| dc.contributor.author | Bond, Charles F. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Howard, Amanda R. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Hutchison, Joanna L. | |
| dc.contributor.author | Masip Pallejá, Jaume | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2024-09-27T10:56:53Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2024-09-27T10:56:53Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2013 | |
| dc.identifier.issn | 0197-3533 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/10366/159810 | |
| dc.description.abstract | [EN]Over the years, people have searched for deception cues in the liar’s behavior. However,
the sender’s incentives to lie might be more revealing than behavior. In Experiment 1, an
incentive was developed that was predictive of lying. Judges with access to incentive
information in addition to behavior achieved almost perfect lie/truth detection. This was
not a result of the speakers’ behavior being transparent (Experiment 2) but because
incentive information was useful to separate lies from truths (Experiments 2 and 3).
Experiment 3 revealed that people may forego perfectly diagnostic contextual cues to
base their judgments on illusory behavioral cues. | es_ES |
| dc.language.iso | eng | es_ES |
| dc.rights | Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional | * |
| dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ | * |
| dc.title | Overlooking the Obvious: Incentives to Lie | es_ES |
| dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | es_ES |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1080/01973533.2013.764302 | |
| dc.rights.accessRights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess | es_ES |
| dc.identifier.essn | 1532-4834 | |
| dc.journal.title | Basic and Applied Social Psychology | es_ES |
| dc.volume.number | 35 | es_ES |
| dc.issue.number | 2 | es_ES |
| dc.page.initial | 212 | es_ES |
| dc.page.final | 221 | es_ES |
| dc.type.hasVersion | info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion | es_ES |