in the political process.[11] On the other hand, in Portugal the process was initiated by the non-hierarchical military followed by a key role played by the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* in the political arena,[12] with a relevant number of elements with extreme-left convictions, having important implications for the future of Portuguese democratisation. Those characteristics are crucial in understanding the condition of the extreme-right during the process, as we will further develop throughout the paper. This path dependence is the first focus of this work that will, as it develops, not only explain what led to the incapacity of the extreme-right in the post-transition period but will also decipher the variables that caused the transition legacies to dissipate, leading to the previous referred loss of immunity and consequent rise of the extreme-right.

 In sum, this work tries to prove the influence of the democratic transitions in the desertification of the extreme-right political forces in both cases, Portugal and Spain, and also determines the reasons that explain the different strength of the extreme-right political parties in the last elections, where *Chega* was incapable of obtaining as impressive of a result as obtained by *Vox* in the last elections in Spain.

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[10] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan*, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (London, John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
[11] Ibid., 97.
[12] The *Movimento das Forças Armadas* was the group of military that overturned the *Estado Novo.*

State of the Art

The literature on extreme-right political parties in general is well-developed, especially regarding the most recent uprising of extreme-right political parties in Europe.[13] About the transitions to democracy in the Iberian Space it's also possible to find well-documented literature from diverse perspectives that examine different independent variables, partially because both transitions were models to apply new theoretical approaches in order to analyse the third wave of democratization.[14] There are different levels of literature available about the extreme-right and about its incapacity after the process of transition in Portugal and Spain. In regards to the extreme-right in the Spanish context, it's possible to find academic works that span a long period from the process of transition until the twenty-first century, with an important emphasis on the incapacity of the extreme-right to organize, to gain the support from civil society and the difficulty of finding a charismatic leader.[15] Even though the literature about the Portuguese situation is less developed in comparison with the Spanish, it's possible to find works with the same characteristics of analysis from the transition period until the twenty-first century.[16]

The availability of relevant literature changes if we speak about comparative works. To our knowledge, there are no comparative works regarding the extreme-right in Portugal and Spain, from a comparative historical approach, as we propose here.[17] Thus emerges a clear space that serves as the first justification for our work—to construct a deeper comparative analysis between the Spanish and the Portuguese extreme-right, a comparison that we cannot find in the literature available.

Also, as discussed in the introduction, in light of recent elections, the reality has changed in both countries with the debut of the extreme-right in Portugal and the best electoral result ever obtained for *Vox* in Spain since democratisation. Regarding *Vox,* there already exists important

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[13] About the uprising of the extreme right in Europe see the recent work of Jean-Yves Camus and Nicolas Lebourg, *Far-Right Politics in Europe*. (Massachussets, Harvard University Press, 2017).

[14] About the third wave of democratisation see Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Oklahoma University Press, Norman and London, 1991); Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe.*

[15] About the Spanish Extreme Right since the transition until the beggining of the twenty first century see Ferran Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria: La Extrema Derecha Española (1973-2005)* (Madrid, Sintesis, 2006).

[16] About the Portuguese Extreme Right since the transition until the twenty first century see Riccardo Marchi, *The Portuguese Far Right: Between Late Authoritarianism and Democracy (1945-2015)* (New York, Routledge, 2019).

[17] There are works comparing the extreme right parties in Europe, but only a superficial is made in order to compare Portugal with Spain, about this see Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003).

literature about its ideology, why it appeared now and why it achieved exceptional results compared to other Spanish extreme-right parties.[18] About *Chega*, beside some journalist works, only one deeper analysis by the scholar Riccardo Marchi is available, in a study which makes the main contribution by analysing the ideological matrix of the party.[19]

This reinforces the relevance and the justification of our work, trying to fill a space that is undeveloped about the political party *Chega,* mainly in regards as to why *Chega* had obtained a result of which no other extreme-right political party was capable. Besides that, we reinforce the main objective of our work through the importance of the comparative approach, by seeking a comparison between *Vox* and *Chega,* and seeking an explanation about the causes that explain the major strength of the Spanish party in comparison with the Portuguese.

To conclude, from the literature available about the extreme-right in Portugal and Spain, a necessity for a comprehensive comparison emerges. The two cases are strongly connected in social and political history and in scientific works in the field of Political Science, but the scholarly community lacks an understanding of how historical processes since the transition have affected the presence of extreme-right parties in these context. By analysing the recent changes in the capacity of the extreme-right, which emerge in both countries at roughly the same time, but with different strength, this will also allow us to look to the incapacity of the extreme-right throughout decades in comparative way. This not only allows us to reinforce factors that have already been identified in the available literature and but to find additional factors that distinguish between the current and electorally successful extreme-right parties with the extreme-right parties that have been electorally incapable in the past.

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[18] About a solid work regarding to *Vox* see Pedro Cuevas, *Vox: Entre el Liberalismo Conservador y la Derecha Identitaria* (San Sebastián, La Tribuna del País Vasco, 2019).

[19] About the work of Riccardo Marchi about *Chega* see Riccardo Marchi, A Nova Direita Anti-Sistema: O Caso do Chega (Lisboa, Almedina, 2020).

Hypotheses

In order to specify our object of study and to create a solid base to make our methodological approach it's important to identify the hypotheses that we want to test. In the first place, as we emphasize in the title of the work, we try to prove the existence of a legacy. By "legacy of the transition" we mean, in general, a threat that put additional difficulties in the democratic consolidation,[20] and specifically in our study we mean the characteristics of the transitions that had contributed to the incapacity of the extreme-right in the following years, such as the institutionalization of the party system, or the arrest and harassment of some members connected with the extreme-right, only to give some examples.

The first hypothesis that we try to confirm in this work, is that the transitions to democracy left legacies on the extreme-right in both Spain and Portugal. Furthermore, we hypothesise that the transition to democracy had an important dampening influence on the extreme-right political parties in Portugal by, for example, arbitrary arrests and persecutions during the transition that influenced the capacity of organization within the extreme-right that we do not obverse in the Spanish transition. In Spain, the Constitution approved in 1978 reflected a defeat in a referendum for the extreme-right ambitions. Furthermore, the recognition of various nationalities within the Constitution revealed an alignment of the Spanish political system far from the ideological matrix of the extreme-right that assumes the Spanish nationality as a cornerstone of its ideology, raised a problem that does not occur in Portugal.[21]

In addition to the factors that we have already mentioned, other later events that were also a reflection of the transition processes can help us to identify elements of the legacy left by the transitions during the democratic consolidation,[22] such as the capacity of co-optation of elements from the moderated right wing parties like the *Partido Popular* in Spain and the *Partido Social Democrata* in Portugal as examples, but also from other smaller parties.

In the second hypothesis we try to decipher what has changed so that the extreme-right parties, *Chega* and *Vox,* are now able to assert themselves as parliamentary forces, thereby marking the end of the legacy remaining from the transitions to democracy. There are causes, such as diminishing trust in political institutions demonstrated in both countries or the rebirth of the independentism problem in Spain that can help to explain a context that presents favourable

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[20] Lisa Anderson, *Transitions to Democracy* (New York, Columbia University Press, 2019), 287.
[21] The Constitution of 1978 was approved by referendum and it´s applied until the realization of this work.
[22] We assume the year of 1982 as the beginning of the democratic consolidation for both cases, regarding to reasons that we will develop further.

conditions for the rise in popularity of the extreme-right parties in question and, as a consequence, the dissipation of the legacy of the transitions, as we will prove throughout the study. In addition to explaining the ability of the aforementioned parties to enter both parliaments, these causes also help to understand the reason for the greater capacity of the extreme-right in Spain compared to Portugal. Furthermore, regarding both hypotheses that we will test in this study, we distinguish between exogenous and endogenous causes, that is, causes that are external to the direct action of the extreme-right, such as the purges that took place in Portugal, and the internal causes such as the capacity or incapacity of the extreme-right to construct solid organizational structures, without failing to mention when there is a direct relationship between exogenous and endogenous causes.

With the object of study specified, the dependent variable and the independent variables clarified, we now turn to a discussion of the appropriate methodological approach to answer these questions and contribute to the existing literature.

Methodology

 The best way to approach our hypotheses is to use a qualitative approach that employs process tracing and comparative historical analysis. To carry out a scientifically rigorous approach we need to intensively analyse the existing literature but also search for personal testimonies,[23] in order to make a proper analysis of our independent variables.[24] A qualitative approach permits us to identify specific causal mechanisms along the historical trajectory, which allows us to perceive the mutations that the extreme-right has undergone over time.

 In order to decipher how the specific causal mechanisms influence the future, in this case the future of the extreme-right, it's very important to identify how these mechanisms develop into path dependence. Path dependence is a term social scientists use to capture how past actions constrain present choices,[25] and to explain the high costs of a return when something has started moving on a certain direction, as proved by the long period of disappearance of the extreme-right from the political system.

 Readers cannot expect comparative historical analysis, or any other research tradition for that matter, to produce findings that are proven beyond all possible doubt,[26] but should instead expect a meticulous search for descriptive and causal findings that tries to reduce doubts as much as possible, sorting through the facts and the eliminating irrelevant events from the causal explanation. Facts precede interpretations, and as we mentioned our objective is not only expose the past incapacity and the actual signals of recovery of the extreme-right in a chronological way but to interpret it and explain why it occurred.

 In our work, we try to go beyond the factual incapacity of the extreme-right to achieve effective electoral results in both countries, Portugal and Spain, in the post-transition period until the current context. The knowledge accumulation assumes an important role in the sense that our dependent variable,[27] the extreme-right as a political party but also the events beyond the parties' inability to achieve effective electoral results, such as the persecution and dislodging of some important figures within the extreme-right, are analysed through two different political

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[23] As example, in Portugal there are diverse personal testimonials about the persecutions made during the transition process that help us to perceive the weakening of the extreme right in that period, we will consider the testimonials of the book António Maria Pereira, *A Burla do 28 de Setembro* (Lisboa. Bertrand, 1976).

[24] The pact signed between political parties and the military in Portugal is a good example of the relevance of some historical documents for our analysis.

[25] Margaret Levi, *Consent, Dissent and Patriotism* (New York, Cambrigde University Press, 1997), 8.

[26] Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,* 137.

[27] A solid approach about knowledge accumulation is made in the work of James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences* (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003).

regimes, authoritarianism, and democracy. The generation of new knowledge is dependent on the existence of prior knowledge from the beginning of our analysis.[28] The democratic consolidation period when the extreme-right was incapable of achieving relevant electoral results during decades was influenced by the anterior political regime, the authoritarian Francoism in Spain and the New State in Portugal.

