2026-09-14T21:17:36Zhttps://gredos.usal.es/oai/request

oai:gredos.usal.es:10366/1597552025-04-30T20:45:56Zcom_10366_156485com_10366_4512com_10366_3823col_10366_156486

Street, Chris N.H. Masip Pallejá, Jaume 2015 [EN]People believe others are telling the truth more often than they actually are, called the truth bias. Surprisingly, when a speaker is judged at multiple points across their statement the truth bias declines. Previous claims argue this is evidence of a shift from (biased) heuristic processing to (reasoned) analytical processing. In four experiments we contrast the heuristic-analytic model (HAM) with alternative accounts. In Experiment 1, the decrease in truth responding was not the result of speakers appearing more deceptive, but was instead attributable to the rater’s processing style. Yet contrary to HAMs, across three experiments we found the decline in bias was not related to the amount of processing time available (Experiment 1-3) or the communication channel (Experiment 2). In Experiment 4 we find support for a new account: that the bias reflects whether raters perceive the statement to be internally consistent. http://hdl.handle.net/10366/159755 eng The source of the truth bias: Heuristic processing? info:eu-repo/semantics/article TEXT Gredos. Repositorio Documental de la Universidad de Salamanca Hispana