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FICTIVE INTERACTION BLENDED NETWORKS IN THE DAILY SHOW WITH JON STEWART

CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL HUMOR DISCOURSE NOT ONLY FOR
ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES

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Introduction

There is a famous proverb that states: *many a true word is spoken in jest*, which means just because something is humorous does not mean it does not contain some wisdom and/or truth to it. The purpose of comedy is to make people laugh, but underneath all that humor lies layers of social and sometimes political opinions and critiques that compel us to face realities that many times we would rather ignore (Koestler 1964). Therefore, humor is a creative process that is produced verbally and/or visually to send us messages of the world we live in.

It is not surprising that especially in American culture, when major elections roll around, politicians and their ideological stances are the main sources of political humor in many media outlets, especially "soft news" televised programs like daytime and nighttime talk shows as well as entertainment and tabloid news programs. It is through humor that social and political commentaries are made on these programs. But why do so many Americans tune into these programs? Why are these "soft news" sources sometimes the main source of information, especially political information? Studies have shown that these types of programs are appealing because they not only entertain the general public but they also do so in a straightforward non complex manner, making the abstract ideas of the political world more meaningful and easier to understand

(Baum 2002; 2003; 2005; Baum and Jamison 2006).

This dissertation examines the discourse of the former host, Jon Stewart, of the well-known American soft news program, *The Daily Show*. More specifically we analyze a conceptual phenomenon he so frequently used in his monologues, which is based on a face-to-face conversation frame, fictive interaction (FI) (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014), to not only inform his audience but also to criticize and present his own views and opinions. After 16 years of successfully hosting the show, Jon Stewart made his last appearance in July 2015, having been replaced by South African comedian, Trevor Noah in September of that same year. In an interview with the British newspaper *The Guardian*, Stewart states his reasons for leaving the show:

"Honestly, it was a combination of the limitations of my brain and a format that is geared towards following an increasingly redundant process, which is our political process. I was just thinking, 'Are there other ways to skin this cat?'" (Freeman 2015)

In this same interview he talks about covering four US presidential elections and that he felt there was nothing more to contribute to this process because the elections are all the same. Nevertheless, his long tenure did not go unnoticed with the show receiving more than 50 awards from 125 nominations (IMDb 2016). It is no wonder this popularity sparked much interest in the academic world, especially in the field of communication and journalism, with a number of studies being performed about this "fake news" program and its highly acclaimed host (Baym 2005; Young 2008; 2013; Polk, Dannagal, and Holbert 2009; Jones 2007; 2010; Xenos and Becker 2009; Waisanen 2009; Hmielowski, Holbert, and Lee 2011).

We do not wish to replicate any of the studies mentioned above, since this dissertation

is in Advanced English Studies from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective and not in the field of communication. Therefore, our main aim is to analyze fictive interaction networks created as rhetorical strategies by Stewart in his discourse, which involve having fictitious conversations with "real" people who are not present in the studio and do not actually take part in any of these exchanges for the sake of the audience. Even though these imaginary dialogues occur in an overt interactional structure, that is during the host's monologues, they constitute a conceptual "three-way communication channel", known as a fictive trialogue (Pascual 2002; 2008b; 2014). Fictive trialogues are prototypical conceptual structures of television programs like *The Daily Show*, where the host, Jon Stewart is the fictive addressor talking to a fictive addressee for the benefit of his audience, the fictive bystanders who are overhearing the unreal conversations. These impossible verbal exchanges are produced not only to make the audience laugh but also for rhetorical purposes.

Fictive Interaction, which follows the Cognitive Linguistic framework, is a cognitive process we use to organize our thoughts through a conversation frame. Pascual (2014, 5) argues that "from our conversational mind emerges a conversational linguistic and discursive structure". Emotions, attitudes, opinions and so on are expressed in imaginative conversations or parts of a conversation. It is not surprising that in order to conceptualize these communicative events so that they may occur at different times and in different spaces, conceptual blending (Fauconnier and Turner 1994; 1998; 2002) is needed. In this specific case of *The Daily Show*, Jon Stewart is only able to talk to his fictive addressees because there are time and space compressions, which allow the fictive interaction blends to occur.

Fictive interaction has been studied in a wide array of discourse types but little attempt

has been made to explore the humorous nature of fictive interaction blends. There is one undergraduate study (Stec 2007) that analyzed FI in different types of narratives, two of which were related to humor: web comics and the segment "word" in the "fake news" program, *The Colbert Report*. Although these narratives are humorous, the main focus was on the fictive interaction blends found in each and not on what made the interactions funny.

Humor has been studied from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective concerned mainly with incongruity theories by describing humor in terms of cognitive categories of construal (e.g. conceptual metaphor, metonymy, conceptual blending) (Brône and Feyaerts 2003; 2004; Brône, Feyaerts, and Veale 2006). The conceptual integration theory has also been studied in humor discourse, especially in political cartoons (Coulson 1996; 2001b; 2006; Marín-Arrese 2003; 2008; Džanić and Berberoviü 2010; Džanić 2013). These studies have revealed that humor arises from blending outlandish incongruent input spaces about the world of politics. Moreover, it simultaneously helps to criticize political reality. Popa (2011; 2013) has also studied humor from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective analyzing multimodal metaphors used in a Romanian political cartoon satire television program and also concluded that humor was being used to provide audiences with information about political issues and politicians.

The purpose of our study is therefore not only to analyze the humor found in the fictive interaction networks in Jon Stewart's monologues on *The Daily Show*, but also to understand how these humorous imaginary conversations provide *The Daily Show* viewers political information from the host's perspective. We chose to study the three televised episodes that aired directly after each one of the 2012 presidential debates, given that this presidential race was close and that sometimes the speculation is that

debates can be "game changers". Furthermore, exposure to news media coverage after debates can influence audiences' evaluations of debate outcomes, especially those who have partially watched the actual debates (Tsfati 2003).

Therefore, the questions we aim to answer in this study are the following:

- Jon Stewart, the former host of The Daily Show, in his monologues about the three 2012 presidential debates, successfully performed fictitious verbal exchanges in a "Current Discourse Space" (Langacker 2001; 2008; 2013) with people who were not found in the Here-and-Now Space (i.e., in The Daily Show studio with the host during the monologue). Who did he have these imaginary conversations with and why? How and why were they created?
- Why did The Daily Show with Jon Stewart resort to fictive interaction as a cognitive strategy? Was it used as a simple humorous device at the discourse level or a rhetorical device to persuade his viewers to look at politicians and their qualifications differently, holding them responsible for their actions/ statements?

We will attempt to answer these questions using a Cognitive Linguistic theoretical framework, mainly Conceptual Integration, focusing on the cognitive phenomenon of

¹ We use Langacker's (2001, 144) concept, "Current Discourse Space" to refer to "the mental space comprising those elements and relations construed as being shared by the speaker and hearer as a basis for communication at a given moment in the flow of discourse". Langacker states that the Current Discourse Space along with the ground are cognitive domains that serve as the conceptual base for the meanings of many linguistic elements. For our purposes here it is the discourse space the fictitious conversations take place in.

fictive interaction. Our aim is not to provide complex in-depth conceptual integration networks illustrating mental operations involved in blending, like blending theorists do. We will; however, attempt to examine the complexity of the fictive interaction networks by analyzing the language used in the fictitious conversations and the social interaction roles demonstrated by the fictive participants to better understand the conceptual ideas that are being transmitted in each network.

1.1 Outline of the thesis

In this chapter we have introduced our interest in political humor, particularly from a Cognitive Linguistics perspective. We have also explained what we set out to achieve in this study and how. The remaining chapters are organized as follows.

Chapter two and three contextualize the study in the relevant literature. Chapter two begins with a brief overview of humor theories from a philosophical and psychological perspective focusing on the three general categories of humor: Superiority Theory, Incongruity Theory and The Relief Theory. We then narrow our discussion to verbal humor, which mostly situates itself within the tradition of incongruity theories, analyzing a more linguistic approach to studying humor. The first theory to pave the way in this area was The Semantic Script Theory of humor (Raskin 1985), that was further developed into the General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin 1991). A more cognitive semantic approach is examined, with Giora's (1991) work on humor, and finally humor is explored within studies that encompass the Cognitive Linguistics realm.

Chapter three begins with a brief review of literature of Cognitive Linguistics focusing on conceptual metaphor theory (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987), frame

semantics (Fillmore 1982; 1985), and conceptual integration (Fauconnier and Turner 1996; 2002), all of which try to explain the way we construe the world conceptually and provide the theoretical framework for the cognitive concept, fictive interaction (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014). We then proceed to define and explain this cognitive strategy, one of the main objects of this study, by analyzing how this conversation frame is used to structure cognition, discourse and grammar.

The subsequent chapter, four, takes a general look at political humor on television, beginning with the distinction between "hard news" and "soft news". The remaining chapter is devoted to the numerous studies about *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart*. These studies show the great interest in this political satire television program from a communications perspective and contextualize its importance as a potential news source for its viewers.

The fifth chapter is concerned with the methodology used for this study. We describe the research methodology of this dissertation, explain the sample selection and present the qualitative methods used to collect and analyze the data.

The data is analyzed in chapter six. We illustrate and explain the instances where fictive interaction networks were found in the monologues of three televised episodes of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. This chapter is divided into three sections, one for each monologue about each one of the three presidential debates.

The chapter that follows discusses the results of this analysis and presents the findings of our work. And finally, in the last chapter we conclude with a brief summary of our key findings and state the conclusions we have drawn from our research and the

contributions made in humor research from a Cognitive Linguistics perspective. We also make recommendations for future research.

We now proceed to the review of literature and begin by discussing research in humor studies.

Humor

What is humor? Such a simple question without a straightforward answer. Humor is a ubiquitous yet enigmatic concept that is difficult to define as a theoretical concept. Philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, linguists and so many other scholars from a wide range of disciplinary fields have attempted to define humor, but none have been entirely successful at providing an explicit definition. "Neither philosopher nor literary critic has given us a wholly satisfactory account of the comic. One difficulty is that so many things are true of comedy; it is hardly less confusing than life itself" (Mathewson 1920, 3). There does not seem to be a general consensus amongst scholars as to what exactly defines humor. Each field of study approaches the concept from their specific perspective, but there does not seem to be any accordance as to what specifically constitutes humor. According to Attardo, "ultimately, it seems that, not only has it not been possible to agree on how to divide the category of 'humor' (e.g. 'humor' vs. 'comic' vs. 'ridiculous'), but it is even difficult to find pre theoretical definition of 'humor' in the most general sense" (1994, 3).

This researcher identifies a number of authors from different disciplines that have seen the need for a detailed definition of humor or have attempted to devise one. Literary criticism is one such area. Sinicropi (1981)² states:

The lack of a rigorous, or at least reliable, definition of humor and of its categories causes (...) another difficulty that hinders research; it is represented by the fact that denominations of processes usually considered sources of humor (...) are often used as if they were synonyms or if they shared a semantic space. This denotes that the semantic field to which they belong does not have precise boundaries.

The literary styles referred to here that involve humor are irony, satire, parody and others. The problem lies in finding precise definitions to distinguish one from the other.

Psychologists, unlike literary critics and folklorists, attempt to divide humor into categories based on the subject matter, for example, into aggressive, sexual, or biological (Attardo 1994).

Nevertheless, there are many humor theories that have attempted, in a wider sense, to explain the reasons why people find certain situations humorous. Given this dilemma, it seems only fit to provide a brief review of literature regarding the three most common humor theories that have shaped or provided theoretical support for many humor researchers.

-

² Translated and quoted in Salvatore Attardo. 1994. *Linguistic Theories of Humor*. New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

2.1 Humor Theories: A brief review

Humor theories have existed for centuries. They date back to classical philosophers like Plato and Aristotle. Other renowned philosophers like Hobbes, Schopenhauer, Kant and Spencer have also contributed to these theories, analyzing why people laugh at certain situations by attempting to explain the various mental processes that allow them to experience humor while others have analyzed the physiological reflexes of laughter that derive from humorous situations. These philosophical ideas have laid the foundation for many studies from a number of academic fields on humor and laughter. Several authors have provided comprehensive reviews of literature concerning these humor theories. One such influential researcher is American psychologist, Patricia Keith-Spiegel (1972) whose review of literature on humor theories prior to the 1970s allowed her to devise a classification of eight major types (biological, superiority, incongruity, surprise, ambivalence, release, configuration, and psychoanalytic theories). Nevertheless, there seems to be a consensus to sort these numerous theories into three general categories: Superiority Theory, Incongruity Theory and The Relief Theory (Attardo 1994; Kline 1907; Monro 1951; Morreall 2009; Morreall 2013; Mulder and Nijholt 2002; Raskin 1985; Smuts 2009). Others also agree that these belong to three larger families of theories: cognitive or cognitive-perceptual (incongruity theory); social or social-behavioral (superiority theory); and psychoanalytical (release theory) (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1994). It is not our intent here to replicate surveys of literature that have already been done so thoroughly by other scholars (Ermida 2008), but to provide a general overview of the three major theories that have served as theoretical background for many humor theories in many disciplines.

The superiority theory is said to be the first humor theory, tracing back to the Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle; however, the major advances done in this theory were credited to the 17th century English philosopher, Hobbes, who believed that people feel superior when they laugh at other people's misfortunes or shortcomings. "The passion of laughter is nothing else but sudden glory arising from sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others or with our own formerly." (Hobbes in Kline 1907, 422). The focus here is on laughter and feeling superior because humor arises not only from the misfortunes of others but also from our own past tribulations. This, in turn, makes us feel better about ourselves. The English psychologist Sully also supported this theory in his Psychology textbook, *The* Human Mind, confirming that people laugh at all kinds of unfortunate situations experienced by others. However, he felt that this humor only arises if the situation we laugh at is not a serious situation or if what is being laughed at causes us to feel compassion or any other unsuitable negative feeling towards the other (Kline 1907). This idea of not laughing at situations in which people feel superior to others due to negative feelings was a main argument against this theory put forward by the eighteenth century Scottish philosopher, Francis Hutcheson, who criticized this theory in his essay, "Reflections Upon Laughter". He argued that there may also be other reasons that lead people to laugh that do not imply any comparison with the other, like hearing or reading a strange metaphor or simile (Morreall 2009, 7). Due to limitations of this theory, many philosophers felt the need to search for other explanations as to why people laugh that are not related to feelings of superiority or inferiority to others, and hence two alternative theories were developed: the Incongruity Theory and the Relief Theory.

The Incongruity Theory is possibly the most popular of the three due to the number of supporters, especially philosophers and psychologists; it has had over the centuries. It dates back to the 18th century with the Prussian philosopher Immanuel Kant. Although Kant did not specifically use the word *incongruous* in his explanation of laughter at humorous situations, he was the first to explain them using the idea of incongruity. James Beattie in the late eighteenth century was said to be the first to use this word stating that laughter is "two or more inconsistent, unsuitable, or incongruous parts or circumstances, considered as united in one complex object or assemblage" (Morreall 2009, 12). But it was not until the 19th century that a clearer description of this theory was proposed by the German philosopher, Arthur Schopenhauer in the mid twentieth century:

The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been thought through it in some relation, and the laugh itself is just an expression of this incongruity. (as cited in Morreall 2013)

In essence what this theory states is that we perceive something to be humorous because it is incongruous and in some way alters our mental patterns and expectations of the world around us. We laugh because there is incongruity with what we expect and what actually happens and many times this takes us by surprise.

The third humor theory is the Relief Theory. Like the Incongruity Theory, this one developed as a challenge to the Superiority Theory. It focuses on the physiological and psychological response to humor. The main idea behind this theory is that laughter is a mechanism that helps relieve strong emotions and nervous energy in people. Morreall (2013) provides an interesting analogy to explain this theory, comparing our nervous

energy to a steam boiler and humor to its pressure valve that releases the built up steam, or in this case nervousness. The two most influential relief theorists are the early twentieth century English philosopher, Herbert Spencer, who is said to have been the first to develop this theory, and Sigmund Freud, the father of psychoanalysis, who further expanded on the theory which reached its highest point. Spencer studied how the body physically reacts to nervous energy by explaining how the body responds to this negative energy by making certain movements to release it. He stated that laughter was also another release mechanism used to relieve this built up nervous energy (Morreall 2013). Sigmund Freud focused in more detail on the "psychic energy", which is found in the body as an aid to suppress feelings in taboo areas, like sex or death and how laughter releases this energy. Freud divided laughter into three distinct sources of laughter: joking, the comic and humor and explained how these all possess some psychic energy. Sexual and hostile feelings were said to be released in laughter provoked by joking, while cognitive energy used in an intellectual task was released in laughter caused by the comic and emotional energy released in laughter produced by humor (Smuts 2009).

Despite having presented these three humor theories separately here, many contemporary humor researchers seem to agree that humor is such a multifaceted concept that it is too immense to be incorporated into only one theory. For many, it is difficult to associate scholars to one specific theory and that the three theories complement each other rather than contradict. Raskin (1985), in his book about semantic mechanisms of humor, confirms this idea when he states:

The three approaches actually characterize the complex phenomenon of humor from very different angles and do not at all contradict each other –rather they seem to supplement each other quite nicely. (p. 40)

Morreall (2009) furthers this idea by pointing out that philosophers like Herbert Spencer, although a major reference of the Superiority theory, also provided ideas that were related to the Incongruity theory and that Kant, a major reference of the Incongruity theory, is also said to have philosophical ideas that equate to the Relief theory.

2.2 Verbal Humor: A linguistic perspective

The three general humor theories discussed in the previous section are also found in humor research conducted in the field of linguistics, but the predominant theory in linguistic humor is the Incongruity Resolution theory. The main reason is because

it accounts for the cognitive and pragmatic processes underpinning the understanding of humorous texts and because it is compatible with other linguistic notions and approaches to discourse comprehension originally put forward outside humour studies (Dynel 2013, vi).

The two most prominent linguistic researchers whose General Theory of Verbal Humor (Attardo and Raskin 1991) is said to be based on the incongruity-resolution theory are Victor Raskin and Salvatore Attardo. These linguists have paved the way for other linguistic researchers studying humor by contributing immensely to humor research in the linguistic field.

Rachel Giora (1991; 2001; 2002; 2003) is another linguist whose work fits into the category of incongruity-resolution theory. Although her research does not solely focus on humor, she has addressed linguistics aspects of it from a pragmatic and cognitive

perspective. Her main focus has been on marked informativeness and optimal innovation.

In the following sections we will closely analyze the work done by these linguists in verbal humor and indicate the relevance of their research. The first section begins with the foundations of verbal humor set by Victor Raskin. The following section discusses the General Theory of Verbal Humor and how both Victor Raskin and Salvatore Attardo expanded and further developed Raskin's Semantic Script Theory of Humor. A more pragmatic perspective to humor research is discussed in the subsequent section, focusing on research in verbal humor on marked informativeness and optimal innovation conducted by Rachel Giora. The last section deals with humor from a Cognitive linguistic perspective and the contributions these studies have made to humor research.

2.2.1 The Semantic Script Theory of Humor

The Semantic Script Theory of Humor proposed by Raskin in 1985 in his famous book "Semantic Mechanisms of Humor" initiates the study of linguistics in humor research from a cognitive perspective. Raskin begins his monograph by proclaiming that his theory is the first complete modern linguistic theory to be applied to the study of humor (1985, xiii). It is centered on a humor competence that is said to be that of a native speaker, because in his opinion, these ideal speakers/hearers have the same sense of humor. Part of the native speaker's knowledge of the world is found in scripts, also known as *schema* (Bartlett 1932) or *frames* (Fillmore 1982), which are cognitive structures internalized by the native speaker. These semantic scripts are the basis of this theory. Raskin defines a script as:

a large chunk of semantic information surrounding the word or evoked by it. The script is a cognitive structure internalized by the native speaker and it represents the native speaker's knowledge of a small part of the world. Every speaker has internalized rather a large repertoire of scripts of 'common sense' which represent his/her knowledge of certain routines, standard procedures, basic situations, etc. (1985, 81)

Scripts are an essential part of verbal humor and the basis of the main hypothesis of the Semantic Script Theory of Humor. In order for a text to be funny, the following two conditions are necessary:

- (i) The text is compatible, fully or in part, with two different scripts
- (ii) The two scripts with which the text is compatible are opposite in a special sense (1985, 99)

In essence this hypothesis states that a joke is only considered to be humorous if a speaker is able to present a joke text with two scripts that stand in opposition to each other but that are both related to the text in some way. These script oppositions often involve some kind of binary groupings that are divided into three levels of abstraction and that are seen as "essential to life" (Raskin 1985, 113–14): real vs. unreal, considered to be the highest level of abstraction; followed by true as opposed to false; and finally at the lowest level, opposites like, good vs. bad, life vs. death, rich vs. poor, etc.

The example Raskin (1985) gives to illustrate this hypothesis is the doctor joke:

Is the doctor at home?" The patient asked in his bronchial whisper. "No", the doctor's young and pretty wife whispered in reply. "Come right in".

In this joke there are two scripts that are said to be partially compatible. The first sentence illustrates a DOCTOR script because there is an ill man who goes to see his doctor for help. The second sentence is incongruous to the patient/doctor relationship because we do not expect this answer from the doctor's young and pretty wife. The second sentence suggests an illicit affair on behalf of the sick man and the doctor's wife in mid-sentence when the wife whispers for the man to come in, and therefore, triggers another script, one of a LOVER. The hearer of the joke goes back and realizes that a different interpretation is possible from the start due to this punchline trigger. Hence the two conditions of the hypothesis are met.

Another important feature of Rakin's Semantic Script Theory of Humor is the pragmatic element. It is used in this theory to explain how jokes are conveyed. Humor occurs when there is a violation of one or more of Grice's maxims of the Cooperative Principle (Raskin 1985; Attardo 1990; 1994). According to Raskin (1985), joke telling is a mode of *non-bona-fide* communication, unlike Grice's Cooperative Principle, which Raskin refers to as *bona-fide communication*. In this latter mode of communication, the purpose of the speaker is to convey serious, clear and truthful information to the listener by using maxims of quality, relation, manner and quantity. In humorous communication or *non-bona-fide communication*, jokes follow the same maxims but with a modified explanation. These are:

- 1. Maxim of Quantity: Give exactly as much information as is necessary for the joke;
- 2. Maxim of Quality: Say only what is compatible with the world of the joke;
- 3. Maxim of Relation: Say only what is relevant to the joke;

4. Maxim of Manner: Tell the joke efficiently. (Raskin 1985, 103)

The intention of the speaker when using these maxims is, of course, to make the hearer laugh. Like Grice's Cooperative Principle, if the speaker does not have full control of the maxims, there can be a breakdown in communication; however, in non-bona-fide communication, the hearer will not laugh if the speaker does not apply the maxims appropriately.

Given the information above, the components of a joke, according to the Semantic Script Theory of Humor are:

i. a switch from the bona-fide mode of communication to the nonbona-fide mode of joke telling;

ii. the text of an intended joke;

iii. two (partially) overlapping scripts compatible with the text;

iv. an oppositeness relation between the two scripts; and

v. a trigger, obvious or implied, realizing the oppositeness relation. (Raskin 1985, 140)

The first component deals with the pragmatic aspects of joke telling and is a sort of preparation phase that sets the tone for telling the joke. The second component is the text of the joke itself. While the last three components are more cognitive oriented and are the reasons why the text is considered humorous. The trigger, mentioned in the fifth line, is the punchline of the joke.

Although this theory is considered to be a great starting point and a significant reference in verbal humor literature due to its pioneering semantic-pragmatic cognitive approach to humor, it has its limitations. One such limitation is the fact that the corpus is solely based on short standard jokes with punchlines. Despite Raskin's (1985, 45) affirmation

that this theory can be applied to longer humorous texts, he did not provide evidence of this. Another limitation is the fact that this theory is only a semantic theory and therefore restricts the analysis of verbal humor only to the field of semantics and does not explain it from other linguistic perspectives. Raskin's script analysis is an additional limitation, when he claims that jokes evoke only two scripts. A joke can conjure numerous scripts, as it is being read or listened to, and eventually reduced to only a couple. Even then, depending on the reader/ listener there can be multiple interpretations of the same joke. Given these limitations, there was a need to follow-up on this theory and expand it to a more general and overall encompassing verbal theory, which will be discussed in the next section.

2.2.2 The General Theory of Verbal Humor

Due to the first two limitations of the Semantic Script Theory of Humor, mentioned in the previous section, Raskin and Attardo (1991) decided to revise and expand on this script-based theory by including ideas from Attardo's earlier research which focused on a five-level model of joke representation. This new theory defines humor not only from a semantic perspective, like the Semantic Script Theory of Humor did, but also from an array of other perspectives within the linguistic field, "that is, it includes (...) most notably, textual linguistics, the theory of narrativity, and pragmatics" (Attardo 1994, 222). Therefore, it is said to be a general linguistic theory of verbal humor. Moreover, it includes all types of humorous texts regardless of their length (Attardo 2001).

This verbal humor theory analyzes a humorous text according to six hierarchical knowledge resources, which also assess the degree of similarity between certain joke

texts. The basic principle is that a certain knowledge resource probably will determine or will be determined by another knowledge resource. These knowledge resources are hierarchical and follow a top-down order that is similar to the meaning-to-sound scheme found in modern linguistic theory. Starting from the most abstract level to the least (i.e., from the top-down order), these knowledge resources are: script opposition, logical mechanisms, situation, target, narrative strategy and the language (Attardo and Raskin 1991). To fully understand the general theory of verbal humor, it is first necessary to explain what is each knowledge resource.

The most abstract knowledge resource is the script opposition as described by the Semantic Script Theory of Humor (Raskin 1985). According to Attardo (2001), "any humorous text will present a script opposition; the specifics of its narrative organization, its social and historical instantiation, etc. will vary according to the place and time of its production" (p. 26). A text is only humorous if it has two fully or partially different scripts that are opposing to each other in some particular manner. In other words, the text of a joke is ambiguous until the punchline, usually at the end of the joke, triggers that there are two opposing scripts and that these existed from the start. This makes the hearer of the joke backtrack and realize another interpretation was possible from the beginning (Attardo and Raskin 1991; Attardo 1994; Attardo 2001).

Logical mechanism is another abstract knowledge resource, which follows the script opposition in the hierarchy of the six knowledge resources and is said to be the resolution of incongruities in humor. Of the six, it is "by far the most problematic parameter" (Attardo 2001, 25). This knowledge resource helps explain how two opposing scripts are brought together in a joke through logic. It accounts for "the distorted, playful logic that does not hold outside the world of the joke" (Attardo 1994,

226). These logical mechanisms can be juxtapositions, false analogies, figure-ground reversals, and/or chiastic structures (Attardo 2001, 25–26). Humor researchers, like Christie Davies, believe that this knowledge resource should not be included in the General Theory of Verbal Humor. Davies (2004) affirms:

The study of logic when it is employed in serious bona fide communication yields systematic and useful results, but there is no payoff to be achieved from listing and attempting to sort into categories the logical mechanisms used in jokes. (...) It is time to discard logical mechanism (LM) from the General Theory of Verbal Humor because it is a variable that does nothing for the theory. There always is a logical mechanism to a joke but it does not follow that it should be included in a theory designed to analyze jokes (p. 379).

This criticism was not taken lightly by Hempelmann and Attardo (2011) who responded to Davies' critique in their article found in the Humor Journal, whose issue was entitled "The General Theory of Verbal Humor, twenty years after". These authors argue that logical mechanisms are testable hypotheses because all logical mechanisms include some element of reasoning especially seen in those like juxtaposition and chiasmus.

Uncontroversial like the aforementioned, situation is the next knowledge resource of the General Theory of Verbal Humor. Every text, regardless if it is humorous or not, has to be "about something". The situation is like the "props" of the text, that is, the objects, participants, surroundings, activities, etc. (Attardo and Raskin 1991; Attardo 2001). Despite being an essential part of any text, some humorous texts rely more on the situation than others. The doctor wife joke described in the previous section is a good example of how important the situation is for the joke to be funny.

The target follows the situation in the hierarchical order of knowledge resources. A humorous text can target a specific person, group or institution by associating stereotypes to them for the purpose of ridicule. These targets are said to be the "butt of the joke" (Attardo 1994, 224). Humorous texts that do not mock anyone do not have a target. This is the only knowledge resource out of the six that is optional. Attardo (2001) states that some research has been done in this area and cites two of the most important. One work he cites is Davies, who in 1990 presented work done on different target groups and provided an explanation as to why these groups were targeted from a sociological perspective. The other study cited is Karman from 1998 whose study led to the broadening of the term target to ideological targets, which are "groups or institutions that do not have a clear constituency, but may nevertheless be made the subject of ridicule (examples are 'marriage', romantic love', etc.)" (Attardo 2001, 24). The second from the last knowledge resource, from the top-down perspective, is the narrative strategy. According to Attardo (1994), "any joke has to be cast in some form of narrative organization, either as a simple (framed) narrative, as a dialogue (question and answer), as a (pseudo-)riddle, as an aside in conversation, etc." (p.224). This author rejects using the term *genre*, stating that it is misleading given the little relevance the literary genre theory has had on humor research (Attardo 2001).

The last knowledge resource is language. It is all the linguistic components chosen by the speaker to form the text of the joke. Key to this knowledge resource is the concept of paraphrasing. Attardo and Raskin (1991), state that any joke can be paraphrased, which means different language choices can be made, but the overall meaning remains intact. This is an important aspect to consider when talking about humor research in

translation. Another important feature of the language knowledge resource is its responsibility of providing the exact wording and positioning of the punchline of a joke. These six knowledge resources are the backbone of this humor theory that has been developed throughout the years. In its early stages the main focus of the General Theory of Verbal Humor was the joke and its punchline, in the early twenty-first century, Attardo (2001) extended the theory to include longer humorous texts focusing on the "speakers' competence at producing/interpreting" (p. 30) these longer texts and not on the speakers' performance. These longer texts are divided into two general categories: the narrative or canned joke, which are rehearsed jokes created and told by the narrator, who releases the humor when he sees fit to get a reaction from the audience. The second category is the conversational joke, which unlike the first category lacks planning and places importance on context in order for an utterance to be correctly interpreted. Regardless of the type of text it is, the method applied to analyze the humor is the same (Attardo 2001, 82), that is, identifying whether the humor is found in the plot, "jab lines", or at the end of the text, "punchlines". Both are identical elements with the only one difference, their textual position and pragmatic function. Jab lines can occur in the middle of a conversation to provide clues for the listener about the speaker's humorous intention, whereas, punchlines appear at the end causing the listener to switch to another script and backtrack to reinterpret the joke.

In addition to the distinction between punchlines and jab lines, this newer version of the General Theory of Verbal Humor also places importance on the analysis of a text as a vector. Given that the humor corpus was extended to include longer texts, Attardo (2001) believed that a text is "physically linear and directed" (Attardo 2008, 110) moving in only one direction and that where humor exists, it can be labeled and

analyzed according to the knowledge resources of the General Theory of Verbal Humor. The relative distribution of the lines of a text is also important because it identifies connections within the text. Lines may be connected according to knowledge resources and when they are, Attardo (2001) calls these "strands". In larger corpora there may be several connected strands called "stacks".

Finally, the General Theory of Verbal Humor was extended to include the taxonomy and analysis of humorous plots. These are: humorous plots with a punchline, that is, a joke with a punchline at the end of it; humorous plots with a metanarrative disruption, that is, texts that include one or more disruptions of "the narrative conventions of its genre" (Attardo 2008, 112) which cause humor to arise; and lastly the most interesting as well as the most problematic category according to Attardo (2008, 112–13), the humorous plot with a humorous central complication. This type involves texts that have a central complication in their story that causes humor. The problem arises due to the lack of a formal definition of the term "central complication".

To conclude, both the Semantic Script Theory of Humor extended and revised into the General Theory of Verbal Humor have contributed immensely to modern linguistic theory of humor and have laid the foundations for many humor researchers not only in the linguistic field but in other disciplines as well. Raskin *et al* (2009) are currently working on humor in the field of computer information and have developed and evolved the General Verbal Theory of Humor into the Ontological Semantic Theory of Humor, a theory that deals with computational detection of humor.