Virtually all empirical social research involves comparison of some sort,[29] and this work assumes a comparative analysis in the sense that in Portugal and Spain we can find relevant differences in the emerging causes during the process of transition that directly influenced the extreme-right. The transition process emerges as context-conditionality, taking into account that the causal process varies across contexts.[30]

In this work, we start from two key events for the understanding of both transitions, the death of the Spanish Head of Government, Luís Carrero Blanco, in an attack orchestrated by ETA in 1973, which raised the first concerns about post-Francoism partially because of the fact that both supporters and opponents of the regime, believed that the regime would have difficulties to prosper in the time after the death of Francisco Franco. The death of who was considered to be the natural successor of Francisco Franco thus created a relevant focus of instability within the regime. In the Portuguese case we will analyse the transition process following the death of António de Oliveira Salazar, the main face of Portuguese authoritarian regime, the New State, whose demise in 1970 put instability on a higher level, even if the first signals of that instability started with the appearance of a health problem that left the leader of the Portuguese regime with important physical weaknesses in 1968. The subsequent death of Salazar was one of the keys for the fall of the New State in 1974, that the following president, Marcelo Caetano, was unable to maintain.[31] These critical junctures serve as the starting points for our contextual analysis, in order to explain the environment in which we find our object of study, the extreme-right.

Our context to analyse the causes of the incapacity of the extreme-right starts during the transition process. In this point it´s also important to underline that it is fundamental to find a relation of equilibrium between the omission of variables that are not important in each context without eliminating key variables; this equilibrium is crucial for our scientific success.[32]

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[28] Ibid., 163.
[29] Charles Ragin, *The Comparative Method* (London, University of California Press, 1987), 1.
[30] Robert J. Franzese, "Multi Causality, Context-Conditionality, and Endogeneity." in *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2007), 45.
[31] The President of the Republic Américo Thomaz selected Marcelo Caetano to substitute Salazar in 1968.
[32] Andrew Abbot, *Time Matters: On Theory and Method* (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001).

In a more recent context it is possible to find different causes and outcomes that justify the different strength of the rebirth of the extreme-right in both political scenarios, even if both countries were for decades commonly described as immune to the this rising, that had already occurred in other European contexts. The objective was not to make a simple chronologic and ambiguous work about the extreme-right context in both countries since the transition process until the actual reality. In fact the main contribution of this work is to go straight to the causes and outcomes of the periods of incapacity in the post transition period and of reborn, with different strength, to the political system in the recent years.

Key-Operationalisation

 This work involves some of the more debated concepts by the political scientists in the last years. The "extreme-right" is a good example of a concept that has been the focus of enormous production of recent and varied conceptualisations that often lead to conceptual uncertainty and imprecision. Hence, is not possible to produce a scientifically rigorous work without first providing a theoretical assessment and measurement strategy of some key concepts to be presented in this paper.

 Firstly, it is indispensable to clarify the theoretical concept of extreme-right to be used in this study. Is the "extreme-right" a universal concept generalizable to many political systems? Or does the extreme-right in Portugal and Spain assume unique characteristics? On the topic of the extreme-right there is a considerable quantity of terms used, which, in our view, display excessive variation in definitions and applications.[33] As an example, Cas Mudde made a distinction between extremism and radicalism, by classifying extremism as a political party that opposes a Constitution and that try to subvert the political system and radicalism as hostile to a Constitution in the sense that seek to achieve the political objectives in the current political system.[34] That vision strongly based on the Germanic approach can hardly be applicable to our study. Due to the fact that we analyse two distinct political regimes it's complex to be consensual in the term that we decide to use in our study, because it in fact depends on the context whether political parties try or not to overthrow the political system. In this line of thought we decided to use the term "extreme-right" for which we conceptualize a basic ideological matrix, but always putting particular attention in emphasizing the framework of each political party in each context, as will be particularly visible in the analysis of *Chega* and *Vox*, where there is already an open debate on the most appropriate classification for the parties concerned, whether the term radical right or the term extreme-right.

 The context is crucial to understand in what conditions the extreme-right was trying to organize and achieve relevant electoral results, such as when the main concern of the extreme-right in Portugal was the future of the colonial empire, and in Spain the decentralization of power to the autonomous communities quickly created a concern that continues until the actual context. Even if we are talking about the same party family, the extreme-right of the contemporary contexts under study here presents different objectives in comparison with the extreme-right of those countries during the transition process. During the transitions, the extreme-right

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[33] Cas Mudde, *The Ideology of Extreme Right* (New York, Manchester University Press, 2000), 13.
[34] Ibid., 12.

represented a resistance to the political change produced by the transition to democracy, while in the modern setting, the extreme-right seeks a change from the current political arena. It is important to underline that we analyse in this work two generations of the "extreme-right", the first being, as we will see in the case of both transitions, the defense of a feeling of nostalgia, manifesting difficulty in proposing an alternative to the course of events, strongly based in an anti-systemic discourse.[35] In the case of the "second generation", the extreme-right adapts to a new social context by proposing an alternative to the current political reality, filling an open space left by traditional parties.[36] As Piero Ignazi pointed out in his work " Extreme Right Parties in Europe", our focus in our work is not the small groups of right extremism, such as the skinheads, but rather the political parties.

Due to this variation in relation to the objectives of the extreme-right and due to the fact that a universally agreed-upon description of the term extreme-right is lacking,[37] we consider that the more solid operationalisation of the concept can be obtained by establishing some basic characteristics of its ideological matrix. Even considering that is not uncommon for authors to use more than one label from time to time or even simultaneously,[38] such as radical right or extreme-right, we consider the term extreme-right to be the more appropriated for this study, safeguarding a precise framework. We thereby avoid variation in the term that would introduce a lack of clarity in the hypothesis that we test in this study.

In the past, the extreme-right was strongly connected with neo-fascist ideology, however in this study we reject this association for *Vox* and *Chega*, partially because in the age of post-industrialism and post-modernity, fascism no longer fulfils the role of the 'mythical' reference, even at the extreme-right.[39] Nowadays the emotional charge that characterised the extreme-right in the past, appears to fall on the shoulders of the entire right-wing,[40] and it helps to understand the constant links established by the right-wing in general, but the particular link between the extreme-right and neo fascist ideology we consider not to be the most appropriate approach in the current context.

In the cases under examination here, the extreme-right looks to the future with suspicion, sees society through a conservative lens, a conservatism that we characterise in this context as the sentiment that good things are easily destroyed, but not easily created.[41] Also, the extreme-right

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[35] Piero Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe* (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003), 33-34.
[36] Ibid., 34.
[37] Paul Hainsworth, *The Extreme Right in Western Europe* (New York, Routledge, 2008), 7.
[38] Ibid., 9.
[39] Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Europe*, 19.
[40] Alain de Benoist, *Les ideés à l´endroit* (Paris, Éditions Libres-Hallier, 1979), 37.
[41] Roger Scruton, *How to be a Conservative* (London, Bloomsbury, 2014).

focusses on security problems within the society, the national identity of the country, and structural concerns.

With this we mean that is fundamental to consider the Portuguese and Spanish contexts in order to find a reliable notion of the ideologic matrix of the extreme-right, as we already mentioned. For example, in Portugal during the process of democratisation the right-wing was the set of non-socialist parties,[42] and the extreme-right was mainly characterised by the defence of colonial empire and the opposition to the establishment of a communist regime,[43] whereas in Spain the extreme-right was immersed in a nostalgic feeling regarding Francoism.

In this work, we focus on the extreme-right in the form of political parties, a concept that we understand as any political group identified by an official label that presents candidates for public office through elections.[44] Nonetheless, we don't disown the importance of the extreme-right outside the formal form of political parties because there are important events and figures, outside the political parties, that help to understand the capacity or incapacity of the parties to be effective in achieving electoral results. However, as our dependent variable is the electoral strength of the extreme-right, we put the focus on political parties, as this is the unit of analysis most appropriate for elections.

With the key term of 'extreme-right' now explained, we also require conceptual clarification on the term 'transition', which is fundamental for understanding our dependent variables. The concept of transition shall be referred to, adopting a simple and precise conceptualization, as the interval between one political regime and another,[45] in this case the interval between the Portuguese and Spanish authoritarian regimes and the establishment of democracy. In line with this, we consider 'democratisation' as the processes whereby the rules and procedures of citizenship are either applied to political institutions previously governed by other principles or expanded to include persons not previously enjoying such rights and obligations or also extended to cover issues and institutions not previously subject to citizen participation.[46]

We consider the concepts of extreme-right, transition and democratisation the three key concepts that require an initial clarification before proceeding with our study, even considering that as the study develops we will elaborate further on these operationalizations.

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[42] Jaime Nogueira Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas* (Lisboa, Bertrand, 2017).
[43] Riccardo Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição para a Democracia Portuguesa (1974-1976),", *Ler História,* no. 63, 2012, 75.
[44] Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party System: A framework for analysis* (Colchester, European Consortium of Political Research, 1976), 56.
[45] Guillermo O´Donnell and Philipe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore, The John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 8.
[46] Ibid., 8.

1. Portugal: The Succession as Dismissal for the Extreme-Right

 The New State, from 1933 to 1974 the Portuguese authoritarian regime, can be characterized as a civilianized authoritarian regime with a weak party, the *União Nacional*.[47] The face of the Portuguese authoritarian regime during decades, António de Oliveira Salazar, suffered a serious health problem in September 1968 that influenced his lucidity and physical availability to continue to lead the regime. Therefore, the President of the Republic Américo Thomaz had the responsibility to nominate a successor for the leadership of the Government. Marcelo Caetano, a former rector of the University of Lisbon and a supporter of the regime who had already held some positions within the structure of the regime was nominated in an act that emphasized the power detained by Oliveira Salazar in the regime. The President of the Republic only nominated Marcelo Caetano as successor when he already had in hand precise medical information about the gravity of the Oliveira Salazar's condition.[48]

 The succession was the beginning of the end of the New State. The debilitation of the main face of the regime and its substitution generated the appearance of fragility and created doubts about the present and even more so the future direction of the regime.[49] The maintenance of the overseas empire was by this time the main concern of the Portuguese authoritarian regime, which continued with open combat fronts in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea. That concern with the maintenance of the colonies would become the main focus of opposition to the way Marcelo Caetano conducted the entire regime but particularly the war in the colonies. This opposition that felt identified with Oliveira Salazar's conservatism and authority represents the beginning of our examination of the Portuguese extreme-right in this context of authoritarianism preceding the transition.

 In general, Marcelo Caetano tried to follow a more liberal doctrine than his predecessor, trying in that way to meet the wishes of civil society and some sectors of the political opposition, for example, by showing intentions to weaken censorship in the press.[50] The main reason that the opposition from the right side of the political spectrum intensified against Marcelo Caetano, was related with his government's decisions regarding the overseas empire, a criticism that did not appear at the beginning of its leadership but only at a more advanced stage. Caetano visited the three colonies at war in April 1969, an act that the former president Salazar never made,

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[47] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 117.
[48] Josep Sanchez Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)* (Madrid, Editorial Nerea, 1995), 1.
[49] Jaime Nogueira Pinto, *Portugal - Os Anos do Fim* (Alfragide, Dom Quixote, 2014), 145.
[50] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 7.

revealing the desire to maintain the overseas empire.[51] Before the end of 1969 Caetano saw the elections of October 26 as an opportunity to measure the social support regarding the colonial empire. The results of the elections, won once again by the political party of the regime, *União Nacional*, was not only seen as an insufficient proof of the liberal direction of Caetano but also contributed to radicalize the opposition to its leadership.[52] In the wake of the 1969 elections, the national assembly that was previously dominated by a majority of national conservatives, turned to a mix of representation with more liberal representatives and some elements without political position assumed and strongly dependent on the Caetano leadership to ensure a progress in their careers.[53] This scenario guaranteed a sensation of security in the perspective of the President of the Council Marcelo Caetano, a scenario that which would change in the following year.

