Vague Heuristics

González Navarro, María

Título

Vague Heuristics

dc.contributor.author	González Navarro, María
dc.date.accessioned	2025-04-24T06:39:06Z
dc.date.available	2025-04-24T06:39:06Z
dc.date.issued	2015-01-01
dc.identifier.citation	Navarro, M.G. (2015). Vague Heuristics. In: Seising, R. (eds) Accuracy and Fuzziness. A Life in Science and Politics. Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing, vol 323. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-18606-1_27	es_ES
dc.identifier.isbn	978-3-319-18605-4
dc.identifier.uri	http://hdl.handle.net/10366/164761
dc.description.abstract	[EN] Even when they are defined with precision, one can often read and hear judgments about the vagueness of heuristics in debates about heuristic reasoning. This opinion is not just frequent but also quite reasonable. In fact, during the 1990s, there was a certain controversy concerning this topic that confronted two of the leading groups in the field of heuristic reasoning research, each of whom held very different perspectives. In the present text, we will focus on two of the papers published in Psychological Review, wherein the arguments of each of these groups were presented	es_ES
dc.format.mimetype	application/pdf
dc.language.iso	eng	es_ES
dc.publisher	Springer Verlag	es_ES
dc.rights	CC0 1.0 Universal	*
dc.rights.uri	http://creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/	*
dc.subject	Filosofía moral	es_ES
dc.subject	Razonamiento moral	es_ES
dc.subject	Imprecisión	es_ES
dc.title	Vague Heuristics	es_ES
dc.type	info:eu-repo/semantics/article	es_ES
dc.relation.publishversion	https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-18606-1_27
dc.subject.unesco	7207.04 Filosofía Política	es_ES
dc.relation.projectID	FFI2013- 46361-R	es_ES
dc.rights.accessRights	info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess	es_ES
dc.journal.title	Studies in Fuzziness and Soft Computing	es_ES
dc.volume.number	323	es_ES
dc.page.initial	281	es_ES
dc.page.final	294	es_ES
dc.type.hasVersion	info:eu-repo/semantics/draft	es_ES