A case of misreckoning: the Catalanian election of 2012

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Abstract

The 2012 snap election for the Catalan Parliament had a rather unexpected result. On the one hand, the predicted increase of the (Catalan) nationalist parties (taken together) did not take place. On the other hand, in the nationalist preferences dimension there was a shift towards more militant positions on both sides of the spectrum. All in all, the (Catalan) nationalist coalition in government calling the snap election suffered a harsh disappointment. Opinion polls and expectations conveyed by the media failed glaringly. In this paper we investigate the dynamic between the 2010 and 2012 elections, using an indirect statistical procedure. Language turns out to be a key factor. The fact that the support of nationalist parties has remained constant between 2010 and 2012 results from this support increasing among Catalan speakers and decreasing among Spanish speakers. The two political organizations that have dominated Catalan politics, CiU (centre-right) and PSC (centre-left), face challenges to their pivotal roles.

1. Introduction

In November 2012 a snap election for the Catalan Parliament took place. The significance of this election went beyond the regional level, and it is no exaggeration to say that it had European repercussions. The results were perhaps among the most unexpected of all the elections held in Spain since the end of Franco’s dictatorship.

The heavy losses of CiU, the nationalist coalition in government in Catalonia, were a general surprise. Also, the general expectation of an increase in the support of the (Catalan) nationalist parties with respect to the previous election of 2010 did not materialize.

Certainly, the opinion polls missed the mark. At least two justifications can be put forward. On the one hand, the characteristic Spanish concealment of the vote (both intended and cast) is specially marked among non-nationalist voters in Catalonia. On the other hand, there has been a misrepresentation of the linguistic reality in Catalonia in the samples of the opinion polls. Catalonia is bilingual, Catalan and Spanish. The fact is that the Catalan-speaking group has been over-represented in the polls (see Penadés 2012). As justified below, 41.7% of the residents in Catalonia with right to vote are either native speakers of Catalan or native speakers of both Catalan and Spanish. Among the electoral polls for the 2012 election only four of them provide information on the language of the respondents. The poll of the official Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS) (face-to-face survey), dependent on the Spanish central government,
shows 45.9% of respondents being native speakers of Catalan or native speakers of both Catalan and Spanish (a moderate 10% deviation; see CIS 2012b). The parallel figure for the poll of the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (CEO) (telephone survey), dependent on the Catalan government (Generalitat), is 49.3% (a 18.2% deviation), and that of MyWord, commissioned by the SER radio network (internet survey), is 54% (a 29.5% deviation). The poll of GESOP (telephone survey), commissioned by the newspaper El Periódico de Catalunya, provides data on the language of habitual use of the respondents; those declaring that it is either Catalan or both Catalan and Spanish are 63.8%.

Even the opinion surveys without linguistic bias lack statistical reliability in order to study the specific characteristics of the voters of the different parties in the elections to the Catalan Parliament, due to the very strong concealment of the vote cast, especially when the issue of nationalism comes to the fore. Thus in CIS (2012a) only 6.9% of those declaring to have voted in the 2010 election acknowledge that they have voted for non-nationalist parties; the real figure was 15.8% (we define below what we understand by “non-nationalist”, “semi-nationalist” and “nationalist” parties). There is no reason to suppose that this 43.7% minority of ex post professed non-nationalist voters are randomly distributed among all non-nationalist voters. On the other side of the spectrum, 9.9% of those declaring to have voted claim that they have voted for the militant nationalist party ERC; this is 141.4% of the real figure of 7%.

In order to overcome the lack of sincerity of the voters, we shall resort to a standard indirect statistical procedure: operating with aggregated data. The level of aggregation is that of the 41 administrative divisions of Catalonia (“comarques”), where we have available both the electoral results and statistically significant linguistic data. At any rate, “it is the mark of an educated mind to expect that amount of exactness in each kind which the nature of the particular subject admits” (Nicomachean Ethics 1094b).

There was a crucial miscalculation on the part of those deciding to call the snap election on the basis of a perception of the Catalan electorate. As it is usually the case with miscalculations, there are lessons to be drawn. Also, expectations, satisfied or unfulfilled, are essential in the dynamic of nationalist movements (see Laitin 2007).