In December of 1970, Marcelo Caetano presented to the national assembly his ambition of a constitutional revision to review some issues related to the overseas empire, something inconceivable from the perspective of the extreme-right. The national assembly was divided, as previously mentioned, between liberals,[54] deputies without assumed political convictions and by what we consider from this part of this study on, the extreme-right deputies or as we mentioned before, the national conservatives.[55] This group of national conservatives already represented by that time the main characteristics that we mentioned in our operationalisation of the concept of extreme-right, a group of deputies that saw the change with suspicious eyes and the entire context with preoccupation. They saw national identity and national sovereignty as key elements and had the conviction that it is difficult to create a better condition than the current. The group of extreme-right deputies maintained Salazar's view of the overseas empire, a group that was by those days strongly reduced in the number of deputies in comparison with the past.[56] By this time the extreme-right considered that the simple fact of putting the colonial empire at discussion would open a perspective of a possible independence of the colonies.[57]

It is at this point of the Portuguese context that we start our analysis by identifying the first of our independent variables. The period between the nomination of Marcelo Caetano and the

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[51] Ibid., 7.
[52] Ibid., 8.
[53] Pinto, *Portugal - Os Anos do Fim*, 224.
[54] The liberals did not initially take a concrete position in relation to overseas empire, probably to make an approximation to the President of the Council.
[55] The national conservatives represented a traditional view about the regime and specifically about the overseas empire, based in the leadership of António de Oliveira Salazar.
[56] Riccardo Marchi, "A Oposição de Direita à Política Ultramarina de Marcello Caetano," *Lusíada História*, no. 7, 2010, 525.
[57] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 11.

revision of the constitution, finally ratified in 1971, allows us to perceive that the extreme-right, even after the replacement of Salazar,[58] was inside the political system. Even considering the changes to the composition in the national assembly following the elections of 1969, the national conservatives maintained a role by defending Salazar's vision about the regime, especially in relation to the overseas empire. The extreme-right assumed an integrationist vision of the colonies, and refused to consider other solutions, as the federal, for the Portuguese empire.

The demise of António de Oliveira Salazar represented the definitive end of the extreme-right's leadership of the regime. Marcelo Caetano decreased the power and the influence of the national conservatives by putting their views as only one amongst others. The national conservatives were ineffective as opponents of Marcelo Caetano,[59] nevertheless they had the opportunity to constitute a notion of how to be organized in the opposition side not only in ideological terms but also in terms of structural organization,[60] something that would still prove to be insufficient to face the challenges of the future, clearly failing when it became necessary to create an opposing structure This situation was the beginning of the division caused by Marcelo Caetano which linked with a growing contestation from some sectors of civil society, as proved by a demonstration against the war in the colonies at the beginning of 1971,[61] that would lead the regime to a point of no return in the years that followed.

1.1 The Antagonist Extreme at the Command

At the time of the last elections of the regime, Marcelo Caetano already had in his hands a regime on the way to its disintegration. The elections of October 1973 for the national assembly represented an exclusion of a certain number of liberals from the list and a return of some of the national conservatives that had not been considered in previous elections,[62] which can be interpreted as an attempt by Caetano in order to control the possibility of opposition from the extreme-right side because in fact, the context during the year of 1973 was already strongly unstable. There were some events which clearly illustrate this instability. A Congress of Combatants at Porto in June of the same year was an example of the aggregation of dissidents,

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[58] António de Oliveira Salazar died before the revision, in the summer of 1970.
[59] Marchi, "*A Oposição de Direita à Política Ultramarina de Marcello Caetano,*" 542.
[60] Ibid., 542
[61] José Adelino Maltez, *Tradição e Revolução: Uma Biografia do Portugal Político do Século XIX ao XXI* (Lisboa, Tribuna, 2005).
[62] Pinto, *Portugal - Os Anos do Fim*, 446.

consisting mainly of officers who had returned from the overseas war in Guinea.[63] We emphasize the dissidence within the military because, as we will confirm further ahead, the military was the key for the end of the New State. Other events, such as a letter of protest from some officials in Angola to the President of the Council Marcelo Caetano,[64] started to reveal a higher state of contestation. This contestation from the military had some structural motivations including low salaries or inadequate social status, but also some ideological motivations within the military by some extreme-left followers.[65] In this context the MFA was created,[66] which combined with a passive leadership of Marcelo Caetano, generalized disbelief regarding a quick victory in the overseas wars and the absence of alternatives, which would result in the breakdown of the regime.[67]

The authoritarian regime officially came to an end, worn out internally and externally, when on April 25 of 1974 a group of military, mainly composed by young officers, marched on Lisbon and overthrew the New State in the coup that became known as the Carnation Revolution, putting an end to Western Europe's oldest dictatorship. This military coup started the transition to democracy that that would come to influence the condition of the extreme-right for decades in the Portuguese political system. The end of the regime came about peacefully even if the 'revolution' lacked a clear leader who took a key role in initiating the transition,[68] albeit with rare exceptions,[69] and with the streets full of civilians.

On the night of April 25 the *Junta de Salvação Nacional* (JSN) was created, a group composed by seven military officers, that until the realization of first democratic elections in May had the power to establish ordinary and constitutional laws.[70] The power was in the hands of the JSN, the President of the Republic António de Spínola,[71] but mainly in the hands of the but mainly in the hands of the *Movimento das Forças Armadas* (MFA), the group within the military responsible for the coup . The institutionalization of the MFA put the military as a dominant

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[63] Ronald H. Chilcote, *The Portuguese Revolution: State and Class in the Transition to Democracy* (Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, 2010), 89.

[64] Maltez, *Tradição e Revolução*.

[65] Pinto, *Portugal – Os Anos do Fim*, 497.

[66] The MFA was the military movement responsible for the coup that overturned the New State.

[67] Ibid., 450.

[68] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 118.

[69] Some members of the state police, known as PIDE-DGS, killed 4 persons in front of the police building.

[70] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 153.

[71] António de Spínola was Governor in Guinea during the last years of leadership of Marcelo Caetano and was nominated President of the Republic because at the moment of the coup was leader of the military forces. Spínola had published a book, in the final months of the regime, that contributed to the perception that the regime had come to an end. About the book see Antonio de Spínola, *Portugal e o Futuro* (Lisboa, Arcadia, 1974).

force during the six provisional governments, between 1974 and 1976.[72] António de Spínola differed from the MFA in his desire to nominate assumed anti-regime figures for the position of prime minister and also created tension with the MFA when he permitted Américo Thomaz and Marcelo Caetano to leave for Brazil.[73] These events marked the beginning of constant tension between Spínola and the leftist faction of the MFA which would end with the demission of Spínola at the end of the year.

Besides that, the coup generated a strong legitimation at the left of the political spectrum, which already owned solid party structures due in part to the many years they were in opposition to the regime. The Communists had at that time the most solid structure, with the *Partido Socialista* also playing a relevant role.[74] The left-wing started to play a key role on the construction of the new regime. On the extreme-right, the only experience in make opposition was achieved at the end of the regime, when some national conservatives started to oppose the colonial decisions made by Marcelo Caetano. Unlike the leftist groups, there was no basis for party structures, leaving the extreme-right completely disorganized.[75]

By that period the main preoccupation within the extreme-right was the creation of political parties in order to approach its two main concerns, the process of decolonization and the imminent dominance of the left-wing in the creation of the new regime.[76] The process of transition was constructed by a leftist ideological and constitutional matrix,[77] and the right-wing and especially the extreme-right, was placed away from this process. Everything that was in some way connected with the New State was perceived as a threat, and during this period begins the firsts purges against elites who had connections with the previous regime.[78]

In disagreement with the ambitions within the MFA, Spínola called for mobilization against those planning to impose a leftist dictatorship.[79] Spínola hoped that the demonstration that would be realized on September 28, with which the American leadership sympathized in the perspective of securing the Atlantic alliance,[80] would reinforce its legitimization. The recently created right-wing political parties, *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD) and *Centro Democratico*

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[72] António Costa Pinto, "Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975–76," *Journal of Contemporary History* 43, no. 2 (2008): 307, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022009408089034.
[73] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 162.
[74] Ibid., 164
[75] Ibid., 164.
[76] Riccardo Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),", *Ler História*, no. 63, 2010, 75.
[77] Jaime Nogueira Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas* (Bertrand, Lisboa, 2018), 256.
[78] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),", 76.
[79] Chilcote, *The Portuguese Revolution*, 100.
[80] Tiago Moreira de Sá, *Os Americanos na revolução portuguesa (1974-1976)* (Lisboa, Editorial Notícias, 2004), 88-92.

Social (CDS), were sceptical of Spínola's plan, so support for the demonstration came exclusively from the right-wing sector connected with the previous regime.[81] The demonstration was banned by the left-wing within the military,[82] with the support of other sectors of society, as the socialist media called for the closure of roads to prevent the movement of people to the demonstration in Lisbon.[83]

On the day of the demonstration and in the presence of some thousands of Spínola supporters the anthem of the *Partido Comunista Português* is played in a symbolic act,[84] but at the same time very revealing of the climate of the time. The failure of the demonstration produced critical changes, with the substitution of Spínola as one the most important alterations. Furthermore, the extreme-right political parties were illegalized and persecuted,[85] and the power of the left faction within the military emerged strengthened from the process. This was followed by a series of arrests of figures who were involved in the organization of the demonstration, a testament to the strength of the Communists' influence within the MFA that discouraged most of the opponents of the direction that the transition was taking.[86]

The failure of the demonstration was a huge hit to the extreme-right.[87] In the following year, in March 11 of 1975, after the Spanish secret services revealed a list of supposed targets that the communist side wanted to eliminate, Spínola attempted a countercoup in the north of Lisbon.[88] The coup failed and, after a first escape to Spain, Spínola went into exile in Brazil, initiating a new phase of left-wing control in Portugal, but not before the political parties signed an agreement to hold elections for the constituent assembly, with the aim of drafting a new constitution.

