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oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/1541582024-01-13T01:01:05Zcom_10366_4283com_10366_4200com_10366_3946com_10366_3823col_10366_4284

Torregrosa Montaner, Ramón José Cooperative production Egalitarism Meritocracy Majority voting Two-stage equilibrium We consider a cooperative formed by a large number of workers differentiated by their initial endowment of wealth, which is both primary input (labor) and consumption (leisure). The cooperative is characterized by its wealth distribution, and produces a consumption good from labor, which allocates among workers according to a convex combination of the Proportional and the Egalitarian rule. In the first stage, workers decide this combination by simple majority. In a second stage, they choose how much labor to provide to the cooperative. We find that when in the cooperative’s wealth distribution, the median wealth is lower (higher) than the average, the degree of meritocracy chosen by workers is lower (higher) than that of the optimum, and coincides with it when both statistics coincide. This choice has similar consequences on the cooperative’s labor–output, since it increases with respect to the degree of meritocracy. 2024-01-12 2024-01-12 2018 info:eu-repo/semantics/article Torregrosa, R. J. (2018). On the endogenous determination of the degree of meritocracy in large cooperatives. Economics Letters, 171, (41-45) 0165-1765 http://hdl.handle.net/10366/154158 10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.027 eng https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.06.027 ECO2012-38860-C02-01 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 Internacional ELSEVIER