2.2.3 Giora's Cognitive Models of Jokes

Giora's work, like Attardo's and Raskin's, is situated within the tradition of Incongruity/Resolution theory of humor, in that these authors believe that jokes express two incompatible interpretations which cause a shift between different cognitive frameworks. The same year Attardo and Raskin published their first article about the General Verbal Theory of Humor, Rachel Giora (1991) published her article entitled "On the Cognitive Aspects of the Joke". In this article the author sets out to explain the surprise effect of jokes from a semantic ambiguity perspective. Central to her theory is that joke texts are markedly informative, because "they are too distant, in terms of number of similar features, from the messages preceding them" (1991, 469). This marked informativeness hypothesis helps to explain the well-formedness of jokes.

In more recent studies, Giora (2002; 2003) has broadened her perspective on marked informativeness and has studied the principles that guide the processes of creativity and innovation in jokes. This has led way to another cognitive model, the optimal innovation hypothesis. The main idea of this hypothesis is that the presence of both novelty and salience makes a message surprising and enjoyable because this combination allows the mind to sway between what is known and what is different from the usual when reaching the punchline of a joke. People have certain expectations when encountering something familiar, while something new violates these expectations and therefore surprise arises creating a humorous situation.

The following sections further explain these two hypotheses proffered by Giora. The first discusses the marked informativeness hypothesis and its importance in identifying a well-formed joke. The subsequent section focuses on the optimal innovation hypothesis explaining the role of salience in joke comprehension.

2.2.3.1 The marked informativeness hypothesis

Before identifying the necessary components for joke well-formedness, Giora (1991) first discusses the well-formedness of non-narrative/ informative texts from a categorical organization perspective (Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1975), that is, that these texts evolve from the least informative message to the most informative message or what is the same, in terms of Clark and Haviland's theory (1977), they tend to start with the information which is presented as "given information" and gradually introduce what is assumed to be "new information". For Giora, this type of discourse is linear and hierarchical, like category concepts, and develops along an informativeness path. Therefore, she states that a text is well-structured if it:

- (a) begins with the least informative message in the given text or text-segment. This least informative message, termed Discourse Topic, is a generalization that governs the rest of the messages in the text. Cognitively, it functions as the prototypical category member which represents the redundancy structure of the set, and
- (b) proceeds gradually along the informative axis whereby each message is more informative than the one it follows (1991, 467).

The former is part of what Giora (1985) calls *The Relevance Requirement*, which states that in order for propositions to be relevant they have to be about a *discourse topic* proposition. According to Giora, discourse topic proposition refers to "the element relative to which the whole set of propositions (of that segment) is taken to be 'about'"(1985, 116). It is a prototypical proposition treated within the framework of the Relevance theory whose cognitive function is to organize the text, "so that each of the propositions of the set is hierarchically connected to it" (1985, 120). This discourse

topic proposition tends to be at the beginning of a text and is considered the least informative message because it is the most accessible proposition with the most common and distinctive features of the set.

The latter component of a well-formed text follows the principles of Giora's (1988) Graded Informativeness Requirement which stipulates that a text gradually becomes more informative and that normally the most informative message is found at the end of that text.

Informativeness is thus the key to understanding how any text is well-formed including joke texts. Informativity was defined by De Beaugrande and Dressler as "the extent to which a presentation is new or unexpected for the receiver" (1981, 139). Given the importance of informativeness, it is best to explain its meaning according to classical information theory (Shannon 1951 and Attneave 1959 cited in Giora 1991), which states that "a message is informative relative to the number of uncertainties it either reduces or eliminates relative to a question" (Giora 1991, 467). In other words, the more alternative the answers given to a question the more informative the message. Giora (1991) expands on this and includes the concept of category which is "a set of two or more entities which are similar to each other in one or more respects" (p. 468). When category members share similar features but present different information they are said to be distinctive and this in turn makes them informative in their category. The most informative member is also the most distant from the category thus enhancing its information value.

Prototype theory from cognitive science and psychology is the basis for this information value. Eleanor Rosch and other researchers in the 70s developed this theory which is

based on categorization and "studies the internal structure of categories, as well as our ability to interpret and organise experience" (Alonso 2014, 123). The main idea is that people automatically and unconsciously create categories of things and assign the same name to things that are not exactly the same but similar. The most representative and familiar example of a category is said to be its prototype. It is the first thing that comes to our mind when we think about that category.

Since the most peripheral members of a category are different from the category prototype, they are the least probable, the least predictable and consequently the more informative; therefore they cause surprise on behalf of the readers or listeners because they go against their expectations. According to Giora (1991), these members are *marked* members. She states that expository texts are not markedly informative because they slowly progress from the least informative to the most informative stages. "The general tendency for structural discourse coherence is to comply with the participants' expectations in terms of organisation of information, which is assumed to be linear and logically interconnected at the local propositional level" (Alonso 2014, 193). One-liner joke texts; however, end with a markedly informative element and do not gradually introduce informative material, which led Giora to develop the *marked informativeness hypothesis* to explain the well-formedness of jokes. A joke is well-formed if it:

- (a) obeys the Relevance Requirement and
- (b) violates the Graded Informativeness Requirement (...) in that it ends in a markedly informative message (the Marked Informativeness Requirement) and
- (c) causes the reader to perform a linear shift: the reader is made to cancel the first unmarked interpretation upon processing the second marked interpretation. (Giora 1991, 470)

These conditions specify that even though a punchline, found at the end of a joke, is markedly informative, it is still compatible with the rest of the joke and that the reader/listener of the joke begins with an unmarked understanding and is forced to change this interpretation after being presented with the second marked element, i.e. the punchline. This change in interpretation is the surprise effect.

Giora presents two jokes to exemplify these three conditions, one of which was taken from Raskin's (1985) monologue and presented previously in this work, the doctor wife joke. From Giora's perspective (1991, 473), the category of 'whispers' found in this joke possesses both unmarked and marked interpretations. From a doctor-patient relationship the first interpretation of a bronchial 'whisper' is prototypical and therefore unmarked because it resembles a number of symptoms, whereas speaking in a low voice, like secret lovers do, so not to be heard, is informatively marked because it deviates from the prototypical information from the context presented. This marked meaning is revealed at the end and forces the reader/listener to cancel the first interpretation and shift to a new one.

Giora points out that her marked informativeness hypothesis dismisses Raskin's script opposition because "opposition does not necessarily pertain to asymmetrical relation" (1991, 474). Two scripts can be opposing and ambiguous but that does not necessarily mean they will be funny. In her semantic model there must be an asymmetrical relationship between the two possible interpretations of a joke in order for the punchline to be informatively marked and funny. Also paramount for a text to be a joke is the idea of cognitive distance. Giora states, "(...) for a text to be a joke, its final constituent must be cognitively distant from the prototypes of the ad hoc set created by the text of the joke" (1991, 474). If the one-liner joke text progresses slowly, it will not be funny.

2.2.3.2 The optimal innovation hypothesis

A decade after Giora's article about the cognitive aspects of jokes, the psycholinguist further developed the marked informativeness hypothesis and has shed some light on another cognitive model of joke texts, the optimal innovation hypothesis (Giora 2002; Giora 2003). Generally speaking, optimal innovation is pleasure induced from stimuli that involve recovering something familiar in something innovative rather than purely in something familiar or only in something innovative. Giora considers jokes to be exemplary in producing affect and therefore are optimally innovative.

The structure of most jokes is such that it keeps us attending to the salient response until the punchline point where a reversal is enforced allowing for the recognition of the novel. The pleasure derivable from this joke hinges on recognizing the innovative in the salient (Giora 2002, 15).

Salience and context are therefore crucial elements in joke comprehension. Giora (1997; 1999; 2003) developed the concept of salience in the Graded Salience Hypothesis. Salience varies depending on frequency, conventionality, familiarity and prototypicality of a given word meaning. According to this hypothesis, salient meanings have priority over less salient meanings, and are organized hierarchically in the mental lexicon. A novel (i.e. less salient) interpretation is reached by first processing a salient meaning, rejecting it and then reinterpreting the meaning. Context support is required to help attain the novel interpretation because it is more difficult to derive than the salient meaning.

Thus jokes are naturally prone to optimal innovation due to readers/listeners opting first for more salient meanings only to discover that a more novel unthinkable interpretation makes more sense. Pleasure obtained from jokes originates in ascertaining the novel in

the familiar. The context, in addition to salience, is also important in the comprehension of the joke. Initially a joke text contains an unambiguous context that is compatible with the salient meaning until the reader/listener reaches the punchline whereby he is surprised with a less salient meaning that forces him to reinterpret the joke. Giora (2002, 16) exemplifies this with a joke taken from Coulson & Kutas (1998):

By the time Mary had had her fourteenth child, she'd finally run out of names to call her husband.

'Names' in the joke has a salient meaning related to 'proper names'. In this specific context of childbirth, the fact that when someone has her fourteenth baby the first interpretation would be 'she has run out of *names* to call it' is activated. Context and salience complement each other well here because they provide a predictive salient meaning of a polysemous word. The surprise comes at the end 'names to call her husband', the punchline, when the reader/listener is forced to reinterpret the initial salient meaning by rejecting it and creating a novel interpretation that makes more sense.

Giora (2003) further develops her ideas and includes the Suppression Hypothesis in her theory of joke comprehension. Based on experimental research (Colston, Giora, and Katz 2000), the salient meaning is suppressed so that a less salient meaning can be activated and included in the context given. Therefore, reinterpretation along with suppression help in the processing of joke comprehension.

Although Giora's work has not solely focused on joke texts, she has contributed to furthering the linguistic research into verbal humor. Similar to Raskin's initial research into verbal humor, a shortcoming of Giora's research on jokes is the fact that this

researcher only studied one class of jokes, one-liners that can be considered punchlines themselves. Dynel (2007) affirms that Giora's joke theory:

does not cover all types of jokes, even within the category of oneliners, which can be inherently devoid of the garden-path mechanism but still rest on humorous incongruity, explicable with a different logical rule (p. 229).

Nevertheless, both the marked informativeness hypothesis and the optimal innovation hypothesis are two important contributions in linguistic humor that not only focus on the semantic perspective of humor but also help to understand the cognitive one as well. Giora's work on salience in her joke theory is also relevant and cited in humor research done from a Cognitive Linguistic perspective, which is the focus of the next section of this chapter.

2.2.4 Humor within the Cognitive Linguistic Theoretical Framework

The linguistic research in humor thus far discussed is cognitively oriented, therefore, research under the theoretical framework of Cognitive Linguistics (CL) is not completely innovative. However, this school of linguistics has introduced some differences in perspective (namely in concepts such as "frame" versus "script") and new approaches (e.g. cognitive mechanism of blending) to humor research, despite criticisms made by other linguists like Attardo (2006), who claim that research in this area replicates viewpoints already studied within the Semantic Script Theory of Humor and the General Verbal Theory of Humor. He asserts, "there are issues that CL is uniquely qualified to tackle, but that it is neglecting to address" (Attardo 2006, 342). The purpose of this section is to show how humor research done within the CL framework has in fact addressed important issues, mainly concerned with the mental

processes that are involved in unraveling the intended non-literal meaning of humorous utterances from the literal meaning initially presented, and provided theoretical support to humor research in general.

Creativity and imagination, within the CL framework, play an important role in human language; therefore, it is not surprising that humor researchers have seen the immense potential in utilizing this research enterprise in their studies. One such researcher is Seana Coulson. In her book, *Semantic Leaps: Frame-Shifting and Conceptual Blending in Meaning Construction* (2001), she expands on the blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1994; 1998; 2002) by analyzing the processes involved in combining knowledge from different domains so that people can understand and express new ideas. These processes are *frame-shifting* and conceptual blending. The goal of this monograph is not to contribute to humor theory, but it is one of the first that touches upon the idea of humor within a cognitive linguistic framework.

She states that examples of *frame-shifting* are commonly found in one-line jokes, where expectations are formed and revised. It is a conceptual revision that "reflects the operation of a semantic reanalysis process that reorganizes existing information into a new frame" (Coulson 2001a, 34). This semantic reorganization occurs when incoming information diverges from what we initially predicted due to the context suggested by the original frame. The basic idea behind *frame-shifting* in humor theory is not original (c.f. Raskin's (1985) Semantic Script Theory of Humor); however, Coulson *et al* (2006) state that the semantic script theory is limited because its knowledge representation is based on traditional views that are unable to process the relationship between unexpected and normal events. According to these authors:

the space structuring model appeals to processes proposed in cognitive semantics for the creative combination of frames and the construction of novel frames in response to contextual demands (2006, 232).

This space structuring model, based on principles developed by the mental space theory, conceptual blending theory and cognitive grammar, used in joke comprehension has shed some new light to humor theory by introducing the approach of meaning construction used in cognitive linguistics. In order to understand one-line jokes, the listener is said to go through a *frame-shifting* process, in which long-term memory helps activate a new frame in order for the listener to reinterpret the information that is already active in his working memory (Coulson 2001a).

Brône and Feyaerts (2003) were one of the first researchers to explicitly state that the cognitive linguistic theoretical framework is compatible with the prominent linguistic humor theories (Attardo 1994; Attardo 2001; Giora 1991; Raskin 1985) we have discussed previously in this work. These researchers agree that these incongruity/resolution theories, especially the General Theory of Verbal Humor, are the solid foundation in linguistic humor research, because they include not only a semantic perspective but also a linguistic-pragmatic interpretation of verbal humor. The logical mechanism knowledge resource presented in the General Theory of Verbal Humor, for example, provides the necessary conceptual mapping for incongruity resolution.

Nevertheless, Brône and Feyaerts claim that these theories fail to analyze linguistic humor from a more dynamic perspective; that is, the creative use of language that can be seen in intricate cognitive processes, due to their rejection of a modular approach to language, a fundamental part of cognitive linguistics (2003, 10). These researchers also

state that the cognitive linguistic concept of *construal* (Langacker 1987; Talmy 2000), i.e. semantics is conceptualization; is significantly important and not dealt with much in humor research. This idea that meaning is conceptual is the key question in our work given that we are analyzing a political humor discourse. Complex meaning construction in this type of discourse often involves non-literal meaning, therefore, in order to make sense of it, we need to identify the cognitive operations that individuals automatically apply as part of our mental processes.

Croft and Cruse (2004) provide a typology of linguistic construal operations that possesses some mechanisms that humor research within the cognitive linguistic framework could study in more detail. These include attention/salience and judgement/comparison. Salience is a concept that has already been researched by Giora (1991; 2003) in humor, as we discussed in a previous section, but according to Brône and Feyaerts (2003), it "is still in serious need of additional descriptive and experimental support" (pg. 12). Selection, found within this category of attention and salience, through profiling and metonymy, can provide this missing support. The example they provide, is the famous ham sandwich example found in the utterance, The ham sandwich is waiting for his check. This utterance may be uttered by a server in a restaurant, therefore activating the cognitive frame, RESTAURANT. The food the customer orders is the salient reference point from the perspective of the server who does not know the name of the customer. Consequently, 'ham sandwich' metonymically stands for the person who ordered the ham sandwich. The profile of the noun phrase shifts from PRODUCT to CUSTOMER given that the customer is waiting for his check.

These researchers suggest that profiling is a crucial element of framing, which is so important in humor, but has been ignored in humor research. With regards to metonymy, these academics believe that this cognitive mechanism is fundamental in understanding humor because it is used as a humor device to "deliberately make use of distorted reference- point structures for the purpose of achieving a balanced processing difficulty" (Brône and Feyaerts 2003, 13).

The other category of construal operation that is of vital importance to any cognitive linguistic approach to humor, is *judgement/comparison*. Within this category, Brône and Feyaerts (2003) accentuate the need to study the development of framing, metaphor, conceptual integration and figure-ground patterns in humor. Although metaphors have been widely studied in cognitive linguistics, these researchers state that studies have only recently focused on the boundaries between humor and metaphor.

Humor, according to these authors, also arises from the blending of different frames, a cognitive process that is not innovative in humor. Koestler (1964) was one of the first writers to try and explain the cognitive mechanisms involved in humor based on incongruity. 'Bisociation', a term he coined, involved the blending of unrelated elements into a new meaningful unit by means of comparison, abstraction, analogies and metaphor. He claimed that humor was a creative process that involved the humorist combining a number of matrices that are not compatible and that therefore may cause a humorous situation. He states:

To cause surprise the humorist must have a modicum of originality—the ability to break away from the stereotyped routines of thought. Caricaturist, satirist, the writer of nonsense-humour, and even the expert tickler, each operates on more than one plane. Whether his purpose is to convey a social message, or

merely to entertain, he must provide mental jolts, caused by the collision of incompatible matrices. To any given situation or subject he must conjure up an appropriate—or appropriately inappropriate—intruder which will provide the jolt. (Koestler 1964, 91–92)

Laughter was perceived as a mental process, according to this author, when two incompatible frames collided, an idea that is central to the incongruity theories of humor.

Douglas Hofstadter, in a workshop on Humor and Cognition (Hofstadter and Gabora

1989), talked about humor based on frame blends. For this researcher a frame blend occurs when someone blends two different frames in their minds creating a new blend that has parts of each situation and that this frame blend many times creates a humorous situation, which he calls 'slippage humor'. He uses the term 'slippage' because he states that one frame prevails over the other and only one or two elements of the less predominate frame 'slip' into the new blended frame. Hofstadter and Gabora's (1989) ideas on cognition influenced Fauconnier and Turner's (1994; 2002) blending theory. Seana Coulson has also applied the theory of conceptual blending to cultural models and has stated that speakers use it to try and persuade others to take a certain position or act in certain ways (2006, 188). This is especially true in social and political humor where humorists try to make their point by projecting people into new contexts. Coulson (2006) states, "humorous examples highlight the human ability to derive meaningful information from partial, non-systematic correspondences in structure, and even to exploit accidental characteristics of input frames." (p.195). The examples she provides in her articles, one about an imaginary computer virus (Coulson 1996) and another with several political cartoons (Coulson 2001b), show how humor can be interpreted based on the complex conceptual blending of incongruent input spaces that share some kind of elements.

In her article about the computer virus joke, the Menendez Brothers Virus³ (1996). Coulson illustrates the complexity of the blend which involves a computer virus as the target domain which depicts frames about technical information about real computer viruses (e.g. disk space, files, deletion of files, etc.) and the Menendez brothers murder trial as the source domain, which includes social knowledge frames about the publicized court case from 1994 about the two brothers who killed their wealthy parents for a large inheritance claiming they did so because they were physically and sexually abused by them. The joke is humorous because there is an analogical blending of incongruent frames: a victim frame, a conspiracy frame and the computer virus frame, resulting in a computer virus that says it is a victim of abuse, just like the Menendez brothers stated in their real court case. This analogical blend is complex because it projects inferences in more than one direction to serve the purpose of the joke, to ridicule the brothers' absurd defense. For the joke to be understood, a successful connection has to be made between the human actions of the brothers to the domain of computer operations and files. There also needs to be an understanding of the criminal case and its implications in the social context it is found in to enable the listener to unpack the blend.

³Menendez Brothers Virus joke: Eliminate your files, take the disk space they previously occupied, and then claims it was a victim of physical and sexual abuse on the part of the files it erased.

Coulson (2001b) also explores how blending is used in political cartoons about the then President of the United States, Bill Clinton. The cartoons all allude to the alleged affair the President had with White House intern, Monica Lewinsky. Political cartoons are humorous because, unlike written jokes, they rely on both verbal cues and pictorial representations. According to Coulson (2001b), this type of cartoon serves not only to entertain the viewer but also to challenge him/her since it is seen as a puzzle that the viewer must solve. She states:

... the challenge, it seems, is to activate the appropriate information in response to the imagery and the verbal cues, and to integrate it with abstract narrative structure. Unpacking the blend and structuring the input spaces allows the viewer to solve the puzzle, and the cartoonist to make his point (Coulson 2001b).

As in the Menendez Brothers Virus joke, the viewer of a political cartoon must also possess the necessary background knowledge to understand the humor and to decipher the conceptual integration network created in it. According to Coulson (2001b), this means understanding the metaphoric and metonymic mappings that are commonly found in the blends of the political cartoons. She argues that the purpose of blending in political cartoons is "to project political actors and events into new contexts where the cartoonist's point can be hyperbolically illustrated ("What's")" (Coulson 2005, 118). In essence, the cartoonist presents his viewpoints and political position humorously in the blends he creates by exaggerating certain characteristics of politicians and/or political events.

Marín-Arrese (2003) examines Spanish political cartoons from the 1970s using the conceptual integration theory as well. She states:

the creation and interpretation of the joke involves the construction of a blend where the integration of structure and elements from the two input spaces yield an incongruity or a cognitive clash (p.1).

Like Coulson (2001b), she too argues that the viewer projects backward to the input spaces in order to understand the incongruity presented and that this resolution is triggered by some visual and/or verbal cue in the cartoon (Marín-Arrese 2003; Marín-Arrese 2008).

Džanić (2013) is another researcher who also analyzed political cartoons using the conceptual integration theory, focusing her attention on modified idiomatic expressions found in these types of cartoons. This author also believes that the blending theory helps to explain the humorous meaning found in political cartoons by providing the viewer with the necessary linguistic cues and the visual aid to unpack the blend to rebuild the input spaces. Džanić further states that the idioms found in the examples she presented were "artistically adapted" and fundamental in creating a humorous visual narrative (2013, 334).

In our work, we intend to analyze how the use of a conceptual communicative strategy within a Cognitive Linguistic perspective that is framed according to a face-to-face conversation, *fictive interaction* (Pascual 2002; 2008a; 2014), is used in a political satire television program. But before analyzing the data, we will first discuss this cognitive strategy in the subsequent chapter, by presenting a brief overview of Cognitive Linguistics to better understand how this concept fits into its general framework, followed by a more detailed look into what exactly is fictive interaction and what purposes it serves.

Fictive Interaction

Fictive interaction (Pascual 2002; 2014) is a cognitive strategy within the Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1998) embedded in the cognitive linguistic framework. It is a communicative strategy of thought which consists of "the use of the schematic interactional structure of ordinary communication as a common organizing frame to understand, think, and talk about verbal as well as non-verbal entities, processes, and relationships" (Pascual 2002, 1). It allows the conceptualizer to represent abstract content, framed according to the structure of a face-to-face conversation, to communicate different viewpoints and attitudes. It unfolds at different levels of linguistic expression: discourse, sentence, clause, phrase, lexical or even the morpheme (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014). Fictive interaction, in essence, helps to structure cognition (e.g. when we talk to ourselves), discourse (e.g. a news broadcaster reporting the news while addressing his audience directly), and language and its use (e.g. rhetorical questions). Conversational features, non-actual and non-token interpretation and metonymy are some defining characteristics that make this cognitive phenomenon, widespread across languages, discourse genres, and sociolinguistic groups.

Since fictive interaction is embedded in the Cognitive Linguistic framework, we believe it is necessary to briefly discuss the work of the pioneering linguists that studied the relation of language and mind focusing on cognitive principles and organization, focusing on the main areas of frames, metaphor, blending and metonymy. We will also look at fictivity in general and the different fictive constructions that have been catalogued by Cognitive Linguistics. Finally in this section, we will take a closer look at how the cognitive phenomenon, fictive interaction, is used as a conversation frame which allows participants to develop a conceptualization created from some concrete reality to structure thought, discourse and language.

3.1 Brief Overview of Cognitive Linguistics

Cognitive Linguistics (CL) is not a single theory of language but a collection of generally compatible approaches, all of which study the relationship between language and cognitive processing in the human brain by analyzing how conceptual patterns and operations are reflected through language use. According to Fauconnier (2006) in the Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, cognitive linguistics:

(...) is the study of language use, and that when we engage in any language activity, we draw unconsciously on vast cognitive and cultural resources, call up models and frames, set up multiple connections, coordinate large arrays of information, and engage in creative mappings, transfers, and elaborations. (p. 1)

It emerged from the field of cognitive science in the 1970s, in reaction to advocates of classic formal theories in semantics, like truth conditional semantics, who argue that the meaning of a given proposition can be explained as to whether a sentence is true in the real world, and advocates of generative grammar that argue that humans possess a specific cognitive faculty in the mind for language separate from other cognitive abilities (Chomsky 1986; Fodor 1983). For generativists, language study is concerned with syntax and the rules that govern word combinations in order to create

grammatically correct sentences. A number of researchers active in the 1970s were interested in the relation of language and mind and rejected these approaches to language. Their response can be seen in the following three main tenets of CL:

Language is not an autonomous cogntive faculty;

Grammar is conceptualization;

Knowledge of language emerges from language use (Croft and Cruse 2004, 1)

The first CL principle that opposes the generative theory, states that our ability to use language stems from general cognitive faculties not a special language mechanism found in the brain. The second principle, which opposes truth conditional semantics, is related to the idea that grammar reveals a conception of the world found within culture. And the last one, which opposes both theories, states that knowledge of language is acquired and contextual, that is, meaning is central to language and reflects patterns of thought. Our linguistic competence is not based on knowledge of language but on our knowledge and interaction with the world that is communicated through informational structures in the mind. Meaning derives from mental configurations that language instances allow, rather than reflect. Language is seen as an instrument used to organize, process and convey information that reflects the needs and interests of people and cultures (Croft and Cruse 2004, 1–4).

How does fictive interaction fit into the CL framework? It is a conceptual communicative concept that frames a face-to-face conversation, in order to conceptually represent events, activities, states or mental attitudes. Because conversation is a domain of human experience and action, and mirrors overall cognitive processes, it is an effective cognitive model for conceptualizing the world around us.

Given this brief explanation of FI, that will be further discussed in the subsequent section of this thesis, it is important to reflect upon the work of the most influential CL linguists who not only helped lay the foundations of CL but whose work directly or indirectly influences the ideas presented in this thesis, namely Lakoff (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1987) and his cognitive semantics, Fillmore (1982; 1985) with his frame semantics, Fauconnier and Turner (1994; 2002) with their theory of conceptual integration, and Talmy (2000) with his work on fictivity.

The research presented by these linguists and therefore the foundations of Cognitive Linguistics stem from the work done on categories that led to Rosch's prototype theory (Rosch 1975; Rosch and Mervis 1975; Rosch 1978). Prototypes are considered to be a crucial part of mental models because they help people build and activate these models in order to make sense of the world. They enhance memory and help identify, categorize and store new information. Prototype theory was heavily researched and developed by Eleanor Rosch and other researchers in the 70s to explain how people categorize concepts based on a prototype, i.e., an abstract mental representation of a given category that assembles key features that best represent it. The purpose of prototypes, according to Rosch (1978, 28), are to provide "maximum information with the least cognitive effort". There are no necessary and sufficient conditions required for category membership. Categories are formed around prototypes, and membership shows different degrees of typicality in relation to prototypes with no clear boundaries amongst them. Assimilation of elements in a category is based on a family resemblance structure. For example, the prototype of furniture is likely to be chair, because it bests represents an instance of this category, but a lamp is also considered furniture yet it is more distant than the prototype chair for the category of furniture. Physical objects, like

the one presented in the example above, were largely part of cognitive psychological studies of categorization at the time. However, this focus began to change when Cognitive Linguistics emerged in the late 70s and early 80s with most works on categorization focusing more on "psychological" abstract entities, like colors, events, actions, mental images, etc.

3.1.1 Conceptualization of meaning

Conceptualization is key to structuring thought, discourse and language in fictive interaction; therefore it is necessary to discuss the conceptualization of meaning in general and how it came to be.

Up until the 1970s the main philosophical position of meaning was an objectivist one, but this was heavily criticized by some linguists, like George Lakoff, Charles Fillmore and Ronald Langacker, and a more experientialist view of meaning emerged, giving rise to Cognitive Semantics in the late 1970s, an academic discipline within the field of Cognitive Science. It is grounded in empirical findings in cognitive psychology on prototype effects within the theory of categorization.

Categorization plays a major role in semantics because it is seen in the use of language and the way we make sense of an experience (Lakoff 1987). Both the objectivists view and the experientialist view of categories start from this premise, but differ drastically as to how meaning is formed. The objectivist's view of meaning is linked to classical theories of categories, which state that categories are defined according to shared properties of their members. Although this view is correct to a certain extent, it does not account for the more complex categorizations humans carry out. Studies performed in the late 1970s on categorization by Eleanor Rosch and colleagues, contradicted the

traditional view and replaced it with a theory of prototypes and basic level categories, which provide the theoretical framework for Cognitive Semantics.

George Lakoff is one of the leading advocates of experientialist cognition in the area of linguistics and contributed immensely to the emergence of Cognitive Semantics. Following on Rosch's work on prototypes and categorization, Lakoff (1987) presented a theory of cognition that centered around conceptual systems organized in terms of categories that rejected objectivist's views, that thought is abstract, disembodied, unemotional, fits the world, universal and logical. Lakoff (1987, 153–54) argued that the way we structure thought is through the use of cognitive models that are embodied and that correspond to categories that have degrees of membership which are reflected in prototype effects. Some cognitive models contain basic level concepts that have no internal structure and are directly meaningful, while other "cognitive models are metonymic, in that they allow a part of a category to stand for the category as a whole for some purpose, usually reasoning" (p 153). He states there are three other cognitive models in the conceptual system besides the metonymic one, these are propositional, image-schematic and metaphoric. Radial categories may also be a part of a cluster of cognitive models that are organized around a center.

Therefore the new account of reason that opposed objectivists views and that Lakoff embraced is that thought is mainly embodied because conceptual meaning is understood through bodily experience; imaginative because it allows us to utilize metaphor, metonymy and mental imagery to better understand abstract concepts, and mainly unconscious because we automatically fit not only things into categories but also abstract entities when we perceive the world according to our experiences.

Lakoff has also contributed immensely to Cognitive Semantics with his work on conceptual metaphors he carried out with Mark Johnson (Lakoff and Johnson 1980), Mark Turner (Lakoff and Turner 1989) and other colleagues. It is with Johnson that he put forward a theory on metaphor in their monograph entitled *Metaphors We Live By* (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). For these researchers, metaphor is not simply a poetic device that can solely be analyzed through language but rather "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just language but in thought and action" (p. 4). Metaphors allow us to structure, organize and process conceptual knowledge; that is why they are not simply a linguistic phenomenon but rather a cognitive one. Conceptual metaphor involves the mapping of cognitive models or schema between conceptual domains, that is, the concepts in a source domain are mapped out onto abstract concepts of a target domain in order for them to be easily understood. The mappings in both domains maintain the same image-schema structure. Abstract ideas are "in most cases 'metaphorical'" and are "grounded in every day experience" in relation to the external world (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 272). Consequently, there is a metaphorical connection between abstract concepts and embodied experience. Metaphorical concepts are also dependent on cultural experiences.

Consider the examples taken from (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 44): "We'll just have to go our separate ways." "We can't turn back now." "I don't think this relationship is going anywhere." According to Lakoff and Johnson, a mapping of the concept love to that of a journey is shared in these sentences, revealing the underlying metaphorical mapping, LOVE IS A JOURNEY. Love, which is the target domain, is viewed in terms of a journey, the source domain. The existence of such a connection allows us to think about love using expressions related to a journey. Language is not primary here, but

secondary to thought and reason. Mappings are part of our conceptual system; subsequently, we better understand love because we conceptualize it as a journey.

3.1.2 Framing Knowledge: Structuring encyclopedic knowledge

Frames are constructs that help individuals structure their encyclopedic knowledge to understand the world around them and to represent that world to others. For the specific purposes of this study, they are central to both fictive interaction and to humor theory as well. They are a fundamental part of fictive interaction because this communicative cognitive phenomenon allows individuals to express abstract content using a specific frame fictively, the face-to-face conversation frame, to structure not only their thoughts but also discourse and language. Frames are equally important in humor research, especially regarding incongruity resolution based humor theories, since these show humor arising when there is a shift in frames. For these reasons, we will briefly focus on frames within the Cognitive Linguistics framework in this section.

Charles Fillmore developed the theory of frame semantics from his work on case frames in Case Grammar (Fillmore 1968), which analyzed syntactic structures of sentences by studying semantic valence of verbs in order to classify them according to the types of events or situations they conveyed. This type of grammar diverged from formal semantics in the 1970s, to embrace a more empirical semantics in which language is seen to be interconnected with background knowledge and experience. According to this linguist, a frame is:

(...) any system of concepts related in such a way that to understand any one of them you have to understand the whole structure in which it fits; when one of the things in such a structure

is introduced into a text, or into a conversation, all of the others are automatically made available. (Fillmore 1982, 111).

Frames are mental structures that offer rich conceptual backgrounds against which word meanings are understood. Words are mentally defined relative to their underlying frame and not to other words. Word meaning is thus a crucial part of frame semantics because it:

can be thought of as the effort to understand what reason a speech community might have found for creating the category represented by the word, and to explain the word's meaning by presenting and clarifying that reason" (Fillmore 1982, 112).