Following the failed coup of Spínola, an unprecedented transformation in the Portuguese economy occurred. The nationalization of banks, electricity, and other industries represented an important step in the direction toward the planned economy in order to implement the extreme left's economic policy desires. The Portuguese economy went through a difficult time with the GDP, after having been manifestly growing in the last years of the regime, falling

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[81] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 175.
[82] Chilcote, *The Portuguese Revolution*, 100.
[83] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 176.
[84] António Maria Pereira, *A Burla do 28 de Setembro* (Lisboa, Bertrand, 1976), 115.
[85] Cervello, *La revolución portuguesa y su influencia en la transición española (1961-1976)*, 179.
[86] Pereira, *A Burla do 28 de Setembro*, 126.
[87] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),", 82.
[88] About the coup see Jorge Feiro, Fernanda Leitão, and Carlos Pina, *11 de Março: Autópsia de um golpe* (Lisboa, Agência Portuguesa de Revistas, 1975).

significantly after the end of the New State,[89] further contributing to the social and political instability.

Within the extreme-right, the failed coup of Spínola signified the end of attempts to institutionalize the respective parties,[90] resulting in no extreme-right representation in the 1975 elections. The Socialists won the elections for the constituent assembly and the votes of extreme-right supporters were divided between the PSD and the CDS.[91] The PSD was composed by many of the liberals from the assembly elected in 1969, and in some documents of the party it is possible to find expressions of adherence to socialism,[92] in an example that illustrates the direction of the Portuguese transition by those days. The CDS was in that context the party with an ideology closer to the traditional right-wing, even if far from the extreme-right ideological matrix. In fact, the traditional right was removed from an effective participation in the political system,[93] and a new phase started in the Portuguese transition, an explosive phase known as the Hot Summer.

1.2 A Route for Stability

The episodes of September 28 and March 11 contributed to an increase of tensions in Portuguese society. In June 1975 at the first session of the constituent assembly, the President of the Republic Costa Gomes expressed the necessity of a direction toward pluralist socialism in the Portuguese transition. Portuguese society was by these days strongly polarised and the summer of 1975 was marked by the imminence of civil war, with numerous assaults on the headquarters of the Portuguese Communist Party and various episodes of violence caused by political and ideological motivations.[94]

For the extreme-right, after the marginalisation of its role in the transition process, it was time for a new strategy based on clandestine actions. In an attempt to construct opposition against the leftist groups of the transition, several members from what it was by this time seen as counter revolutionary and extreme-right actions, from national conservative to political refugees of the political policy of the New State, meet in Spain in order to organize the

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[89] Filipa Lino, *As Nacionalizações do PREC* (Lisboa, Parfisal, 2016), 14.
[90] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),", 84.
[91] Ibid., 85.
[92] Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas*, 267.
[93] Ibid., 268.
[94] About the political violence after the Revolution of 1974 see Miguel Carvalho, *Quando Portugal Ardeu* (Alfragide, Oficina do Livro, 2017).

clandestine actions.[95] From those meetings two clandestine movements emerged, the *Exército de Libertação de Portugal* (ELP) and the *Movimento Democratico de Libertação de Portugal* (MDLP),[96] which had proximity with the supporters of António de Spínola. Both movements were denounced by a commander close to the prime minister of the first five provisional governments, Vasco Gonçalves.[97] The ELP and the MDLP played an active role during the summer 1975, but contrary to the right-wing political parties, that opposed the extreme-left's goals for the transition without appealing to political violence, these movements engaged in numerous acts of political violence and terrorism during the "hot summer" which contributed to delegitimate even more the extreme-right in the future. The extreme-right was not in the command of the opposition during the hot summer,[98] a place reserved for the CDS, PSD and mainly for Socialists with the leader Mário Soares managing to add the vast majority of opponents to the extreme-left during this period. According to Mário Soares, the Portuguese society was, after the authoritarianism of the right wing under the New State, under an authoritarian threat of the extreme-left of during 1974 and 1975.

After two key events, the September 28 and the March 11, and already on the sixth provisional government led by the admiral Pinheiro de Azevedo after Vasco Gonçalves left, on November 25 some factions of the military forces occupied some bases in order to reinforce the leftist orientation of the transition. Diverse sectors of the military were involved if we consider the coup and the counter-coup, however, the coup attempt would be blocked by some factions of the armed forces, with an important role played by General Ramalho Eanes, who would later become President of the Republic. That event represented the end of the "soviet fear" and the end of the extreme-left's attempts to shape the institutionalisation of the new regime. The November 25 coup put Portugal again on the route of a pluralistic democracy now without the imminent fear of a new authoritarianism.

The post 25 November would spare the Communists from the purges and illegalization suffered by the extreme-right at the beginning of the transition. The Communists changed the strategy after the 25 November and tried to avoid the return of the right-wing without resorting to subversive actions.[99] Even so, the extreme-left has managed to maintain a great influence on the social and territorial level, due in part to the fact that the parties with the most social support

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[95] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),",85.

[96] Ibid., 85.

[97] José Gomes Mota, *A Resistência* (Lisboa, Edições Expresso, 1976), 83.

[98] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),",89.

[99] Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas*, 268.

on the right-wing have maintained a constant fear regarding an association with the traditional right wing.[100]

1.3 The End of an Era for the Extreme-Right

 After the November 25 coup, the Portuguese society saw, not an end, but a decrease of tensions and polarisation. Even though, after six provisional governments under the clear influence of MFA, the influence of the military persisted after the failed coup of November 25. The 1976 constitution included some non-democratic features, putting the same power in the military of the Council of the Revolution, as the power owned by the assembly of the republic.[101] A greater degree of democratic consolidation would only arrive in 1982 when a constitutional review put an end to the interference of the armed forces in the political power.[102]

 In that context and after November 25, the revolutionary repression regarding the extreme-right decreased and opened a new space for political action.[103] Nevertheless, some factors would narrow the capacity of extreme-right forces to rejuvenate. The overseas empire and the threat of an extreme left dictatorship were the two main reasons that had put the extreme-right on the political battle.[104] By the year of 1976 the possibility of an overseas empire was only a nostalgic memory and the threat of an extreme-left dictatorship had ended a few months before. That scenario generated in some cases a lack of motivation to participate in the political arena, and a difficulty to adapt the political discourse to the new context.[105] The extreme-right was also incapable to mobilize most of the veterans of the colonial war,[106] and no political party has based its political project on Salazar's or Caetano's vision of the state.[107] Besides that, the extreme-right, despite having freed itself from the repression of the extreme-left verified during the firsts steps of the transition, continued to be affected by the disintegration it suffered during that period through purges and the lack of legitimacy under the view of the civil society, to which the actions of the MDLP and the ELP also contributed. The more centrist parties of the right-wing also sought a constant detachment from everything that could be related to the

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[100] Ibid., 269.

[101] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 123.

[102] Ibid., 126.

[103] Riccardo Marchi, *A Direita Nunca Existiu* (Lisboa, Instituto de Ciências Sociais, 2017), 443.

[104] Marchi, "As Direitas Radicais na Transição Democrática Portuguesa (1974-1976),",91.

[105] Marchi, *A Direita Nunca Existiu*, 443.

[106] António Costa Pinto, "Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975–76,", 327.

[107] Marchi, *A Direita Nunca Existiu*, 445.

traditional right, partially by considering the fact that the Communists remained after 1976 with strong relevance in the civil society.[108]

The Portuguese transition eliminated completely the institutional design of the New State and the majority of legacies were more a result of the characteristics of the transition than they were of the authoritarian regime.[109] A marginalisation and an incapacity of the extreme-right in finding new bases for its ideological position were in a first level of analysis a legacy from the process of transition, with particular relevance to the persecutions and to the fact that the transitions eliminated key motivations for the action of the extreme-right, as the overseas empire. The new generations of "right-wingers" were massively directed to PSD and to CDS,[110] parties that manifested a constant fear in relational to a hypothetical emotional charge that characterised the extreme-right in the past and that and they feared could fall on the shoulders of the entire right-wing, as we mentioned in our operationalisation.

The 1976 legislative elections were won by the Socialists led by Mário Soares and until the election of André Ventura from the political party *Chega*, not a single extreme-right deputy was elected for the Portuguese parliament. The entrance of Portugal into the European Economic Community in 1986 was only possible after democratic consolidation, and the social stability and economic growth associated in the following years of the entrance put the Portuguese society in a stable social environment based on a cosmopolitanism direction, in this case mostly European, that that does not connect with key ideological points of the extreme-right. For example, national identity was a key component for the ideological matrix of the extreme-right until this context, a vision of a overseas empire, that had vanished and, as we will further develop in the case of *Chega*, substituted by other vision about identity that makes them more capable of achieving electoral support in the current context. The lack of space in civil society for the conservative lens that sees change with suspicion and perceives national identity and the security of the country as a priority, combined with some economic stability mainly provided by the entry in the European Economic Community, created a hostile environment for the extreme-right that vanished from the Portuguese political system and became just a marginal extra-parliamentary force.

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[108] Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas*, 270.

[109] Pinto, "Political Purges and State Crisis in Portugal's Transition to Democracy, 1975–76,",331.

[110] Pinto, *A Direita e as Direitas*, 270.

2. Spain: Carrero Blanco as an Anticipation of the End

Since the victory of the nationalists in the civil war, the Spanish authoritarian regime was led by the leader of that force, Francisco Franco. After almost four decades under his full control, in June 1973 the head of state appointed the admiral Luis Carrero Blanco as president of the government—a nomination that indicated a concern for the future of the regime and in that sense an attempt to ensure that the regime would have a future after the disappearance of its founder.[111]

A terrorist attack by ETA, an independentist organization of the Basque Country, would murder Carrero Blanco in December of the same year in an episode that increased concerns within the regime. Many figures of the regime believed that Carrero Blanco would be the correct figure to guarantee a consensus between the different views within the regime, thus guaranteeing the future of the regime after Franco's death. The death of Carrero Blanco left more concerned particularly the most conservative wing of the regime.[112] The regime, but in particular Francisco Franco, resented the death of Carrero Blanco who, as well as being the chosen future leader of the regime, was also the figure that connected Franco with the political reality at a time when Franco was already at an advanced age. [113]

To succeed Carrero Blanco, another figure of the regime's conservative wing, Carlos Arias Navarro, was appointed. It was therefore surprising that Arias Navarro presented some openness to a reformist view of the regime, a view that would provoke a reaction from the more conservative wing.[114] It is important to emphasize that until this phase we consider both wings, the conservative one composed by the *immovilistas* and the reformist wing composed by the *aperturistas*, as extreme-right due to the fact that both sides have different positions in relation to, for example, decisions regarding future state institutions, but without ever putting the authoritarian regime in question at this early stage.

The figure who would come after the fall of the regime to win a seat as a deputy representing an extreme-right party, Blas Piñar, was one of the critics of Arias Navarro at this time by alerting the most conservative wing to the dangers that a reformist view could raise for the regime.[115]

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[111] José Luis Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas: La extrema derecha en España, del tardofranquismo a la consolidación de la democracia (1967-1982)* (Madrid, CIS, 1994), 165.
[112] Ibid., 166.
[113] Xavier Casals, *La Transición Española: El voto ignorado de las armas* (Barcelona, Pasado & Presente, 2016), 28.
[114] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 166.
[115] Ferran Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria: La extrema derecha española (1973-2005)* (Madrid, Editorial Síntesis, 2006), 61.

