http://hdl.handle.net/10366/141403 Tue, 21 Apr 2026 07:29:13 GMT 2026-04-21T07:29:13Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142696 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142696 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142694 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142694 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142695 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142695 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142693 El trabajo retoma estudios sobre voto de clase en Argentina, ofreciendo una exploración adicional basada tanto en datos de encuestas nacionales sobre elecciones presidenciales de los últimos tiempos como en datos agregados, en este caso usufructuando tanto de un amplio estudio reciente sobre las elecciones de 1946 como de datos de las últimas elecciones de 2015, en ambas instancias datos de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires (CABA) y de los Municipios de la Provincia de Buenos Aires circundantes a la CABA (Conurbano Bonaerense). Y, en algunos casos, la exploración se amplía a comparaciones internacionales, considerando la relación clase-voto del laborismo británico. En lo metodológico, a los esfuerzos tradicionales se agregan algunos avances con métodos log-lineales, discutiendo modelos de independencia, de efectos constantes y de efectos uniformes, cruzando datos de tres elecciones nacionales y tres partidos, bajo el supuesto de que estos partidos van de menos a más “populistas”. Los resultados muestran que debe aceptarse el modelo de asociación constante, indicando que el efecto de la clase sobre el voto, más allá de su magnitud, muestra cierta inercia en los últimos tiempos. Además de detectar según distintas aproximaciones que la relación clase-voto mantiene su relevancia, se puntualiza que, cuando el alcance de la variable clase se evalúa en el contexto de la presencia de variables tanto de corte político-ideológico como de percepciones de la economía, esta todavía muestra su fuerza para dar cuenta del voto. Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142693 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142691 From the beginning of this century Argentina and Uruguay, as many Latin American countries, underwent a turn to the left. These turns to the left may be called “the Kirchner cycle” (or “K cycle”) in Argentina, after presidents Néstor Kirchner and his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and the “Frente Amplio cycle” (FA, Broad Front) in Uruguay, for its leading political party. Argentina’s turn to the left ended in the presidential election of 2015 in which the Kirchnerist candidate was defeated; Uruguay’s FA cycle will run at least until the 2019 presidential election. Since Argentina and Uruguay’s turns are part of a simultaneous regional turn to the left, their respective national leaderships were not the absolute creators of each country’s “turn”. What they did was to give national shape to strong regional waves. These processes were conditioned by national circumstances, which in some respects were clearly different in each of them. Despite deep social similarities, Argentina and Uruguay have different political cultures and histories that shape their electoral campaigns. Thus, this paper probes into the similarities and differences between the two “turns” to the left focusing on their victorious presidential campaigns (2003, 2007 and 2011 in Argentina, and 2004, 2009 and 2014 in Uruguay). This analysis leads to (i) an assessment of the relative importance of historical accidents in the two cycles (high in Argentina, low in Uruguay) and of enduring and different political traditions (high in both countries); (ii) an exploration of the differing nature of the two cycles, and finally, (iii) to some implications regarding the broader, regional turn to the left. Do these stories suggest we should expect continuity or new cycles (e.g. to the right) in Latin America? Or should we rather expect the Latin American turn to the left to dissolve into diverging stories? The paper concludes that the most likely scenario is the latter, “diverging stories”.; From the beginning of this century Argentina and Uruguay, as many Latin American countries, underwent a turn to the left. These turns to the left may be called “the Kirchner cycle” (or “K cycle”) in Argentina, after presidents Néstor Kirchner and his wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, and the “Frente Amplio cycle” (FA, Broad Front) in Uruguay, for its leading political party. Argentina’s turn to the left ended in the presidential election of 2015 in which the Kirchnerist candidate was defeated; Uruguay’s FA cycle will run at least until the 2019 presidential election. Since Argentina and Uruguay’s turns are part of a simultaneous regional turn to the left, their respective national leaderships were not the absolute creators of each country’s “turn”. What they did was to give national shape to strong regional waves. These processes were conditioned by national circumstances, which in some respects were clearly different in each of them. Despite deep social similarities, Argentina and Uruguay have different political cultures and histories that shape their electoral campaigns. Thus, this paper probes into the similarities and differences between the two “turns” to the left focusing on their victorious presidential campaigns (2003, 2007 and 2011 in Argentina, and 2004, 2009 and 2014 in Uruguay). This analysis leads to (i) an assessment of the relative importance of historical accidents in the two cycles (high in Argentina, low in Uruguay) and of enduring and different political traditions (high in both countries); (ii) an exploration of the differing nature of the two cycles, and finally, (iii) to some implications regarding the broader, regional turn to the left. Do these stories suggest we should expect continuity or new cycles (e.g. to the right) in Latin America? Or should we rather expect the Latin American turn to the left to dissolve into diverging stories? The paper concludes that the most likely scenario is the latter, “diverging stories”. Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142691 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142692 While Twitter has become an increasingly important platform for public opinion formation, little is known about its use in recent Latin American election campaigns. We therefore investigate the case of the presidential elections in Brazil in October 2014, in order to analyze communication structures in actual and para-social interactions with presidential candidates. In particular, while Twitter makes it easy for ordinary citizens to express their opinion online, it is maybe even more important that they can also address and communicate with persons who would otherwise not be reachable at all. Politicians are probably the most important group in this regard. Based on N = 1,891,657 tweets containing an @mention of a candidate in the Brazilian elections of 2014, we investigate which actual or para-social interactions with the candidates take place. Furthermore, because framing literature suggests that all actors involved in a discussion on social media will try to highlight specific aspects and interpretations of issues and events, we used techniques of co-word analysis to investigate the ways in which the main candidates were framed by the Twitter users. The results give insight into the deliberative potential of Twitter: they show how the candidates are presented to the social media community and thus how this presentation may be reflected in public opinion.; While Twitter has become an increasingly important platform for public opinion formation, little is known about its use in recent Latin American election campaigns. We therefore investigate the case of the presidential elections in Brazil in October 2014, in order to analyze communication structures in actual and para-social interactions with presidential candidates. In particular, while Twitter makes it easy for ordinary citizens to express their opinion online, it is maybe even more important that they can also address and communicate with persons who would otherwise not be reachable at all. Politicians are probably the most important group in this regard. Based on N = 1,891,657 tweets containing an @mention of a candidate in the Brazilian elections of 2014, we investigate which actual or para-social interactions with the candidates take place. Furthermore, because framing literature suggests that all actors involved in a discussion on social media will try to highlight specific aspects and interpretations of issues and events, we used techniques of co-word analysis to investigate the ways in which the main candidates were framed by the Twitter users. The results give insight into the deliberative potential of Twitter: they show how the candidates are presented to the social media community and thus how this presentation may be reflected in public opinion. Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142692 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142690 This article shows that while the impact of crime victimization on support for democracy is sensitive to question wording, the influence of fear of crime on this attitude is consistent and immune to measurement effects. We construe this as evidence that fear of crime has greater attitudinal consequences for democratic support than crime victimization. We show that fear of crime is affected by actual individual and contextual levels of crime victimization as well as evaluations of regime performance. Finally, and consistent with the affective intelligence literature, we find that crime fails to activate people’s surveillance systems in countries that exhibit very low levels of it (typically, where less than 10% of respondents report to have been victims of crime). It is only in countries that have significant crime victimization where fear of it becomes a factor affecting support for democracy.; This article shows that while the impact of crime victimization on support for democracy is sensitive to question wording, the influence of fear of crime on this attitude is consistent and immune to measurement effects. We construe this as evidence that fear of crime has greater attitudinal consequences for democratic support than crime victimization. We show that fear of crime is affected by actual individual and contextual levels of crime victimization as well as evaluations of regime performance. Finally, and consistent with the affective intelligence literature, we find that crime fails to activate people’s surveillance systems in countries that exhibit very low levels of it (typically, where less than 10% of respondents report to have been victims of crime). It is only in countries that have significant crime victimization where fear of it becomes a factor affecting support for democracy. Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142690 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142688 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142688 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142689 Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142689 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142687 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142687 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142686 Resumen Wed, 01 Jun 2016 00:00:00 GMT http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142686 2016-06-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142685 Índice http://hdl.handle.net/10366/142685