In other words, part of the research in frame semantics, is to discover why a speech community creates the category represented by the word and including that reason in the clarification of the meaning of the word. Categorization is a crucial part of frame semantics because frames are seen as a system of categories whose structure is embedded in motivating human and social experiences as well as cultural practices. Given this context, it is not surprising that this theory of semantics is influenced by the principles of Rosch's prototype theory. Both theories stress the experiential basis of meaning, that is, our experience with the world influences our understanding of what a word means and not necessary and sufficient features according to 'checklist' theories of meaning like truth conditional semantics (Fillmore 1985). Basic level concepts represent experiential categories hence making it possible for word meanings to be understood within the frame they evoke. A frame is said to be prototypical because it allows

"the complexity of fit between uses of the word and real world situations to be attributed to the details of the prototype background frame rather than to the details of the word's meaning" (Fillmore 1982, 118).

To illustrate this idea, let's take the word BREAKFAST as an example (Fillmore 1982, 118–19). We understand this word because it evokes a prototypical frame that depicts a cultural practice related to meals, in which this word can typically have three conditions associated to it: first, it is considered one of three meals we typically have per day; second, this meal is eaten in the morning after a night's rest; and third, there is certain kind of food eaten at this meal (which can differ based on the speech community). These three conditions prototypically serve as the background for the frame this word evokes, but all of them do not necessarily have to be present for someone to use the word BREAKFAST and be understood. For example, someone who works a late shift, goes home and sleeps several hours and wakes up at 3 p.m. and eats eggs, toast and has a cup of coffee and says this meal is their breakfast will be understood by another speaker of the same speech community, even though in this specific case, two prototypical features of BREAKFAST, a night's rest and a meal eaten in the morning, are not present.

Because lexical items are categories that get their meanings from the conceptual structures or semantic frames they occur in, they cannot be treated in isolation. Alonso affirms (2014, 130) that semantic frames "constitute an intrinsic part of language behavior, and although they are not essentially linguistic in nature, they are marked by lexical elements which form a part of them and which contribute to their understanding". Lexical items, as well as other grammatical features and syntactic patterns are understood within the cognitive frames they evoke, and not according to the individual meanings of other related words. Frames not only organize our

experiences and help us understand them, they also serve as "tools" for describing and explaining lexical and grammatical meaning (Fillmore 1985).

The most cited example of a frame is Fillmore's description of The Commercial Transaction Frame. This frame is in itself complex, but we will provide a simplified version of it here. In this frame, a buyer and a seller exchange goods and money; therefore, the concepts BUYER, SELLER, GOODS and MONEY, are considered the main basic frame elements of this frame. The commercial transaction verbs like BUY, SELL, PAY, CHARGE, SPEND, and COST each evoke a different feature of this commercial transaction frame. Let's take the verb BUY, for example. The main focus of this verb is on the buyer and the goods while the seller and the money serve as the background of this verb. To understand the meaning of this verb, it is necessary to know something about commercial transactions and to a certain extent the meaning of the other verbs as well within this frame. The Commercial Transaction Frame is part of our conceptual knowledge and experience and serves as the background and motivation of our understanding of the categories related to it. The words which represent the categories evoke the frame in the speaker's/ writer's mind while the person who interprets the text invokes the frame.

The ideas thus far presented in this section about frames are important in this study because as individuals we try to make sense of the world, both consciously and unconsciously, through some kind of framing of our experiences in the world. Frames are also an important part of mental spaces and allow conceptual blends to run; therefore, the next section will discuss conceptual integration, a more evolved version of blending theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1994).

3.1.3 Conceptual Integration Theory

Conceptual integration theory, or conceptual blending theory is a theory of cognition that explores the way we think, create and understand the world around us. It consists of a complex network of mental spaces that are used to break up and organize information logically or creatively and is said to be "at the heart of imagination" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 89). In this sense, it is understandable how this theory can help explain humor and how it is created by analyzing the input spaces of two opposing worlds, a real one and a fictitious one, an incongruity occurs in the blended space and hence produces a humorous effect. The conceptual integration of a mental space is also found in fictive interaction blends (Pascual 2002; 2008b; 2014) within the frame of face-to-face conversation. Given the importance of this theory in our work, we will briefly present the origins of this theory and discuss its importance within the Cognitive Linguistics framework.

Like Lakoff and Fillmore, Gilles Fauconnier also believed that language should not be studied in an isolated format like generative grammar did in the 1970s and 1980s because he felt it prevented linguistics from connecting to other deeper aspects of meaning. He believed that traditional theories of semantics studied with the tools of formal logic could not help explain the full extent of natural language, and turned to a more cognitive theory. For all these reasons, Fauconnier (1985; 1997) developed the mental space theory to deal with the classic issues in semantics such as reference, presupposition and counterfactuals. For him meaning construction involves creating a web of mental spaces and the mappings between those spaces always within a context. When communicating with other people, individuals construct mental spaces which are triggered by linguistic information and context, and that is how they are able to

construct meaning and successfully communicate. Base, viewpoint and focus are three vital notions that allow us to understand the intricate mappings of mental spaces in order to properly draw inferences from those meanings. These mental spaces are defined as:

... small conceptual packets constructed as we think and talk, for purposes of local understanding and action. They are very partial assemblies containing elements, structured by frames and cognitive models. (...) Mental spaces are interconnected in working memory, can be modified dynamically as thought and discourse unfold, and can be used generally to model dynamic mappings in thought and language. (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 102)

This theory looks at words not only from a perspective of direct relation to entities in the world. Words activate concepts, mental spaces and knowledge domains; they also serve as prompts to construct mental spaces and mappings across and within these spaces. According to Fauconnier (1997), there are three kinds of mappings: (1) schema mapping which is related to context, (2) projection mapping related to analogies and metaphors since it is projecting a structure of one mental space to another, and finally, (3) pragmatic function mapping related to metonymy because it connects two spaces through a pragmatic purpose.

Mental spaces are "constructs distinct from linguistic structures but built up in any discourse according to guidelines provided by linguistic expressions" (Fauconnier 1985, 16). The point being made here is that firstly, mental spaces are not linguistic structures, they are conceptual structures and secondly, they are the products of an ongoing discourse. These conceptual structures may be formally marked by linguistics expressions: prepositional phrases to set up representational spaces (*in the picture; at*

the university), time adverbials (in 1995, last year) to set up times spaces, connectives (if p, then q) to set up hypothetical spaces, subject-verb combinations (Ana hopes, Joe believes to) for belief spaces. These expressions are what Fauconnier (1985) calls space-builders. They explicitly set up mental spaces and elements found in them as well as relations that pragmatically connect these elements. An example of two explicit space builders are found in the following sentence:

<u>Max believes</u> that <u>in Len's picture</u>, the flowers are yellow. (Fauconnier 1985, 17)

In this example there are two space builders which set up two mental spaces: one that is formally marked with a subject-verb combination, *Max believes*, which sets up a space for Max's beliefs, and the other marked with a prepositional phrase, *in Len's picture*, which sets up a representational mental space.

In addition to space builders, there are other grammatical devices that also guide the construction and connection of mental spaces. These include: names and descriptions (i.e. noun phrases), tense and mood, presuppositional constructions (e.g. definite descriptions, aspectuals, clefts, pseudo-clefts), trans-spatial operators (copulative verbs) and identification of elements (Fauconnier 1997, 40–42).

Not all mental spaces, however, are explicitly introduced, i.e. formally marked. They may also be implicitly constructed on pragmatic grounds, for example, in fiction or theatre. These combined with language generate an unlimited number of meaning constructions.

Fauconnier's mental space theory was further developed in collaboration with Mark Turner and led to the Conceptual Blending Theory, also known as Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1994; 1998; 2002) which explores the way

we think, create and understand the world around us. Whereas the mental space theory focused on describing how conceptual spaces are activated to represent what we know about reality, in terms of our beliefs, desires, hypotheticals and counterfactuals, and how language helps us to link different spaces, the blending theory has slightly changed the focus to how information from two or more spaces is combined to create new conceptual structures.

Creating an integration network is a process which, according to Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 44), "involves setting up mental spaces, matching across spaces, projecting selectively to a blend, locating shared structures, projecting backwards to inputs, recruiting new structure to the inputs or the blend, and running various operations in the blend." Blending is a complex network of mental spaces that are used to break up and organize information logically or creatively. Elements in one mental space are connected with elements in another mental space through mappings that arise from different kinds of relations. These networks come about by linking two or more input spaces, which are the sources of meaning, by means of a generic space. This generic space is abstract and contains schematic information that reflects the roles and frames common to both or all input spaces. An integrated network is hence created and consists of a fourth space known as the blended space. This new space takes elements from the other input spaces and goes further in meaning by providing additional information that is not contained in either input spaces thus creating a new meaning from preexisting inputs that are compatible because they share from the generic space (Fauconnier and Turner 1994; 1998; 2002).

A four-space blend is represented in the diagram (Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 143) seen in Figure 1.




Figure 1: Conceptual Integration Network - Four space blend

The circles in the diagram represent mental spaces that also include background frames while the dots in the circles represent elements pertaining to each space. The dotted lines indicate connections whereas the solid lines represent cross space mapping which links counterparts in the input spaces. Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 142) add that "such counterpart connections are of many kinds: connections between frames and roles in frames; connections of identity or transformation or representation; metaphoric connections, etc.". The blend develops an emergent structure not present in the inputs by three processes: composition, completion and elaboration. Composition is an operation in which elements are composed from the input spaces in the blended space that are found in each one of the input spaces. Fusion is an example of composition where counterparts from each input space come together in the blended space to create a new element. Completion is an unconscious process that takes information from longterm memory and matches it to the structure in the blend. The final process is elaboration, closely related to completion, which is the running of the blend. During elaboration, connections to the inputs are maintained, and Fauconnier and Turner (2002, 44) add "...all these 'sameness' connections across spaces seem to pop out automatically, yielding to a flash of comprehension...".

Compression is one of the main cognitive processes used in blending that is useful for memory and understanding complex meanings. Fauconnier and Turner (2000, 283) define it as "a phenomenon that allows human beings to simultaneously control long diffuse chains of logical reasoning and to grasp the global meanings of such chains". Providing "compressions to human scale of diffuse arrays of reality" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 30) is one of the main benefits of conceptual blends, where human scale refers to "the level at which it is natural for us to have the impression that we have direct, reliable, and comprehensive understanding" (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 323). "Vital relations", like time, space, cause-effect, identity, and change, are conceptual connections within and between two or more mental spaces; therefore compressing them into one blended space not only facilitates the construction of meaning but also enhances our ability to integrate dissimilar concepts.

The regatta example (Fauconnier and Turner 1994, 7–8) taken from a 1993 article from a sailing magazine is a clear example of blending. It is an excerpt about an imaginary race between a ghost clipper, Northern Light in 1853 and a catamaran, Great America II from 1993 to see if the latter beats the former's record. In order for the reader to understand the text and make inferences he constructs four spaces: an input space with reference to 1853 when Northern Light made the journey in 76 days and 8 hours, the other input space refers to Great America II who in 1993 is trying to break the Northern Light record, a generic space, which includes schema, is what the two input spaces have in common: boats, a trajectory, days/times and positions, and a fourth blended space referring to the imaginary race between both vessels which the writer explicitly provides the reader with in the text by giving the positions of the boats. In order to talk about this imaginary race, the two input spaces are compressed so that both events can

be viewed at the same time. There is a time compression, placing the 1853 clipper and the 1993 catamaran in the blended space, as well as a space compression so that the two boats can follow the same course. This blended space, which is in itself a new conceptual domain that has its own partial structure and organization, contains partial structures projected from each input space and generic space, adapting to the preexisting racing cultural frame.

The fictitious scenario of an imaginary race in the example above is possible due to conceptual integration. We are better able to directly compare the performances of both boats because time and space of the two factive events are compressed and thus create a blended space of a fictive race, which never occurred. We will take a closer look at fictivity and fictive interaction in the next sections.

3.2 Fictivity

Talmy was one of the first to have analyzed fictivity within the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. In his book, he clearly defines and makes a distinction between "factive" and "fictive" representations of identities (e.g. objects, things, people, landscapes, etc.), stating that the former indicates "a cognitive assessment of greater veridicality" (Talmy 2000, 100) which is not to be confused with the idea that something is factual or real. "Fictive", on the other hand, is used by Talmy and other linguists for "its reference to the imaginal capacity of cognition" (p. 100) and does not necessarily suggest that something is unreal. The focus of his study was more on fictive motion, illustrated by sentences that despite containing a motion verb do not in fact involve a physical movement. The cognizer is said to go through a cognitive process that mentally

"moves" the subject of the sentence, a subject that cannot move itself (e.g. states, abstract concepts, etc.). The following sentence taken from the article exemplifies this:

That mountain range goes from Canada to Mexico.

This example illustrates a fictive motion because a mountain range is incapable of physically going anywhere. The sentence, however, does represent a sense of movement. The reader mentally scans the mountain range from north to south.

Langacker also discusses factive and fictive representations of language in his paper on virtual reality, but calls them actual and virtual entities. Even though the terminology is different, the idea remains the same. Like Talmy, Langacker dismisses the idea that actuality pertains only to the "real world" or reality and virtuality to a fictitious world. He claims both can derive from any kind of "global world" or a "derivative" one like myths, novels, etc. Virtual entities are mental constructs individuals use to deal with the world they live in.

Pascual (2002) goes a bit further and states that:

"Fictive realities are not conceptualized as belonging to a domain of fiction, of dreams, or even of the hypothetical or counterfactual. They are set up by language with the purpose of making mental contact with, shifting focus to, or saying something about a conceptual reality that may or may not be factual, and which is not directly referred to by linguistic means" (p.5).

Therefore, fictivity is taking the conceptual world and trying to make sense of it through mental constructions. It is starting with the "real" and mentally scanning the language, whether veridical or not, and trying to cognitively understand it because the linguistics means does not necessarily make direct reference to the meaning being transmitted.

There are different types of fictivity studied and found in the literature. There is fictive motion (Talmy 2000; Matsumoto 1996; Matlock 2004), the one that has been most studied; fictive change (Sweetser 1997), fictive speech acts (Langacker 1999) and a type which branches off from fictive speech acts, fictive interaction (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014), the focus of this work. The next section takes a closer look at this type of fictivity that uses a conversation frame to organize thought, discourse and language.

3.3 Fictive Interaction

Fictive Interaction (FI) is a communicative cognitive phenomenon coined by Pascual (2002) in her book, Imaginary Trialogues: Conceptual Blending and Fictive Interaction in Criminal Courts, to refer to "non-veridical communication at the perceptual level" (p. 13). It is seen to be a communicative or conversational fictivity modeled by the conversation frame, one which is intersubjective, found within verbal and nonverbal interaction that is "used metonymically to stand for whole mental and emotional states, activities, and events" (Pascual 2002, 16). Communication for Pascual is "constructed through the situated interaction of participants, as they project overall cultural, social and everyday knowledge prompted by those, setting up cognitive domains which model each other from different dimensions of conceptual representation" (2002, 80). She asserts that the use of the conversation frame in fictive interaction helps to structure our thought (e.g. when we talk to ourselves), language (e.g. when we ask rhetorical questions) and discourse (e.g. when we have dialogic monologues). FI (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014) described from discourse, syntactical and lexical perspectives help to explain how individuals cognitively process and infer information in terms of the Conceptual Integration Theory (Fauconnier and Turner 1994; 1996; 1998; 2002).

Fictive interaction is not a genuine dialogue, but occurs within 'fictive interaction blends' (Pascual 2002; 2008a; 2008b; 2014), which are the outcome of conceptually integrated blends in a mental space (Fauconnier 1985) that correspond to a face-to-face conversation frame. In the factive conversational frame there are specific roles (i.e. addresser, addressee, bystander, message), which individuals use to actively and successfully participate in "real" dialogues. In the conversation frame of fictive interaction blends, the interaction involves a fictive addresser(s) interacting with a fictive addressee(s) whose purpose is to exchange information for the ultimate benefit of a fictive bystander(s). According to Turner (2010), these types of FI blends help readers and listeners better comprehend the mappings of the blends where fictive interaction takes place.

The most cited and well-known example of this is found in the conceptual blending theory literature, Fauconnier & Turner's (1998) "Debate with Kant" blend.

I claim that reason is a self-developing capacity. Kant disagrees with me on this point. He says it's innate, but I answer that that's begging the question, to which he counters, in Critique of Pure Reason, that only innate ideas have power. But I say to that, What about neuronal group selection? And he gives no answer" (Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 145).

In this debate a modern philosopher and professor argues with Kant, an eighteenth century philosopher to illustrate a philosophical concept to his students in a lecture. According to Pascual (2002; 2006; 2014), this debate is possible due to fictive interaction, because the modern philosopher (fictive addressor) interacts with Kant (fictive addressee), an already deceased philosopher, by creating and adopting fictive conversational turns and using question-answer techniques to express thoughts and

ideas in the arguments presented in the INPUT spaces. These arguments are well thought out and serve a purpose, which is to elucidate the modern philosopher's students (fictive bystanders) in a lecture. She claims that this creates an "imaginary trialogue" in an academic discourse setting where the philosophical ideas of the modern philosopher/professor are presented in opposition to those of Kant in order to teach the students. These "trialogues" or "three-way communication channels are especially seen in monologues where a fictitious conversation is set up in order to present the fictive addressor's own view (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2008a; 2008b; 2014).

Fictive interaction blends found in philosophical dialogs at the discourse level, like the example above are commonly found in Western philosophical texts for argumentative purposes (Brandt 2008; 2013). According to Brandt,

Vivifying concepts by having them be played out in the imagination, animating them, rather than just having them be pointed to as meanings abstracted from experience makes these discourse referents more present experientially which appears to increase the rhetorical effect (2008, 116).

Xiang (in press) agrees with Brandt and also confirms that the same seems to be true for classical Eastern philosophical texts. This author has been studying fictive interaction networks found in the *Zhuangzi* text, an ancient Chinese text about the early teachings of the Daoism philosophy written by the Chinese philosopher with the same name and the 1992 two-volume comic book version, *Zhuangzi Speaks*. According to Xiang (in press), readers are able to identify with the text because it is written in such an interactional manner that the readers feel they are speaking directly with the narrator. The text consists of a large number of short allegorical dialogs in which the philosopher presents his views by taking on a number of different fable-like roles to help explain

different perspectives, present arguments and provide several sides to an issue. In his doctoral study partially presented in this article, Xiang explains how fictive interaction networks found in the fictitious dialogs of the text aid Zhuangzi in convincing readers of his philosophical beliefs. Xiang also claims that reality, fiction and fictivity appear to be embedded in one another or overlap in order for readers to comprehend the moral of the text. He states that,

actuality, fictivity and fiction are not a clear-cut category, but a radial one with prototypical and peripheral members, like many other linguistic or nonlinguistic categories in Cognitive Linguistics (Xiang in press, 31).

This is the first time that these ontological categories are perceived in this manner, given that fictive interaction studies up until now have seen these categories as distinct categories. This researcher is also the first to analyze fictive interaction blends as "multi-scope integration networks" due to their complex blending operation that occurs over several input spaces.

FI has not only been the object of study in philosophical texts but there have also been many other types of studies performed on a wide range of genres. These studies seem to agree that FI is an important communicative strategy whose underlying interactional structure helps to organize the discourse as well as serve argumentative or didactic purposes. These studies have involved different discourse types which include: court room discourse (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2008a; 2008b); political argumentation (Cienki and Giansante 2014); written route directions (Santos Mendes 2008); classroom discourse (Brandt 2008); dramatic discourse (Abrantes 2009); religious texts (Sandler in press); professional discourse (Chaemsaithong in press; Fitzgerald and Oakley in

press); autistic conversations (Dornelas and Pascual in press) amongst others that are still in preparation and have not been published yet.

3.3.1 Linguistic and communicative forms of fictive interaction: discourse and grammar

FI in its communicative form is also a grammatical phenomenon. Pascual (2002; 2006; 2008b; 2014) has studied a large corpus of both written and oral data from a large number of unrelated languages, spoken and signed, from a wide array of discourse types and has identified different linguistic forms and communicative functions where fictive interaction can be found. She proposes three different levels: (i) the inter-sentential level, (ii) the sentential level, and (iii) the intra-sentential level. She also analyzes fictive verbal interaction found within the word, focusing on English nominal compounds.

FI at the inter-sentential level deals with the grammar, i.e. the connections between sentences and clauses, within question-answer patterns typically found in the conversation frame. In a real communicative situation this would typically be presented as a speaker asking a listener a question in which the listener would reply. In a fictive interaction the fictive speaker is both the questioner and the answerer of his own question for the purpose of introducing a discourse topic, focus or conditionality.

At the sentence level, embedded fictive interactions are grammaticalized in sentence types that are seen and explained through: "fictive assertions", "fictive commands" and "fictive questions".

Fictive assertions are declarative sentences that present an actual statement that is cancelled out by a fictive statement. Pascual (2002) presents an example taken from a US court proceeding.

<u>I will bet you</u>... my house! that [...] if they came down it wouldn't make any difference.

The attorney who said this fictive utterance, is not in fact making a bet with the jury, but rather says these words to show the jury that he truly believes what he is saying to be true, so much so, that he is willing to bet his house on it. Pascual (2002) points out that the intention of fictive assertions, like the one above, "is to invite the addressee to make an inference concerning the addresser's emotional state and position towards a particular aspect of or element in the broader Current Discourse Space" (p. 179). The fictive assertion is therefore found in two mental spaces, the actual one and the fictive one.

Similarly to fictive assertions, fictive commands are also construed in two mental spaces. Commands are orders that are stated by an addresser to be complied by an addressee; however, in fictive commands the addresser gives an order that is not actually intended for the addressee to fulfill but rather is stated to challenge or strengthen an idea expressed by the addresser. One example provided by Pascual is from a Catalan court proceeding when an attorney says:

A: <u>Digue'm</u> un sol cas que siguidiferent. [Tell me one sole case that is different]

This is a fictive command because the lawyer does not want the jury to tell him about any particular case that is different, but is using this command to strengthen his idea that this case is like so many others of its kind.

The last sentence type presented in Pascual's book is fictive questions. She believes question structures are set up by "illocutors", a term she uses to refer to a questioner and an answerer that "may or may not correspond to two individuals in actuality, i.e.

the addresser and the addressee(s) in the situation of communication" (p. 195). An example given by the author is from a US murder trial in which the district attorney is presenting his closing arguments:

Did he eat at Burger King? No. Does he have a receipt? No. Did he get anything to drink? No. [...] So, does he go to Jack-in-the-Box and get something to eat? No. Well if he was hungry why didn't he go back to Jack-in-the-Box? Well, because he says he really wasn't hungry. [...] Does he have a receipt? No. Can he verify his – he was there? No. How do you know he was there? You have his word.

Closing arguments are considered to be monologues because in actuality there is only one person talking, but cognitively speaking this is an illustration of a fictive dialogue or trialogue. The district attorney is asking questions that he gives the answers to in order to make his argument stronger for those listening, the jury/judge and the other attorney.

Fictive interaction has been analyzed and discussed thus far at the sentence level, but it can also be analyzed one level down, at the clausal level. These clauses are embedded imagined speech not direct quotations or paraphrases of prior speech. Pascual (2002) is a pioneer in this area given that she presents preliminary categorization, which had never been done prior to her study. She found four basic clausal fictive interaction uses: "like + clause"; "prepositional clause"; "predicative clause" and "relative clause". The examples she gives are from colloquial conversations rather than from her legal corpus given that this type of clausal fictive interaction was not found.

The clausal fictive interaction, "*like* + clause", are fictive utterances that are not direct quotations or paraphrases of real language use occurring in a specific context. Pascual

(2014, 119) illustrates this in the example uttered by a disappointed Lance Armstrong fan who was speaking to a journalist about the cyclist's admittance of using performance-enhancing drugs (Pascual's marking of the text):

I beat cancer, so did you. I was an athlete and I came back and I played at a really high level... But I didn't cheat. For me it's kind of <u>like</u>: why did <u>I</u> look up to <u>you</u>? Why aren't <u>you</u> looking up to me?

The embedded utterances are not actual utterances said by the ex-fan to Armstrong. Therefore, the phrase marker *kind of like* sets up a fictitious conversation between the two men for fictive purposes by introducing direct speech understood as a conversational turn. In this new blended space the ex-fan is the fictive addressor arguing with the famous cyclist, the fictive addressee, who is not physically present, while the journalist is now the fictive bystander. The purpose is to show how upset this former fan is with Armstrong. According to Pascual (2002) these "are fictive utterances that serve as part-whole compression of factual patterns of behavior, thought, and emotional states" (p. 205).

Fictive interaction is also seen two levels down from the clause, at the phrasal and lexical item levels. Once again Pascual (2002) is the first to describe and analyze these levels in cognitive linguistics. For this author, lexical phrases are "those FI occurrences which refer to a profiled instance of some type of thing (or process or relationship); whereas lexical FIs will be those occurrences that describe a type of thing (or process or relationship)" (p. 216). She also states that phrasal fictive interactions are compressions of already existing fictive interactions that can be in the form of idioms: "a 'nobody will believe this when I tell them' situation", "a take-it-or-leave-it grin".

These examples illustrate a fictive idiomatic phrase that describes a noun. Pascual believes that these type of phrasal FI are not the most common types. The most common in her opinion are the "[kind / type of + phrasal FI] constructions". Examples of these constructions are: "a *must see* (movie)", "this *I'm so cool* attitude".

The other type of FI is the lexical item, which Pascual states is not clearly distinct from the phrasal FI. The two are said to have fuzzy boundaries. In order to identify these lexical items, the author presents distinguishing features at the level of the word, like derivational or inflectional morphology ("a do-it-yourselver", "the do's and don'ts"), in written language different words that form one word ("whodunit" or "forget-menots"), and acronyms ("BYOB [bring your own booze] party").

These intra-sentential examples of FI have similar pragmatic and discursive features to typical uses of direct speech. The reason being, according to Pascual (2014) is that intra sentential FI:

(i) sets up a non-genuine communicative exchange, in the sense that – just as is the case for genuine quotation – it is not to be interpreted as directly applying to the situation of production; (ii) involves acting out rather than describing its referent; (iii) depicts its referent selectively; (iv) often involves the mixing of different voices and subsequently of different viewpoints; and (v) often seems to be motivated by the difficulty of explicitly describing its referent. (p.54)

Although it shares similar features with direct quotations, intra-sentential fictive interaction is not an ordinary quotative, but an embedded imagined speech. It sets up an imaginative scenario where a fictive verbal exchange (by the fictive addresser) is

used to talk about a non-conversational reality and not to report a real verbal interaction between two people (factive addresser and factive addressee).

3.3.2 The role of metonymy in fictive interaction

Another important characteristic of intra-sentential FI is its metonymic usage. Deriving from the Ancient Greek meaning "change of name", Cognitive Linguistics has shown that metonymy is not only a linguistic trope – the so called metonymic expressions, but also is a conceptual phenomenon. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), in *Metaphors We Live By*, were the first to study the conceptual nature of metonymy in cognitive semantics and argued that it is central to human thought and language. According to these researchers, "metonymy has primarily a referential function, that is, it allows us to use one entity to stand for another. But metonymy is not merely a referential device. It also serves the function of providing understanding" (Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36). They provide the following example to illustrate this: *The Times hasn't arrived at the press conference yet.* This is an example of THE PART TO THE WHOLE. "The Times" in this example has a referential function referring to a reporter (part) who works for the *Times* newspaper (whole). Using the name of the institution is not accidental, as it suggests that the reporter works for a prestigious institution, which in turn may also suggest s/he is an important person and a good reporter.

This is not the only type of metonymy presented in the book. Lakoff and Johnson (1980, 38–39) provide a taxonomy for other kinds of metonymies, a similar approach these scholars had to metaphors, because both are said to be grounded in an individual's experience. This taxonomy can be seen in Table 1.

Types of Conceptual Metonymy	Examples
THE PART FOR THE WHOLE	There are a lot of <i>good heads</i> in the university. (= intelligent people)
PRODUCT FOR PRODUCER	He's got <i>a Picasso</i> in his den. (= painting by Picasso)
INSTITUTION FOR PEOPLE RESPONSIBLE	The <i>Senate</i> thinks abortion is immoral. (= senators)
THE PLACE FOR THE EVENT	It's been <i>Grand Central Station</i> here all day. (= crowded event)
OBJECT FOR THE USER	The <i>sax</i> has the flu today. (= saxophone player)
CONTROLLER FOR THE CONTROLLED	Nixon bombed Hanoi. (= The USA military headed by President Nixon)
THE PLACE FOR THE INSITUTION	Wall Street is in a panic. (= Stock market)

Table 1: Taxonomy for conceptual metonymies

Unlike metaphor, metonymy involves entities that are closely or directly related conceptually (pp38–39). In the case of the metonymy, mappings are made within the same conceptual domain.

Gibbs (1999) states the difference between a metaphor and metonymy lies in the number of conceptual domains and the connection between entities. He believes that metaphors have two conceptual domains, where "one is understood in terms of another" (p. 62). Metonymy, on the other hand, is a specific kind of mental mapping that

connects entities in only one conceptual domain, a view already shared by Kövescses and Radden (1998, 39) a year earlier.

The distinction between metaphor and metonymy; however, has not been so clear cut in CL. Barcelona (2002) lists three problems found in distinguishing between what is considered a conceptual metaphor and what is a conceptual metonymy. The first problem is related to the concept of domain. Barcelona (2002) states, "cognitive domains often have fuzzy boundaries so that it is not always easy to know if the source and the target domains are or are not in the same superordinate domain" (pp. 232-239), hence causing some linguists to label them metaphors while others label them metonymies. The second problem is concerned with the context of interpretation, "a linguistic expression may often be interpreted, on the *sole* basis of context, background knowledge, or the purpose of the interpreter, as metaphorical, or as metonymic" (2002, 240–41). The last problem distinguishing between metaphor and metonymy cited by Barcelona (2002) is associated with the interaction between metaphor and metonymy; "metaphor and metonymy very often interact in intricate patterns, which complicates their distinction" (pp. 241-245). Barcelona (2002, 246), therefore, defines metonymy as an instance of a pragmatic function mapping between two domains that are part of a common frame in which the source, as a reference point, mentally activates the target domain indicating a close relationship between the two entities due to link in the roles each of them performs in the same "functional domain".

Although many studies have been done in this area⁴, we have decided not to include them here given that our focus is on the conceptual concept of fictive interaction in a satirical television program. We therefore focus our attention on metonymy from an FI perspective.

FI is predominantly based on the analysis of the verbal aspect of language where parts of conversation are sometimes used to "metonymically stand for whole mental and emotional states, activities, and events" (Pascual 2002, 16); therefore, "metonymy plays a crucial role in the production and interpretation of fictive interaction constituents such as modifiers in direct speech compounds" (Pascual 2014, 65).

Metonymy in fictive interaction allows fictive addressees to easily recognize a scenario given the overall knowledge of the world s/he possesses, whether it be socio-cultural, historical or so on. A well-known example Pascual cites in her works to illustrate this is the text "I do! Dishes", found on a box of an American brand of wedding china. "I do" here is a direct speech modifier of the noun "dishes" and evokes a performative speech act that is typically found at the crucial moment in a wedding where a bride and groom accept each other as husband and wife. In this example the utterance metonymically refers to the overall wedding. By having the fictive addressees recall

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⁴ Besides Barcelona, conceptual metonymy has been researched by many other cognitive linguists, like Kövescses and Radden (1998), one of the first to provide comprehensible theory of metonymy in cognitive semantics. Panther and Thornburg (1997) focused their attention on the role of metonymy in different types of pragmatic inferencing. They also edited a book entitled *Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing* (Panther and Thornburg 2003), which included several important papers from renown cognitive linguists like Barcelona, Coulson and Oakley.

this wedding frame, the owner of this brand of dishes is creating an affective response in order to convince him/her to buy the dishes.

Other examples of fictive verbal interactions in English nominal compounds, where a head noun is modified by a sentence or clause are: "Hi honey, I'm home" happiness"; "Not happy? Money back! guarantee" (Pascual 2014, 59). For Pascual (2014) these "self-sufficient discourse units" are parts of fictive conversational turns. They are fictive because they metonymically make it easy for people to recognize them due to their vast knowledge of the world. These fictive constructions are cultural models used by fictive addressers to identify their mental, emotional and behavioral world.