Arias Navarro tried during 1974 and 1975, until Franco's death, to maintain a weighted stance so as not to further polarise the different views within the regime,[116] composed by a unique party, the *Falange Española Tradicionalista y de las Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional Sindicalista*, usually referenced as *Movimiento Nacional* similar to the New State in Portugal. When Arias Navarro considered the option of openness to different opinions and the plurality of political association,[117] it was impossible to achieve this balance. During this period the most conservative wing of the regime launched constant attacks against Arias Navarro and some of his ministers, such as Pío Cabanillas.[118] The attacks, mostly carried out through the more conservative press, such as the publication *Fuerza Nueva*, reflected the fear felt by the conservatives in relation to a process that could weaken the regime and probably allow a leftist offensive.

The signs of openness to reform within the regime itself combined with the coup on Portuguese soil in 1974 and the possibility of Francisco Franco's imminent death ended up impelling a greater mobilization of the more conservative wing, in a period in which it was also essential to create a national confederation of former combatants with a relevant capacity of mobilization.[119] The extreme-right by this time had not yet lost its positions in power,[120] but demonstrated an inability to perceive the possibility of losing it.

The death of Franco in November 1975 would lead to a period of silence for the extreme-right and particularly for its more conservative wing.[121] In a paradoxical context in which some figures were already looking at the possibility of including themselves in the future of the regime even if they, in general, did not believe that the moment of change would come.[122] Some figures were exceptions to this silence after the demise of Franco, such as José Antonio Girón who, alongside Blas Piñar, were among the most uncompromising figures in Francoism. At the beginning of 1976, the Spanish political and sociological scenario was complex. Franco's death was still very present at a time when, among other difficulties, the economic crisis assumed an important relevance.

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[116] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 174.
[117] Julio Gil Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón: Una historia política de la derecha en España 1937-2004* (Barcelona, Taurus, 2019), 132.
[118] Ibid., 135.
[119] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 73.
[120] Ibid., 75.
[121] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 179.
[122] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 96.

2.1 The Political Reform and the Extreme-Right Nostalgia

 A new government was formed in early 1976, a government that included some figures of the regime, such as the example of Manuel Fraga, that by this time already manifested reformist tendencies.[123] Even so, Arias Navarro would prove unable to reconcile the different expectations in relation to the government and would be replaced by Adolfo Suarez in July. At the beginning of 1976, the reformists had made great strides in formalising their ambitions, including by achieving some support of prosecutors.[124]

 When Suarez took over the leadership of the government, the institutionalisation of the democratic process was still involved in a context of uncertainty.[125] Uncertainty that started to decompose when Suarez started to negotiate the Political Reform,[126] which would, after being approved in parliament, be approved by Spanish society in a referendum held at the end of the year. The approval of the reform meant laying the foundations for democratisation and consequently the disintegration of the institutions of the regime,[127] in a process characterised by intense negotiations with the most diverse quadrants of the political system.

 For the extreme-right it was a period marked by consecutive defeats and growing isolation. The approval of the Political Reform in the parliament represented a defeat for the extreme-right in a time that a relevant part of personalities of the regime already understood that that some political reforms are inevitable, in an inevitability clearly accelerated by Franco's death.[128] At this stage, the perception obtained by the reformists within the regime coincided with the thinking of civil society,[129] which eagerly desired the arrival of pluralism and, as in Portugal, was seduced by the European project.

 Since Suarez's entry in June 1976 until the elections held in June 1977, the extreme-right has entered a phase of isolation and growing incapacity, largely due to the inability to adapt to institutional changes and the absence of a political project. The extreme-right, legitimized by the victory in the civil war, did not have the capacity to oppose, because it never had this need. Furthermore, although there are exceptions as some moments of the *Fuerza Nueva* (FN) of Blas Piñar,[130] the extreme-right also lacked the necessary competences to massively appeal to civil society, which was also evident in the defeat of the referendum on the political reform.

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[123] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 183.
[124] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 238.
[125] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 94.
[126] Ibid., 94.
[127] Ibid., 95.
[128] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 190-191.
[129] Ibid., 191.
[130] Ibid., 192.

A number of reasons led the extreme-right to an inability to resist the changes that took place during this period, as Ferran Gallego well identifies. At a stage when the extreme-right was already at risk of losing the position in power, the first loss of the extreme-right was the loss of massive support, which it took for granted within the institutions of the regime itself and in the civil society.[131] The lack of perception of what was happening managed to be even more damaging than the loss of human resources. At a time when everything was evolving in a dizzying way, especially after Franco's death, the extreme-right felt that these were isolated betrayals to a regime that they believed to be perpetually legitimate and protected by the monarchy and the armed forces.[132]

In the approach to the first legislative elections, the ability to mobilize became a key factor, as in any pluralist regime. The right-wing was by this time automatically connected with Francoism, [133] which generated a need for demarcation by the moderate right-wing, mainly composed of reformists, to denominate itself as the "centre" of the political spectrum. During the summer of 1976, the moderate right-wing was a fragmented set of various political parties. Suarez and his ministers realized that fragmentation was not the path to the electoral success of "centrism". During this period the focus is on the creation of the *Partido Popular* (PP), composed of, for example Pío Cabanillas and Manuel Fraile, and on the creation of the *Alianza Popular* (AP), founded by Manuel Fraga, that contrary to PP represented a more conservative ideological position, therefore being able to attract many of the "inmovilistas" of the regime, removing thousands of possible voters to the extreme-right parties that would come forward in the 1977 legislative elections.

The extreme-right remained, unlike the other right-wing forces, inseparable from the basis of Francoism, at a time when all its supports were gradually lost, from the press to the union power, passing through the subsequent dissolution of the *Movimiento Nacional*.[134] The lack of means became evident, which, together with an increasing lack of human resources, constituted part of the recipe for an impending electoral disaster. The extreme-right was uncapable of creating solid political parties, entering a fragmentation spiral. The absence of a leader capable of bringing together all the extreme-right parties and an inability to create multifaceted political programs extended the range of limitations.[135]

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[131] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 107.
[132] Ibid., 107.
[133] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 237.
[134] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 110.
[135] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 317.

The diverse defenders of the regime ended up being divided into diverse parties, with the party of Blas Piñar assuming particular relevance. Before becoming a political party, the FN tried to reinforce the regime's original ideological matrix.[136] When the regime headed for extinction, the objective became to build an alternative to the pluralist path to which the Spanish political system was heading. In this period of inertia and isolation of the Spanish extreme-right, there was a structural factor that helps to explain all those previously mentioned, from the loss of support from civil society to the loss of elements of the regime, who ended up joining mainly in AP. This factor was the ideological vacuum, which also partially explains the difficulty in elaborating complex political programs.

The death of Francisco Franco and the loss of the various sources of support, from financial to catholic, left the extreme-right in a deep identity crisis.[137] The ideological matrix of the extreme-right, and almost transversal to all of its political parties, was based on a mythical appeal to the figure of Franco and the symbols of Francoism.[138] The only thing the extreme-right had to offer to "neo-francoists" and civil society was a feeling of pure nostalgia.[139] The complaint regarding the political course taken was the alternative proposed by the extreme-right, a complaint without a concrete political program beyond the nostalgia invoked.[140]

The results of the first legislative elections were expected to be disastrous for the extreme-right. The suspicions were confirmed in June 1977, with the extreme-right parties obtaining overall a total of 0.84% of the votes.[141] Nor did the coalition supported by the National Confederation of ex-combatants, the *Alianza Nacional del 18 de Julio*, composed and led by the FN of Blas Piñar manage to reverse the trend. With regard to the *falangistas* parties, the results were particularly disastrous.

The extreme-right was thus getting their first clash with the new reality, a reality that showed the ability of Adolfo Suarez to lead the central bloc and the ability of Manuel Fraga's AP to capture many conservatives and "neo-francoists" who were potential voters of the extreme-right parties, demonstrating that the extreme-right had difficulties even to win votes from the Francoists.[142] Franco's nostalgia proved at the outset to be a strategy tailored to failure and only useful for the central bloc led by Adolfo Suarez, the *Unión de Centro Democrático* (UCD),

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[136] Jiménez, *Reaccionnarios y Golpistas*, 203.
[137] Pedro Carlos Cuevas, "Las Tradiciones Ideológicas de la Extrema Derecha Española.", Hispania LXI/I, no. 207, 2001, 139.
[138] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 112.
[139] Ibid., 112.
[140] Ibid., 115.
[141] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 334.
[142] Gallego, *Una Patria Imaginaria*, 133.

which thus disengaged itself from the traditional right-wing but especially from the Francoist heritage, unanimously handed over to the extreme-right.[143]

2.2 The Constitution and the Exception of Blas Piñar

The deputies elected in the 1977 elections drafted a constitution, which after being passed in parliament, was passed in a referendum by citizens in 1978.[144] The constitution of 1978 is key to decipher the untapped potential of the extreme-right, not only during the transition but for decades in the Spanish political system, which as we shall see later in our work is now harnessed effectively by *Vox* of Santiago Abascal.

The constitution of 1978, still applied today, opened gaps on issues that are often exploited by extreme-right—a space was opened by including the term "nationalities" and the development of the "state of autonomies",[145] thus denying Spanish nationality as one and indivisible. The unity of Spain was a cornerstone of the ideological matrix of the *Movimiento Nacional* as it was for the extreme-right after the fall of the regime. In addition, "nationalities" could be interpreted as an entity that aspired to constitute itself as a state in the future.[146]

In this context, it is essential to take into account the independence movements historically rooted in the Basque Country and Catalonia. Combined with regular ETA terrorist attacks, which in 1978 alone killed 65 people,[147] and that as we remember victimized Carrero Blanco, shows us the importance of the 1978 constitution. Regular terrorist attacks and the approval of the constitution in 1978 raised doubts regarding two structural issues, national identity and security, that as we mentioned in our basic operationalization of the concept of extreme-right, are basic for its ideological structural.

During this period after the approval of the Constitution which extended until the post-election of 1979, there was a strong violence from the extreme-right and the extreme-left.[148] Regarding the extreme-right, violence was articulated and facilitated by close relations with police forces and secret services,[149] an example of this is the *Grupo Armados Españoles*. It was in a tense context that the March 1979 elections arrived. The UCD of Adolfo Suarez came to these elections already with a very solid structure compared to 1977. The UCD won the elections

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[143] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 282.
[144] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 96.
[145] Cuevas, *Vox*, 22.
[146] José Gil Robles, La Aventura de las Autonomías (Madrid, Rialp, 1980), 85.
[147] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 99.
[148] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 351.
[149] Ibid., 351.

with 168 deputies elected, followed by the PSOE with 121, thus denying the absolute majority to Adolfo Suarez, who was forced to negotiate with the other right-wing forces, with special emphasis on Manuel Fraga's AP.[150]

More relevant to our work than the UCD's inability to obtain an absolute majority was the result of the extreme-right. The FN, which had the strongest structure within the extreme-right, showed coalition intentions with the *falangistas* as well as the desire to attract the more conservative elements of Manuel Fraga's AP.[151] Although the leader of that coalition was not yet unanimous, the coalition's structural proposal was, based on an opposition to the Constitution approved in 1978,[152] in a clear allusion to the unity of Spain.

