Hierocles y la génesis de la conciencia

Abstract

Through the appropriation concept (oijkeivwsi~) stoicism achieved to work out a notion of consciousness or self-awareness (suneivdhsi~Ésunaivsqhsi~) certainly not yet present at the classic period. Both concepts have their roots in onto-epistemic considerations, which have in the perception (ai[sqhsi~) or, exactly speaking, in the aisthetic faculty (aijsqhtikh; duvnami~), its genesis as well as its permanent and reciprocal articulation. In this regard, Hierocles, stoic philosopher who probably lived in the second century a. D., in his work Elementa Moralia (PBer. Inv. 9780v) with all sorts of details sets forth how, beginning from which moment, and under which circumstances all animals, as soon as they are born, have continual and uninterrupted self-awareness or at least a sense of themselves. Consequently, in order to shape a notion of self-awareness which has its genesis and its articulation by virtue of the aisthetic faculty, in other words, its development depends on it, Hierocles made use of sunaivsqhsi~ rather than the traditional term suneivdhsi~. His concern, therefore, is to highlight that the percipient as soon as it perceives something, simultaneously co-perceives itself along with the perceptible object and from here on by itself establishes the corporeal-spatial boundaries of its own constitution.

A través del concepto de apropiación de sí (oijkeivwsi~) el estoicismo atisbó la elaboración de un concepto de conciencia de sí (suneivdhsi~Ésunaivsqhsi~) inédito hasta entonces en la tradición clásica. Ambos conceptos hallan sus basamentos en consideraciones onto-epistémicas que tienen en la percepción (ai[sqhsi~) o, más precisamente, en la facultad aisthética (aijsqhtikh; duvnami~), su génesis así como su permanente y recíproca articulación. En tal sentido, en la obra Elementa Moralia (PBer. Inv. 9780v) del filósofo estoico Hierocles se expone detalladamente cómo, en qué momento y bajo qué circunstancias todo animal posee continua e ininterrumpida conciencia sensible de sí desde el mismo momento en que nace. Por ello, y para poder plasmar una noción de conciencia gestada, articulada y anclada en la percepción, Hierocles recurrió al término sunaivsqhsi~ en lugar de emplear el tradicional término suneivdhsi~. Su planteamiento, en consecuencia, se centra en señalar que el sujeto percipiente al percibir algo simultáneamente se co-percibe con el objeto perceptible y a partir de ahí establece los límites corpóreo-espaciales de su constitución.