Brandt (2008, 110; 2013, 124), who analyses fictive interaction from a semiotic perspective, concurs with Pascual on the importance of metonymy in fictive interaction and states that "embedded metonymic enunciations" are an important part of this communicative conceptual phenomenon. Like Pascual, Brandt also believes that enunciations are metonymic because the fictive communicative context allows the addressee to make mental observations with certain frames and cultural models they possess to understand the language presented. These embedded fictive enunciations metonymically stand for a belief or attitude of a particular person, group of people or institution, which Brandt calls "embedded personal enunciation" (2013, 125). The following example illustrates this type of enunciation. It is a quote embedded in an utterance said by a financial economist:

When Congress passes a minimum wage law, they are essentially giving up on the poor. They are saying, "We don't believe you are capable of making your efforts to be paid a decent wage". (Brandt 2013, 124)

In this utterance, the fictive quote, which was never said by Congress, an institution, is embedded in the economist's speech and metonymically stands for his negative attitude towards Congress passing the law.

In addition to "embedded personal enunciations" there are also what Brandt (2013, 125) calls "embedded generic enunciations". These are fictive enunciations whose subject is not an actual person, group or institution but has a more generic speaker role. She gives an example from a 2005 Microsoft Office ad, which reads:

The OOPS I HIT ALL era is over.

In this example the embedded utterance, "oops I hit all", is modifying the noun era and it is generic because it can be said by anyone who uses the software. It generally refers to a "state of affairs" and metonymically stands for a big mistake.

Given the information presented, it is clear to see that metonymy is an important part of fictive interaction. It is used to set up scenarios that can be easily recognized by individuals to retrieve frames and cultural models to mentally manage the overall fictive situation of communication (Pascual 2014).

3.3.3 Fictive Interaction in political argumentation

Fictive interaction has been studied in a wide variety of discourse types, as we already mentioned above, and though possible, we will not discuss all of them here given that they would not contribute directly to the full understanding of this work. Nevertheless, the work done by Cienki and Giansante (2014) on conversational framing in televised political discourse is of great interest to us.

These authors examined how two national 'populist' politicians, one from the US (Sarah Palin) and the other one from Italy (Silvio Berlusconi) used fictive interaction

with their audience while being asked questions by journalists during a televised political program. The data from the US was taken from the televised 2008 presidential debate between Sarah Palin and her opponent Joseph Biden, while the data from the Italian context was obtained from extensive televised interviews by Italian journalists with Silvio Berlusconi and Walter Veltroni, the two candidates for prime minister. In both cases the politicians were answering journalist's questions, therefore evoking an interviewer/interviewee frame while at the same time evoking a second frame, a media one and thus interacting with a third participant, the audience viewing the televised program (Cienki and Giansante 2014, 258). This can also be compared to Pascual's (Pascual 2002; 2008b; 2014) trialogues. There are cognitive/affective consequences of moving to this second frame, which can be seen in the politician's linguistic performance. Cienki and Giansante (2014, 258–60) provide a prototypical list of five sets of behavior that can involve all or some elements of each, that are considered "necessary and sufficient conditions for conversational framing" (p.258). These are:

- 1. Use of "local pronouns" (1st and 2nd person: *I*, we, you)
- 2. Use of colloquial vocabulary and pronunciation
- 3. Use of short intonation units
- 4. Use of grammatical/syntactic structures which help maintain topics in short-term memory
- 5. Use of eye gaze and gesture typical of face-to-face interaction with an interlocutor

The use of 1st and 2nd pronouns is widely used in spoken discourse and therefore in fictive interactions can activate in the hearer a conceptual conversation frame. It is also common in conversations to use more informal lexical items (e.g. *dude*) and pronunciation (e.g. omitting final letters, *doin* instead of "doing", or reductions, like reducing "want to" to *wanna*). These elements may metonymically signal in the hearer

a more casual conversation. The use of lesser words per intonation unit is also common in conversation when new ideas are being presented (Chafe 1994). The reason being that the listener is more cognitively capable of processing the new information when presented in shorter intonation units. The same holds true for grammatical and syntactic structures. These structures tend to also be simplified in conversation (e.g. breaking up complex phrases into separate clauses). And finally the last behavior, related to nonverbal behavior, eye gaze and gestures is very important when speakers and listeners interact with one another in a conversation. Cienki and Giansante (2014) affirm that in a televised program, looking straight into the camera is a way for the interlocutor to make direct contact with the television audience.

Cienki and Giansante (2014) analyzed these behaviors in the American and Italian politicians' discourse and concluded that Palin and Berlusconi, the two 'populist' politicians, used conversational framing a lot more than their opponents. By using conversational framing to virtually "talk" to the audience, that is use fictive interaction (Pascual 2002; 2014), these politicians were able to involve the viewer in the discussion making them feel like 'one of them', which according to Cienki and Giansante (2014, 279) "highlights their supposed common ground with the people, allowing them to take on the role as spokesperson for them". These authors state that conversational framing with the audience in televised programs is not used by all politicians but that there are some aspects of it that some politicians use more than others.

3.3.4 Fictive Interaction in humor

Another fictive interaction study we feel is important to describe here is one about FI found in different types of narratives done for an undergraduate honors thesis in the

linguistics department at the University of California at Berkeley (Stec 2007). The focus of this thesis was on how Authors and Readers interact. This study is of interest to us because the researcher also studied fictive interaction in humor. She analyzed several examples from a segment called *Word* from the comedy TV news program The Colbert Report hosted by Stephen Colbert on the cable network Comedy Central. In this segment, the host interacts with a slideshow containing text, images, video or other types of animation. This interaction is seen on a split screen with Colbert on one side and the Word on the other. Stec explains how the Word segment and Colbert's monologue are clear examples of fictive interaction. She first starts by taking the Colbert space and the *Word* space and blending the two to create a new space. In this blended space the Word interacts with SC and vice versa. The text which appears on the Word side of the screen is considered to be a conversational turn in this interaction while Colbert's monologue is the other. A fictive dialogue is created because the only one who is actually doing any talking is Colbert himself. The Word is text that appears in response to what Colbert is saying, however, in this segment Colbert does not acknowledge or refer to the text on the Word side of the screen. Stec gives the following example:

"Do you know why we invaded Iraq?", the Wørd says (NOT A CLUE), and Stephen Colbert continues "— to give that country what it sorely lacked: Americanism."

In this example fictive interaction occurs because Colbert and the *Word* appear to be interacting with one another. Colbert makes a comment in the form of a question and the *Word* responds to it, thus creating a fictive dialogue.

In this chapter we explained the importance of the conceptual phenomenon, fictive interaction, and its place within the CL framework by reviewing the literature in this field. The next chapter discusses the literature related to the data of this dissertation, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Firstly, we explain the genre it belongs to and discuss the role of the audience in this media interaction. The second part of the chapter provides some background information about the show and examines important features of it by discussing some of the numerous studies performed about this show.

The Daily Show with Jon Stewart

Political humor is a type of humor whose main purpose is to criticize or make fun of politics and politicians (Raskin 1985; Nilsen 1990; Tsakona and Popa 2011). It can be produced by anyone, for example, politicians themselves, political commentators, cartoonists, comedians, news broadcasters, people in general, etc. It may occur in political settings, like debates, political congresses, parliaments, government meetings, etc., or in other settings. Given that the data of this work centers on the news satire television program, The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, and the monologues of the episodes that are dedicated to the three 2012 Presidential debates, we believe it is necessary to present work related to this particular political satire found in the media. But before discussing the literature about this famous show, it is first important to look at the type of genre it falls under and the role of the audience.

4.1 Televised Political Satire: "hard news" vs "soft news"

There are hundreds of television programs worldwide, which are considered news programs with a satirical inclination, or parodies of news broadcasts, with either real or fake stories about politics. For example in Spain there is *El Intermedio*, a satirical news program, in France, *Le Petit Journal*, a French news and entertainment program, in the

UK, *Have I Got News For You*, a political quiz show based on news stories, *Eretz Nehederet* ("A Wonderful Country"), a very popular Israeli satirical show that makes fun of Israeli politicians and life in Israel (Friedman 2014) and in the USA, the two most famous American fake news programs: *The Colbert Report* (which ended in 2014) and *The Daily Show* (formerly with Jon Stewart as its host until 2015 and now with Trevor Noah), and *Last Week Tonight with John Oliver*, a late-night talk and news satire program, amongst many others. All these television programs belong to the "soft news" genre that is said to be a blurred line between information and entertainment. In this section we will briefly discuss the differences between "hard news" and "soft news", focusing more on "soft news" related to political satire found on television.

For over 30 or so years the concepts "hard news" and "soft news" have been used in many research works in the field of communication studies due to the increase of "soft news" programs that began to immerge in the 1980s with the growth of cable TV and in the early 21st century with the high use of the internet as a news source (Baum 2002). Nevertheless, there does not seem to be a consensus as to the exact definition of these terms nor how they should be defined or measured (Reinemann et al. 2011)⁵. It is not our intent to put forward a standardized definition of these concepts, since this is not the focus of our work, but it is important to clearly state what is meant by these terms and how The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, is an example of one of them.

⁵ Reinmann *et al* (2011) present a well-thought comprehensive outline of prior studies that have attempted to measure and define news as being either "hard" or "soft".

Although there seems to be no consensus as to the specific meanings of "hard news" and "soft news", Reinemann *et al.* (2011), based on a comprehensive review of the literature, define these terms in the following manner:

The more a news item is politically relevant, the more it reports in a thematic way, focuses on the societal consequences of events, is impersonal and unemotional in its style, the more it can be regarded as hard news. The more a news items is not politically relevant, the more it reports in an episodic way, focuses on individual consequences of events, is personal and emotional in style, the more it can be regarded as soft news (p. 233).

According to this definition, hard news; therefore, has a more serious tone and takes a factual approach on topics like politics, war, economics and crime and is found in media outlets for those who seek this type of information because they are intrinsically interested in politics or public affairs (Baum and Jamison 2006). Soft news, on the other hand, has a more emotional and less serious tone and presents human interest stories of the topics previously mentioned. Wise and Brewer (2010, 130) affirm that hard news reporters "adhere to the principle of ideological objectivity", while soft news hosts are critical and more opinionated.

Focusing more on television as the main media outlet of political knowledge, hard news is often seen on traditional news broadcast television programs, while soft news is seen on television programs like daytime and late nighttime talk shows and entertainment news shows like *The Daily Show*.

It has been argued that soft news has increasingly been chosen over hard news as a source of political information especially during election time by individuals who are not interested in politics or foreign policy or are politically inattentive (Baum 2002;

2003; Baum and Jamison 2006). The reason being that soft news is said to be "in the business of packaging human drama as entertainment (Baum 2002, 91)" and many times certain political topics are easily depicted as captivating human dramas. Therefore, when it comes to voting, these less attentive political viewers are said to learn a great deal from soft news programs which in turn helps them choose the political candidate that best suits their personal preferences (Baum and Jamison 2006). These types of programs present stories about "a candidate or politician's personality, trustworthiness, integrity, honesty, or other character traits" (Zukas 2012, 400) and use more informal language to do so, instead of hard news programs that use more distant language related to government or business institutions (Patterson 2000). And when there is an election, in order to reach these inattentive voters, many politicians appear on soft news programs, like entertainment talk shows or late night shows, in order to get more supporters that are not accessible through hard news programs (Baum 2005; Moy, Xenos, and Verena 2005). According to a study conducted by the Center for Media and Public Affairs (2008), presidential candidates have been appearing on late night shows as early as 1992. In fact, in 1992 Democratic candidate Bill Clinton was criticized for appearing on *The Arsenio Hall Show* playing the saxophone. In the early twenty-first century, this quickly changed and politicians started to appear more and more on soft news TV programs. George W. Bush and Al Gore were guests on the Tonight Show and the Late Show with David Letterman during the 2000 presidential election, John Edwards told Americans about his candidacy on *The Daily Show* in 2004. The Republican candidate, John McCain, in 2008 announced his withdrawal from the presidential race on the Late Show with David Letterman. As a matter of fact, this study indicated that a total of 110 appearances were made during the 2008 presidential campaign season by candidates and their family on late night talk shows. And during the subsequent American presidential election, President Obama appeared as a guest on *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* the day after the second presidential debate in 2012. In this year's presidential race, the candidates are "hitting the late-night circuit more than ever before" (Garcia 2015). Candidates have been appearing more and more on these soft news television programs, especially during election time, to boost their personal images and/or discuss their policies in a less traditional serious manner to reach wider audiences, that is potential voters.

People are tuning in more to televised political satire shows because these have turned complex political content into comprehensible entertaining information for everyone not just the politically inclined hard news viewers. According to Jones (2010) these television programs are successful because they pursue many different paths to present politics in imaginative ways and "can offer voices, positions, perspectives, and critiques not found in traditional political television (p.15)". He also affirms that the audiences favor these programs because they have a need for political programming that is more meaningful to them and that involve them more politically. Viewers feel more connected to political ideas because these types of shows provide:

new ways of thinking about politics, criticize that which needs scrutiny, and speak to them through accessible and pleasurable means (Jones 2010, 15).

These programs have many viewers because they present politics in diverse and creative ways that spikes their interests and gives them food for thought while at the same time entertain them. Although the studies thus far mentioned are mostly related to the American culture, we feel it is important to also provide an example of a satirical

television program from Eastern Europe that influenced its viewers. This program was a satirical animated cartoon show about politics in Romania studied by Popa (2011). She concluded that this TV genre: provided its viewers with information about current affairs in a simple manner, it pointed out mistakes in political life allowing its viewers to make the necessary associations between people and events in public life, it talked about issues that the audience may not have known by exaggerating and emphasizing them on the show, it indicated the key people involved in political issues and finally it assisted the audience in understanding "the implications of certain political acts performed by the politicians" (p.157). Her study also concluded that political satire plays a crucial role in the media and that without it people may not participate in political life. The show, aired on a national Romanian network and was cancelled in 2008, a month before Romanian parliamentary elections. The initial reason given for cancelling the show was supposedly the economic crisis at the time, but later some politicians stated that the real reason was related to the way politicians were being depicted in some episodes before the elections (Popa 2011). Just how significant are these "soft news" programs? Do they affect their audiences? What role does the audience play in this media interaction? The next section takes a look at the role of the audience within the media talk framework of soft news programs.

4.2 The audience as a participant in television media interaction

Media interaction is said to take place in a participation framework (Goffman 1981), which in terms of television media, that is between a presenter/host/interviewer, the interviewee or guest and the audience (Hutchby 2005; O'Keeffe 2006; Dynel 2010; Dynel 2011; Brock 2015). Let's briefly look at Goffman's main points of his interactional analysis theory that have greatly contributed to media interaction studies.

Goffman (1981) was a sociologist who studied everyday human interactions to help explain society and stated that people used a theatrical methodology during face-to-face interactions. Much of his interactional theory is not only seen in media interaction studies but also in the conceptual framework of fictive interaction (Pascual 2002; 2014), especially his notion of participation framework.

"When a word is spoken, all those who happen to be in perceptual range of the event will have some sort of participation status relative to it. The codification of these various positions and the normative specification of appropriate conduct within each provide an essential background for interaction analysis (...) (Goffman 1981, 3)".

In essence, what Goffman is saying is that everyone involved in an interaction, not just the speaker and the hearer, but also those who are close by overhearing the conversation, also participate in one way or another.

His work was not only confined to "ordinary conversations" but he also spoke of talk in monologues that involve of course one speaker but also an audience who participates in this interaction. In these cases, the audience does not reply to the speaker but rather participates in the interaction by contemplating what the speaker says, for example in a political speech, a poetry recital, and so on. The "audience" also refers to people who hear conversations on the radio or TV. This audience can be a "live audience" and/or a "broadcast audience", in which the former can co-participate since they are physically present in the studio, and the latter because they are not in the same physical space, participate differently by making their own judgments of what is being said and imagining possible responses. Because the main purpose of television media is to broadcast information, the audience, whatever the type, is said to be ratified hearers

(O'Keeffe 2006; Hutchby 2006; Dynel 2011; Brock 2015), that is one of the main recipients of the TV presenter's/ host's/ interviewer's speech.

Therefore, what is said on television and how it is said "cues audiences into the sense that what they are encountering is, in fact, entertainment" (Hutchby 2006, 3). For example, as mentioned in the previous section, talk shows contain language that is at times confrontational, or confessional, and insinuating, making this type of "soft news" program, entertaining, while "hard news" programs, like a serious news broadcast would contain more serious language. Broadcast talk is produced for target audiences of a show in a certain social context and is designed to appeal to them, making them participants of the interaction. But what is broadcast talk? Hutchby (2005, 442) states there are three defining characteristics of broadcast talk:

- (i) It is talk that displays a close relationship with the structures and patterns of ordinary conversation;
- (ii) It should, however, be understood as an institutional form of discourse; and
- (iii) It is talk that is produced for the benefit of an overhearing audience

According to these features, broadcast talk is a public talk that is understood because it is presented in a manner very similar to a face-to-face interaction whose main recipient is the audience. The main difference between a broadcast talk and a casual conversation between friends is the place where the interaction takes place. Because the former takes place in a studio, there are institutionalized roles where the presenter or host is said to have the power, because he decides "when and how to open the interaction, and how to frame it, (...) when to raise a topic, when to change it (...)" (O'Keeffe 2006, 4). Casual conversations also differ in that they are normally not intended for millions of viewers,

recorded and stored for later use, or need a presenter/ host to start or finish the conversations and so on. Nevertheless, both types of interactions have similar internal features in relation to language. Both incorporate turn-taking techniques and use pragmatic markers like hedging, discourse markers and interjections to reveal interpersonal meanings and the intentions of the speakers (O'Keeffe 2006).

By using similar features to a casual conversation, presenters/hosts on television build closer relationships with their audience because they feel they can trust him/her. The fact that the participants of this media interaction have a shared knowledge of the world they belong to and a socio-cultural identity that connects them, draws the audience to the television program because they "feel part of that identity because it represents their positioning (O'Keeffe 2006, 155).

In the next section we will take a closer look at a very popular American cable televised political satire show which labels itself as "fake news", *The Daily Show*. It is considered a soft news source since it is motivated more by entertainment standards than hard news standards (Young 2008); however, its "fake news" broadcasting style allows its host "to question, dispel, and critique the manipulative language and symbolizations coming from the presidential campaign" (Jones 2010, 168) in a humorous way which provides its viewers with real information about politics and informs them in such a way that hard news does not.

4.3 The Daily Show with Jon Stewart

The Daily Show is an American late night satirical television news program centered on headlines from current news stories that depict political figures, media and pop culture. It is a late night show aired four nights a week on Comedy Central, an American

cable network but is broadcasted on a number of networks all over the world. And if Americans miss an episode or choose to see one again, they may do so on the show's official website. Its popularity is also reflected in the many awards it has won over the years with its former host, Jon Stewart, such as: three Critics' Choice Television Awards given by the Broadcast Television Journalists Association for best talk show⁶, twenty-three primetime Emmy awards in different categories⁷ and two distinguished Peabody awards for its coverage of the presidential elections in 2000 and 2004.

The show began in 1996 and was hosted by Craig Kilborn for two years. The ratings started to skyrocket when Jon Stewart took over in 1999. This famous comedian decided to leave the show in 2015 and was replaced by the South African comedian, Trevor Noah in September of the same year. The format of the show remains the same. Each episode begins with the host performing a monologue resembling a daily news segment mocking the recent news headlines, followed by parody reports from a number of culturally diverse correspondents that add to the show's humorous take on the news. In the final part of the show the host conducts a studio interview with a celebrity. One of the most viewed shows was in 2008 when Jon Stewart interviewed President Barack Obama (Allen 2013). According to a Pew Research Center in 2012), a US nationwide survey on audiences of news sources, 39 percent of *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* viewers were under the age of 30, 36 percent were between the ages of 30 and 49 and

⁶ The show was nominated five times from 2011 to 2015, winning an award in 2015, the last year Jon Stewart was its host.

⁷ The show was nominated 60 times and in 2015 won three Emmys for: Outstanding Variety Talk Series, Outstanding Directing for a Variety Series and Outstanding Writing for a Variety Series.

23 percent were over the age of 50. This show with Jon Stewart at its helm and *The Colbert Report*⁸, another comedy political "fake" news show on the same cable network, had the youngest audiences of all the 24 news sources, both soft and hard, that were surveyed at the time. So what makes Americans and people all over the world tune into this parody news program?

This political satire show with Jon Stewart as its host, has been the object of many studies in the field of communications due to its success and the show's insistency on the fact that it is "fake news". But many scholars like Erion (2007) assert it is "more than just a 'fake news' program, The Daily Show offers a rare brand of humor that requires its audience to recognize a deeper, more philosophical criticism of contemporary television news" (p.5). Other academics have analyzed and tried to understand the motivations that lead so many people, especially young Americans, to tune into this satirical television program not only for entertaining purposes but also as a news source of information about political issues and current events. For example, Brewer and Marquardt (2007) concluded in their study that this television program has the potential to inform viewers about politics and world news events after analyzing 52 episodes of show from the first four months of 2005. Even though they label the program as "mock news", primarily due to its entertaining content of serious information, these authors found that the show regularly addresses political topics as well as world affairs which help viewers understand the political world they live in and

⁸ This show was created by Stephen Colbert, Jon Stewart and Ben Karlin to satirize conservative type hard news political talk shows. Stewart was one of the executive producers. Colbert decided to leave the show after 10 seasons, airing his last show in December of 2014.

pay closer attention to what is going on internationally. These authors also concluded that the show could also encourage viewers to take a critical and cynical look at how traditional news programs cover news stories. "*The Daily Show*'s metacoverage of the press, in turn, could encourage either cynicism or skepticism about the news media and politician's efforts at news media management" (Brewer and Marquardt 2007, 265).

A large number of young Americans (aged 18-24) are said to watch this program; therefore, there have been studies performed to find out the reasons that lead young people to view or "avoid" political satire shows like *The Daily Show* (J. Baumgartner and Morris 2006; Young 2013). Baumgartner and Morris (2006) studied young people's perceptions of the candidates in the 2004 presidential campaign after viewing programs like *The Daily Show*, and concluded that their perceptions are diminished especially when they don't know the candidate and that these younger Americans are less likely to get their news from traditional hard news programs and get some of their news from programs like *The Daily Show*. Another study performed by Young (2013) indicated that the main reasons young people watch political humor shows is for humor and entertainment purposes, because it is a "source of information" and because it provides a "context for prior knowledge" and a background to help them understand political issues and current events. This study suggests that these types of television programs satisfy a number of needs and gratifications. In regards to those who "avoid" these types of political humor shows, Young's (2013) findings suggest they do so because they lack the political knowledge to understand the humor in them, hence not wanting to tune in.

Another study on the show revealed a correlation between viewers of soft news programs like *The Daily Show* and their attentiveness to political issues (Cao 2010).

"Extended to *The Daily Show* this logic suggests that receiving information about a political issue on the program can increase viewers' attentiveness to additional information about the topic because they will find the topic entertaining and easy to understand" (Cao 2010, 31).

The idea presented here is that audiences of soft news programs understand political issues better because late night programs present information in less confusing ways.

Feldman (2013) analyzed the informative value of *The Daily* Show. She suggested that audiences learn about political issues from late night comedy and political satire shows like The Daily Show when they approach the content from these programs as informative as well as entertainment. According to this researcher, when they do so, they exert a cognitive effort that allows them to process and learn from the media messages. She also stated that even those who view the program as simply entertaining also learn from it if they are given an informational-viewing reason to watch the show. There is a more content-oriented study that focused on why *The Daily Show* should not be considered "fake news", but rather an "alternative journalism" which is relevant and meaningful in political journalism of the 21st century (Baym 2005). This study examined how the show dealt with the 2004 Presidential campaign by closely analyzing the three main components of the show: "the daily news segment", "parody reports" and "studio interviews" in order to observe its journalistic practice and political discourse. Given that our study focuses on the first of these three, we shall primarily analyze the insight into how the show presents the news to the viewers. The article discusses how nowadays the media environment is blending news and entertainment and that

"discourse of news, politics, entertainment, and marketing have grown deeply inseparable; the languages and practices of each have lost their distinctiveness and are being melded into previously unimagined combinations" (Baym 2005, 262).

The idea is that technology has advanced in such ways that it allows people to obtain information at a rapid speed from any part of the world and that this easy access is providing individuals with information of an infinite size from a number of sources and different genres. Hence, the idea that *The Daily Show* is an exemplar of "discursively integrated media" (Baym 2005) because it merges discourse of respected nightly news programs with discourse of late-night talk shows "not in binary opposition, but in complementary arrangements" (p. 262). The example of this hybridity is seen from the start of the show, when the viewers are first presented with the typical opening format of a respected news program: the first image seen on the screen is a globe with the date accompanied by a serious news-suggesting music track and an announcer saying the date and then "From Comedy Central's world news headquarters in New York, this is The Daily Show with Jon Stewart." What follows is similar to a late night talk show: the music changes to a more upbeat soundtrack and a live audience cheering is heard in the background.

Despite the resemblance to mainstream news media, *The Daily Show*, intentionally infringes journalistic conventions by choosing soundbites from primary politicians that professional journalists would ignore, like rambling verbal presentations, quotes with poor grammar, mistakes in statements made to the media, long pauses or any other significant incoherent type of discourse. Such conventions are used to mock the political actors and/or obtain a humorous reaction from the audience. Jon Stewart does this many times by interrupting these soundbites and responding with his own reactions

to the information presented, a primary strategy of "dialogic confrontation" used by the show, not seen in traditional news which is considered to be monologic. Humor arises from asking unanswered questions, an approach that holds politicians accountable for their actions and words and thus a confrontation of political power. The news media is also under scrutiny on The Daily Show because it does not live up to its role of democratic responsibility. Jon Stewart is constantly criticizing "real news" journalists. In accordance with Baym, Jeffrey Jones (2010) also states that Stewart is able to influence his audience by engaging with videos clips from other media and hence brilliantly creating a conversation. According to Jones, "it is here Stewart changes the conversation from accommodation and spectacle to confrontation and accountability" (2010, 117). The use of juxtaposition of clips from other media is what McKain (2005) calls remediation, which is media borrowing and recontextualising content for specific purposes. In the case of The Daily Show, it is used to hold people in power accountable for their actions and to criticize the media. The show heavily uses this strategy especially when the emphasis is on showing politicians' soundbites. Barbur and Goodnow (2011) believe that organizing politician's statements, which may have been made over a certain time span, in a particular order, help to make their contradictions and hypocrisies more evident. They also state that the use of clips from other news broadcasts accentuates the way "nearly everyone on television uses similar language and assumptions to discuss issues" (p.10).

Waisanen (2009) also studied Stewart's interaction with video clips, more precisely he studied the discourses of Jon Stewart from *The Daily Show* and Stephen Colbert from the *Colbert Report* and concluded that these hosts are not only entertainers but "rhetorical critics who creatively guide audiences toward democratic possibilities" (p.

120). His content analysis revealed that these hosts utilize three rhetorical strategies using incongruity within a comic frame to "critically reframe American political discourse" (p.119). These are: parodic polyglossia; satirical specificity; and contextual clash.

The first incongruous comic strategy is "parodic polyglossia", originating from Bakhtin's (1981) term of *polyglossia*, referring to the multi-voiced view of the world. Both Stewart and Colbert are able to present their perspectives through their linguistic abilities by shifting from a political and cultural role to another that is not seen on traditional news broadcasts. Stewart, for example, uses his own left leaning voice as a concerned citizen, to give his opinions and talk passionately about political topics, using prosodic features (e.g. high pitch, rate of speech, etc.) and quickly gives voice to other characters, sometimes from pop culture not only to make his discourse funny by showing incongruities but also to be critical or sympathetic in his tone with regard to others. Stewart makes his arguments through this multi-voiced strategy and the audience responds well and relates to it because they see these arguments from multiple perspectives as something they would have also said or would have liked to have said themselves (Waisanen 2009, 122–26).

"Satirical specificity" is the second rhetorical strategy Waisanen (2009, 126–30) states that both Stewart and Colbert employ in their discourses. These hosts try to clarify their viewers when it comes to the ideologies of the political world by reframing them in terms of everyday honest language that audiences can relate to. The purpose of this, Waisanen (2009) argues, is to "direct critical accountability toward the suasive, mystifying merger in terms of politics and media" (p.130). People watch political speeches on television, for example, and are confronted with political claims about

values like family, equality and freedom, and what these two hosts do is critically demystify this content for their viewers.

Waisanen (2009, 130–34) identifies "contextual clash" as the third and final rhetorical strategy the fake news hosts use in their discourses. This strategy "involves the multiplying and mixing seemingly unconnected contexts with one another" (Waisanen 2009, 130). Stewart and Colbert utilize incongruous comparisons in their discourses not only to make their discourse humorous but more importantly to create political insights for viewers who are presented with diverse conflicting political and social environments. For example, removing what a politician says in a political context and placing it in another entirely different sometimes absurd context, gives viewers a better understanding of the political message being transmitted and criticized by the hosts.

These three rhetorical strategies, although comically framed, are powerful tools Stewart and Colbert used on their shows to analyze and criticize politicians' political discourse, therefore, making important contributions to public discourse.

Based on this literature review about The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, and that of Fictive Interaction in chapter three, and humor theories in chapter two, we will now focus on the data we collected and the qualitative methods we used.

Methodology

The main goal of this thesis is to explore, describe and explain how and why fictive interaction, a conceptual communicative concept that uses a conversation frame in order to structure thought, discourse, and language (Pascual 2002; 2006; 2014), is used by Jon Stewart, the host of a political satirical televised program, The Daily Show. Studying social phenomena in media is quite complex and involves analyzing different textual and intertextual relationships as well as extralinguistic variables. For these reasons, we chose to use a qualitative methodological approach in this dissertation. Our main concern was to provide answers to our research questions and not to make generalizations about the concept and its use in all types of political satirical television shows, that is why we did not perform a corpus-based analysis and choose a large sample size. Instead we chose to analyze three specific episodes of The Daily Show, which contained rich data of fictive interaction. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), "richness and holism" are characteristics of qualitative data that help reveal the true complexity found within it and help provide "thick descriptions' that are vivid, nested in a real context" (p.10). Quantitative methods would not provide us with this "richness" or bring any additional pertinent information in explaining the data from a fictive interaction perspective. Therefore, this chapter describes and outlines the qualitative methods applied to gather the data for later chapters in this thesis and explains the decisions made along the way as to the reasons for choosing this specific data.

The first section briefly outlines the multimodal methodological approach we adopted to a certain extent in our data analysis. The following section describes our data and the methods we used to collect it.

5.1 Multimodality

Face-to-face communication is by nature multi-modal. When communicating, people not only use words, but also their eyes, gestures, tones of voice, the physical surroundings they are found in, and so on. According to Gumperz (1992, 42), "participants actively signal how the interaction is to be framed and managed by means of postural and gestural moves that can be empirically observed through in - depth qualitative analysis". Analyzing language alone is not enough to fully understand the messages that are being communicated in verbal interactions. Given that the focus of this work is the study of a conceptual communicative concept based on a face-to-face conversation frame, fictive interaction, found in an American televised satirical program, it is difficult to separate language from other modes, such as the ones previously mentioned, as well as others like image, video clips, sound, etc. Consequently, it is important to approach the data from a multimodal perspective in order to better understand how the interaction between multiple modes of communication can help construct conceptual meaning and how it can contribute to the understanding of humor found within the fictive interactions analyzed in the three episodes of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Not surprisingly, the transcripts of the monologues of these three shows (cf. appendices A, B, and C) include multimodal

descriptions to a certain extent that partially represent the multimodal interaction found in each show. We use the word partially because the description of these modes is not done exhaustively, nor do we intend to make it the purpose or focus of this thesis. However, we do feel the need to include this information in the transcripts as well as the analysis of the data, because they are considered important elements that contribute to the understanding of the fictive interactions found in The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. In this section, we will briefly discuss what is meant by multimodality and how it relates to Cognitive Linguistics.

Multimodality is a very popular and rapidly increasing inter-disciplinary research approach that investigates "the relationship between different semiotic modes in human communication and their 'textual' instantiation" (Pinar 2013, 227). Disciplines like linguistics, anthropology, aesthetics, psychology, cognitive science, amongst others, have studied different aspects of multimodality for their specific theoretical purposes. But what exactly is "multimodality"? According to Jewitt (2009a), multimodality refers to

"approaches that understand communication and representation to be more than about language, and which attend to the full range of communicational forms people use - image, gesture, gaze, posture and so on - and the relationships between them" (p. 14).

