http://hdl.handle.net/10366/154649 2026-04-21T16:13:30Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/168279 [ES]Como se ha discutido en la introducción y en otros capítulos de este libro, en los últimos dos años el sistema de partidos en España (caracterizado desde los años ochenta por un estable y sólido bipartidismo entre el PSOE y el PP) ha cambiado radicalmente, con la llegada al panorama político nacional de dos nuevos partidos relevantes: Ciudadanos (Cs) y Podemos. En los últimos años en Europa se ha producido un cambio sustancial en el sistema de partidos con la proliferación exitosa de nuevos partidos (Hobolt y Tilley, 2016; Teperoglou y Tsatsanis, 2014), especialmente en el Sur de Europa (Hutter, Kriesi y Vidal, 2018). En general, este cambio se atribuye a dos factores entrelazados. El primero, se ha otorgado al descontento que se ha producido por la desconexión entre votantes y partidos provocada por el desajuste entre preferencias ciudadanas y oferta política consecuencia de la Gran Recesión iniciada en 2008 y sus secuelas políticas de ajuste y austeridad (Gómez y Ramiro, 2017; Hernández y Kriesi, 2016; Polk y Rovny, 2015; Roberts, 2013). El segundo, y juntamente con lo anterior, a la incapacidad de satisfacer los nuevos espacios de representación que se propician como consecuencia de la aparición o politización de nuevos conflictos o issues (Harmel y Robertson, 1985; Meguid, 2005, 2008; Kriesi et al., 2012). Pero entonces, ¿cómo es que estos nuevos partidos representan sectores ideológicos y con propuestas tan dispares como La Lega Nord o M5S en Italia; Golden Dawn, ANEL o Syriza en Grecia; o Podemos y Ciudadanos en España? 2018-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/160433 [EN] Despite the geographical distance, the war in Ukraine has brought to the fore links between the Russian establishment and Radical Right forces in Spain. Both scholars and pundits have taken an interest in the question, which spread to party competition, quickly turning into a (discursive) race away from Putin as the consequences of war become more evident. Despite the war’s unquestioned relevance and previous links between Russia and the Radical Right in Spain (albeit less established than in other European countries), a systematic analysis of the effects of the invasion is missing. This report addresses this gap by focusing on the impact of the Ukraine invasion on party discourse and public opinion in Spain. It analyses records of proceedings from the Spanish Parliament, Twitter messages posted by the VOX party and its leader, and survey data gathered since February 2022 by the Spanish Center for Sociological Research (CIS). The main findings at the party level highlight the relatively weak associations between the Kremlin and The Radical Right in Spain (compared to other European countries), as well as efforts to separate from Putin after the invasion started. A more complex pattern of preferences is identified at the individual level. 2023-01-01T00:00:00Z http://hdl.handle.net/10366/160432 [EN] This chapter deals with the association between radicalism, populism and Euroscepticism in the context of the 2024 European elections. It first examines the electoral platforms of leading political parties and shows that Eurosceptic ideas, while not highly prevalent, are more common among forces of the radical right. It also suggests that, as second-order theories expect, national issues dominated the electoral campaign for the European Parliament (EP) in Spain. Second, public opinion data is used to describe the general state of attitudes towards the EU and their association with voting for different political parties. The main results from this section are evidence that voters of radical-right parties are more critical of the EU. They also underline a potential reconfiguration of the radical-right space that now includes Vox and a new anti-establishment, outsider formation, The Party is Over (Se Acabó La Fiesta, SALF). 2024-01-01T00:00:00Z