The literature on Catalan nationalism offers a large assortment. The historical background may be considered, with the mythical years 1640 (Revolt of Catalonia during the Thirty Years War) and 1714 (fall of Barcelona during the War of the Spanish Succession) coming up often (see Linz 2008); not to forget the Middle Ages (see Armstrong 1982). But Catalan nationalism, as many European nationalisms, is born in the 19th century (see Vicens Vives 1961 for a description of the birth), and “nationalism is the crystallisation of new cultures, not the awakening of old ones” (Gellner 1983: 49).

1 Other surveys of CIS (also face-to-face) show figures that coincide almost exactly with the 41.7% estimate (based on the data of the Catalan Statistical Office), as in CIS (2012a), where 42.4% of residents in Catalonia with right to vote are either native speakers of Catalan or native speakers of both Catalan and Spanish.

2 Apart from the fact that the self-perceptions on “language of habitual use” are fuzzier than those on “mother tongue”, in the first case the estimates of data for the population with right to vote are more delicate (see below).

3 πεπαιδευμένου [γάρ] ἔστιν ἐπὶ τοσούτου τάκτικας ἐπιζητεῖν καθ’ ἐκαστὸν γένος, ἐφ’ ὅσον ἢ τοῦ πράγματος φύσις ἐπιδέχεται (see Aristotle 1934).
In this paper we investigate the dynamic between the 2010 and 2012 elections, focusing on the role of language. We circumvent the data difficulties by using an indirect statistical procedure. The fact that the support for nationalist parties has kept constant between 2010 and 2012 results from this support increasing among Catalan speakers and decreasing among Spanish speakers. This has to be analysed in the context of a changing balance between the two linguistic groups. The Spanish speakers are now in the clear majority, although the Catalan speaking group is predominant economically and socially.

2. Economics and language

From a comparative politics viewpoint, beyond laws and political decisions there are two relevant structural elements to consider in the territories with an implicit or explicit separatist movement: the relative economic position of the territory and its linguistic distribution.

In the regions richer than the state to which they belong, often at least part of the electorate feels disadvantaged by a perceived excessive or unfair redistributive activity of the central government.

The richest regions in Spain comprise Madrid, the Basque Country and Navarre, with a GDP per capita around 30% higher than the Spanish average (see INE 2013b; data of 2010, the latest broken down by provinces). Apart from these three regions, rich Spain, with a GDP per capita at least 5% higher than average, extends along an arch from Valladolid to the Balearic Islands; here the highest income, around 15% above average, corresponds to Catalonia (with very similar values for its 4 provinces) and the province of Burgos. The Catalan GDP per capita is 17% larger than the Spanish average. In general, the GDP per capita can be broken down into labour productivity level (measured as GDP to employment ratio) and the extent of labour utilization (measured as employment to total population ratio). The labour productivity in Catalonia is a moderate 4% higher than the Spanish average, but the labour utilization is 12% larger (see La Caixa 2012; data of 2010). Concerning the latter, the participation rate is higher and the unemployment rate is lower in Catalonia than in Spain overall; the difference in the participation rate is essentially due to the larger female participation rate.

Some comparisons could help. As for the temporal dimension, regional differences in per capita income decreased during the Spanish economic boom of the sixties and early seventies. Significant internal migratory flows were instrumental in this process; in particular, Catalonia received a substantial immigration that was to affect the linguistic situation. Beside a general advance of the position of Catalonia as compared with the EU average, in 1955 Madrid was 56% richer than the Spanish average and Catalonia

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4 In the case of Spain, it has to be considered that the two richest regions, the Basque Country and Navarre, have an idiosyncratic fiscal system, essentially pre-modern, with the result that the higher than average income of their inhabitants has virtually no extra-regional redistributive effect. Obviously other regions (especially the rich ones) may feel that this is a case of “agravio comparativo” (“offence arising from inequality”), a very Spanish concept. In fact, in the Basque Country most taxes are levied by the three provinces forming it, but not by the region; this circumstance gives appreciable political clout to each of the provinces (see Novo Arbona 2010), making secession attempts more difficult.
60%, in 1975 the data were 34% and 28% (see Fundación BBV 1999), and in 2010 they were 30% and 17%.

Catalonia has a very particular demographic structure. The larger metropolitan area of Barcelona (in Catalan “Àmbit metropolità de Barcelona”) contains 68% of the population.

As for the spatial dimension, comparisons between the per capita income of Catalonia and the per capita income of this or that EU country have been used and interpreted in the electoral campaign of the 2012 election. Caution is called for in piecewise spatial comparisons of income involving large metropolitan areas whose economic influence extends to the whole country or beyond. At any rate, the Italian case suggests parallels with the territorial conflicts in Spain\(^5\).