The coalition, whose main allies in the media were *El Alcazar* and *El Imparcial*, it turned out to be called *Unión Nacional* being composed by FN, *FE-JONS*, *Circulos Doctrinales José António*, National Confederation of Ex Combatants and the *Agrupación de Juventudes Tradicionalistas*.[153] The coalition obtained 2.11% of the votes and elected Blas Piñar in Madrid, an improvement over the results obtained in 1977. The AP of Manuel Fraga did not object so clearly to the constitution and that ended up costing him a considerable loss of votes, which mostly headed to *Unión Nacional*.[154] The defence of Spain's unity allowed the party to improve their results in a campaign that was still and as it happened in 1977, marked by the complaint and not by the proposed solutions.[155]

The coalition thus remained with a complaint, but with no alternative, in a nostalgia without a future. The election of Blas Pinar would not be repeated and no other extreme-right deputy managed to be elected in decades of democracy, thus demonstrating the inability of the extreme-right that was immediately evident in the following elections, in 1982.

2.3 The Route for Marginalization within the Democratic Consolidation

The Spanish transition was marked by an often underestimated event, the attempted military coup on February 21, 1981.[156] The attempted coup came after a series of events that had as a common denominator the instability of the Spanish political system. Without an absolute majority in parliament, with regular episodes of terrorist attacks on the part of ETA and with

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[150] Ibid., 265.
[151] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 254.
[152] Ibid., 255.
[153] Ibid., 257.
[154] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 340.
[155] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 263.
[156] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 89.

divisions within the UCD regarding the state of autonomies and integration into the European Economic Community, the leadership of Adolfo Suarez became increasingly fragile.[157]

Already after a reshuffle in the government, Adolfo Suarez would come to resign in late February, at a time when the polls were already giving a great advantage to the leader of the *Partido Socialista Obrero Español* (PSOE), Felipe González, in vote intentions.[158] The presidency of the government would be go to Leopoldo Calvo-Sotelo, former vice president, who was scheduled to take office on February 23, a day that would be marked by the biggest coup threat of the Spanish transition.

To understand the motivations of those who carried out the coup, it is vital to remember the condition of the extreme-right in this final phase of the Spanish transition. Since 1979, after the Constitution was approved, coup plots had intensified.[159] With strong support from the extreme-right press,[160] an environment of regular destabilization and conspiracy was created, but again the opposition, this time armed, was not done in an organized and consensual way,[161] with the extreme-right who played outside the military circle seeing the possibility of an armed coup as something undesirable.[162] The coup would be headed by the Lieutenant Colonel António Tejero.[163] On the day of the investiture of Calvo Sotelo, Tejero went to the parliamentary headquarters and kidnapped the deputies, while other soldiers tried to occupy public radio and television in Madrid,[164] in a coup that would prove to fail. The attempted coup, often called "23-F", failed largely due to the intervention of King Juan Carlos and the help he received from civilian and military figures.[165] The attempted coup was seen by the extreme-right as a missed opportunity,[166] mainly due to the moment of political instability experienced at that time. The failed attempt to overthrow the regime would contribute to the poor result achieved by the extreme-right in the 1982 elections.

The 1982 legislative elections represented the definitive arrival of democratic consolidation, due to the failed coup the previous year and the victory, by an absolute majority, of the PSOE led by Felipe Gonzalez,[167] which confirmed the political pluralism that had been evident throughout the democratisation process, through, for example, the legalisation of the *Partido*

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[157] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 271.
[158] Ibid., 274.
[159] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 278.
[160] Ibid., 284.
[161] Ibid., 286.
[162] Ibid., 286.
[163] António Tejero had previously been arrested due to a conspiracy built in 1978, known as *Operación Galaxia*.
[164] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 365.
[165] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 291.
[166] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 366.
[167] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 108.

Comunista de España (PCE), and was now reinforced by the first electoral victory of the left. For the extreme-right, the 1982 elections marked the end of an era. The extreme-right parties, as a whole, lost more than 300,000 votes, a loss that was mainly due to the renewed capacity of AP and the "23-F", which contributed to civil society's deteriorating perception of the extreme-right,[168] with FN being the most voted party within the extreme-right. The most-voted party within the extreme-right during the transition would dissolve shortly after the 1982 elections, when Blas Piñar spoke saying that the party had been abandoned by citizens, the clergy, the military and businessmen.[169]

 Blas Piñar's words reflected the sentiment of the entire extreme-right, who was orphaned by the Francoist institutional design and its supports. The extreme-right was marginalized by rejecting the new political system and mainly the 1978 constitution, something that has been accepted and supported by civil society.[170] The absence of a proposal for the future combined with the episodes of violence,[171] as the "23-F", further delegitimized the extreme-right, making it unable to enter in the parliament for decades.

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[168] Jiménez, *Reaccionarios y Golpistas*, 267.
[169] Perrachomán, *La Estirpe del Camaleón*, 346.
[170] Ibid., 425.
[171] Ibid., 425.

3. From Legacies to New Generations

The democratic transitions of Portugal and Spain were evidently quite different. The transition by a coup in Portugal strongly contrasts with the "pacted transition" in Spain, that counted, in the figure of Adolfo Suarez, with a leadership that Portugal did not have.[172] The leadership of the transition process was initially assumed in the Portuguese case by the left-wing of the armed forces, that as we mentioned after General Spínola's failed demonstration, started a series of arbitrary arrests and persecutions of right-wing politicians, making evident the direct conditioning of the right and specifically of the extreme-right, which did not occur in the Spanish transition. Furthermore, the pluralism ensured in the Spanish transition, an example of which is the legalisation of the PCE, contrasted with the early illegalisation of extreme-right parties in Portugal.

The extreme-right also showed differences regarding its political doctrine. In Spain the feeling was of nostalgia for Franco's leadership, which, as we have seen, contributed to the inability of the Spanish extreme-right to elaborate alternative political programs. In Portugal, partly due to the weak indoctrination within the regime that came from the leadership of Salazar and worsened under the leadership of Marcelo Caetano,[173] the extreme-right did not assume a nostalgic defence of the particular legacy of Caetano or Salazar, focusing attention on two objectives, the maintenance of the overseas empire and the impediment of a left-wing dictatorship. This led the Portuguese extreme-right to enter a phase of decompression in the political struggle once realizing the impossibility of maintaining the empire and the end of the risk of a leftist dictatorship, while in Spain the nostalgic feeling lasted for a longer period. These factors help to explain the highest mobilization and the relative success, through the election of Blas Piñar, that the Spanish extreme-right achieved in comparison with the Portuguese during the period of transition.

The Portuguese transition implied a legacy composed of exogenous factors that we did not find in the Spanish transition, which placed the Portuguese extreme-right in a more precarious position. Still, in both cases the extreme-right due to their incapacity also endogenous factors such as the difficulty in drawing up a credible political project or episodes of violence, which in both cases eventually caused them to lose even more credibility with civil society. The extreme-right fail to win any parliamentary seats in any election since the 1980s, with *Vox* and *Chega* putting an end to this trend.

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[172] Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, 118.
[173] Pinto, *Os Anos do Fim*, 143.

3.1 The Context of a New Right-Wing Extremism

Democratic consolidation in the Iberian Peninsula brought an end to a generation of the extreme-right, which at the end of its days lost power and failed in attempts to regain it. This end of a generation partially explains our decision to use the term "extreme-right" over "radical right" as suggested by Cas Mudde in order to characterise parties that do not intend to subvert the political system, as we mentioned in our operationalisation. We see in Piero Ignazi's generational approach to the extreme-right a more solid base to adopt in our study, even considering that academics such as Pedro Cuevas and Riccardo Marchi do not categorize *Vox* and *Chega* as extreme-right parties, partially due to the fact that both parties defend democratic values.

The first post-authoritarian generation, the traditional extreme-right, was based on a nostalgic feeling and the absence of an alternative proposal to the reality that it criticized,[174] as we confirmed in our analysis of both transitions. This generation would be exhausted after clear defeats and societal changes, something that was evident in both political parties that we analysed here and in other more minority groups within the extreme-right, with Spanish neo-nazism as an example.[175] From the 1980's, a second generation, the post-industrial extreme-right, emerged with an anti-system approach, thus proposing an alternative to the problems of the current political systems, with security and identity taking on particular importance on the agenda of these parties. [176]

This second generation of the extreme-right failed in Portugal and Spain, spanning the period from democratic consolidation until the emergence of *Vox* and *Chega*. An example of this failure in Portugal was the *Partido Nacional Renovador*, founded in 2000. The *Partido Nacional Renovador* assumed a nationalist and anti-systematic ideological position by regularly criticizing elites and traditional parties, but the lack of charismatic leadership, a fragmented extreme-right, and the ability of the moderate right-wing parties to capture some of their potential voters,[177] were some of the reasons for its incapacity. In Spain, and mostly for the same reasons, the political party *España 2000*, founded in 2002, is one of several examples of the incapacity that plagued the Spanish extreme-right during a long period. During this period,

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[174] Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, 33.
[175] Xaviel Casals, *Neonazis en España: De las audiciones wagnerianas a los skinheads (1966-1995)* (Barcelona, Grijalbo, 1995), 300.
[176] Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, 34.
[177] Riccardo Marchi, "The Extreme right in 21st-Century Portugal: the Partido Nacional Renovador," in *Right-Wing Extremism in Europe: Country Analysis, Counter-Strategies and Labor-Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, ed. Ralf Melzer and Sebastien Serafin (Berlin: Projekt Gegen Rechtsextremismus, 2013), 133-155.

a series of endogenous factors, such as the lack of a charismatic leader, and a number of exogenous factors, such as the ability of traditional moderate right-wing parties to reach the electorate, help to explain the inability of the extreme-right to transform their anti-system approach, characteristic of the post-industrial extreme-right, to achieve effective electoral results.

In this sense, it is important to understand the reasons that led to the arrival in the parliament of *Chega* and *Vox*. Before analysing each party, it is important to decipher some of the exogenous factors that potentiate both parties by starting with the economic crisis that emerged in 2008. As pointed out by Mariano Torcal, the civil society in Portugal and Spain put a relevant grade of responsibility on political institutions in order to solve the economic and social problems caused by the crisis.[178] Even though economic performance is not the best predictor of the decline of trust in political institutions, public confidence in these institutions diminished mainly due to corruption and the general inability of their members to respond to the needs of society.[179] Bearing in mind that the countries that suffered most from the economic crisis presented, in general, a greater decrease in confidence in political institutions,[180] a larger space was opened for an anti-system political approach, characteristic of the second generation of the extreme-right, which had already become relevant at this time in other European geographies.