Studying other modes besides language, like gesture and gaze, have always been a concern in areas of psycholinguistics (McNeill 1992; 1998; 2005) as well as sociolinguistics, like interactional sociology (Goffman 1981) and interactional sociolinguistics (Gumperz 1999). Nonverbal modes of communication in sociolinguistics were seen as simply expanding or changing meaning, while the main meaning of communication was carried in the verbal mode. Kress *et al* (2001) state that

in the past traditional approaches to communication and representation were "monomodal" because the main focus was on one mode, usually language. Theories of communication were said to be very similar to theories of language in that both saw language as the main form of communication; therefore, "describing its structure would serve adequately to describe communicational characteristics of other forms of communication" (Kress et al. 2001, 3). Nevertheless, this "monomodal" tendency shifted when technology started to produce and disseminate multimodal communication, for example through mass media and its use of multiple modes to communicate meaning. Multimodality thus replaced the "monomodal" approach to studying communication and representation.

Social semiotics, a branch of semiotics that studies the social and cultural dimensions of meaning-making and communication, at the beginning of the twenty-first century started to move towards a multimodal approach to studying communication "in which common semiotic principles operate in and across different modes" (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2001, 2). The word *mode* in a social semiotic approach to multimodality refers to "a socially shaped and culturally given resource for making meaning" (Kress 2009, 54). In social semiotics, signs are social systems of meaning that are always motivated (Hodge and Kress 1988). Kress *et al* state,

"the relation between form and meaning, signifier and signified, is never arbitrary but...always motivated by the interests of the maker of the sign to find the best possible, the most plausible form for the expression of the meaning that (s)he wishes to express" (2001, 5).

This makes the individual the sign-maker of meaning. In a social semiotic approach to multimodality, meaning is made through multiple modes, each consisting of semiotic

resources people choose to use when communicating in order to suit their interests and needs. Kress et al. (2001) state that communication is achieved through all modes separately and, at the same time, together. In essence, each mode is said to have a communicative function all on its own, as well as be an integral part of an interrelated web of other modes in order to make meaning possible in communication.

This previous idea is linked to the four theoretical assumptions Jewitt (2009a) affirms underpin multimodality. According to her, although multimodality is an approach and not a theory, there are four interrelated theoretical assumptions that support multimodality, these are:

- "language is part of a multimodal ensemble";
- "each mode in a multimodal ensemble is understood as realizing different communicative work";
- "people orchestrate meaning through their selection and configuration of modes";
- "meanings of signs fashioned from multimodal semiotic resources are, like speech, social" (Jewitt 2009a, 14–16)

The first assumption stresses the idea that language (i.e. speech and writing) is not the only mode used in communication, the others are equally important and also contribute to meaning. The second assumption refers to what was said previously about the communicative importance of each mode separately as well as the interplay of all modes in communication. The third is based on the idea that people, according to their cultural and social backgrounds, choose certain modes and arrange them to communicate their meaning. And finally, the last assumption focuses on the social and how all the modes are shaped through cultural and social norms within a context.

Jewitt (2009b) also discusses three approaches to multimodality: social semiotic multimodality, multimodal discourse analysis and multimodal interactional analysis. The first approach focuses on the sign maker and his use of modal resources in sign-making in social contexts (Kress and Van Leeuwen 2001; Kress 2010). The second approach, multimodal discourse analysis (O'Toole 1994; O'Halloran 2004; Bateman 2008), focuses on the study of multimodality within a range of discourse genres taking as its underlying theoretical principles Halliday's systemic functional grammar and extending it to other modes besides language. The last approach, multimodal interactional analysis (Scollon and Scollon 2003; Norris 2004), as the name suggests focuses on situated interaction and context within an interactional sociolinguistic perspective.

The multimodal metaphor approach (Forceville 1996; Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009; Forceville 2009) is another approach that could also be added to Jewitt's previous list of multimodal approaches. This approach focuses on the nonverbal to explain conceptual metaphor and takes Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) metaphor theory as its starting point. Multimodal metaphors are "metaphors whose target and source are rendered exclusively or predominantly in two different modes/modalities" (Forceville and Urios-Aparisi 2009, 4). Multimodal metaphors consist of a mapping or blending of domains that are from different modes, for example, a visual mode and a verbal mode. Forceville (2009, 23) argues that defining the concept *mode* and providing an exhaustive list of modes are two complex tasks; nevertheless he suggests a list of the most common types of modes: images; written language; spoken language; gestures; non-verbal sounds; music; etc. He goes on to state that certain modes are specifically chosen to convey facts, emotions and pleasure and that these together affect the overall

meaning of the multimodal metaphor that is produced. In cognitive research this is important because relying simply on the verbal mode may "blind" the researcher and not provide enough information to fully comprehend the metaphor.

Research in multimodality based on the approaches discussed thus far has received increasing attention in cognitive linguistics. The Review of Cognitive Linguistics journal in 2013 dedicated the entire issue to multimodality and Cognitive Linguistics, dividing the papers presented into three parts: the first related to the multimodal metaphor approach, the second to the multimodal discourse analysis approach and the third to the multimodal interactional approach (Pinar 2013). The first part of the volume consists of papers related to multimodal metaphors found in "alternative" genres like: comics, films, automobile brands and political entertainment.

We will present the findings of the paper on political entertainment given that our data is also based on this genre. Diana Popa (2013) analyzed three modes: the visual, the verbal and the auditory in metaphors that depicted politicians in zoomorphic characters in a Romanian satirical animated cartoon sitcom, *Animated Planet Show*. The aim of her study was to see how multimodal metaphors are conceptually conceived by the viewers. Popa concluded that all three modes together contributed to the cognitive meanings and connotative interpretations of the metaphors represented in the zoomorphs. Multimodal metaphors are essential tools used in political entertainment because they are used to portray real events and politicians in fictitious settings, they help persuade people of certain view points, they show a critical position towards a person or thing, and they inform viewers of political issues and/or events that no other type of media can transmit.

For all the reasons thus far presented, the data in our thesis is also analyzed from a multimodal approach. The following section describes the data and the how it was collected and analyzed.

5.2 The data

The data for this study includes the monologues from three televised episodes from season 18 of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, each following the three presidential debates in the 2012 US Presidential Elections. These episodes were chosen due to the close 2012 presidential race and the common speculation that debates sometimes help tip the outcome of a race. Davis *et al* (2011) go even further to state that winning a debate can have a "positive impact on electoral support for the candidate's party, particularly among undecided voters". That is why debates and their media coverage are important media events that stimulate conversation. According to Tsfati (2003, 73), people "gain social cues and information from these conversations and use them in making their judgments about the debate". Consequently, media coverage after a debate is just as important as the actual debate because it discusses and analyzes in detail the performance of the candidates in the debate, which in turn may influence voters, especially undecided voters, to choose a certain candidate (Kraus 2000, 147–49).

Bearing in mind that our main goal is to analyze how and why Jon Stewart uses a cognitive fictive discursive strategy in his monologues, we analyzed the host's monologue at the beginning of each televised episode from season 18 aired the day after each one of the three presidential debates held in October 2012, a month before the presidential election. Despite being broadcasted more than a week apart from each other, the main title for each one of the three monologues was the same: "Democalypse

2012". The first monologue we analyzed was entitled "Democalypse 2012 – Obama, Where Art Thou?" (cf. Appendix A) aired 4 October 2012 about the first presidential debate and lasted twenty minutes and fifty-five seconds. The title of the second monologue was "Democalypse 2012: The Second Debate: Now Including the President" (cf. Appendix B). This monologue about the second presidential debate aired 17 October 2012 and lasted approximately ten minutes. And the last monologue we analyzed, "Democalypse 2012 *We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This*" (cf. Appendix C), concerning the third and final debate, was broadcasted on 23 October 2012 and lasted ten minutes and eighteen seconds.

Since it was not possible to obtain official transcripts of the show, we decided to transcribe into written form, the video recordings of the first part of each program, Jon Stewart's monologue, ourselves (cf. Appendices A, B, C) so that they could be studied in detail. Because the host's discourse was our focal point, we chose not to use any special computer transcribing software, fully aware that non-computer transcripts are not neutral records of events, but reflect the researcher's interpretation of the data.

Our next step was to choose from a wide array of transcript conventions, one which would aid us best in analyzing the discourse in our data. Given that our main focus is on conversational fictivity modeled by the conversation frame, we chose and adapted only a few of the transcription conventions developed by Gail Jefferson (1984) for conversation analysis. This popular type of transcription convention not only allows us to write down what was said but how it was said. In order to make the transcript text readable, and given that our main aim was to analyze the discourse presented, we chose only to include some conventions related to prosodic features, time and nonverbal occurrences (cf. Table 2).

Convention	Name	Use		
(1.0)	Timed Pause	Number in parentheses indicates the time, in seconds of a pause in speech.		
(.)	Micropause	A brief pause, usually a tenth of a second.		
•	Downward arrow	Falling pitch or intonation (if significant).		
↑	Upward arrow	Rising pitch or intonation (if significant).		
>text<	Greater than/Less than symbols	Enclosed speech was delivered more rapidly than usual for the speaker.		
<text></text>	Less than/Greater than symbols	Enclosed speech was delivered more slowly than usual for the speaker.		
F****	First letter and asterisks for each letter missing	Profane word beeped out in the video.		
ALL CAPS	Capitalized text	Shouted or increased volume speech.		
Underlined	Underlined text	Speaker is emphasizing or stressing the speech.		
((audience laughs))	Double parenthesis	Transcriber's description of extralinguistic information, e.g. about gestures, images on screen, camera etc. The comments are italicized to indicate that they are not spoken by the participants.		

Table 2: Annotation conventions adapted from Jefferson (1984)

Taking into account the length of the transcriptions, we believed it was important to break down the discourse into manageable semantic units for analysis. We did not want to simply analyze the text only according to events and actions, but we also wanted to account for the opinions expressed; therefore, we chose an episodic organization (van Dijk 1982). Each transcript, which represents Stewart's monologue found in the first part of the thirty minute show, was thus further divided into 'episodes' (van Dijk 1982) and we used continuous line numbering for each transcript (cf. Appendices A, B, C). We would like to point out that we will refer to 'televised episode' as the entire thirty-minute program that makes up The Daily Show, that is, each season of the show is

divided into individual episodes that are chronologically numbered. We do not want to confuse the concept of 'televised episodes' with van Dijk's (1982) term 'episodes', which he states:

(...) are characterized as coherent sequences of sentences of a discourse , linguistically marked for beginning and/or end , and further defined in terms of some kind of 'thematic unity'--for instance , in terms of identical participants , time , location or global event or action (p177).

An episode is a semantic unit of discourse made up of a sequence of sentential propositions, i.e. a macroproposition. It is part of a whole with a beginning and an end that can be identified and distinguished from other episodes (van Dijk 1982, 179). Subsequently, macropropositions belong to the global structures of a discourse as well as to its topically coherent parts. They reflect the individuals' cognitive schema, that is, their pre formulated expectations about the structure and content of the discourse which in turn simplifies the processing of information. Some grammatical markers that help indicate the beginning of an episode include: markers that indicate a change in time; markers indicating a change in place; 'cast' change markers to introduce an individual with the use of an indefinite article, or to reintroduce someone mentioned before by using noun phrases instead of pronouns; predicates that indicate a new frame; and time/aspect markers to indicate change of perspective (van Dijk 1982, 181).

We also chose this theoretical linguistic analysis of episodes because it works well with cognitive models of discourse processing. For van Dijk (1982, 191), each episode is said to have several cognitive functions:

(a) As an additional unit in the organization of textual sequences of propositions, it assigns further 'chunking' possibilities, i.e.

further organization, to the text, which in general allows more structured representation in memory and especially better recall.

- (b) Episodes are the textual manifestation of macropropositions; properly marked, they therefore strategically allow an easier derivation of macropropositions and hence allow better and faster understanding of the text as a whole, as well as better retrieval and recall.
- (c) Episodes may be associated with various textual and cognitive functions, (...) and maybe for certain discourse types of pragmatic functions (...).
- (d) Episodes may be the 'locus' for local coherence strategies: coherence relations between facts, the (re-)identification of referents by means of pronouns, the possibility to keep place or time indications implicit, may take place within the boundaries of an episode: language users therefore need to search for the relevant information not in the full preceding discourse representation in memory, but only in the representation of the current episode.

In light of van Dijk's analysis of what is an 'episode', we decided to divide each of the three monologues into manageable episodes to better understand Stewart's conceptually complex discourse. The division was based on topics the host presented. Although the line numbering was continuous in the three monologues of the three distinct televised episodes, we chose to number the episodes only within each monologue and name them according to their content in that specific episode. Each time the host changed the focus of his topic, we created an episode with a number and a title to better recall the information found in that episode. We chose to only analyze fictitious dialogs that occurred in the monologue between the host and another non-present participant. Each time the host had an imaginary conversation, a fictive

interaction network (Xiang in press) was identified in the episode. We chose to label these examples networks due to their conceptual complexity. We provided a subtitle, "FI network example" and started numbering the interactions within each episode indicating who the participants were, always beginning with the fictive addressor. A list of episodes and fictive interaction networks for the first monologue are found in Table 3.

Episode	Episode name	Fictive Interaction (FI) Networks			
#		Example #	Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee	
1	Intro to show				
2	Americans agree Obama lost debate				
3	Romney won despite ()				
4	Dude he's yelling at you	1	Stewart	Obama	
5	Roll you?	2	Stewart	Obama	
6	Liar Romney lie	3	Stewart	Obama	
7	What's the difference?				
8	Power Shift	4, 5	Stewart	Obama	
9	Osama Bin Laden	6	Osama Bin Laden	Osama Bin Laden	
10	Urgent emails	7	Stewart	Obama	

 $Table\ 3:\ Episodes\ for\ Stewart's\ Monologue\ in\ "Democalypse\ 2012:\ Obama,\ Where\ Art\ Thou?"$

As can be seen from the table above, the monologue dedicated to the first presidential debate was divided into ten episodes. Each episode was named according to the topic that was covered by Stewart in his monologue. Seven non-genuine dialogs were found that provided rich fictive interaction networks found in six episodes of this monologue. Jon Stewart was the fictive addressor talking to President Obama, the fictive addressee in six examples found in this first monologue. Only one example contains a different

fictive addressor, Osama Bin Laden, represented by Jon Stewart's voice, talking to himself.

Table 4 contains information about the episodes from the second monologue studied from the televised episode, "Democalypse 2012: The Second Debate: Now Including the President.

Episode	Episode name	Fictive Interaction (FI) Networks			
#		Example #	Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee	
1	Intro to show				
2	Town hall crowd				
3	The first question				
4	It's alive!				
5	Romney was sharp but	1	Stewart	Romney	
6	The Blunt Amendment	2 3	Stewart	Romney University students	
7	Romney recruiting women for cabinet positions				
8	Romney's ace in the hole	4	Stewart	Obama	
9	Semantic Trap	5	Stewart	Romney	
10	Post debate media coverage				

Table 4: Episodes for Stewart's Monologue in "Democalypse 2012: The Second Debate: Now Including the President"

This table shows that the monologue about the second debate also contains ten episodes. Four out of these ten contain fictive interaction networks based on four different unreal dialogs. All of the fictive interaction networks had the same fictive addressor, Jon Stewart. However, his fictive addressees varied: speaking three times to Mitt Romney and once to Barack Obama and another time to university students.

The episodes from the last monologue about the third debate can be seen in Table 5.

Episode	Episode name	Fictive Interaction (FI) Networks		
#		Example #	Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee
1	Intro to show			
2	Weakness in foreign policy			
3	Romney leaning Obama			
4	Duet on Syria			
5	The Afghanistan withdrawal			
6	Iraq	1	Stewart	Romney
7	Iran	2	Stewart	Romney
8	Freaky Friday Situation			
9	The President's professorial side	3	Stewart	Obama
10	Conclusion to trilogy of debates			

Table 5: Episodes for Stewart's Monologue in "Democalypse 2012: We Missed NLCS Game for This"

The data in this table also reveals that the monologue about the last debate was also divided into ten episodes. Most of the titles are related to foreign policy because this was the topic of the third presidential debate. This monologue only contains three fictive interaction networks deriving from three non-genuine dialogs. Stewart was the fictive addressor in all three, talking to two fictive addresses: Romney in two instances, and Obama in one.

The information present in tables 3, 4 and 5, will be further analyzed and discussed in the subsequent chapters, data analysis and results.

Data Analysis

The data, as mentioned previously, are the monologues of the three televised episodes of The Daily Show with Jon Stewart from season 18 aired in October of 2012. The first monologue we analyzed is from the televised episode, *Democalypse 2012 – Obama Where Art Thou?* about the first presidential debate between democratic incumbent President Barack Obama and Republican Governor Mitt Romney. This was the longest of the three monologues that contained the most imaginary conversations. The second monologue under analysis was *Democalypse 2012 - The Second Debate: Now Including the President,* about the second presidential debate. This monologue was half the time of the first and contained five fictive interaction networks. The last monologue we studied was entitled *Democalypse 2012 - We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This.* Like the previous monologue, it lasted approximately ten minutes and contained only three fictitious conversations. We will analyze each in depth in the subsequent sections.

6.1 Jon Stewart's Monologue About the 1st Presidential Debate: *Democalypse 2012 - Obama Where Art Thou?

The content of Jon Stewart's monologue in the televised episode aired October 4, 2012 of the Daily Show entitled "Democalypse 2012 – Obama, Where Art Thou?" was entirely related to the first televised 2012 US Presidential debate; where the winner was said to be Mitt Romney, according to several polls taken shortly after the debate, like:

CNN/ORC International survey ("CNN Poll: Most Watchers Say Romney Debate Winner" 2012) (Figure 2); CBS News Poll ("CBS News Instant Poll: Romney Wins First Presidential Debate" 2012) (Figure 3); and Google Survey (Blake 2012) (Figure 4).




Figure 2: CNN/ ORC International Poll (October 3, 2012)




Figure 3: CBS News Poll (October 3, 2012)




Figure 4: Google Survey (October 3, 2012)

The title of this televised episode, "Democalypse 2012 – Obama, Where Art Thou?", indicates a reference to Obama's loss and is a clear example of a conceptual blend within a cultural context. In this title there are two blends with Biblical references. The first conceptual blend is found in the word "Democalpyse", a blend of the words, Democracy and Apocalypse. In this episode JS is revealing to his audience the outcome of the 2012 Presidential debate, which was like a battle between good (Obama) and evil (Romney, who, according to JS, lied all night). Hence there are two frames, a religious frame depicting the ultimate victory of good over evil found in the New Testament of the Bible; blended with the second frame which represents the first debate between the President and his Republican opponent.

The subtitle "Obama, Where art thou?" is also taken from the bible. The frames are the same as the ones above. The input spaces in this example; however, are different. The first input space refers to the Book of Genesis, when God calls out to Adam who was hiding in shame after eating the forbidden apple in the Garden of Eden. The second input space refers to Obama as the President of the US and one of the most powerful

men in the world. The blended space alludes to the fact that Obama, like Adam, was absent from the debate because he was passive all night and didn't fight back.

In this particular show, Stewart spends the entire monologue talking about this first presidential debate and clearly indicates how upset he is with the President's performance. This is especially conveyed when JS, in his monologue, directly talks to Obama giving his opinion and advice, as well as showing his overall discontent with the outcome of the first debate. These fictitious dialogues he creates with the President are fictive interaction networks that not only create humorous situations but also to a certain extent reveal the host's emotions, ideas and opinions that are politically biased. Through fictitiously addressing Obama, asking him where he was/is in an imaginary blended space, Stewart is also fictively addressing the audience, the bystanders of the fictitious dialogue by indirectly telling them that he thought Obama was too absent in the debate. The following section takes a closer look at the five examples found of fictive interaction networks in this televised episode.

Jon Stewart's monologue in this televised episode, "Obama where art thou?", contains seven examples of FI networks, six involve the host talking directly to the president and one involves Osama Bin Laden talking to himself. These fictitious conversations are not only used to create humor but also to show the host's opinion and make his points stronger. These interactions do not occur accidentally but are used as discourse devices to introduce or explain Stewart's own ideas and opinions. In this type of interaction, we are confronted with an imaginary "trialogue" (Pascual 2002; 2014) between three key participants (cf. Figure 5).




Figure 5: Trialogue for Fictive Interaction on the TDS

It is fictive because it consists of Jon Stewart (JS) (the fictive addresser) talking to the passive, not in the studio, President Obama (PO) (the fictive addressee) while the The Daily Show Viewers (TDSV) are overhearing this fictitious conversation (fictive bystanders). Although JS always initiates the conversation, he is able to maintain the trialogue by implying what the President would say or what he would like each one to say. By overhearing the fictive conversation between JS and Obama, the viewers get an idea as to what JS thinks about the President's performance in the debate while at the same time informing them about what actually happened.

In the following sections, we are going to take a closer look at the six episodes, which contain fictive interaction networks and analyze how JS is able to maintain the dialogue with the President.

6.1.1 FI Network Example #1 - Episode 4: Dude he's yelling at you

Before this episode the viewers are shown two video clips from the debate the night before. Both are related to a sound glitch that occurred during the debate in which Romney is talking with sound and in the other clip he is talking but we can't hear him. In both clips the President is looking down at his podium writing something down while Romney is talking. This lack of eye contact was heavily criticized in all media outlets

and many believed it was one of many reasons why Obama was defeated in the first debate. Stewart takes this opportunity to clearly show his indignation of the President's failure to maintain eye contact by creating a fictitious conversation with him, where the host is the fictive addressor, Obama the fictive addressee, while the audience and home viewers are overhearing the conversation making them fictive bystanders.

30 **JS:** <u>DUDE</u> HE'S YELLING AT <u>YOU LOOK UP</u> ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) < <u>LOOK UP</u>> ((Obama looks up))

In order for this interaction to occur, two factive events are compressed both in time and in space. In one input space there is a very upset host who is in the Daily Show studio in the present time. In another input space, represented by a video clip, there is a democratic presidential candidate debating his republican opponent the day before at the University of Denver in Colorado. This time and space compression allows a conversational blend to be created which is in itself a new conceptual domain with its own structure and organization with partial structures from each input space adapting to the face-to-face conversational frame. The Current Discourse Space where this nongenuine conversation occurs is at the debate, the day before in Denver. The fictitious scenario of a face-to-face conversation is possible due to conceptual integration.

We will now further analyze this fictive interaction network, which generates laughter from the viewers of The Daily Show, the fictive bystanders, to better understand its purpose. This is the first time JS directly addresses the President and does so using the term "dude" (30), a colloquial form of address used amongst friends, especially men, in a very informal way. The complex semantic role of "dude", here, represents Stewart's stance of solidarity or camaraderie, with Obama. It also shows Stewart's opinion of Obama's effortlessness in the debate, mainly because the word "dude" is

metonymically linked to "surfer" or "druggie" subcultures. By positioning himself as the president's friend in this imaginary conversation, JS is able to say whatever he wants to Obama, in this case giving him a specific order, to look up and take action.

Stewart's despair is emphasized when he strategically repeats the direct command, "look up" (30), twice prolonging the expression the second time he utters it. This is JS's first criticism of the night directed at Obama, who spent a lot of the debate looking down and taking notes instead of maintaining eye contact with Romney, the commentator and/or the audience. By saying "dude he's yelling at you" (30), where the third personal pronoun "he" is used to refer to Romney, and repeating "look up" so despairingly to Obama, JS is conceptually directing his audience's attention to the fact that this lack of non-verbal behavior made Romney look more dominant and Obama disengaged or dismissive of Romney's viewpoints or arguments. This is further seen with the continuation of this discourse.

- 31 ((JS vigorously taps pen on paper while looking at camera)) **JS:** WHAT ARE <u>YOU</u> LOOKING <u>AT</u>? (.)
- 32 **\(\Delta\)** WHAT ARE YOU WRITING <u>THAT IS SO IMPORTANT?</u> (.) ((image of black hands sketching MR's head on a drawing of a naked woman's body taken from the movie Titanic))
- 33 (.)↑WHAT ARE <u>YOU</u> DOING (.) ((AUD laughs& claps)) ↓ oh <u>that's</u> nice (.) ((image with Titanic sketch to the left of JS))

Here the host's tone rises and he asks the questions emphatically while vigorously tapping his pen on the papers in front of him and his eyes bulging out and looking straight into the camera, as if the camera were the President; using his gaze to signal his intent to keep his turn in the conversation. These prosodic and multimodal features, i.e., tapping his pen and opening his eyes in such a manner, indicate how upset and

frustrated JS is with the President. We notice here the use of the interrogative pronoun, "what", and the empty deictic, "that", throughout the whole interaction. As JS receives no response from his absent interlocutor, they remain empty of reference, giving the impression that the latter is writing/doing nothing. JS profits from that to fill them up himself in a humorous way as will be seen below.

"What are you looking at?! What are you writing that is so important?! What are you doing?" (31-33) are factual information-seeking questions that Stewart asks but of course gets no reply from Obama, therefore they are fictive questions that cognitively imply a communicative pattern. They are used not only to set up a humorous situation but are also used by Stewart as a rhetorical device to show his strong negative reaction to Obama's lack of eye contact during the debate. In a real face-to-face conversational frame, the President would answer them. In this fictive interaction network the answer is not a verbal one but an unexpected image (cf. Figure 6) used as a turn taking mechanism that shifts frames causing incongruity and thus making the fictive bystanders laugh.



Figure 6: Romney's head on Rose's body from the movie Titanic

The image (cf. Figure 6) is a complex blend within the fictive interaction network. It is set in the time frame of the debate, which can be seen by the black hands, the left one

holding a pencil while drawing the sketch and a partial representation of a black face, the right ear and cheek, which given the context we can assume all belong to Obama. A time and space compression allows the blend to successfully occur in the image. The drawing is metonymically linked to the Titanic movie and reveals a multimodal metaphor that blends one input space representing the debate, with Mitt Romney's head smiling from the victory of the first debate, with another input space representing the movie Titanic, with Rose's body, the naïve female character from the 1997 movie. It also inherently connects the film to the actual British passenger liner with the same name that sank in 1912. This complex blend is essential for the successful interpretation of the humorous episode. It is funny because there is an analogical blending of incongruent frames: a debate frame, a movie frame and a compromising portrait frame. The viewers are able to unpack the blend given the social context it is found in. This multimodal metaphor triggers a new conceptual frame that briefly shifts the focus away from Obama's lack of eye contact. The new blended space places Romney in a vulnerable position in the image. By ridiculing Romney, JS, to a certain extent, is discrediting his win in the first debate in order to save the president's face, like any "friend" would do.

The host then proceeds to ironically respond to his own questions in lines 33-36.

- 33 (.) ↑ WHAT ARE <u>YOU</u> DOING (.) ((AUD laughs& claps)) ↓ oh <u>that's</u> nice (.) ((image with Titanic sketch to the left of JS))
- 34 ((Making a funny face while sticking his finger in his ear)) oh alright that is impressive work
- 35 (1.0) I didn't realize that (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) Maybe you could give that to
- 36 Mitt Romney as <a <u>souvenir</u> of the night (.) he <u>crushed you</u> in <u>that</u> debate> (1.0)

In lines 33-36 the image is deictically referenced with "that" and is emphasized each time it is said calling the viewers' attention to the situation. However, the last occurrence of "that" is exophorically referencing to the debate. Stewart's strategy here is to reprimand Obama for his loss in the debate, by not being responsive or taking action, and holding him responsible for this defeat, "the night he crushed you in that debate". This last utterance exploits the conceptual metaphor of ARGUMENT IS WAR (Lakoff and Johnson 1980) because we are talking about a debate, which is like a war because it has two sides that are fighting against each other and at the end one side wins. In the debate the two sides are the Democratic Party represented by Obama and the Republican party represented by Romney. Both of these sides are supposed to defend their own points of view while attacking their opponent's positions, using whatever strategies they can to persuade people to vote for them. Stewart uses this conceptual metaphor to point out that Obama failed to do this and therefore lost this first debate.

The next FI network example is found in the episode that follows this one.

6.1.2 FI Network Example #2 - Episode 5: Roll you?

Even though this episode is a continuation of the previous one, it is considered another episode because it begins with JS returning to his "news broadcaster" mode, that is, he directs his discourse to his viewers and not to the President, informing them that Obama lost despite Romney lying throughout the debate. It is towards the end of this episode that JS fictitiously talks to the President again about this situation, making the Current Discourse Space the same as in the example above.

- 49 ((soundbite of Romney at debate)) **MR:** President said he cut the deficit in half (1.0) unfortunately he doubled it
- 50 ((JS very upset gesticulating arms)) **JS:** > ↑ IT'S <u>DOWN</u> FROM 1.2 TRILLION
- 51 WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE TO ↑1.1 TRILLION NOW<
- 52 < MR PRESIDENT ARE YOU JUST GOING TO LET HIM ROLLYOU?>

In (50-52) JS is responding to the information presented by Romney in the debate about the President doubling the deficit. He is very upset because he believes Romney is lying and this is seen in his rising tone of voice and his emphatic speech while gesticulating his arms, but as soon as he speaks to the President (53) his speech slows down a bit. He continues to be upset, and this is seen in the rise in intonation and emphatic way in which he speaks. This sets up the FI network and directs the viewers' attention to the fact that he is no longer talking to them but to the President. In (52), JS addresses Obama more formally as "Mr President", emphasizing the word "President" so as to clearly indicate he is switching interlocutors. This is also evident with the use of the pronouns "you" referring anaphorically to the President. Although he formally addresses Obama, JS talks to him as though they were friends by rhetorically questioning the President's dismissiveness in (52) informally, "are you just going to let him roll you". The adverb "just" in this question is being used emphatically, because it "picks out a subpart of the relevant semantic range in which the concept is manifested in a particularly salient or intense phase" (Lee 1991, 51), that is, in this example "just" is perceived conceptually as an intensifier. JS is urging the President to take action in the debate. It also intensifies the informal idiomatic expression, "let him roll you", which metaphorically refers to the idea that Romney is defeating the President in the debate with lies. "Roll" is a forward movement being exerted by someone onto someone else therefore involving the conceptual metaphor MOVEMENT IS DECEPTION. The idea is that Romney is

defeating the President in the debate with lies using his words to deceive the American people. The following episode continues the idea that Romney lied during the entire debate and also contains a fictive interaction network.

6.1.3 FI Network Example #3 - Episode 6: Liar Romney lie

In this episode we are shown a part of the debate where the moderator, Jim Lehrer, tells the President he has two minutes to talk, so the TDS viewers are shown video clips of Obama talking in the debate, but there are clear cuts of these two minutes to give the impression that the President was too verbose. This entire clip ends with the President apologizing to Lehrer for going over the two minutes. This sets up the next fictitious interaction between JS and Obama. Multimodality plays a big role in the beginning of this interaction. JS does not talk immediately but his facial expression and body language clearly indicate that he is bored and confused and then just before speaking incredulous at what the President said in the two minutes he had to defend himself from what Romney said about the deficit. First we see JS in a frozen position showing a bored trance with his head tilted upwards in an unmoving posture with a fixed stare and not looking at the camera with his eyes wide open and not blinking (cf. Figure 7). Then he slowly shifts his eyes from right to left then his head as if he were waking up from the trance and he was trying to figure out where he was.



Figure 7: JS in a daze

His widened eyes and his raised eyebrows show his shock at what just happened and he looks directly into the camera and speaks to the President (63-65). There is a rise in intonation as if he were asking Obama ironic rhetorical questions.

- 63 ((JS stares with head tilted up and shifts his eyes from side to side and then his head as if bored and confused to where he is)) ((AUD laughs)) **JS**: ((opens eyes wide)) (8.0) ↑ You went over your time? (1.0) ((AUD laughs))
- And <u>yet</u> somehow managed in all that overtime to not <u>turn</u> and look your opponent in the eye and just mention
- 65 <what he said was untrue? > ((AUD laughs))

The audience laughs when JS snaps out of his daze and initiates the conversation with the President. Unlike the previous two examples of fictive interaction networks, in (63-65) we witness a different time compression. The Current Discourse Space of this fictitious conversational blend occurs in the present in The Daily Show studio with JS as the fictive addressor talking to the President, the fictive addressee, who is not physically in the studio but is in the same temporal space as JS, in the present. The two are talking about that moment in the debate the day before, when Obama went over his time. The use of the past tense is an indication of this. One of the purposes of this fictive interaction is to criticize Obama for apologizing for going over his time and not

defending himself. By apologizing, the President shows a more vulnerable position instead of a more counter-reactive one. In (63) JS does this ironically by uttering a declarative statement with a rise in intonation as a question. He does not expect an answer but instead is affirming his amazed disbelief. JS is also criticizing the President for not maintaining eye contact with Romney and defending himself. In (63-65) he questions Obama again with a declarative statement and the use of prosodic features to accentuate this.