The Catalan language maintains a vigorous cultural activity in spite of the strong presence in Catalonia of Spanish, one of the main world languages\(^6\). The language is also the core of Catalan nationalism.

In fact, 35.3% of residents in Catalonia (14 or older) have Catalan as their mother tongue, 39.4% declare that Catalan is their own language (identification language) and 39.5% that it is their language of habitual use\(^7\) (data taken throughout 2010; see Fundacc 2011\(^8\)). The study of the flows between each first language and each identification language is revealing. Approximately the same proportion (in the range 13%-15%) of initial Spanish speakers change to Catalan as the other way round\(^9\); the higher number of initial Spanish speakers means that the proportion of those identifying themselves as Catalan speakers is larger than that of initial Catalan speakers. On the other hand, among those having an initial language other than Spanish or Catalan (roughly, the immigrants not coming from Spanish speaking American countries\(^10\)), the proportion of those changing to Spanish is five times as large as that of those changing to Catalan. It follows that the future of Catalan depends essentially on the evolution of the proportion of those having Catalan as their mother tongue. In this sense, what is really relevant is the proportion of those Catalan-born having Catalan as their mother tongue. Indeed, 56.7% of the Catalan-born have Catalan as their mother tongue, compared to only 2.9% of the non Catalan-born. Approximately, 60% of residents in

\(^5\) There are some similarities in the economic aspect: Italy has almost exactly the same GDP per capita (PPS, “Purchasing Power Standard”) as Spain, some rich regions advocating fiscal devolution, and two large metropolitan areas (Rome in Lazio and Milan in Lombardy) with an extensive range of influence. Lombardy has approximately the same income per capita as Madrid (132 and 129, GDP per capita (PPS) of 2010, in percentage of the EU average), and that of Lazio is similar to that of Catalonia (117 and 116) (see EUROSTAT 2013).

\(^6\) As for abilities, 77.5% of the residents in Catalonia can speak Catalan and 99.8% can speak Spanish (see Fundacc 2011).

\(^7\) It is clear that the answers to questions on language can be affected by the wording of the questions, the way in which the answers are elicited, the behaviour of the interviewers and the character of social pressure when the poll takes place. The figures for “identification language” and “language of habitual use” are very important, but less “robust” than those for mother tongue.

\(^8\) The sample size of this survey (31,000) provides statistically significant data disaggregated according to (1) geographical sub-units, (2) age and (3) nationality (Spanish or non-Spanish).

\(^9\) Perhaps marriage/cohabitation is the reason of many of these changes of language.

\(^10\) Nationals of Spanish American countries make up approximately 30% of foreign residents in Catalonia, a proportion similar to the overall Spanish average (see INE 2013c).
Catalonia are Catalan-born, while 20% are born in the rest of Spain and the same proportion are born abroad.

Among the Catalan-born, the proportion of Catalan native (mother tongue) speakers is remarkably stable for those up to 44 years old, at around 45% (45% for the 14-19, 46.5% for the 20-24, 43.6% for the 25-34, and 45.6% for the 35-44). For the older groups, the percentage of Catalan native speakers increases sharply with age (57.7% for the 45-54, 73.6% for the 55-64, and 83.8% for those over 65) (see Fundacc 2011). In the long term, caeteris paribus, the overall proportion may be predicted to stabilize at around 45%. Assuming that the proportion of Catalan-born keeps at 60%\(^{11}\), and that of non Catalan-born Catalan native speakers remains at 3%, it follows an overall long-term proportion of 28.2% for native Catalan speakers, in contrast with the present proportion of 35.3%.

Only Spanish citizens (18 or older) can vote to elect the Catalan Parliament. As 15.4% of residents (14 or older) in Catalonia are foreigners (data of 1 July 2010; see INE 2013c), and assuming that virtually no foreigner has Catalan as mother tongue, it can be inferred from the data of Fundacc that 41.7% of residents in Catalonia with right to vote are native speakers of Catalan.