Far from the period of economic and social stability that followed the entry into the European Economic Community, and despite the economic recovery from the most recent economic crisis, the extreme-right entered the political systems of Portugal and Spain, taking advantage of an empty space of political supply.[181] The moderate right-wing parties also contributed a good deal to the creation of that space of political supply as we will see in the detailed analysis of *Vox* and *Chega*, in which we try to explain the structural differences between them and to decipher the reasons for a greater capacity of *Vox* compared to *Chega*.

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[178] Mariano Torcal, "The Decline of Political Trust in Spain and Portugal: Economic Performance or Political Responsiveness," *American Behavioral Scientist* 58, no. 12 (2014): 1561.

[179] Ibid., 1560.

[180] Ana Maria Belchior, *Confiança nas Instituições Políticas* (Lisboa, Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos, 2015), 81.

[181] Mariana S. Mendes and James Denisson, "Explaining the emergence of the radical right in Spain and Portugal: salience, stigma and supply," *West European Politics*, (2020): 19.

4. Vox: From Foundation to Initial Incapacity

In December 2013 a new political party emerged in Spain. The political party *Vox* had as some of its main figures Alejo Vidal Quadras, former leader of the *Partido Popular* (PP) in the autonomous region of Catalonia, and Santiago Abascal, the current leader of the party and also a former member of the PP in the autonomous region of the Basque Country.[182] Other figures could be mentioned, but Santiago Abascal and Alejo Quadras allow us to immediately understand the motivations that led to the creation of this new party at a time when Mariano Rajoy (of the center-right party PP) was the President of the Government. Abascal saw his personal and professional life marked by the terrorist threat from ETA and Quadras saw the "centrist" tendency on the part of the PP led by Mariano Rajoy as incapable of responding to territorial and institutional challenges.[183] Alejo Quadras was the first leader of *Vox* and voiced its main concerns by strongly criticizing Rajoy's stance in relation to the state of autonomies and the entire Spanish political system in general by criticizing the legal and economic structure.[184] From the very beginning, *Vox* demonstrated its focus on identity.

The party's first year of life was to be troubled with a disastrous result in the European elections, in which they did not obtain any seats. Vidal Quadras left the party and the result was a revision of the statutes and the election of a new leader at the end of 2014, Santiago Abascal. *Vox* would welcome several dissidents from the PP, at a time when, as we have said, Mariano Rajoy was President of the Government since 2011. It was not, therefore, simple dissatisfaction with the electoral results of the PP, but dissatisfaction with the "centrist" tendencies of Rajoy's leadership[185] in a context of economic recovery but as we saw in the previous section, accompanied by growing distrust in political institutions.

The years following the failure in the first elections would not be easy. Disavowed by the media,[186] *Vox* was unable to win legislative seats in either the Andalusian regional elections of 2015 or in the legislative elections of 2016. At this time, Santiago Abascal pronounced himself to be against the "law of historical memory",[187] a law that represented, in the view of *Vox*, the establishment of victorious and defeated by the transition process. *Vox* accused the PP of trying to undermine the election campaigns of *Vox*. Furthermore, in 2016, *Vox* would evolve its

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[182] Cuevas, *Vox*, 108.
[183] Ibid., 109.
[184] Ibid., 114.
[185] Carles Ferreira, "Vox como representante de la derecha radical en España: un estudio sobre su ideologia," *Revista Española de Ciencia Política* 51, (2019): 76.
[186] Cuevas, *Vox*, 127.
[187] The law foresaw, among other provisions, the location and possible exhumation of victims of Francoism and the increase of financial aid for the victims of the authoritarian period.

ideological matrix, with Abascal showing satisfaction with the result of the Brexit referendum,[188] indicating what would be later confirmed—that the identity aspect would be further strengthened in the ideological matrix of the party.

4.1 The Ideological Clarification as the Route for Electoral Success

In 2017, Abascal made it clear that he presented an alternative to the traditional parties and that *Vox* refused any defence or identification with Francoism.[189] At a time when corruption scandals haunted the PP, and Albert Rivera's *Ciudadanos* was a party with an ideological matrix even more centrist than the PP, the Catalan institutional crisis would become a turning point in *Vox's* electoral performance. A referendum aimed to consult the Catalans' desire for independence violated the 1978 constitution and created a level of polarisation unprecedented in Spanish society since democratic consolidation. Abascal was a fierce critic of the government action in reaction to the referendum, defending the illegalization of the Catalonian independence parties.[190] There followed the fall of Mariano Rajoy from the government in June 2018 and the first electoral success for *Vox* in the Andalusian elections.

Vox obtained 11% in the elections of the autonomous community of Andalusia, winning 12 deputy seats in an autonomous community that had been dominated by the PSOE for more than three decades.[191] Despite calls by the PP against *Vox* during the electoral campaign, the PP would be supported, after long negotiations, by *Vox* and *Ciudadanos*, allowing the election of Moreno Bonilla as president.[192] The strong call for unity in Spain and the desire to reduce independentism in autonomous regions in the wake of the Catalan crisis, were the key factors for *Vox's* success in the Andalusian elections.[193]

At this stage, *Vox* already had a very complete ideological position, and it was already possible to have a clear notion of its political platform. *Vox* sees identity as the basis of its political project, seeing the integrity of Spain as something unquestionable, refusing all separatisms, and even the possibility of federalism.[194] *Vox* values history and the mythological aspect, such as the discovery of America, in its notion of the Spanish nation.[195] It also defends the transversality

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[188] Cuevas, *Vox*, 134.
[189] Ibid., 140.
[190] Ibid., 147.
[191] Stuart Turnball-Dugarte, "Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox," *Research and Politics*, April-June (2019): 1.
[192] Cuevas, *Vox*, 185.
[193] Turnball-Dugarte, "Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox,", 7.
[194] Cuevas, *Vox*, 165.
[195] Ferreira, "Vox como representante de la derecha radical en España: un estudio sobre su ideologia,", 87.

of the Spanish language to the entire territory. *Vox* also sees Islamic immigration as a potential threat to the West and particularly to Spain, ensuring that Spaniards will always be at the top of the agenda. The conservatism present in the ideological matrix of *Vox* is mainly opposed to what the party considers the left's moral relativism, criticizing the progressive tendency. *Vox* enhances the preservation of traditional values, especially of the family, opposing, for example, gender ideology.[196] Finally, *Vox* pays great attention to security and economic liberalism, stating that law and order are fundamental pillars of its political project, as is the defence of the free market and private property.[197]

At the beginning of 2019 and after the Andalusian success, *Vox* had more than 30,000 supporters [198] at a time when the PSOE government of Pedro Sanchez, who succeeded Mariano Rajoy as president, was in a fragile position mainly due to the Catalan issue and his lack of support in the parliament. Santiago Abascal was already by that time a charismatic leader, capable of bringing together defenders of Spanish integrity, which the parties of the "cowardly right-wing" as Abascal referred, were unable to defend. Abascal's charismatic leadership would be very evident in a rally in Madrid's Plaza de Colón, two months before the legislative elections.[199]

Vox would obtain 10% of the votes in the April 2019 legislative elections, winning twenty four seats in parliament to become the fifth political force, followed by the obtainment of 6% and three deputies in the European elections in the following month. Regarding the European Union, *Vox* assumed itself as a defender of the sovereignty of the nation-state.[200]

Pedro Sanchez's victory in the April elections brought a period of political instability, largely due to the lack of agreement between left-wing parties. In November 2019, new elections allowed *Vox* to reach 15% of the votes and gain fifty two deputies, far surpassing the total won by Albert Rivera's *Ciudadanos* and approaching the PP, now led by Pablo Casado. *Vox* had thus put a definitive end to the inability of the extreme-right to obtain relevant electoral results. An extreme-right distanced from the nostalgic feeling of Francoism and far from a neo-fascist connotation, *Vox* represents a new post-industrial extreme-right that took advantage of the Catalan crisis. Unlike those that failed for decades, *Vox* has a charismatic leader and had the ability to take advantage of the political crisis within the moderate right, mainly generated by the PP's corruption scandals.

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[196] Cuevas, *Vox*, 167.
[197] Ferreira, "Vox como representante de la derecha radical en España: un estudio sobre su ideologia,", 91.
[198] Cuevas, *Vox*, 197.
[199] Ibid., 203.
[200] Ibid., 216.

5. Chega: The Instant Capacity

On April 9, 2019, the foundation of *Chega* was formalized. The new political party had as its main figure André Ventura. André Ventura was a former member of the *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD), and at the time of the foundation of *Chega*, he was already a mediatic figure in the Portuguese society. André Ventura has seen his popularity gradually increase since he asserted himself as a regular football commentator on a Portuguese television channel, the *CMTV*. In addition, an event that occurred in 2017, when André Ventura was still a member of the PSD, made him mediatic and controversial in the political field. In 2017 André Ventura was a candidate for the municipality of Loures by the PSD, having at the time a statement in relation to the Roma community that generated great media impact by saying that "(…) the Roma community lives almost exclusively on state subsidies.",[201] which represented the beginning of a difficult relationship between André Ventura and the media, which would be constantly hostile with the party he would later found.

Ventura's statements at the time had a great impact partially due to the fact that he was a PSD candidate, a political party that had no record in this type of approach towards ethnic minorities. This was just a sign of what was to be confirmed, with André Ventura leaving the PSD at the end of the following year, due to the disparity between his political ideas and those of the party.

The foundation of *Chega* would thus become a personal project and an attempt to bring his ideas to life in the Portuguese political system. The first founders of *Chega*, led from the beginning by André Ventura, had diverse ideological origins,[202] from former members of the *Partido Nacional Renovador*, to former members of the moderate right-wing parties. At this point is relevant to note that from the beginning to André Ventura knew that the only "empty" space to enter in the Portuguese political system would be at the right of *Centro Democratico Social* (CDS),[203] which was until the election of André Ventura in the 2019 legislative election the party further to the right in the Portuguese parliament.

Due to the fact that the party's foundation was confirmed too close to the European elections in May, André Ventura would become part of a coalition in those elections,[204] which would not be able to elect any deputy. It must also be said that the logistical and bureaucratic process of

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[201] André Ventura, "Os ciganos vivem quase exclusivamente de subsídios do Estado". Interview by Sebastião Bugalho. *Jornal Sol*, July 17, 2017. https://sol.sapo.pt/artigo/572564/andre-ventura-os-ciganos-vivem-quase-exclusivamente-de-subsidios-do-estado.

[202] Riccardo Marchi, *A Nova Direita Anti-Sistema: O Caso do Chega* (Lisboa, Almedina, 2020), 59.

[203] Ibid., 51.

[204] The coalition *Basta* was composed by the *Partido Popular Monárquico*, *Partido Cidadania e Democracia Cristã* and the movement *Democracia 21*.

the party's foundation postponed the construction of a complex political project, although themes such as immigration and justice, which would become key themes in *Chega*, were already part of the coalition's agenda.