The other purpose of this fictive exchange is to give the President advice as to what he should have said in the debate. JS shifts the temporal frame of reference from the past to the present to reenact what Obama should have said in the debate. Lines (65-73) illustrate this. JS starts by telling the President he should have said a profane idiomatic expression masqueraded in a sneeze (65). This gets the audience laughing and applauding. Of course, the President would never swear in a debate, but JS here is showing his audience his discontent with Romney's lies.

- 65 <what he said was <u>untrue</u>?> ((AUD laughs)) (.)> Not even a quick sneeze before your answer< a quick ((JS makes a sneeze-like sound that sounds like f*** you)) (.) ((AUD laughs & applauds))</p>
- 66 <No need to be coy> let me see if I can (.) come up with a two minute answer
- 67 that might have been <u>more</u> effective (1.0) ((JS clears throat and throws out his arms to show he's getting ready and points to his right and pretends to be looking at his watch))
- 68 < LIAR ((AUD laughs)) LIE LIE LIAR LIE LIE LIAR LIE LIE (.) LIE LIAR LIE ROMNEY LIE (.)
- 69 ROMNEY LIAR> >your time is up< so shut your fat pie hole Lehrer (2.0) ((AUD cheers))
- 70 <u>I'm</u> the Commander in <u>Chief</u> I don't take orders from <u>tote</u> bag Johnny
- 71 ((looking at wrist again)) Lie lie lie (2.0)

- 72 What did you think <u>Lehrer</u> was going to bail <u>you</u> out ↑ Hold Romney's feet out to the fire ↑
- 73 Lehrer spent the night trying to figure out ↑who was who↑

JS continues to give the President advice and offers him a suggestion as to what he should have said. A counterfactual is used (66-67) where JS places himself in the President's place in the debate the night before, causing a time and space compression. This sets up another fictitious interaction network found within the previous one, where JS is no longer in the present hosting The Daily Show, but is now Obama, fictive addressor, in the debate the day before talking to Romney and Lehrer, both fictive addressees. Before he begins his speech he clears his throat and positions himself pretending to be looking at his watch, given that he had two minutes to respond to Romney. Humor arises when he starts by calling Romney a "liar" and he repeats the words "liar" and "lie" several times (68) in an exaggerated manner while staring at an image of the President in the debate and turning to the camera/audience once, something the president failed to do during the debate, maintain eye contact. Repeating "liar" and "lie" recasts it in a humorous way while mocking Romney at the same time. This repetition is similar to what a child would say to another child who ridiculed him. Although JS is playing the role of the President, as fictive addressor, he also briefly takes on the role of the moderator, making him the fictive addressor, when he says in a normal voice, (69) "your time is up" to Obama, who now becomes the fictive addressee for that short period of time. As complex as this interaction may be, the audience is able to follow it due to the contextualization the host provides his viewers with change of his tone of voice and body position. By becoming the President during the debate, JS shows his viewers that Romney may have won the debate but that he did so lying the entire night to the American people. Stewart also wants everyone to know that Obama should have been in control of the situation due to who he is, and his position as seen in (69-71), which is a continuation of this interaction.

- 69 ROMNEY LIAR> >your time is up< so shut your fat pie hole Lehrer (2.0) ((AUD cheers))
- 70 <u>I'm</u> the Commander-in-<u>Chief</u> (.) I don't take orders from <u>tote</u> bag Johnny
- 71 ((looking at wrist again)) Lie lie lie (2.0)

JS here changes his role once again and becomes the president, fictive addressor talking to the moderator, fictive addressee. By pretending to be the president and telling the commentator that "I'm the Commander-in-Chief" (70), he is reminding his viewers that Obama is the supreme commander of the armed forces of the USA, and hence "Commander-in-Chief" metonymically links to the idea of the most powerful man in the country. To further enhance this idea that the President is powerful, he also insults the moderator by telling him to shut up and metonymically referring to him as, "tote bag Johnny", 'tote-bag' meaning idiot in slang and 'Johnny' a name normally given to someone insignificant or not important. The fictitious conversation is humorous because it is incongruous. A President of a country during a debate would never glorify himself by stating his position and/or title nor would he belittle a moderator by calling him names and telling him to shut up.

In the remaining part of this episode (72-73), JS returns to his "normal" self, host of the show and fictive addressor talking to the President, fictive addressee, the day after the debate. Here he asks the President rhetorical questions as to what he was thinking when he apologized to Lehrer for going over his time.

What did you think <u>Lehrer</u> was going to bail <u>you</u> out ↑ Hold Romney's feet out to the fire ↑

73 Lehrer spent the night trying to figure out ↑who was who↑

JS is being ironic as he and the TDS viewers know that Lehrer as the moderator could and should not be biased in anyway during the debate. The idea of rescuing the President from his poor performance in the debate is illustrated with the idiomatic expression "bail you out" based on the conceptual metaphor of LIFE IS A JOURNEY (Lakoff and Johnson 1980). Another expression JS uses is 'hold Romney's feet out to the fire' (72) that relates to the conceptual metaphor HARM IS PHYSICAL INJURY (Radden 2003), where Lehrer would be the one holding Romney's feet out to the fire. Here JS is again using the idea of Lehrer putting pressure on Romney to hold him accountable for his lies about Obama.

6.1.4 FI Network Examples #4 and #5 - Episode 8: Power shift

In this episode, there are two examples of fictive interaction networks, the second embedded in the first. JS sets up both FIs with the President by stating that Obama was only able to defeat Romney in telling the biggest lie of the night, which was saying that Jim Lehrer did a great job moderating the debate. JS reacts to this soundbite from the debate in an upset manner. This is seen when he nods his head in disapproval at what the President said and throws his arms up and says "look" (95-99). These multimodal features display JS's annoyance and show how fed up he is with the situation. Given this frustration, JS feels the need to react and talk to the President in the Current Discourse Space, that is, in the Daily Show studio in the present time. He begins the fictitious conversation letting Obama know how upset he is. The deictic "this" that is stressed in (96) and repeated in (97) not only refers to the President's comment on Lehrer's moderating skills but also to his performance in the entire debate.

- 95 ((JS is nodding with a worried look)) **JS:** ((AUD laughs, cheers, applauds)) Look ((JS throws up arms and looks away from the camera)) (.)
- You know (2.0) ((JS looks at camera)) I don't get <u>this</u> ((JS points to the camera)) (1.0) >I honestly don't
- 97 get this Mr President you seemed either annoyed to be there or reluctant to make your case<
- 98 <u>because</u> (.) I'm assuming <u>you</u> have a <u>case</u> (.) which would be a whole other issue you know I hate
- 99 to do this to you sir (1.0) Camera three please ((turns to camera))

Another fictitious exchange occurs in this same episode and is still related to the first, thus with the same Current Discourse Space. Even though Stewart is still talking to the President, this next exchange clearly shows a new discourse constellation signaled by a change in camera angle and a change in the host's physical position, as seen in (99). A new intimate space is created where Stewart "talks" to the President as if it were a private face-to-face conversation between the two of them

- to do this to you sir (1.0) Camera three please ((turns to camera)) (2.0) ((JS speaks in boyishly embarrassed tone))
- 100 Hh hi Mr President ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) ((returns to normal voice and stacks papers evenly in front of him))
- 101 you know look (1.0) I know you probably dread having to spend <u>90</u> minutes (.) debating some
- 102 <u>knucklehead</u> from ((JS lifts hands and says word with different low base tone)) <u>Harvard</u> who is just going to
- 103 ((right hand mimicking talking)) rarara all night (1.0)

Although JS always refers to Obama as "Mr President", there is a blend in formal and informal registers in this exchange between the two. First there's a power distance and therefore a more formal register, where Stewart shows a more respectable, humble and distant relationship with the President when he addresses him as "sir" and then proceeds

to greet him using a formal vocative: "Hi Mr President" in a boyishly, as though embarrassed, humble tone (100). This distance is blended in (101-103) when JS says:

101-103 you know look (1.0) I know you probably dread having to spend <u>90</u> minutes (.) debating some <u>knucklehead</u> from ((JS lifts hands and says word with different low base tone)) <u>Harvard</u> who is just going to ((right hand mimicking talking)) rarara all night (1.0)

In this utterance (101-103), Stewart uses a more informal register and talks to the President as if the two were peers. The use of a common colloquial expression used amongst friends, "you know", and a colloquial term, "knucklehead" to metonymically refer to Mitt Romney that cognitively clashes with "from Harvard" which activates the frame of one of the most prestigious American universities well-known for only having very smart alumni or students not only shows a blend in registers but also makes the interaction hilarious. The latter also reveals Stewart's poor opinion of the Republican candidate, who even though he went to Harvard, the host considers him an idiot. All of this fictive interaction makes Obama's defeat even more surprising while at the same time diminishing Romney's victory.

Stewart also refers to his personal experience in debates and mentions his next debate with the guest of the show, Bill O'Reily, a political commentator in (103-105).

- 103 ((right hand mimicking talking)) rarara all night (1.0) Believe me I know (.) I've been there (.) or (.)
- 104 ((JS talks in serious tone)) will be Saturday at eight ((JS slowly moves his head from one side to another like a robot and then laughs looking down and taking one sheet of paper and placing it under the stack of papers he's holding)
- 105 (AUD laughs, claps and cheers)) (9.0) No camera on in the green room right? (2.0) Stewart in (103-105) is not only showing empathy towards the president, but also substantiating his opinion as an expert in the area, "believe me, I know. I've been there"

(103). The viewers laugh and cheer when the host says "Saturday at eight" because they know it is metonymically linked to the upcoming debate Jon Stewart is having with Bill O'Riley, the guest of the show. Giving a personal example of his own debate and comparing it with the President's debate the night before, is a common conversation topic amongst friends. This leads up to the "friendly" advice he gives him in (106-108), which in turn narrows the power distance even more:

- But you <u>know</u> Mr. President (.) everyone has <u>parts</u> of their jobs they don't <u>like</u> as <u>much (.)</u> but
- 107 they still have to do those things if they want to ↑ keep those jobs (0.5) And if you don't want to
- 108 do it for <u>yourself</u> (.) think of your supporters (1.0) Look what your performance did last night to one of them

Here JS is criticizing the President for not fulfilling his obligation to perform well in the debate in order to continue being the President of the United States. His criticism is personal and makes Obama take responsibility for himself as well as responsibility for those who support him. Here conditional statements are used to make his point, "if they want to keep those jobs" and "if you don't want to do it for yourself, think of your supporters". By calling Obama's attention to what wasn't done, he is indicating the consequences for what he actually did so that he does not repeat his mistakes in the next two debates. Humor arises here due to incongruity of frames. In an ordinary situation an unmotivated employee would hear this advice from a friend or co-worker and in the situation presented here, Obama is not facing unemployment, but could stop being the president of the country if he loses the election.

As can be seen below, JS gives Chris Matthews, a political commentator from MSNBC news program, as an example of an upset supporter who concurs that the President lost

the debate and asks the President a rhetorical question, "You happy?" in (112), in order to make his case stronger.

- 109 ((soundbite from MSNBC Chris Matthews speaking)) I don't know what he was doing out there
- 110 ((video cut)) I don't know how he let Romney get away with the crap he threw out ((video cut))
- what was he doing tonight? ((video cut)) He went in there disarmed. Where was Obama tonight?
- 112 **JS:** ((JS looking into camera with upset facial expression)) YOU HAPPY ((AUD laughs & claps)) (3.0) ((JS points to his right looking into camera with upset facial expression))
- 114 nobody can use him (.) <u>now</u> (JS points to camera) (2.0) ((AUD laughs & claps)) >admittedly Matthews is
- on a complex machine everyone knows he's just a simple potato battery< but still (2.0)
- 116 ((JS points to camera)) ((AUD laughs)) he ↑likes you (.)

This rhetorical question is said with despair as JS's intonation rises and we see him pointing with an upset facial expression. It's humorous because the host is imitating what a child would say to another who is not behaving well, as though Obama had purposely done what he did to upset the commentator.

6.1.5 FI Network Example #6 - Episode 9: Osama Bin Laden

The sixth example of a fictive interaction network in this show about the first Presidential debate is found in the ninth episode and is a continuation of the latter episode. We are confronted with another participant in the interaction, Osama Bin Laden, America's and the Christian world's public enemy number one before his death

in May 2011. Here, the idea is to give another example of someone else who also thought the President did not do well in the debate. The fictitious exchange here is found within the other interaction (cf. Figure 8).




Figure 8: Embedded fictive exchange in a trialogue

JS is still talking to the President but he introduces Osama Bin Laden (both fictive addresser talking to himself as fictive addressee). Here JS takes the voice of Osama Bin Laden to prove his point. This fictional dialogue is introduced with a different screen shot. We no longer see JS, but rather a new Current Discourse Space, a SpongeBob Squarepants⁹ cartoon underwater world with a 'real' image of Osama Bin Laden sitting on a sofa besides Squidward Tentacles¹⁰, a character from the SpongeBob SquarePants cartoon, both looking at a cartoon television set with a 'real' image of Obama at the debate (cf. Figure 9).

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⁹ SpongeBob Squarepants is an American cartoon series that takes place in the underwater city of Bikini Bottom which, is located in the Pacific Ocean beneath the real life coral reef Bikini Atoll.

¹⁰ Squidward Tentacles is an arrogant, bitter, rude octopus who dislikes life in general and is SpongeBob's unhappy neighbor that would do anything to get away from him.




Figure 9: Osama Bin Laden's underwater world

This image is a complex conceptual blend of novel temporal and spatial compressions. There are a number of inputs from past and present spaces as well as underwater cartoon space and the debate from the real world space that are blended in such a way that not only create humor but also help Stewart show his viewers that although the President did not perform well in the debate, he was able to find and kill the most infamous terrorist in the world. Three different input spaces refers to the past: one refers to a further past when Osama Bin Laden was alive and well, another when Bin Laden was found, killed and buried at sea in an unknown place during Obama's presidency in May 2011, and the final one is the most recent past, the presidential debate the day before. Blending life and death in its alive and dead states is very common and often used in persuasive discourse (Coulson and Pascual 2006; Pascual 2008b). The input spaces referring to the present are, first, the cartoon space illustrated by the underwater world from the famous SpongeBob SquarePants cartoon, represented by the arrogant Squidward Tentacles who dislikes the likeable main character SpongeBob and life in general, alongside the most hated man in the world Osama Bin Laden, who like Squidward dislikes the President. Although one is a fictional cartoon character and the

other a dead human being, they both are able to coincide and make sense in this blend because of the common elements they share: both have habitats underwater, both hate a loveable person and both are miserable with their current situation. The second input space referring to the present is the Here-and-Now Space of the Daily Show where the fictitious interaction is taking place (117-120).

- and even people who <u>don't</u> like you were somewhat <u>stunned</u> at the poor performance (.) Even
- Osama Bin <u>Laden</u> from the bottom of his watery <u>grave</u> ((full screen of an underwater cartoon scene taken from SpongeBob Squarepants with a 'real' Osama Bin Laden sitting on a cartoon couch next to Sponge Bob octopus character Squidward Tentacles watching a 'real' Obama on a cartoon TV))
- 119 watched and was like ↑that's the guy that killed me? ((AUD laughs)) ↑Really?((full screen of JS pretending to write on paper with surprised look on face))
- 120 Mr look down at the paper all night, \(\Triangle\) shot me in the face?

JS in (117-120) continues talking to the President to introduce another example of someone who doesn't like him but also thought he did bad in the debate. This fictivity is introduced by a clausal fictive interaction, "like + direct speech", which already presents a non-actual utterance and a non-information-seeking question, "really?" (119), said by a dead-alive individual in a made-up reality cartoon blend, show Osama Bin Laden's surprise and disbelief at Obama's poor performance. The utterance in (120) contains a temporal contrast found in the nominal phrase which functions as the subject and the predicate. A verb phrase is used as a nominal phrase, "Mr look down at the paper all night", to relate to the present time and the passive President Obama who did not react to Romney in the debate. Using this phrase to metonymically refer to the President, creates a funny effect, which is extended in the predicate "shot me in the face", which consists of a past verb tense to refer to one of the highest achievements in the President's first term, when Bin Laden was found and killed. The contrast presented

not only causes viewers to laugh but also makes them reflect on why the President, an active, successful, capable and determined leader who managed to fight against terrorism and track down and kill the most wanted man in the world, was not able to defeat and react to his opponent in the presidential debate. By using Osama Bin Laden's voice as his own, JS is fictively stating what he believes to be true: the capable powerful President lost the debate when he should have won it.

6.1.6 FI Network Example #7 - Episode 10: Urgent emails

Episode 10 contains the last fictive interaction network of the "Democaplypse 2012 Obama Where Art Thou?" television episode. This episode is also the last one of this show about the first debate. JS uses this last fictitious conversation to remind the President that throughout the campaign he sent countless emails to his supporters asking them for support, money and effort and yet did not live up to his requests or show his "relentlessness" and "passion" in the first presidential debate.

121 (3.0) ((JS looks into camera points and gets more serious)) Here's ((puts index finger on mouth and points to camera))(.)

The episode begins with a three second pause from the previous one to show the shift in humor to more seriousness. This pause allows the viewers to understand that a new Current Discourse Space is established where the host is back in the studio in the present time fictitiously talking to Obama. This is seen when JS, as the speaker, uses the deictic "here's" in (121) to not only draw Obama's, the addressee's, attention from the humorous Bin Laden sketch back to the more serious issue at hand, his poor performance in the debate being discussed on his show, but also to draw attention to

the TDS viewers, the overhearers, as well. By looking directly into the camera using a pointing gesture and verbally using the deictic word, JS is shifting the indexical ground from the imagined space, the underwater Bin Laden scene, to the actual space in the TDS studio to orient his interlocutors' attention. Hence, a mental space is built in which the members of the trialogue are all present at that given point in time in order for JS to take them back temporally to the presidential campaign before the debate to criticize the President for the urgent emails he has sent out to his supporters.

- what's perhaps most maddening ((JS puts index knuckle on his mouth and points with his pen to camera))
- 123 (1.0) for the <u>past</u> year and a <u>half</u> (.) <u>you</u> Mr President have inundated this country with urgent
- emails ((full screen of JS's inbox email with Obama's name highlighted in blue)) begging for <<u>support</u> and
- 125 <u>money</u> ((same inbox screen with Michelle Obama's name highlighted in blue)) and <u>energy</u> ((same inbox screen
- with Joe Biden's name highlighted in blue)) and <u>money</u> ((same inbox screen with Jill Biden's name highlighted in blue))
- and money (.) ((same inbox screen with Beau Biden's name highlighted in blue)) (0.5) and money ((same inbox screen with Bo the dog's name highlighted in blue)) ((AUD laughs))

In (122-127), Stewart says that in these emails the President "begs for": support, energy and money, a word repeated 4 times, these lexical items are strategically chosen to hold the President accountable for his defeat in the debate. The only image on the screen is an email sent to Jon Stewart with instructions to donate money to Obama's campaign with a name change of the email sender (first Barack, then the first lady Michelle, then the Vice President Joe Biden, then his wife Jill Biden, then Beau Biden, the Vice President's older son and attorney general of the state of Delaware, and finally by Bo the President's dog) (cf. Figure 10).



Figure 10: Urgent emails

Humor arises from exaggeration displayed in the last sender of these emails, the family dog, a feat known by all is impossible, hence making this interaction fictitious. JS ridicules the emails by having all these people, family members and even a dog, sending the emails on behalf of the President. The image also reveals that the recipient of these emails is JS, which inclines viewers to believe that he is also a supporter of the President.

JS also criticizes the content of the emails in (128-134). This is especially shown when JS quotes from Obama's email. In this segment the screen is split, on one side we see JS looking into the camera emphasizing what he is saying by pointing to it with his pen, while on the other side of the screen parts of the email are shown with the words he is saying in larger print in front of Obama's email: "say you're in" (130), "your response is critical" (131), and "I can't do this on my own" (129). The last quote gets a response from JS who replies "and by the way you made that abundantly clear last night" (133-134). The last part of this utterance, "that abundantly clear last night" is said in a slower tempo to emphasize that the President does need help based on what he failed to do in

the debate to win it. The use of the deictic "that" refers to the quote from the email and is temporally linked to the debate with the adverbial time expression "last night". Here the host is fictively addressing the president, turning the email from a past communicative situation into a conversational turn in the present communicative situation, that is, the Here-and-Now Space. Stewart is making a strong argument as to the President's lack of effort during the debate.

- 128 > And it's not just the number of emails (.) it's the intensity of their content (.)
- ((full screen JS with email to the right from Obama and a sentence taken from it in larger print "This is Our One Shot", JS shaking pen)) **JS:** <u>This</u> is our <u>one</u> Shot
- 130 ((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "say you're in")) <u>say</u> you're in
- 131 ((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "you're response is critical")) you're response is <u>critical</u>
- 132 ((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "I can't do this on my own")) <u>I</u> can't do this <on my own>
- 133 ((JS changes tone of voice shifts eyes from one side to another)) and by the way you made that abundantly
- clear last night> (.) ((JS looks at camera and points with pen)) But the point is this (.) you and your cam

Stewart's direct criticism to the President is seen in (134-138). He emphasizes the character trait descriptive lexical items like "effort", "urgency" and "relentlessness" that he states Obama wanted from this supporters in the emails he sent and then turns these words describing positive personal qualities around to show how they backfire on the President by repeating them and saying that Obama did not possess these in the debate.

clear last night> (.) ((JS looks at camera and points with pen)) But the point is this (.) you and your cam

- campaign have demanded a level of <<u>effort</u>, <u>urgency</u> and <u>relentlessness</u> from your supporters> (.)
- 136 A level of effort (.) urgency and relentlessness (.) <u>you</u> failed to display in a national presidential
- debate (.) Shouldn't your <u>urgency</u> and <u>passion</u> be on <u>par</u> with the urgency and passion <of your e-
- 138 blasts >? (0.5) Or are you not on your mailing lists? ((AUD laughs)) (.)

This fictitious conversation, for fictive purposes of argumentation, is wrapped up with two rhetorical questions (137-138) which are used to present the President as accountable for what he has done and what he should do to remedy the situations, i.e. win the next debate. In the first fictive question (137-8), JS uses a modal verb in the negative form, "shouldn't", to tactfully influence the President to be more passionate and relentlessness in his campaign, something he did not reveal in the first debate he lost. By starting the question with this modal verb, Stewart supposedly leaves the decision about what to do in Obama's hands, but in practice he is ordering him to take action. The second fictive question (138) serves as a reminder to the president as to the content of his emails, to reinforce the point that he is not doing what he has been stating in his campaign.

The last part of this episode coincides with the end of JS's monologue (138-142) in which the host ends with a short clip of a video sponsored by the liberal federal Super PAC, The Jewish Council for Education & Research (JCER), who supported Obama and tried to reenergize his campaign and popularity which was not as high as it was in the previous presidential campaign. Using this clip sponsored by this Super Pac also reveals Stewart's bias towards the President, given that TDS viewers know that Stewart is Jewish. The online video entitled "Wake the Fuck Up" was released the month before the debate and featured the political actor Samuel Jackson narrating an adult-oriented

profane nursery rhyme book *Go the Fuck to Sleep*, in which the actor tries to encourage a passive family who were former active Obama supporters to campaign for Obama, using some of Romney's positions to "wake the family up". The purpose of the ad is to tell people that this election is important and they need to take action and show a little more interest in it, and not be passive. The use of the idiomatic expression "wake up", is being used to tell democratic voters to become more involved in this election, because they have not been, like they were in the 2008 presidential election. The video is nearly 4 minutes long, but JS only shows the part when Samuel Jackson says "wake the fuck up", an utterance repeated throughout the video.

- 138 (.) I'm tempted to leave <u>you</u>
- with the wise words of a <u>noted</u> actor (.) who's campaign viral video has been <u>forwarded</u> to <u>my</u>
- inbox (.) <u>nineteen</u> hundred times by some of you who are passionate followers (0.5) I believe <u>it</u>
- 141 goes a little something like this:
- 142 ((soundbite of an angry Samuel Jackson talking in Pro-Obama Ad by JCER)) **SJ:** Wake the f*** up ((AUD laughs, claps and cheers))

Stewart introduces this video telling the President and his viewers that he is sharing with them a campaign video he has received by email from many people. The deictic "you" in (138) refers not only to the President but also to TDS viewers. It is still part of the fictitious conversation but JS also includes his viewers when the reference to "you" is made clearer in (140), when he says: "by some of you who are passionate followers". The video is a direct culmination of what JS thinks about the President's performance. He believes Obama put more effort into the 2008 campaign and showed a loss of interest in this debate by showing his passiveness and needs to become more active in the next two debates if he wants to win the election.

6.2 Jon Stewart's Monologue About the 2nd Presidential Debate: Democalypse 2012 - The Second Debate: Now Including the President

The second 2012 presidential debate held at New York's Hofstra University was held on October 16, 2012 the day before The Daily Show with Jon Stewart televised episode entitled "Democalypse 2012- The Second Debate: Now Including the President" aired. The title given to this episode reveals the overall consensus among US voters that Obama performed much better in the second presidential debate than he did in the first. According to polls taken shortly after the debate, CNN/ORC International survey ("CNN Poll: Split Decision on Debate" 2012) (cf. Figure 11), the Gallup poll (Jones 2012) (cf. Figure 12) amongst others, Obama was said to have been the clear winner of the debate.




Figure 11: CNN/ORC International Poll (October 16, 2012)

Views of Who Did Better Job in Presidential Debates Based on Americans who report watching each presidential debate			
	Obama	Romney	Neither/Both/No opinion
	%	%	%
Second debate (Oct. 17-18)	51	38	11
First debate (Oct. 4-5)	20	72	9
GALLUP'			

Figure 12: Gallup Poll (October 17-18, 2012)

This debate was moderated by a CNN anchor, Candy Crowley and followed a town hall format, that is 82 undecided voters asked the two candidates questions primarily related to domestic affairs: taxes, unemployment, job creation, the national debt, energy, women's rights and immigration. Jon Stewart's monologue the day after the debate was dedicated to what happened in the second debate.

This monologue was quite different from the one he presented the day after the first debate, which contained seven examples of fictive interaction networks all with President Obama, holding him accountable for his defeat in the debate. In the monologue about the second debate, five instances of fictive interaction networks were found, three of which contained fictitious conversations with Governor Mitt Romney, one with the incumbent President Barack Obama and another with a home audience of university students watching the debate. Given that the President won this debate, the need to "speak" with him was not as imperative. Although Stewart acknowledged that "Romney was sharp and drew blood" (cf. Appendix B, episode 5, line #193), he noted that unlike two weeks prior, the president made several zingers at Romney. In fact, in this show JS shows how happy he is with the President's sharp performance in (177-179).

- 177 ((full screen JS with astound look on his face and to his left the same image of Romney and Obama pointing at each other but with a yellow sign underneath "NOW INCLUDING THE PRESIDENT")) **JS:** ((JS screaming with both hands on the desk and his eyes bulging out looking up from side to side)) ((AUD laughs, cheers and claps)) > IT'S ALIVE (.) IT'S ALIVE (.)
- 178 ((swirling all around in his chair with his mouth wide open and arms stretched out))>WOOH
 WOOH< (2.0) YES
- 179 PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA DECIDED TO <u>ATTEND</u> THIS DEBATE ((AUD LAUGHS)) (1.0)

His happiness is revealed not only in the words he utters but also in his actions. His bulging eyes and his body language when twirling in a swivel chair, while screaming "wooh" like a siren, calls everyone's attention to the fact that the President indeed decided to attend the debate. Humor emerges from the incongruity found in the President physically attending the debate and being mentally present versus being mentally absent from it. These actions accompanied by the repeated utterance "it's alive" help to accentuate the humor even more. This expression conjures in the audience the Frankenstein movie (Coppola 1994) frame, another fictional domain acting as an input in this blend, when Frankenstein surprisingly comes to life when no one thought he would. JS is using this moment to acknowledge that he, like Frankenstein's creator, was astounded at Obama's comeback.

Jon Stewarts's monologue in this television episode, #18004, lasts approximately ten minutes, which is half the time he spent on his monologue about the first debate. We divided this monologue into 10 episodes that contained five examples of fictive interaction networks as mentioned previously. The following sections take a closer look at these five examples.

6.2.1 FI Network Example #1 - Episode 5: Romney was sharp but ...

This episode follows the one in which JS shows how happy he is that the President performed better in the second debate and that he believes the candidates were able to have a discussion and tell each other how much they hate each other. Episode five begins with a clip of the debate where both candidates are arguing back and forth with an upset Romney being the last one to speak in the soundbite. The Current Discourse Space of this short fictitious conversation is the debate the night before held between JS, fictive addressor, and Romney, fictive addressee, as seen in (190-192). This time compression adds to the fictivity as well as the humorous situation.

- 190 (4.0) ((full screen with JS and to his right an image of Obama and Romney at debate talking to each other)) **JS:** ((JS with mouth open and tongue thrusting inside his cheek looking to the right with his arms open as the AUD say oh)) I believe you
- 191 ((JS shifts arms right to left looking up)) meant to add mother f***er ((JS looks into camera)) ((AUD laughs and claps)) (1.0)
- 192 It wasn't the question mother f***er (1.0) ((full screen with video clip of Romney at debating speaking))

The audience reacts in a surprised manner vocalizing this by saying "oh" and the first reaction we get from JS, while the audience is reacting, is nonverbal (cf. Figure 13).



Figure 13: JS's cheeky reaction

This open arm gesture and tongue protruding in JS's open mouth, tells us that he is holding back a negative thought that he will share. He is being "cheeky" and reveals his thoughts when he tells Romney he forgot to add the profane expression, "mother f***er" to metonymically refer to Obama. JS blends himself with Romney in a counterfactual blend, speaking for him and repeats what Romney should have said, and this of course gets a laugh from the audience who also clap. Romney would never utter those words in a presidential debate, but JS uses this moment to show how aggressive Obama was during this debate. It's a conversation with Romney, because JS uses the pronoun "you", but the actual receiver of the message is the audience, both the home and the studio audience.

6.2.2 FI Network Examples #2 and #3 – Episode 6: Romney and the Blunt Amendment

In this episode there are two distinct examples of fictive interaction related to the Blunt amendment topic. The first is between JS and Romney, while the second one is with JS and university students who are watching the debate. The Blunt amendment was a controversial issue during the 2012 presidential elections. The amendment was devised by a Republican senator Roy Blunt, and stated that employers could decide whether to cover healthcare that violated their religious or moral beliefs. It was controversial and labeled the anti-contraceptive bill by liberals who were against it. When Romney was asked his opinion about the amendment during the campaign he said he was against it, only to change his mind and state in another interview that he was for the amendment and didn't understand the question about it in the previous interview.

6.2.2.1 FI Network example #2 - JS and Romney

This second FI network comes after a soundbite from the debate in which Romney says:

207 ((soundbite video clip of debate)) **MR:** I don't believe that bureaucrats in Washington should tell someone whether they can use contraceptives or not.

JS fictitiously talks to Romney in (208-209) to discredit what he said in the debate.

- 208 **JS:** ((JS with serious look on his face, eyebrows lowered and pushed together and slightly nodding his head)) Yeah (.) you should tell that to your (.) disembodied voice (.) that supported the
- 209 Blunt Amendment (.) which does limit choice

Once again, there is a time and space compression between JS, who is in the studio to a Romney, who is from the past talking in the debate thus creating a new Current Discourse Space where this imaginary conversation occurs. In this FI network JS is more serious and skeptical, as can be seen from the look on his face, especially his wrinkled eyebrows pushed together (cf. Figure 14), and the slight nodding of his head, which also indicates his disapproval of what Romney said.



Figure 14: JS disapproval of Romney's Blunt Amendment comment

The use of the modal "should" in the utterance (208) and the use of the expression "disembodied voice", to refer to a past Romney saying he agreed with the amendment

is a counterfactual given that the voice can not be separated from the body and what Romney said cannot be erased. JS also stresses the emphatic expression "does limit" in this utterance to emphasize that Romney's support of the amendment in the past limits the American's choice regarding contraceptives. By having this fictitious conversation and using this counterfactual utterance, JS is accentuating Romney's contradiction of what he said in the debate and what he said before in relation to the Blunt amendment, and this makes it fictive, as a fictive assertion to the TDS viewers, who can now see Stewart's opinion of Romney. He wants to discredit him by showing the viewers that Romney cannot always be trusted. To reinforce what Stewart said and emphasize on Romney's change of opinion, an audio soundbite is played with Romney speaking on a radio show in February of that same year stating he supported the bill (cf. Appendix B, episode 6, lines 210-212).