Often opinion polls contemplate the possibility of speakers with both Catalan and Spanish as mother tongues; it is not the case of the data of Fundacc. An extensive survey of the Catalan Statistical Office shows 36.2% of Catalan native speakers (15 or older) and further 2.5% being both Catalan and Spanish native speakers in 2003; the figures are 31.6% and 3.8% in 2008 (see IDESCAT 2013). Reasoning as above with the data of 2008, and considering that 15.1% of residents (15 or older) in Catalonia are foreigners (data of 1 January 2008; see INE 2013c), it follows from the 2008 data of IDESCAT that (also) 41.7% of residents in Catalonia with right to vote are either native speakers of Catalan or native speakers of both Catalan and Spanish. The Catalan Statistical Office also provides data for the language of habitual use in 2008: 35.6% for Catalan (46% in 2003) and 11.9% for both Catalan and Spanish (4.7% in 2003). An estimate of the corresponding data for the population with right to vote is now a more delicate exercise.

The proportion of Catalan speakers is thus declining in recent years. We have few statistically reliable linguistic data before 1975 (the death of Franco). In a good survey (see Fundación FOESSA 1970) carried out in 1969 among “amas de casa” (here “ladies of the home”\(^{12}\)), 55% of respondents had Catalan as “mother tongue” (literally), and a further 2% both Catalan and Spanish; the figures for “father tongue” are 58% and 1%. As for the language of habitual use (in this case, language preferred to speak with the husband), the data were 59% for Catalan and 2% for both Catalan and Spanish.

The following table summarizes the evolution of the percentage of native Catalan speakers, with the caveats mentioned above for the data of 1969 (here the data for

\(^{11}\) It is difficult to make long-term predictions of the proportion of Catalan-born. On the one hand, the population tends to be increasingly mobile; on the other hand, the present figure of non Catalan-born is inflated because of the massive foreign immigration between 1998 and 2009. These immigrants are relatively young and mostly inclined to become Spanish speakers if they are not already so (see above).

\(^{12}\) The universe of the survey were the women, younger than 61, running or supervising some household (not necessarily housewives); the province of Girona was not considered.
“mother tongue” and “father tongue” have been integrated tentatively, in such a way that the 1969 Total is a lower bound estimate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2008</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(1) Catalan</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>36.2</td>
<td>31.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(2) Cat. &amp; Spanish</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (1)+(2)</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>38.7</td>
<td>35.4</td>
</tr>
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</table>

3. The election

The Catalan Parliament is elected by proportional representation through closed party-lists. Each one of the four provinces (Barcelona, Girona, Lleida and Tarragona) constitutes a district, with an electoral threshold of 3%. The province of Barcelona (73% of the population of Catalonia) is sub-represented in the allocation of seats, which favours nationalist parties.

The following parties obtained representation in the Catalan Parliament in 2012, in ascending order of (Catalan) nationalism (as perceived by the electors, see CIS 2012b: question 30).

- PP (Partido Popular). The major centre-right Spanish party.
- PSC (Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya). Although an independent party, it has a complex association with PSOE (see Gutiérrez and Llamazares 2013), which is the major centre-left Spanish party.
- ICV-EUiA (coalition between Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds and Esquerra Unida i Alternativa). It blends communist and eco-socialist elements. Usually contests the Spanish elections in coalition with IU (United Left).
- CiU (coalition between CDC, Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya, and UDC, Unió Democràtica de Catalunya). Both CDC and UDC are centre-right, the latter with a Christian democratic character. CDC, certainly the senior member of the coalition, is more nationalist than UDC.
- ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya). Centre-left, although its main perceived sign of identity is strong nationalism.
- CUP (Candidatura d’Unitat Popular). Anti-capitalist. The party advocates the constitution of a new state embracing the so-called “Catalan countries”, i.e. the area where Catalan is claimed to be the main language (including the Balearic Islands and part of the Valencia region).

The electoral turnout of Catalans is lower in the elections for the Catalan Parliament than in those for the Spanish Parliament (Cortes). The political landscape of Catalonia has been structured around two big poles: PSC and CiU. The former has obtained in the Catalan Parliament elections from 1984 through 2006 results in the range between 25% and 31% (with the exception of the 1999 election, when it reached 38%); afterwards it has decayed (18% in 2010 and 14% in 2012). CiU has had two periods, corresponding to its only two leaders so far. In the first period, under Jordi Pujol, obtained values
around 45% in the first three elections from 1984, with a moderate decline in the subsequent two ones (41% and 38%), keeping always the government of the Generalitat. From the election of 2003 onwards, CiU assumes a profile increasingly nationalist, under its new leader, Artur Mas. In 2003 CiU has to cede the power to a heterogeneous centre-left coalition around PSC, only to recover it in 2010 after the government of this coalition becomes much discredited. In all the elections after (and including) 2003, CiU obtains approximately 31% of the votes, except in 2010 (38%).