The ideological matrix would be more defined after the European elections when *Chega* already projected the legislative elections autonomously. The first aspect to emphasize from *Chega's* political project is its anti-system vision by criticizing the traditional parties and particularly those of the moderate right-wing, PSD, and CDS. *Chega* put clear the need for a renovated political regime in Portugal,[205] and made a constant reference to the corruption, as a structural problem. *Chega* assumes itself as conservative in values, by defending, for example, traditional family values, and liberal in the economy by defending, for example, the free market and the right to private property. The nationalist strand of the party gives social primacy to the Portuguese over other nationalities, therefore leaving aside the possibility of obtaining Portuguese nationality for refugees and illegal immigrants.

The concern with the sovereignty and well-being of the Portuguese's goes hand in hand with a strong focus on security,[206] and with changes in the legal system to include, for example, chemical castration for pedophiles or the application of life imprisonment. No identification with the New State or any authoritarian regime is assumed, on the contrary, *Chega* portraits itself as a defender of democratic values. In regard to the European Union, *Chega* shows support for the European project but not without safeguarding Portugal's sovereignty. The federalist possibility is refused by *Chega*, seeing the entry into the European Economic Community in 1986 as, despite assuming the benefit in some aspects, a facilitator of corruption actions because of the managing of European funds.[207]

It was on this ideological basis that André Ventura was elected in the October 2019 legislative elections by winning 1.29% of the votes, which meant the election of the first deputy of a party to the right of the CDS since the democratic transition. The traditional and most representative parties on the right, PSD and CDS, obtained two of the worst results in their history, accentuating the crisis on the right of the political spectrum.

André Ventura managed to be elected, in the first elections in which *Chega* presented itself independently, based on an ideological matrix that had failed to enter parliament until his election. The crisis of the moderate right-wing parties, who have always feared since the transition that "the emotional charge that characterized the extreme-right in the past can fall on

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[205] Marchi, *A Nova Direita Anti-Sistema*, 146.
[206] Ibid., 142.
[207] Ibid., 185.

the shoulders of the entire right-wing", in the words of Alain de Benoist, and the crescent distrust in the political institutions opened a space for an anti-systemic discourse and an alternative political project proposed by *Chega*, thus representing the first signs of capacity from the post-industrial extreme-right in Portugal, which is still far from the capacity of *Vox* in Spain.

6. A Comparison of Strength

The electoral results of *Vox* and *Chega* in the respective electoral acts in 2019 immediately leave a clear difference between the parties. Before the 2019 election results, however, it is important to analyse the circumstances surrounding the founding of both parties. *Vox* was founded by several figures who were dissatisfied with the political direction taken by the *Partido Popular* (PP) in recent years and particularly with the leadership of Mariano Rajoy. Two of the main figures, Santiago Abascal and Alejo Quadras, had a history strongly marked by the defence of the unity of the Spanish territory, an idea that would prove to be fundamental for *Vox's* subsequent electoral success. On the other hand, although André Ventura left the *Partido Social Democrata* (PSD), the other founding members did not confirm this migratory trend from the PSD to *Chega*.

Regarding the leadership, it is important to underline that Santiago Abascal was not the only leader of *Vox* since the foundation of the party. Although he became the charismatic leader of the party, *Vox* was not the result of a singular or personal project by Santiago Abascal. Regarding *Chega*, André Ventura was the only party leader until the date when this work is being carried out. *Chega* was at an early stage the result of a personal political project by André Ventura, which can indicate a greater dependence on *Chega* in relation to its leader compared to *Vox*.

About the ideological matrix, it is important to underline the various similarities, as both parties combine economic liberalism with conservatism in values. Still, there are relevant differences, with *Vox* not having an anti-system matrix as pronounced as *Chega*, and having the defence of the unity of Spain as a nation as the main objective, an issue that is not present in the Portuguese context. The concern with immigration is present in both parties, yet *Vox* presents a more exacerbated concern than *Chega*, which on the other hand makes of the corruption a constant in his speech, something in which *Vox* is less frequent.

After this basic differentiation, it is important to understand the difference between the electoral results obtained. *Vox*, unlike *Chega*, went through a period of four years of electoral failure between 2014 and the 2018 Andalusian elections. In 2017, a year before *Vox's* first electoral success, the Catalan crisis began, something that was decisive for the result of *Vox* in the Andalusian elections of the following year.[208] The Catalan crisis, coupled with the growing distrust of political institutions and the crisis of traditional parties, particularly the PP that was

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[208] Turnball-Dugarte, "Explaining the end of Spanish exceptionalism and electoral support for Vox,", 7.

strongly shaken by the recent corruption scandals and the difficult end of Mariano Rajoy's leadership, allowed *Vox* to change the direction of this electoral results.

The extreme-right that failed for decades did not have a charismatic leader and an alternative political program. Santiago Abascal and his position in the face of the Catalan crisis was the key factor for *Vox's* electoral success. On the other hand, *Chega* managed to elect only one deputy but managed to do it in the first elections in which the party presented itself independent of other parties. Portugal does not have any similar to the Catalan crisis but as we have seen in this work, it presents, like Spain, a growing distrust in political institutions. Furthermore, the 2019 elections represented one of the worst results in history for traditional right-wing parties. These facts allow us to interpret that *Chega* managed to add the wear and tear of traditional right-wing parties to the distrust of the political system, which allowed it to be the first extreme-right party to enter Parliament. Those exogenous factors were enhanced by the fact that André Ventura had a relevant media impact, due to his past on Portuguese television and his constant approach to fracture themes.

The emergence of *Chega* and *Vox* is the result of a series of exogenous and endogenous factors. As exogenous factors we have a growing lack of trust in political institutions, which drives an anti-system view of *Vox* and *Chega*. On the other hand, the mediatic leadership and the elaboration of an alternative political project had not been seen in other extreme-right attempts over the past few decades and partially justifies the unprecedent capacity of both parties. In addition, the emergence *Vox* and *Chega* illustrate the new generation of extreme-right parties, the post-industrial, representing a mobilization against the postmodern and globalizing trend,[209] which causes less focus on the identity aspect. Traditional parties, in this case those on the right, in addition to the factors that have conditioned them since the transition processes, such as the stigma of possible identification with the authoritarian regime, were pioneers of supranationalism in Portugal and Spain, through their entry into the European Economic Community. That is why parties like the PP and PSD do not have an ideological matrix that allows to respond to a systematic and "suprasystemic" dissatisfaction.

This interpretation finds validity in the Catalan crisis, which is the key factor for the greater capacity of *Vox* in relation to *Chega*. The future of *Chega*, with regard to electoral results, is due to the absence of this phenomenon in Portuguese society and to its most recent foundation, therefore having a more fragile structure and dependent on its leader, more difficult to predict by comparison with *Vox*.

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[209] Ignazi, *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*, 217.

Final Considerations

In this conclusive phase of our work, it is important to remember the hypotheses that we set out to address. The first hypothesis we proposed was to compare the legacies left by democratic transitions in the extreme-right.

In the Portuguese case, there were exogenous factors that conditioned the extreme-right. The existence of a political power concentrated in the armed forces after the coup allowed political constraining assumed, mainly by the military, to the figures who would have ties to the New State. This conditioning was particularly illustrated by the arbitrary arrests of members who had hypothetical links to the authoritarian regime. The fact that no extreme-right party appeared in the first elections under democracy also allows us to have a perception of the conditioning exercised over that side of the political spectrum.

On the other hand, in the Spanish "pacted transition" the exogenous factors that we found in the Portuguese transition were not verified. The priority, especially during the leadership of Adolfo Suarez, was to create the basis for democratic pluralism and not to retaliate against the authoritarian period. The legalisation of the *Partido Comunista de España* is in sharp contrast to the illegalisation of extreme-right parties in Portugal.

In both cases, the extreme-right´s disability is enhanced by endogenous factors. If, in the Portuguese case, the end of the possibility of maintaining the colonial empire and the disappearance of the threat of a leftist dictatorship caused a motivational and political project vacuum, whereas in the Spanish case the extreme-right was not able to free itself from the nostalgic feeling around Francoism. In both cases, the involvement of the extreme-right in episodes of political violence contributes to accentuate its discredit in the perspective of society.

The absence of exogenous factors present in the Portuguese transition helps to explain the fact that the Spanish extreme-right, despite the absence of an alternative political project and the nostalgic feeling towards Francoism, managed to elect Blas Pinar, an election motivated by opposition to the 1978 Constitution. The constitution approved in 1978 allowed the Spanish extreme-right to make this their political project, something that the Portuguese extreme-right did not have at its disposal. We can therefore conclude that the legacy left by the Portuguese transition was more constraining on the extreme-right than the legacy of the Spanish transition.

After the consolidation of democracy, the extreme-right was completely incapacitate, fragmented, without a charismatic leader and without an alternative political project, causing the extreme-right to fall into a path of marginalisation. A trend to which *Vox* and *Chega* put an end.

Vox and *Chega* represent the post-industrial extreme-right, distanced from the nostalgic appeal for authoritarianism and from the attempts to subvert the current political regime. They are the result of exogenous factors, such as growing distrust in the political institutions and the crisis of the moderate right-wing parties, which, since the transitions to democracy, have been afraid of being associated with the authoritarian regimes, thus generating fear of taking over the right of the political spectrum. But the new generation of the extreme-right is also the result of endogenous factors, such as the charismatic leadership and the alternative political project they propose, aspects that have been lacking for decades in the extreme-right parties of the peninsula.

Vox and *Chega* are far from being similar parties, as evidenced by the electoral results they reached. The future of *Chega* is still quite unpredictable, mostly due to its recent foundation and the lack of a solid party structure, as André Ventura still seems to condense the party's full potential. On the other hand, *Vox* seems to present a more solid party structure and in addition a political project that is based on a political fracture that is non-existent in the Portuguese context. It is important to remember that the Catalan crisis was created due to a failure to comply with the Spanish Constitution, a constitution that the extreme-right opposed in the transition period, precisely because of the risk that, from the extreme-right´s perspective, could facilitate the events that came to pass in Catalonia in 2017. This demonstrates the importance of the issue of Spain's territorial integrity in the Spanish political system, which contributes to the election of Blas Piñar in 1979 an to the best electoral result of the extreme-right in the democratic period in 2017 following the exacerbation of the issue.

Spain's territorial integrity may become the key element for *Vox's* electoral future, which, as we see, represents a new generation of the extreme-right, which, unlike during the transition period, sees the Constitution as a refuge to safeguard Spain's integrity, reinforcing the importance of a context and the importance of social and political changes over time. A detailed analysis of the Spanish and the Portuguese political systems since the transition processes provides us the conclusion that the legacy of the Portuguese transition was more constraining compared to the Spanish but above all the perception that the issue of territorial integrity of Spain can boost *Vox*, a key issue for their platform that *Chega* will not find in the Portuguese context. *Chega's* future will depend on the solidification of party structures and on the search for structural issues for its political project, something already solidified and achieved by *Vox*.

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