The next FI network example is also related to the Blunt amendment but is with a different addressee.

6.2.2.2 FI Network Example #3 – JS and university students

The third example of a FI network encountered in this show is with JS and university students watching the debate. Like the previous example, there is a compression of different situations of communication taking place at a different space and time, and involving different participants. JS from the Here-and-Now Space in the studio is talking to university students from the day before who were watching the debate in their dorms (213-217), thus the Current Discourse Space is the dorm rooms at the time of the debate when the Blunt Amendment was mentioned.

- 213 **JS:** ((JS looks into camera and points with pen)) <u>Yeah</u> (.) by the way for those of you let's
- 214 say in your dorm rooms right now filling a large tube ((brings hands closer together to indicate tube))
- with water or carving an apple ((AUD laughs)) ((JS looks down)) (.) Um (1.0) ((JS looks up))
- whose ears may have perked up at the mention of a ((makes quotes gesture with fingers))
- blunt amendment Um (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS with a smirk on his face)) it has nothing to do with that (.) ((AUD laughs))

We know he is referring to university students given the reference JS makes to "dorm rooms", a common sleeping accommodations for college students in the US. Humor arises when there is a frame shift in the word "blunt". The topic of the episode is the Blunt amendment, whose name derives from the surname of the republican senator who advocated for it. JS takes the context of the second debate, held at a university, and creates the humorous frame shift. First he contextualizes his viewers and conceptually makes reference to a typical stereotype of university students being smokers of marijuana when he says, "filling a large tube of water", which is a typical apparatus used to smoke the illegal substance and sets up the humor with the remaining part of the utterance "whose ears may have perked up at the mention of a blunt amendment". JS accentuates the words "blunt amendment" by making quotation marks with his fingers while saying the utterance, which is a homographic pun. This polysemic word is also slang for a hollowed-out cigar filled with cannabis, hence the humorous effect. JS intensifies the humor by continuing the fictitious conversation and telling the students that it has nothing to do with "that" referring to the marijuana cigar. The purpose of this fictive interaction is to make fun of the Blunt amendment which in turn is an indication of what the host thinks about it.

6.2.3 FI Network Example #4 – Episode 8: Romney's ace in the hole

In the show about the second debate, the only FI the host has with the president is in this episode, where JS is setting up his viewers for what he calls is Romney's "ace in the hole", a metaphor meaning a secret advantage. JS gives Obama the win on the Libya debate that according to him should have been Romney's "ace in the hole".

A soundbite of the debate is shown where Romney is talking about the 2012 Benghazi attack¹¹ and how the president took a long time to tell the American people it was a terrorist attack. The soundbite ends with a rhetorical question "how could we have not known?", which is also in itself a case of sentential FI, and JS fictitiously talks to the president in (237) in which the Current Discourse Space is the debate the night before the The Daily Show televised episode.

237 ((JS leaning forward looking with wide eyes into the camera)) **JS:** ((JS lifts closed right hand and drops it open)) BOOM (.) Mr President (.) you just walked into a mid storm In this conversation, JS is telling the president that metaphorically Romney dropped the bomb, meaning he announced shocking or startling news, coming from the conceptual metaphor, ARGUMENT IS WAR. This metaphor is seen in the host's gestures, that is, lifting his closed right hand and dropping it open as if it were a bomb, and then uttering the onomatopoeic word, "boom". This FI sets the TDS viewers up for what comes next, which is Obama's astounding comeback and defense.

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¹¹The Benghazi attack occurred the month before the debate in which Islamic militants attacked the US consultant in Benghazi, Libya and killed the US ambassador and the US foreign service information officer.

A soundbite of the debate is shown where the President is talking about how he told the American people the day after the attack that it was a terrorist attack and that he said he would find the people responsible for the attack. After this soundbite JS continues his talk with Obama in (241-243).

- 241 ((JS looks into camera slightly swaying head from side to side)) **JS:** OK (.) ((JS nudges head to right when saying the next word)) forceful (1.0) ((JS uses right hand to make a move like a DJ is scratching a record))
- remind people that killing terrorists is kind of ((next 2 words said with African American accent and pointing))
- your thing ((AUD laughs, JS shakes his head up and down and closes his mouth and opens it with a sound and looks up to his right))

In the continuation of this fictive interaction, interrupted by the soundbite, JS is revealing his satisfaction at what Obama said because he thought Romney would have scored points when it came to talking about how at the time the Obama administration muddled the response about the US consulate attack, only no points were scored. In (241) he uses the word "forceful", describing Obama's response to Romney's accusation. Humor arises when JS in (242-3) tells the president that "killing terrorists is kind of your thing" using a Black English accent to say "your thing", an expression meaning doing what one does best. This utterance is also accompanied by his DJ-like gesture.

6.2.4 FI Network Example #5 – Episode 9: Semantic trap

Episode 9 contains the final fictive interaction network of this show about the second debate. It is a continuation of the previous episode with a focus on Romney's "semantic trap". The fictitious conversation is between JS and Mitt Romney and comes after a soundbite from the debate where Romney flings a false charge that the president didn't

refer to the previous month's attack as "an act of terror" the day after the attack. During his accusation, Obama repeats three words: "please proceed governor", so as to prepare for his comeback, but this is interrupted with JS's fictitious conversation with Governor Romney in (254-264) whose Current Discourse Space is the debate the night before.

- **JS:** ((both hands slightly lifted off the table, eyes wide open and mouth open in surprise, AUD OH's and claps)) ((in a whispering voice leaning forward and pointing JS says)) There's your first clue (1.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((with a more vibrant tone JS pointing and looking into the camera says)
- 255 When you feel you're about to <u>spring</u> what <u>you</u> Governor Romney think is the
- 256 <checkmate moment of the debate> (.) <and your debate opponent says to you> (1.0) ((right arm stretched out in front of him moving slowly from right to left with a smile and a very formal tone of voice))
- please ((reverses the movement of the hand)) (AUD laughs, claps and cheers))proceed (.)
- 258 ((JS stretches out his hands in front of him)) Hold on ((JS puts his fist to his mouth)) (1.0) are you
- 259 trying to open that door (.) ((JS's tone of voice is still formal with a rise in intonation. JS's gestures as if he were opening a door))
- allow me to open it (.) wider (.) >The door that <u>you</u> appear you want to <u>walk</u> through< ((pointing at camera))
- 261 (.) >But when your opponent does that you might want to take a breath and
- 262 wonder< if ((image to right of cartoon of road runner and coyote)) a la Wile E.
- 263 Coyote and the road runner (1.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS points to the image to his
- 264 right)) that door your opponent is pointing to is merely <paint on a rock>

After the soundbite, the TDS viewers are confronted with a flabbergasted host whose facial expressions clearly indicate his surprise at what had just happened in the clip: his eyes are bulging out and his mouth is wide open (cf. Figure 15), which naturally gets a laugh from the audience.



Figure 15: JS flabbergasted

His "conversation" with Romney begins with JS leaning forward and whispering, "There's your first clue", with the deictic "there's" referring to the last thing said in the video clip from the debate, "please proceed governor". JS is warning Romney from the debate, a time and space compression, that his "checkmate moment" is not going to happen but rather turn into a road runner cartoon (cf. Figure 16), a metaphor for disaster and failure.



Figure 16: Road Runner and Wile E. Coyote

This complex reality-fiction blend begins when JS uses the word "spring", a typical movement of the Wile E. Coyote when chasing the road runner to eat him. JS mocks Romney, which causes humor, when he says "please proceed" in a polite formal manner

using hand gestures to show that he is allowing someone to go on and asks him if he is opening "that door", referring to the trap that lies ahead of him, which is losing a big opportunity to score points in the debate. By asking Romney if he wants him to open the door wider, JS is telling his viewers that the governor had what was coming to him. In the blend, Romney is the coyote who tries to use absurd contraptions and elaborate plans to catch the road runner, in this case Obama, but does not succeed because his plans backfire and end up hurting him instead of the astute bird.

6.3 Jon Stewart's Monologue About the 3rd Presidential Debate: Democalypse 2012 - We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This

The third and final 2012 presidential debate held at Lynn University in Boca Raton, Florida was on October 22nd, 2012 the day before The Daily Show with Jon Stewart, episode entitled "Democalypse 2012- We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This" aired. The title given to this episode reveals the disappointment felt by the host as to the interest of this final debate due to the lack of dramatic differences found amongst the candidates on foreign policy stances. NLCS stands for the *National League Championship Series*, which is a postseason Major League Baseball series played in October where two teams play seven games to see who will play the winner of the American League Championship Series in the World Series. The Giants were playing the final game against the Cardinals at the same time as the debate. The deictic "we" in the title refers not only to Stewart but to all Americans who watched the debate and who could have been watching the more interesting final baseball game instead. The empty deictic "this" is used to shift the focus of the monologue to the final debate.

This debate did not have a clear-cut winner as the first two did, Mitt Romney in the first and Barack Obama in the second. According to CNN/ORC International survey (Steinhauser 2012) (Figure 17), the results were too close to call given the margin of error.




Figure 17: CNN/ORC International Poll (October 22, 2012)

Nevertheless, the overall opinion was that Obama did in fact win this final debate.

Jon Stewart's monologue about the third debate was approximately the same amount of time as the one about the second debate, 10 minutes and 18 seconds. In this monologue, Stewart's general opinion was that Barack Obama and Mitt Romney had similar views on foreign policy as can be seen in (346-350).

- 346 **JS:** ((AUD laughs, claps and cheers)) ((surprised look on face − eyes bulging out and sitting back in his chair, eyebrows frowning)) WOW! (2.0) ((JS speak in upset tone)) ↑WHAT THE HELL
- WAS THAT? (1.0) A foreign policy (.) it appears that (.) ((JS makes circular motion twice with hands))
- all that's left for the presidential race is this <u>one model</u> ((pointing to image on his right with both hands)) (1.0)
- 349 I mean at least we still get our choice of color ((JS speaks passionately)) ((AUD LAUGHS))
- 350 but >it's the same model < (3.0)

After a montage of video clips from the debate (cf. Appendix C, Episode 4, lines 328-345) where both candidates are basically saying the same thing about Syria, the host shows his disappointment in both candidates. The first reaction the viewers see is Stewart's surprised look on his face: bulging eyes, frowning eyebrows and sitting back in his chair followed by the interjection "wow" in (346) said sarcastically to express his disapproval. The rhetorical question, a case of FI, said emphatically that follows in (346-47) accentuates this feeling. JS uses the metaphor CAR IS A PERSON to emphasize the sameness found in both candidates' foreign policy. "One model" in (348) and "same model" (350) refer to both candidates' similar views on foreign policy. "At least we still get our choice of color" found in (349) refers to the political colors blue and red, the former referring to the Democratic party and the latter to the Republican party. Stewart wants to show that Americans and himself included, "we", have a choice in political parties but this is contrasted with the utterance that follows, "but it's the same model" meaning that the political ideologies are the same.

The entire monologue follows this general idea of sameness with Stewart accentuating that the foreign policy shared amongst the candidates is Obama's and not Romney's. Stewart points out that during the debate Romney often agreed with Obama on issues pertaining to the Middle East, when in the previous year he spent his time criticizing the president's diplomatic efforts. This is illustrated in (395-399).

- 395 ((pointing at camera)) But here's the crazy part (.) After basically casting off
- what were months (.) and weeks ago his ((shaking both hands to form a ball like gesture to the right))
- bedrock principles and beliefs (.) to copy ((shaking both hands to form a ball like gesture to the left))
- 398 Obama's policy positions>in a ((JS opens his arms and hands)) transparently cynical

399 appeal to moderate undecideds< (.)

JS is showing his viewers how volatile Romney's "bedrock" principles and beliefs are and clearly states that he is copying the President's policies on foreign affairs in order to deceptively get votes from Americans who have not decided who they will vote for – "transparently cynical appeal to moderate undecideds".

Given this overall scenario, there are three fictive interaction networks in this televised episode that will be presented and analyzed in the sections that follow this one. Two of the three involve Mitt Romney and the other one is with President Barack Obama. Both fictive interaction networks with Romney have one thing in common, they all show a contradictory and untrustworthy republican candidate who throughout the debate supported many parts of the president's foreign policy approach, despite previously describing them as a total failures. The only fictive interaction network with Obama reveals a more arrogant president, a significant difference from the FIs from the show about the first debate.

6.3.1 FI Network Example #1 – Episode 6: Iraq

This episode shows Romney contradicting himself about the war on Iraq. JS shows his viewers a soundbite from the Republican debate of candidates from January 2008 where Romney clearly states he supported the war on Iraq. The fictive interaction comes directly after this video clip and it is between JS and Romney from the debate back in 2008. Here the host asks Romney a question slowly, and pauses for some time with gestures (365-66).

365 **JS:** < But do you support it > (4.0) ((with left arm stretched out JS looks at wrist as if

366 to look at his watch and quickly says leaning forward and pointing to the camera)) >NOW!<



Figure 18: JS looking at wrist

JS is showing his viewers once again that Romney cannot be trusted. He slowly starts to ask the question and gives a four second pause in which he shows that time is passing by looking at his wrist as if he were looking at his watch (cf. Figure 18) and quickly shouts "now". Stewart has already had a similar gesture of looking at his watch in the televised episode about the first debate when he pretends to be the president and calls Romney a liar. This idea of time passing is important not only because time is limited in a debate but also to show that the candidates did not use their time wisely in the debate. In this specific example, the Daily Show viewers are left with the idea that some years have passed since Romney's statement was made. Stewart is setting his audience up for what Romney said the day before in the debate with Obama, which was a contradiction of what he had said before. The soundbite from the debate the day before shows Romney saying that another Iraq situation would be wrong. This fictive interaction contains a compression of different situations of communication taking place at a different space and time, creating a Current Discourse Space that expands over time beginning in January 2008 during the Republican campaign up until the 2nd presidential debate with Obama. JS takes what Romney said in January 2008 and combines that with what he said in the debate the day before to show his viewers that

the republican candidate is not to be trusted. A recurrent theme in the next episode that also contains a fictive interaction network and is a continuation of this one presented here.

6.3.2 FI Network Example #2 – Episode 7: Iran

The Middle Eastern foreign policy continues to be the background for yet another fictive interaction. This example centers on the military options for Iran. Stewart reminds his viewers of Romney's position on Iran by showing them soundbites from three different news programs from three different years: 2012, 2011 and 2007. All these soundbites show Romney criticizing the President's diplomatic stance on Iran and states that military action would have been more effective. Using Romney's previous words as bait, JS fictitiously talks to Romney from those previous years in (384-386).

- ((pointing to camera and moving hand back and forth)) <So here's (1.0) your chance
- to contrast Obama's appearement through diplomacy (.) with your
- 386 ((pointing at camera)) freedom through strengths

JS is fictitiously talking to one Romney whose general ideas about Iran are from three different years, creating once again a time compression and creating a Current Discourse Space where this conversation with Romney occurs, the debate the night before. Although these ideas are from the past, JS brings them to the present with the deictic "here's" when he says: "So here's your chance". JS in this fictitious exchange is giving Romney an opportunity, so as it seems, to show what his opinion on Iran is and how different it is from Obama's who is more diplomatic. The purpose of this fictive interaction is to remind the viewers of what Romney's stance was on Iran before the debate and how strong his convictions were. JS also helps viewers remember that these convictions were the use of military action, which contrasts Obama's, by uttering

the words "freedom through strengths" while at the same time pointing at the camera with his pen as if he were talking directly to the republican candidate. The host, therefore, sets up a scenario in which Romney is seen as contradicting himself, when he shows a clip of Romney talking in the debate the night before about using more peaceful and diplomatic means to take care of the Iranian situation, repeating the words "peaceful" and "peace" several times. Stewart's verbal and non-verbal response (cf. Figure 19) to this soundbite is seen in (390):

((leaning forward pointing to his right with a strange look on his face shifting his eyes)) ((AUD laughs)) ((in authoritative tone)) **JS:** Get a hair cut hippie ((AUD laughs, cheers and claps))



Figure 19: JS reaction to Romney's peace solution

By leaning forward and pausing some time with a strange look on his face, JS shows his viewers his surprise at Romney's response which is completely different from what he had said in the previous years. His verbal response to Romney's peaceful solution is a command: "get a hair cut hippie", bringing to mind the frame of the peaceful hippie sixties, where the famous anti-war slogan was "make love, not war".

6.3.3 FI Network Example #3 - Episode 9: The President's professorial side

The only fictive interaction found between JS and Obama came towards the end of the show in the ninth episode. JS begins this episode telling his viewers that the President performed well in the third debate and that he was confident, so confident that his "professorial side" surfaced. A soundbite of Obama at the debate is shown where he talks about dealing with extremism in Somalia, Yemen and Pakistan. JS's fictitious conversation with Obama comes after this short contribution as can be seen in (441-447). The Current Discourse Space is the debate at Lynn University.

- Pakeestan (.) really? ((AUD laughs)) Suddenly you're a guy who is desperate to
- prove that you once roomed with a ((JS lowers his pitch while nodding his head))
- foreign exchange student (.) Look (.) ((AUD laughs)) this is America (.) we
- don't use (.) ((using both hands to show a place to the right of his desk while looking at camera)) the pronunciation locally (.)
- ((hands in front of him on desk)) We don't say ((moving left hand to right and speaking with Spanish accent)) "México" or
- ((with French accent and shoulders shrugged upwards and right hand slightly lifted with index finger and middle finger touching thumb)) "France" (.) or (.) it's ((in American accent))
- ((looking into camera)) Mexico (.) France (.) and ((exaggerating the word using a less intelligent American accent opening his mouth wide)) Pakistan ((AUD laughs)) (1.0)

In this imaginary conversation JS is criticizing the president for being arrogant and a bit cocky with his pronunciation of the word "Pakistan". Stewart utters the statement of disbelief, "really" with a rise in intonation while shaking his head when saying it twice, to show how unimpressed he is in Obama for pronouncing the word with a British English accent. It is through this fictitious dialog that the host is revealing to the audience that Obama is the best candidate in foreign policy because of his experience. This conversation comes after a soundbite of the President at the debate talking about

the partnerships he created with Middle Eastern countries. Stewart uses exaggeration and humor to show his viewers that the President is strong and that he may have gone a bit overboard in his self-confidence.

Discussion

In the preceding section, we analyzed fifteen fictive interaction networks found in the monologues of the three different televised episodes of the Daily Show from season 18 all aired in October 2012 enacted entirely by its former host, Jon Stewart, about the three 2012 presidential debates. In this section we will answer the research questions posed in the introduction of this dissertation by discussing the findings of this study and reviewing these within the literature aforementioned.

The purpose of this study was to analyze a discourse strategy commonly used by the former host of The Daily Show, Jon Stewart, to mock political actors while obtaining a humorous reaction from his viewers. Therefore, we would like to refer back to our initial research questions that we aimed to answer throughout this dissertation.

- Jon Stewart, the former host of The Daily Show, in his monologues about the three 2012 presidential debates, successfully performed fictitious verbal exchanges in a Current Discourse Space with people who were not found in the Here-and-Now Space (i.e., in The Daily Show studio with the host during the monologue). Who did he have these imaginary conversations with and why? How and why were they created?
- Why did The Daily Show with Jon Stewart resort to fictive interaction as a cognitive strategy? Was it used as a simple humorous device at the discourse level or a rhetorical device to persuade his viewers to look at politicians and their qualifications differently, holding them responsible for their actions/ statements?

All of the fictive interaction networks analyzed were based on imaginary conversations that took place within Jon Stewart's monologues where only he was speaking. Fictive trialogues, or "three-way communication channels" (Pascual 2002; 2014) were created in which the Daily Show viewers were the fictive bystanders (Goffman 1963; Pascual 2002; 2014), overhearing the fictitious dialogs created for their sake by Jon Stewart, the fictive addressor, present in both the Here-and-Now Space as well as the Current Discourse Spaces, talking to the fictive addressees (Barack Obama, Mitt Romney Osama Bin Laden and university students watching the debate from their dorm rooms) not present in the Here-and-Now Space but belonging to the Current Discourse Space. By creating these trialogues, the host was able to show his viewers his reactions to the debates and his opinions of the presidential candidates using humor conceptually in a face-to-face conversation frame that was possible due to the rich complex blending of incongruent frames (Coulson 1996; 2001b; 2005; 2006; Marín-Arrese 2008; Džanić and Berberoviü 2010).

Table 6 shows all the fictive interaction network participants and the Current Discourse Spaces the imaginary conversations took place in and which one of the three Jon Stewart monologues about the three 2012 Presidential debates they belonged to.

Daily Show Monologues								
1. Obama Where Art Thou?		2. The 2 nd Debate: Now Including the President			3. We Missed the NLCS Game for This			
Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee	Current Discourse Space	Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee	Current Discourse Space	Fictive Addressor	Fictive Addressee	Current Discourse Space
JS	Obama	Oct. 3, 2012 at the 1 st debate	JS	Romney	Oct. 17, 2012 at Daily Show Studio	JS	Romney	
JS	Obama		JS	Romney	Oct. 16, 2012 at the 2 nd debate	JS	Romney	Oct. 22, 2012 at the 3 rd debate
JS	Obama	Oct. 4, 2012 at Daily Show Studio	JS	Univ. students	Oct. 16, 2012 in the students' dorms	JS	Obama	
JS	Obama			JS	Obama			
JS	Obama		JS Obama					
Osama Bin Laden	Osama Bin Laden	Oct. 3, 2012 Sponge Bob Cartoon Underwater World	JS	Romney	Oct. 16, 2012 at the 2 nd debate			
JS	Obama	Oct. 4, 2012 at Daily Show Studio				•		

Table 6: FI Networks in the 3 Daily Show Monologues for the 2012 US Presidential Debates

This table clearly indicates that the monologue about the first debate contained the most fictitious conversations, almost all with JS as the fictive addressor (with one exception in which Bin Laden talks to himself making him the fictive addressor as well as the fictive addressee) and President Obama as the fictive addressee. In this monologue

about the first debate the host felt the need to speak with Obama more, given that the President did not perform well and lost the debate. The FI networks were created to show the Daily Show viewers, the fictive bystanders, how upset the host was with Obama who lost the debate despite Romney lying throughout the debate as well as to show his viewers that he held the President responsible for his loss.

The second monologue about the second debate contained five FI networks in which JS was the fictive addressor in all the non-genuine dialogs while Romney was the fictive addressee in three and Obama and university students were the fictive addressees in the other two. In this show, JS created more fictitious conversations with Romney to show his viewers that in this debate he was the weaker candidate and that Obama was more aggressive and performed much better than in the first debate. Although the other two imaginary conversations had different fictive addressees, their fictive purpose was the same, to discredit Romney.

The third presidential debate about foreign policy was the topic of JS's last monologue, which only contained three FI networks. Three fictitious conversations were held between JS, the fictive addressor in all of them, with Romney the fictive addressee in two, and Obama the fictive addressee in one. These FI networks mainly served the purpose of showing the Daily Show viewers that both candidates shared the same views on foreign policy, with the host focusing on Mitt Romney's flip flops¹² in foreign affairs.

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¹² A term widely used in the press to refer to politicians who change their opinion or policies especially when running for office.

All the imaginary conversations found in the fictive interaction networks were about political issues that affected the 2012 presidential campaign and were created not only to entertain and make the Daily Show audience laugh, but also to inform them of the issues and to a certain extent hold the politicians responsible for their actions. This was accomplished through humor operating at a cognitive level within the FI networks. These fictitious conversations used a combination of reality, fiction and fictivity not only to entertain the Daily Show viewers but also persuade them of the host's political stance through the humorous complex fictive interactional networks that were created. Like Xiang (in press), we also believe that reality, fiction and fictivity are not independent of each other but are embedded in one another in these conversations for argumentative purposes in a dynamic way through multiple blending (Fauconnier and Turner 2002, 279–95). Although Xiang studied an Eastern philosophical text, and we studied a televised political satire show, we believe these findings are also true in this case because this is one of the ways human beings conceptualize reality. This is especially true in the FI networks that contain pop culture references (e.g. Titanic movie, Sponge Bob cartoon, Frankenstein movie, Road Runner cartoon) that are used to make the incongruent frame shifts. These fictional references clash with the real issues presented in the debate causing humor and serving as a rhetorical strategy.

This can be seen, for example in FI network ex #1 from Stewart's monologue about the first debate with the multimodal metaphor of the sketch of Romney's head on a woman's body taken from the 1997 Titanic movie. The blend is comprised of a network of blends and involves a number of input spaces one of which is fictive, the fictitious conversation between JS and Obama. Another is not real, the scene from the movie when Jack draws Rose's naked body. Other spaces involve real spaces, like the debate

space where Romney won, the real Titanic ship and its disaster space, etc. All of these fictive, unreal, real spaces were used to make this final network of blends humorous, through incongruous frames, as well as serve a purpose which was to conceptually show Romney's victory by placing him in a position in which it would be difficult to take him seriously. Despite its complexity, the viewers are able to unpack the blend due to the rich visual context provided for them and the fact that they share the same cultural background knowledge (Coulson 1996).

Another example is also found in JS's monologue about the first debate (FI ex. #6) in the multimodal cartoon with Osama Bin Laden and Barack Obama. There are multiple blends working together that not only make the audience laugh but also glorify Obama at a moment when he lost the debate. In this example the unreal Sponge Bob cartoon space blends with the dead Osama Bin Laden space to conceptually remind viewers of one of the President's biggest achievements, finding and killing Osama Bin Laden, enemy number one of the USA. There's also a fictive blend when Bin Laden talks to himself while watching yet another blend of the cartoon space with the real debate space of a real image of Obama on a cartoon screen TV to conceptually represent Obama's loss but stated by a man he was able to defeat, contrasting a passive Obama from the debate with a powerful president from the past.

Using a mental simulation of a conversation, i.e., fictive interaction networks, in this political satire television show allows its audience to be interpersonally involved while also entertained. By overhearing Jon Stewart's imaginary conversations cued with behaviors that are prototypical of conversational framing by televised speakers (Cienki and Giansante 2014), the viewers also feel like they are a part of the conversation and therefore are more prone to agree with the hosts ideas and opinions.

Let us return to our data and give examples of these behaviors listed by Cienki and Giansante (2014) that Stewart uses in his monologues when performing his non-genuine dialogs. The first prototypical behavior found in all the fictitious conversations is the host's high use of "local pronouns" (Cienki and Giansante 2014, 258–59). When he uses the first and second person singular pronouns the viewers automatically activate the cognitive frame of a face-to-face conversation, even though the only "real" person they see is Stewart talking to himself.

Colloquial lexical items and pronunciation (Cienki and Giansante 2014, 259) are another prototypical behavior that speakers in real informal conversations use and that JS also used in his unreal conversations, especially to reference the presidential candidates as can be seen in Table 7.

Obama	Romney		
Dude	Liar		
(Monologue 1 - FI Ex #1)	(Monologue 1 - FI Ex #3)		
Mother Fucker	Knucklehead from Harvard		
(Monologue 2 - FI Ex #1)	(Monologue 1 - FI Ex #5)		
Guy (Monologue 1 - FI Ex #5) (Monologue 3 - FI Ex #3)	Hippie (Monologue 3 - FI Ex #2)		

Table 7: Colloquial expressions referencing the 2012 presidential candidates found in FI network examples

These colloquial expressions are also conceptually used to show the fictive bystanders the host's opinion of each candidate. The expressions used to metonymically reference Obama are generally more positive within their given context, than the ones used to reference Romney. In Obama's case, Stewart calls the president "dude" as if they were friends; "mother fucker" refers to what Stewart thinks Romney should have called Obama who was being forceful in the second debate; and finally "guy" is an informal

word for man. Romney's colloquial expressions, on the other hand, are more derogative within their context and conceptually indicate JS's opinion of the republican candidate. The first expression, "liar" refers to the first debate and the fact that Romney won despite lying all night; "knucklehead from Harvard", also from the first monologue about the first debate depicts the candidate as an idiot even though he is a Harvard alumni, a clear example of incongruity; and finally "hippie" from the third monologue referencing Romney's failure to show strength in handling foreign policy. Romney many times is "the butt of a joke" (Attardo 1994), Stewart's target of most jokes to ridicule him.

The host also uses a derogative name for Jim Lehrer, the first debate moderator, when he calls him "Tote-bag Johnny" (FI network ex #3) meaning idiot. JS is telling Obama what he should have said to the moderator, conceptually giving the idea to the viewers that the president should have been more forceful in the first debate.

There is also an example of a polysemic word which is also considered a colloquialism, the word "blunt" found in the 2nd monologue in FI ex #3. The word has several meanings but within the context of the debate it was referencing an amendment named after a Republican senator whose last name is Blunt. The Daily Show viewers are presented with this salient meaning given the context it is first presented in. Humor arises when the host uses a fictitious conversation with university students providing a context leading to a shift in meaning of this word to a cigar filled with marijuana, having the viewers reject the first salient meaning and reinterpreting it and creating a new interpretation of the word that makes sense within the context the host provides, what Giora (2002; 2003) refers to as optimal innovation.

An example of colloquial pronunciation is also found within the FI network example #4 in episode 8 of the second monologue. JS talks with Obama and tells him that killing terrorists is "your thing" and says this with a Black American accent to once again show his solidarity with the president and let his viewers know the president's strengths in foreign diplomacy.

Short intonation units (Cienki and Giansante 2014, 259) was another prototypical behavior found in televised speaker's conversational framing and that we encountered in JS's speech. Although we did not use any type of phonological software, we were able to note down pitch, duration of speech and intensity using our transcript codes. These shorter intonation units were especially found when the host was most emotional, which was very often, especially in the first monologue about Obama's poor performance in the first debate. Here are two examples (cf. Table 8) from this monologue to illustrate two different emotions JS expressed in his fictive interactions.

Episode/FI network example	Utterance	Emotion
Ep.4 ex #1	<u>>DUDE</u> HE'S YELLING AT YOU< LOOK UP ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) <look up=""></look>	Despair
Ep. 9 ex #5	↑ that's the guy that killed me? ((AUD laughs)) (.) ↑ really?(.) Mr look down at the paper all night ↑ shot me in the face?	Surprised

Table 8: Prosodic features used to express emotion

In the first example found in table 8, the prosodic features used to express despair are: high speech rate (>text<), increase loudness (represented by the all caps), emphatic speech (underlined words) and slower rate of speech (<text>). The second example illustrates Osama Bin Laden's surprise at Obama's poor performance. JS expresses this surprise with rise in intonation (arrows pointing upwards). In these examples and others, we see that it is not only what the host says but how he says it that the viewers

understand the emotions JS is expressing throughout the imaginary conversations. These emotions allow the fictive bystanders, the viewers, to grasp nuances of meaning in what Stewart wants to conceptually convey, that the President lost the first debate and the host was not expecting him to lose.

And finally, the use of non verbal behavior that is so typical of face-to-face conversations and not very common in monologues. In almost all of the fictitious conversations, there are gestures that either accompany the discourse or are representational without discourse to clearly show the idea being transmitted and that evoke humor. An example of the former is found in the first monologue, episode 8, FI network ex #4 when JS fictitiously talks to Obama about Romney's supposed ace in the hole.

237 ((JS leaning forward looking with wide eyes into the camera)) JS: ((JS lifts closed right hand and drops it open)) BOOM (.) Mr President (.) you just walked into a mid storm In (237) JS leans forward and looks directly into the camera, an effective strategy used by people on television to reach their audience (Cienki and Giansante 2014, 260), but in this case to talk to Obama for the sake of the audience. The host says the word "BOOM" while at the same time gesturing as if a bomb were dropped. The discourse used and gestures all allude to the conceptual metaphor of ARGUMENT IS WAR depicting the debate as a war between two sides, the Democrats and the Republicans. And like in any war, bombs are dropped to harm the other side. The host here is setting up the audience for what they think will be a poor comeback from the president, but in fact is not.

An example of gestures being used for representational purposes can be found in the first monologue, episode 6, FI ex #3, after a soundbite with many obvious video clips

of the president talking is shown. This sets up the viewers for what JS does next before talking in (63).