In order to classify the Catalan political parties according to their level of nationalism, we contemplate two key issues: (1) the independence of Catalonia; (2) an appreciable level of government language planning in favour of Catalan, understood mainly as linguistic immersion (in Catalan) in education. As a result, three categories appear:

- Nationalist parties, when both (1) and (2) are advocated: CiU\textsuperscript{13}, ERC and CUP.
- Semi-nationalist parties, when (2) is supported, whereas the position on (1) is either negative or neutral: PSC and ICV-EUiA.
- Non-nationalist parties, when (1) and (2) are opposed: PP and C’s.

From the standpoint of comparative politics, the linguistic requirements for access to public employment are crucial in government language planning. These requirements have been subject to relatively quiet acceptance and the issue has not been so far particularly salient in political debate in Catalonia. There are 375,000 public employees in Catalonia (first quarter of 2013), i.e. 13.5% of total employment (see INE 2013\textsuperscript{a}). Only 30,000 work for the central government, around 86,000 for the local authorities (municipalities and provinces), and the rest are under the control of the Catalan government (see MHAP 2013)\textsuperscript{14}. For those wanting to be admitted to public employment, the Catalan Government is the most important reference point.

4. The results of the election

The results of the election are in the table (indicating percentages of valid vote; in 2010 CUP did not contest the election, and Solidaritat Catalana per la Independència (SI), a militant pro-independence coalition, obtained parliamentary representation). The snap election was called in view of an apparent upsurge of nationalist feeling in Catalonia since the previous election of 2010. The coalition in Government (CiU) put forward to the electorate that it was the right moment for the start of the “process of national transition” towards an independent Catalonia, and that this difficult process needed a strong leadership, that of CiU and its leader, Artur Mas. The CiU sought a sufficient parliamentary majority from the Catalan people to carry out this task. Two components can be observed in the result:

\textsuperscript{13} The minor member of the coalition, UDC, is lukewarm on the independence of Catalonia, officially advocating a “confederation” with the rest of Spain.

\textsuperscript{14} The data of MHAP, showing 306,000 employees at 1st January 2013, are only complete for the central government. As for the Catalan government, the employees of public bodies with their own legal personality (“organismos públicos” in Spanish law) are not included; the same can be said for the local authorities, although here the numbers are lower.
1. The predicted increase of the nationalist parties (taken together) did not take place. In fact, their aggregated percentage of vote remained approximately as in 2010 (at a level essentially constant since the election of 2003).

2. In the nationalist preferences dimension, there was a shift towards more militant positions. The drop of CiU was almost completely compensated by a rise of ERC, a clear winner of the election. An analogous effect took place on the other side of the spectrum: the increase of C’s may be related with the fall of PSC.

The combination of (1) and (2) brought about the heavy losses of CiU.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<th>2010</th>
<th>2012</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>30.7</td>
<td>Nationalists</td>
<td>48.7</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ERC</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CUP/SI</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Semi-nationalists</td>
<td>25.8</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSC</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICV-EUiA</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>Non-nationalists</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>20.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PP</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C’s</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

5. Language and voting dynamic

It is well known that there exist a high correlation in Catalonia between the mother tongue (Catalan or Spanish) and the intensity of nationalist feeling. Whereas 57.6% of those having Catalan as mother tongue are in favour of an independent Catalonia, only 17.1% are for it among those having Spanish as mother tongue (see CIS 2012a: the crossing between questions 47cl and 12al have been provided by CIS); the overall figure is 33.7%. The figures for those in favour of a right to secede (in principle) are similar: 63.5% (Catalan), 19.8 (Spanish), 37.4% (overall)\(^{15}\) (see CIS 2012a: the crossing between questions 47cl and 12 have been provided by CIS).

Another question is the change of nationalist feelings between the elections of 2010 and 2012, as taken shape in votes. How language has had an influence? While the nationalist vote has kept stable overall between 2010 and 2012, has it kept unaltered in each of the two language groups? Certainly opinion polls are not of much assistance to answer this question, as explained above.

We adopt an indirect approach to find out how the nationalist vote changed between 2010 and 2012 in each language group: Catalan speakers and Spanish speakers. We consider the 41 administrative divisions of Catalonia. Fundacc (2011) offers data (taken throughout 2010) on language of habitual use, statistically significant for the administrative divisions. In one half of the administrative divisions of Catalonia the share of Catalan speakers is above 66%. On the other side, the lowest values are in the

\(^{15}\) In 1979 they were (overall) 44.5% (see Gunther, Sani and Shabad 1986); admittedly, in contrast with that survey, the question of CIS was not dichotomic (e.g., federalism was one of the alternatives to the right to self-determination).
metropolitan area of Barcelona (27.9% in the administrative division of Barcelona proper), the urban area of Tarragona and the Aran Valley.\footnote{16 The original language of the Aran Valley is not Catalan, but Aranese, a variety of Occitan.}

A language share index is assigned to each division: index 153 means that the proportion of Catalan speakers in the division is 153% of the average for Catalonia (39.5%). In the scatter plot of the figure the language share index is on the abscissa axis and the increment (positive or negative) of the percentage of vote for the nationalist parties is on the ordinate axis. The regression line has equation $y=0.1084x-12.219$, with $R^2=0.7223$. Excluding the 4 divisions of the Ebro area (in Catalan Terres de l’Ebre, comprising Baix Ebre, Montsià, Terra Alta and Ribera d’Ebre), a border area where the nationalist issue is perhaps affected in some way by particular exchanges and relations with the neighbouring regions of Valencia and Aragon, the regression line has equation $y=0.1214x-13.658$, with $R^2=0.7831$.

Between 2010 and 2012 the electoral turnout increased from 58.8% to 69.6% (and the percentage of blank votes decreased from 2.9 to 1.4). The hypothesis of a differential surge in the mobilization of the Spanish speaking group has been put forward in the media. We cannot find almost any support for this hypothesis. If the language share index is on the abscissa axis and the increment (positive or negative) of the electoral turnout is on the ordinate axis, the regression line has now equation $y=-0.0093x+10.611$, with $R^2=0.1951$. Excluding the 4 divisions of the Ebro area, the regression line has equation $y=-0.02x+11.787$, with $R^2=0.0799$. 

\begin{figure}[h]
  \centering
  \includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{scatter_plot.png}
  \caption{Scatter plot showing the relationship between language share index and increment of nationalist vote percentage.}
  \end{figure}
All in all, the fact that the support to nationalist parties has kept constant between 2010 and 2012 results from this support increasing among Catalan speakers and decreasing among Spanish speakers.

**Conclusion**

The evolution of the vote between 2010 and 2012, relating to the issue of nationalism, went in opposite directions in the two linguistic groups, the Catalan speakers and the Spanish speakers. In the background are the facts that (1) Spanish speakers are now in the clear majority and (2) the Catalan-speaking group is still predominant economically and socially.

It is obvious that the leaders of CiU overestimated the nationalist vote in the incoming 2012 election. Besides, taking for granted a hefty upsurge of it, they tried to minimize in the election campaign the transfer of nationalist vote towards ERC by raising the militant tone (without success).

The misreckoning of the nationalist vote by the leadership of CiU has explanations beyond the flop of opinion polls (suffering from the well-known concealment of the non-nationalist vote and the so far rather disregarded over-representation in the samples of the Catalan-speaking population). Beyond surveys, professional politicians are supposed to have a feeling for the opinions of the electorate. In this sense, the leaders of CiU perceived in their environment a growing support for Catalan nationalism. This perception matched up with the truth in the Umwelt of those leaders: the Catalan-speaking group. Certainly neither the Catalan media nor the electoral polls were of much help in gauging the prevalent opinions among the Spanish-speaking population.

As indicated above, Catalan politics has been dominated by two political organizations since the re-establishment of the autonomous government: CiU, at the centre-right of the spectrum, and PSC, at the centre-left. Both have been mostly under the aegis of the Catalan-speaking bourgeoisie. Both have a complex structure: CiU is a coalition with a dominant partner, Convergència, and with strong tensions at present between the two partners (on account of the minor partner, UDC, being either less nationalistic or more realistic); PSC has a complicated relation of association with the Spanish PSOE (the former is an independent party, but with substantial organic power in the latter), and this relation is now threatened by the PSC having accepted, at least in principle (and rather confusedly), the right of Catalonia to secede. Both are losing popular support (especially the PSC, so far having its best supply of votes in the mostly Spanish-speaking working class) and risk splits. The channels in which the Catalans of the two linguistic groups participate in party politics may perhaps change in the future.

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