63 ((JS stares with head tilted up and shifts his eyes from side to side and then his head as if bored and confused to where he is)) ((AUD laughs)) **JS**: ((opens eyes wide)) (8.0) ↑ You went over your time? (1.0) ((AUD laughs))

Because the President seemed to be rambling for a long period of time, JS shows his viewers that the speech was long winded through gestures, by pretending to be in a daze and slowly coming out of it and realizing where he is before he "speaks" to Obama.

In all the prototypical behaviors of a conversation frame found in the imaginary conversations, Stewart was able to reveal his opinions about the two candidates, favoring Obama in every case. Although the host takes shots at both politicians, his tendency was to show how great the President is and how little he admired Romney, targeting him as a candidate who lies and shifts political opinions to suit his needs. This is not surprising given that Jon Stewart is said to be more liberal and show more liberal orientation on the show (Becker, Xenos, and Waisanen 2010, 148; Jones 2010, 237).

What made these fictitious conversations credible, funny and convincing was the fact that they all occurred after video or audio clips of the candidates during the debates or from other past moments when they publicly spoke or hard news television programs that commented the debates. Stewart was able to contextualize the conversations for his viewers and direct them towards the issues he wanted to discuss by carefully choosing these soundbites he reacted so passionately to. These soundbites served as platforms of discussion for his non-genuine conversations, calling his audience's attention to the parts of the debate he wanted to accentuate and explain from his point of view. By interacting with soundbites in which his fictive addressees are speaking, Stewart is able

to successfully create the conversation frame and say what many would have liked to have said during the debate at the moment the candidates said what they said.

To sum up this discussion, fictive interaction networks were created not only to entertain the Daily Show viewers throughout the three televised episodes about the three 2012 US presidential debates and make them laugh, but there was also a further agenda, to inform them of the results of the three debates from the perspective of its host. By creating fictitious verbal exchanges conceptualized at the discourse level, through the use of metaphors, complex multiple blends, gestures, video clips, images, prosodic features, linguistic devices (e.g. repetition, use of local pronouns, shifts in register) the host as a conceptualizer is able to represent the content from the debates in a humorous way while at the same time using a face-to-face conversation frame to provide his audience with his opinions and viewpoints to make his arguments stronger and hold the presidential candidates accountable for their actions.

Conclusions and Recommendations

In this final chapter of our dissertation, we will recapitulate the purpose and findings of this study and conclude with some final remarks as to the contributions we believe this study has made in the area of fictive interaction and humor research. We will also present the limitations of our work, and make recommendations for future research.

8.1 Conclusions

Although Jon Stewart has already left The Daily Show, he has definitely left his mark on "soft news" political satire television. His sixteen years of hosting *The Daily Show* has led many academics to study the ways in which this show and its host has made an impact on this form of political television programming that has labeled itself "fake news". However, he managed to use this platform not just to entertain the American people but also to provide them with informative and critical information about news events. Humor was a mechanism he used to unravel the truth behind the issues found in politicians' and the media's political discourse by breaking down what was said using his own rhetorical strategies that many times were very subjective for the sake of his audience.

His final words on his last appearance of The Daily Show, aired July 21st 2015 tie in with what we have been saying throughout this work about dialoging with his audience:

"An artist I really admire once said that he thinks of his career as a long conversation with the audience. A dialog. And I really like that metaphor for many different reasons. But the main one is because it takes away the idea of finality. This is just a conversation. This show isn't ending. We're merely taking a small pause in the conversation. A conversation, which by the way, I have hogged and I apologize for that. I really should have at some point turned the camera around and seem like do you have anything to add. I have really been dominating this in a very selfish way." – Jon Stewart, 2015

This "dialog" mentioned, is especially seen in the conceptual rhetorical strategy, fictive interaction, the object of this study, he frequently used on his show to inform his audience.

This leads us to the main purpose of this study, which was to analyze the reasons why Jon Stewart frequently resorted to fictive interaction, a cognitive strategy based on a face-to-face conversation frame, in his monologues about the three 2012 US presidential debates. He used this conversation frame with other cognitive mechanisms, like blending, metaphor and metonymy, along with his ingenious ability to produce humor, by manipulating images and video and exaggerating what he said (e.g. increase in loudness of his voice, high pitch, shifting registers from formal to informal, using gestures and facial expressions, using colloquial lexical items and pronunciation etc.) to effectively perform his fictitious conversations with a number of fictive addressees. The host successfully created these non-real verbal exchanges in his monologues by creating complex blended spaces in which he was the fictive addressor talking to a

fictive addressee (e.g. Obama, Romney, Osama Bin Laden, or university students watching the debate), who was not physically present in *The Daily Show* studio but many times represented in video clips of the debates or other hard news program video clips, while the audience overheard these conversations, becoming fictive bystanders and hence creating a fictive trialogue. These fictive addressees were not randomly chosen. Each served a specific purpose in each one of the fictive interaction networks. The host's fictive purpose of choosing these particular fictive addressees was to ultimately favor Barack Obama as the best candidate for president of the USA in the 2012 election and discredit Mitt Romney despite the outcome of the first debate, and enhancing certain aspects from the other two debates.

Stewart's overzealous responses to what the fictive addressees said or did on the video clips he so carefully chose to make his points, not only made his viewers laugh but also involved them in his trialogues. He simply verbalized what everyone else was thinking. These humorous imaginary trialogs were successfully performed to serve fictive purposes, that is, to make *The Daily Show* viewers think about the candidates' issues and how they presented themselves in the three 2012 presidential debates from Jon Stewart's perspective. The host attributed belief spaces, opinions and points of view to his audience through these non-genuine conversations based on blends of outrageous incongruent spaces that were funny as well as informative. We agree with cognitive linguistic scholars (Coulson 2001b; Marín-Arrese 2003; 2008; Džanić and Berberoviü 2010; Džanić 2013) who have studied conceptual integration networks in political cartoons, when they argue that blending these incongruent input spaces helps to create and understand humor while simultaneously criticizing the world of politics. We also concur with Brandt (2008; 2013) and Xiang (in press) who have also proven that fictive

interaction blends serve as an argumentative strategy. Although these authors base their findings on philosophical texts, we feel they are also true for humor discourse types because this is how individuals conceptualize reality. We also found that incongruity produced in the fictive interaction networks produce humorous effects that operate at a cognitive level within the networks.

Our findings suggest that theatrically acting out fictitious conversations about abstract political issues by contextualizing these exchanges with video clips from the debates or from other "hard" news programs, as well as using images, gestures, prosodic features, multimodal metaphors, conceptual metaphors, metonymy and blending, Jon Stewart was fictively able to humorously voice his emotions and opinions about the candidates' performance during the debates favoring one candidate, Barack Obama, over the other, Mitt Romney. To a certain extent, the host was also giving a voice to the American people, by saying what so many would have liked to have said in a "real" conversation with the two candidates about their performances in the three debates. Of course "hard news" broadcasters would not be able to do this, because they have to be objective and non-partial and just present the facts as they are. Jon Stewart, on the other hand, is able to say whatever he wants and however he wants, many times shockingly so, because he is a "fake news" broadcaster of a "soft news" program. His imaginary conversations were mainly based on footage he chose from the debate, conveniently starting and stopping video clips at crucial points so that he could subjectively respond to what was said by the fictive addressees he chose for each situation, to make his arguments stronger for the sake of his viewers. It is in his dialogical monologues that he is allowed to conceptually reinforce his political views through humor and share these with his audience.

The success of the show during his reign is largely due to these complex fictive interaction blends he created to analyze and criticize politicians' as well as hard news political commentators' political discourse, holding them accountable for what they said to better inform and raise viewers' awareness of political issues.

8.2 Limitations of research

Like any research study, this one also has certain limitations. One is related to sample size. The findings of our study are limited to three televised episodes of *The Daily Show with Jon Stewart* and therefore the data collected and analyzed is restricted to the examples found in these specific shows. A larger sample size would have permitted other types of data analysis, like statistical analysis of the number of times local pronouns, for example were used, given that this is a prototypical behavior of conversation.

Another limitation also related to the data is the transcription process we used. Transcribing video data involves judgments about the level of detail to choose and can be a bit biased on behalf of the transcriber. For this particular study, verbal and non-verbal interaction were very important given that our main goal was to study a cognitive strategy based on a conversation frame. Despite providing a descriptive text of the visual data that accompanied the verbal information, we felt at times facial expression and body orientation could have been explained in more detail to reinforce the manner in which the host spoke through his non-verbal communication. However, this visual data is difficult to process since there are not many conventions to represent visual elements on a transcript.

Another limitation also related to nonverbal communication, was the lack of in depth analysis of multimodal features found in the data. We are aware of the importance the nonverbal plays in interaction and how it can influence viewers, therefore, we discussed the most important elements found in the data, but we could have dedicated more time to this type of analysis. It is our intention in future work to do so.

Despite these limitations, we feel the work done in this dissertation has proven fruitful for fictive interaction research, especially from a humor perspective. Due to time and space limitations, we were not able to explore other avenues that would have enriched this work more, therefore, in the next section we make recommendations for future work in this area.

8.3 Recommendations for future work

The Daily Show is no longer hosted by Jon Stewart, a master at creating complex fictive interaction networks especially when he carried out fictitious conversations with people by passionately responding to video clips he chose in order to dissect political discourse and uncover what he believed to be the truth behind the issues, especially during election time, like those presented in the 2012 US presidential debates. Now, four years later the show has a new host, Trevor Noah, who uses the same writers. Like Stewart, he also responds to video clips and carries out fictive interactions. Nevertheless, television critics, like Willa Paskin (2016), have criticized the new host and have said he is not "as passionate" as Jon Stewart and that is why the show has lost viewers, especially during the 2016 controversial presidential election with so many naturally occurring humorous situations and unbelievable political ideologies. Future research could be done to compare the two hosts' fictive addressor roles to uncover and study

their different levels of success of fictive interaction. Are there certain communicative performances that make fictive interaction more convincing and proven to be more conceptually accepting by the audience than others?

The Daily Show is just one example of a "soft news" television program. Future research into the importance of humor found in fictive interaction blends could be further studied in other sources of soft news media outlets, like social media or Internet memes. Analyzing verbal and nonverbal elements of humorous fictive interaction blends and the purposes they serve. Because nowadays people look for information that is concise and easily accessed, it would be interesting to explore the importance of fictive interaction blends in these other soft news media outlets and assess their impact on different kinds of publics.

Another avenue for further study would be investigating how recipients unpack humorous fictive interaction blends to understand the underlying meaning that is being conveyed to them and see if this matches with the producer's fictive purposes. Humor research has started to study what recipients of humor think about political humor, especially looking into how they try to understand the messages being transmitted to them. Research could be done to study fictive interaction blends in humor from the "fictive bystanders" perspective and confronting the fictive addressor with that information to see if his fictive purposes were transmitted.

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Appendix A

Transcript of Obama, Where Art Thou?

Transcript of Jon Stewart's Monologue October 4, 2012: *Democalypse 2012: Obama, Where Art Thou?*

ANN: Male Announcer

JS: Jon Stewart

MR: Mitt Romney

OB: Barack Obama

JL: Jim Lehrer (the first 2012 Presidential Debate Moderator)

SJ: Samuel Jackson

AUD: audience

Episode 1: Intro to the show

1	ANN ((voice off)): October fourth (0.5) two thousand twelve (2.0) from Comedy
	Central's world
2	news headquarters in New York (.) this is the Daily Show with Jon Stewart (10.0) ((AUD cheers, claps))
3	JS: WELCOME TO THE DAILY SHOW WE'VE GOT A GOOD PROGRAM FOR YOU
4	TONIGHT (.) My name is Jon Stewart (.) My guest tonight one <william bill="" james="" o'reily=""></william>
5	(.)He will be discussing his book <killing kennedy=""> which I can only assume(.)is a confession(.)</killing>

Episode 2: Americans agree Obama lost debate

6	JS: ALRIGHT (2.0) ((AUD laughter)) let's get right to it we all know this is a deeply
	divided nation
7	or at least it was (.02) until last night when something happened that brought (.)
	all Americans together (.) in agreement

8	((soundbite of political commentator on Live CNN, aired Oct 3rd)): President Obama
	took a shellacking
9	((soundbite of political commentator on MsNBC News aired Oct 3rd)): He was not
	properly <u>prepared</u> for this
10	((soundbite of James Carville on CNN aired Oct 3rd)): The President didn't bring(.) his
	A game
11	((soundbite of MsNBC: Morning Joe aired Oct 4th)): He was just so dull
12	((soundbite of Live CNN: America's Choice 2012)): He looked <u>tired</u> to me
13	((Fox News: Election 2012)): Romney won hands down.
14	((Live Fox News – 2012 Presidential Debates)): He was very very bad last night
15	JS : ((throwing arms up and frontwards)) THERE IS NO <u>RED</u> AMERICA THERE IS
	NO <u>BLUE</u> AMERICA
16	THERE IS ONLY <u>THE</u> AMERICA (.) <u>THAT</u> CAN'T BELIEVE ↑ how bad <u>this</u>
	guy ((pointing with thumb to image on right))
17	did in the debate (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) How bad was the defeat? Obama <u>lost</u> despite
	↑Mitt Romney doing ↑ this:

Episode 3: Romney won despite (...)

10	((countlity of MD analysis at the debate)). The country lim () The coing to store the
18	((soundbite of MR speaking at the debate)): I'm sorry Jim (.) I'm going to stop the
	subsidy to PBS (.) I'm going to stop other
19	things I like PBS I love Big Bird I actually like you too (.) but I'm not going to
	I'm not going to
20	keep on spending money on things to borrow money from China to pay for it
	((AUD laughs))
21	JS : ((image of Big Bird with PBS logo on left)) ((JS opens arms and speaks in upset tone with
	upset facial expression)): MOTHER F**** FIRED BIG BIRD ((AUD laughs, cheers,
	applauds)) (3.0) <america's< td=""></america's<>
22	favorite non-fried bird> (2.0) ((Pointing to image of Big Bird))> Mother f**** fired
	Big Bird and won<
23	((AUD laughs)) (2.0)> Beloved children's character Big Bird and the sad truth is
	Romney could
24	have <water <u="" boarded="">Aladdin (.) ((image of cartoon Aladdin to left of JS)) put <u>down</u> Blue</water>
	(.) ((image of cartoon blue dog))
25	(1.0) <u>deported</u> Dora <u>the</u> Explorer ((image of MR in front of podium pointing at cartoon of
	Dora running with tears in eyes))
26	((AUD laughs)) and <u>still</u> won walking away(.) Romney won with the sound ↑ up
27	((soundbite of the MR speaking at the debate)) MR: you're entitled (.) as the president
L	

2	28	to your own airplane and to your own house (.) but not to your own facts
2	29	((JS is speaking with image of MR to the left)) JS: Romney won with the sound off
		((Soundbite of MR speaking but sound is not audible. OB looking down.))

Episode 4: Dude he's yelling at you - Fictive Interaction (FI) Network Example #1: Stewart talking to Obama

30	JS: <u>DUDE</u> HE'S YELLING AT <u>YOU LOOK UP</u> ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) < <u>LOOK</u>
	<u>UP</u> > ((Obama looks up))
31	((JS vigorously taps pen on paper while looking at camera)) JS: ↑WHAT ARE <u>YOU</u>
	LOOKING <u>AT</u> ? (.)
32	↑WHAT ARE YOU WRITING <u>THAT</u> IS <u>SO</u> IMPORTANT? (.) ((image of black
	hands sketching MR's head on a drawing of a naked woman's body taken from the movie
	Titanic))
33	(.)↑WHAT ARE <u>YOU</u> DOING (.) ((AUD laughs& claps)) ↓ oh <u>that's</u> nice (.) ((image
	with Titanic sketch to the left of JS))
34	((Making a funny face while sticking his finger in his ear)) oh alright that is impressive
	work
35	(1.0) I didn't realize that (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) Maybe you could give that to

36 Mitt Romney as <a <u>souvenir</u> of the night (.) he <u>crushed you</u> in <u>that</u> debate> (1.0)

Episode 5: Roll you? - FI Network Example #2: Stewart talking to Obama

37	JS: And here's the thing (.) Obama <u>lost</u> even though <u>Romney</u> < ↑ was lying his
	ass off the \uparrow entire night>
38	((soundbite of MR talking at the debate)) MR: Medicare (.) for current retirees (.) he's
	cutting 716 billion dollars from the program
39	((JS speaks in despair into camera with eyes wide open and gesticulating arms)) JS:↑ >He's
	not cutting \$716
41	billion from the program (.) he is negotiating lower payment formulas to
	providers and insurance
42	companies, aka <u>the</u> exact same thing <u>that</u> is in Paul Ryan's budget Ψ plan<
43	((soundbite of debate with Romney to the left and Obama looking down to the right)) MR: You
	put 90 billion dollars (.) into into green jobs ((video cut)) And these
44	businesses (.) many of them have gone out of business I think about half of
45	them of the ones have been invested in they've gone out of business
46	((JS reading his notes in full screen with spilt image of Romney to the left and Obama to the
	right)) JS: Well almost half out of nearly

47	three dozen uh three of them (1.0) have gone out (.) ((AUD laughs)) well <u>that's</u> (.)
48	uh almost half except aka >NOWHERE F**** NEAR HALF< ((AUD laughs))
49	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: President said he cut the deficit in half (1.0) unfortunately he doubled it
50	((JS very upset gesticulating arms)) JS: >↑ IT'S <u>DOWN</u> FROM 1.2 TRILLION
51	WHEN HE TOOK OFFICE TO ↑1.1 TRILLION NOW<
52	< MR PRESIDENT ARE YOU JUST GOING TO LET HIM ROLLYOU? >

Episode 6: Liar Romney lie - FI Network Example # 3: Stewart talking to Obama

53	((soundbite of JL and OB speaking in debate)) JL: Mr President (.) two minutes
54	OB: When I walked in the Oval Office (.) I had more than a trillion dollar deficit
	greeting me (.)
55	and we know where it came from ((video cut)) Yes, we had to take some initial
56	emergency measures to make sure we didn't slip into a Great Depression ((video
	cut))
57	Let's make sure we are cutting out those things that are not helping us grow
	((video cut))

58	18 government programs for education that were well intentioned ((video cut))
59	Medical fraud (.) in Medicare ((video cut)) to cut a trillion dollars out of our
	discretionary domestic ((video cut))
60	a specific \$4 trillion deficit-reduction plan (.) It's on a website (.) You can look
	at all the numbers (.) Let let me just finish this point because you're looking for
	contrast.
61	JL: We're way over the two minutes
62	OB: Sorry
63	((JS stares with head tilted up and shifts his eyes from side to side and then his head as if bored
	and confused to where he is)) ((AUD laughs)) \mathbf{JS} : ((opens eyes wide)) (8.0) \uparrow You went
	over your time? (1.0) ((AUD laughs))
64	And <u>yet</u> somehow managed in all that overtime to not <u>turn</u> and look your
	opponent in the eye and just mention
65	<what he="" said="" untrue?="" was=""> ((AUD laughs)) (.)> Not even a quick sneeze before</what>
	your answer< a quick ((JS makes a sneeze-like sound that sounds like f*** you)) (.) ((AUD
	laughs & applauds))
66	<no <u="" be="" need="" to="">coy> let me see if <u>I</u> can (.) come <u>up</u> with a <u>two</u> minute <u>answer</u></no>
67	that might have been more effective (1.0) ((JS clears throat and throws out his arms to
	show he's getting ready and points to his right and pretends to be looking at his watch))

68	< LIAR ((AUD laughs)) LIE LIE LIAR LIE LIE LIAR LIE LIE (.) LIE LIAR LIE
	ROMNEY LIE (.)
69	ROMNEY LIAR>>your time is up< so <u>shut</u> your <u>fat</u> pie hole <u>Lehrer</u> (2.0) ((AUD cheers))
70	<u>I'm</u> the Commander in <u>Chief</u> I don't take orders from <u>tote</u> bag Johnny
71	((looking at wrist again)) Lie lie lie (2.0)
72	What did you think <u>Lehrer</u> was going to bail <u>you</u> out↑ Hold Romney's feet out to the fire↑
73	Lehrer spent the night trying to figure out ↑who was who↑

Episode 7: What's the difference?

74	((soundbite of debate with JL facing forward and MR with back to camera)) JL: What are
	the differences between the two of you as
75	to how you would go about (.) tackling the deficit? ((video cut)) Do you believe
	there is a
76	fundamental difference between the two of you as to how you view the mission
	of the federal government?

77	((video cut)) Do you see a major difference between the two of you on social
	security?
78	((video cut)) Let's move to health care where I know there is a clear difference
79	((surprisingly looks at his paper than back to camera, AUD laughs)) JS: You're both around the same height
80	is is is there a difference in your weights? Is there (1.0) I see energy wise there's a difference
81	uh uh this gentleman here ((pointing to OB then looks at paper in his hands)) uh uh appears to be on Ambien (.)
82	and the other gentleman appears to have tried <u>caffeine</u> for the first time in his life
83	((AUD laughs)) (2.0) you guys notice that too↑ Seriously (.) it's like minutes before the debate (.)
84	Scott Bakula ((image to left changes to actor Scott Bakula)) quantum leaped into Lehrer's body (.) and
85	then had to figure out where the f*** he was (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((imitating Lehrer's voice and shifting body from side to side))
86	Alright two people on stage and there's an audience uh (0.5) what's the difference between them

87	and then Bakula is like ((image to left is of the actor Dean Stockwell, JS imitates Bakula's
	voice shifting body))
88	hey Dean Stockwell> am I here to prevent crime ((AUD laughs)) or what the hell is
	going on around here<
89	(2.0) Anyway my point is (.) uh Quantum Leap was a really good show (1.0)
	((AUD laughs))

Episode 8: Power Shift - FI Network Example #4 & FI Example #5: Stewart talking to Obama

90	Anyway (.) here is the saddest part (.) despite Romney's best effort at lying
91	the only category Obama <u>defeated</u> Romney in was <u>biggest</u> lie (.) <of night="" the=""></of>
92	((soundbite of debate with JL speaking)) JL: I'm not going to grade the two of you
93	and say you've (.) your answers have been too long or I've done a poor job.
94	OB: You've done a great job.
95	((JS is nodding with a worried look)) JS: ((AUD laughs, cheers, applauds)) Look ((JS throws up arms and looks away from the camera)) (.)
96	You know (2.0) ((JS looks at camera)) I don't get this ((JS points to the camera)) (1.0)

97	>I honestly don't get this Mr President you seemed either annoyed to be there
	or <u>reluctant</u> to make your case<
98	because (.) I'm assuming you have a case (.) which would be a whole other
	issue
99	you know I hate to do this to you sir (1.0)
100	Camera three please ((turns to camera)) (2.0)
101	((JS speaks in boyishly embarrassed tone)) Hh hi Mr President ((AUD laughs)) (2.0)
102	((returns to normal voice and stacks papers evenly in front of him))you know look (1.0) I
	know you probably dread having to spend <u>90</u> minutes (.) debating some
103	knucklehead from ((JS lifts hands and says word with different low base tone)) Harvard
	who is just going to ((right hand mimicking talking)) rarara all night
104	(1.0) Believe me I know (.) I've been there (.) or (.)((JS talks in serious tone)) will
	be Saturday at eight ((JS slowly moves his head from one side to another like a robot and
	then laughs looking down and taking one sheet of paper and placing it under the stack of papers
	he's holding)
105	(AUD laughs, claps and cheers)) (9.0) No camera on in the green room right? (2.0)
106	But you know Mr President (.) everyone has parts of their jobs they don't like
	as much (.) but
107	they still have to \underline{do} those things if they want to \uparrow keep those jobs (0.5)

108	And if you don't want to do it for <u>yourself</u> (.) think of your supporters (1.0)
	Look what your performance did last night to one of them
109	((soundbite from MSNBC Chris Matthews speaking)) I don't know what he was doing
	out there
110	((video cut)) I don't know how he let Romney get away with the crap he threw
	out ((video cut))
111	what was he doing tonight? ((video cut)) He went in there disarmed. Where was
	Obama tonight?
112	JS: ((JS looking into camera with upset facial expression)) ↑ YOU HAPPY ((AUD laughs
	& claps)) (3.0) ((JS points to his right looking into camera with upset facial expression))
113	↑Mr President < <u>you</u> broke ↑Chris Matthews> ((AUD laughs & claps)) (2.0) <u>now</u>
	((JS crisscrosses arms))
114	nobody can use him (.) <u>now</u> (JS points to camera) (2.0) ((AUD laughs & claps))
115	>admittedly Matthews is on a complex machine everyone knows he's just a
	simple potato battery<
116	but still (2.0) ((JS points to camera)) ((AUD laughs)) he \lambda likes you (.)

Episode 9: Osama Bin Laden - FI Network Example #6: Osama Bin Laden talking to himself

117	and even people who don't like you were somewhat stunned at the poor
	performance (.)
118	Even Osama Bin <u>Laden</u> from the bottom of his watery <u>grave</u> ((full screen of an
	underwater cartoon scene taken from Sponge Bob with a 'real' Osama Bin Laden sitting on a
	cartoon couch next to SpongeBob Squarepants octopus character Squidward Tentacles
	watching a 'real' Obama on a cartoon TV))
119	watched and was like ↑that's the guy that killed me? ((AUD laughs)) ↑Really?
	((full screen of JS pretending to write on paper with surprised look on face))
120	Mr look down at the paper all night, \uparrow shot me in the face?

Episode 10: Urgent emails - FI Network Example #7: Stewart talking to Obama

121	(3.0) ((JS looks into camera points and gets more serious)) Here's ((puts index finger on mouth
	and points to camera))(.)
122	what's perhaps most maddening ((JS puts index knuckle on his mouth and points with
	his pen to camera))
123	(1.0) for the <u>past</u> year and a <u>half</u> (.) <u>you Mr President have inundated this country</u>
	with urgent

124	emails ((full screen of JS's inbox email with Obama's name highlighted in blue)) begging
	for < support and
125	money ((same inbox screen with Michelle Obama's name highlighted in blue)) and energy
	((same inbox screen
126	with Joe Biden's name highlighted in blue)) and <u>money</u> ((same inbox screen with Jill Biden's
	name highlighted in blue))
127	and \underline{money} (.) ((same inbox screen with Beau Biden's name highlighted in blue)) (0.5) and
	money ((same inbox screen with Bo the dog's name highlighted in blue)) ((AUD laughs))
128	> And it's not just the <u>number</u> of emails (.) <u>it's</u> the <u>intensity</u> of <u>their</u> content (.)
129	((full screen JS with email to the right from Obama and a sentence taken from it in larger print
	"This is Our One Shot", JS shaking pen)) JS: <u>This</u> is our <u>one</u> Shot
130	((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "say you're in")) say you're
	<u>in</u>
131	((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "you're response is critical"))
	you're response is <u>critical</u>
132	((email changes to highlighted circled subject line which reads "I can't do this on my own")) \underline{I}
	can't do this on my own>
133	((JS changes tone of voice shifts eyes from one side to another)) and by the way you made
	<u>tha</u> t <abundantly< th=""></abundantly<>

134	clear last night> (.) ((JS looks at camera and points with pen)) But the point is this (.)
	you and your cam
135	campaign have demanded a level of <effort, and="" from<="" relentlessness="" td="" urgency=""></effort,>
	your supporters> (.)
136	A level of effort (.) urgency and relentlessness (.) <u>you</u> failed to display in a
	national presidential
137	debate (.) Shouldn't your <u>urgency</u> and <u>passion</u> be on <u>par</u> with the urgency and
	passion <of e-<="" td="" your=""></of>
138	blasts>? (0.5) Or are you not <u>on</u> your mailing <u>lists</u> ? ((AUD laughs)) (.) I'm tempted
	to leave <u>you</u>
139	with the wise words of a <u>noted</u> actor (.) who's campaign viral video has been
	forwarded to my
140	inbox (.) <u>nineteen</u> hundred times by some of you who are passionate followers
	(0.5) I believe <u>it</u>
141	goes a little something like <u>this</u> :
142	((soundbite of an angry Samuel Jackson talking in Pro-Obama Ad by JCER)) SJ: Wake the
	f*** up ((AUD laughs, claps and cheers))
143	JS: Will be right back.

Appendix B

Transcript of The Second Debate: Now Including the President

Transcript of Jon Stewart's Monologue October 17, 2012 – Democalypse 2012:

The Second Debate: Now Including the President

ANN: Male Announcer

JS: Jon Stewart

MR: Mitt Romney

OB: Barack Obama

CC: Candy Crowley (the second 2012 Presidential Debate Moderator)

AUD: audience

Episode 1: Intro to show

144 ANN ((voice off)): October seventeenth (0.5) two thousand twelve (2.0) from Comedy

145	Central's world news headquarters in New York (.) this is the Daily Show with
	Jon Stewart (10.0) ((AUD cheers, claps))
146	JS: WELCOME TO THE DAILY SHOW (.) MY NAME IS JOHN STEWART
	((takes pen out of inside jacket pocket and throws it under his desk and looks directly at the camera and speaks)) (2.0)
147	we're gonna have a nice one for you tonight(.) from the New York Times (.) Five
148	Three Eight Block Statistician <u>all-star</u> <nate silver=""> (.) >will be joining us tonight< (.)</nate>
149	((JS picks up papers in front of him and looks down at them stretching out his arm then changing pages as he speaks)) and uh (3.0) then ((looking down at his papers)) tomorrow night ((in a lower voice))
150	◆President Barack Obama (.) ((looks up and directly at the camera with big eyes))
151	BUT STILL ((AUD laughs)) (1.0) these people ((JS stretches out his right arm and hand and
152	moves them from right to left indicating the audience)) get to see ((crisscrosses his arms twice as he says the name)) Nate Silver
153	(5.0) Nate Silver the president of ((JS raises his eyebrows and roles his eyes up then looks into camera)) <statistician stand=""> ((AUD chuckles and JS looks down towards his right and nods his head and shrugs his shoulders)) (4.0)</statistician>

Episode 2: Town hall crowd

154	JS: ((JS looks down then directly into the camera)) As you know last night the
	presidential
155	campaign headed to Hofstra University where the candidates debated <u>before</u> (.)
	((screen changes to video of the debate at Hofstra University))
156	>A DIVERSE TOWN HALL CROWD OF LONG ISLANDERS RANGING
	FROM< ((full screen of abc news broadcast of man, Phillip Tricolla with microphone in
	hand))
157	ITALIAN GUYS TO (.) ((full screen of debate audience and 2 circles around 2 Italian
	looking men)) OTHER
158	ITALIAN GUYS (1.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((full screen with man in suit, Jeremy Epstein with
	microphone in hand))
159	< <u>TO</u> A <u>JEWISH GUY</u> ((full screen to woman with microphone in hand)) ↓ and his
	<u>mom</u> > ((AUD laughs)) (1.0)
160	((full screen of JS with an image of Romney and Obama facing each other. The title above the
	image is Democalpyse 2012 and underneath it in caps "The Second Debate")) \mathbf{JS} : ((JS with a
	smile on his face shifting his head back and moving it slightly from side to side)) such
	diversity in Long Island (1.0) ((AUD laughs))

Episode 3: The first question

161	((JS speaks with a more serious tone without the smile)) >the first question somehow
	ended up< on the auto industry rescue
162	((soundbite of MR speaking at the debate. Split screen with Obama on the right smiling with
	mouth closed and MR on the left talking to Obama)) MR: And I know he keeps saying,
	you want to
163	take Detroit bankrupt(.) Well (.) the President took Detroit bankrupt (.) You
	took
164	General Motors bankrupt (.) You took Chrysler bankrupt (.) ((video cut)) That
	was
165	precisely what I recommended and ultimately what happened.
166	((Full screen JS with image of MR to the left holding microphone at debate.)) JS: Well OK
	(1.0) ((AUD laughs and JS laughs with closed right hand and index finger up and thumb out
	looking down and laughing then looking up to the right and then in a more serious tone looking
	into the camera he says))
167	>in fact Obama's publicly financed Detroit auto industry managed bankruptcy
168	((JS touches his index finger with his thumb and moves this gesture back and forth while
	talking)) <is (1.0)="" not="" precisely=""> what Romney recommended (.) Romney</is>
	PRECISELY recommended

169	((JS stops gesticulating with his right hand and now uses his entire left hand)) private credit
	which at the time was
170	>to be ((JS uses his index finger and thumb gesture with his left hand)) precise NON-EXISTENT<
171	(1.0) >meaning under his plan Detroit's bankruptcy would have been
172	< <u>UNMANAGED</u> and quite permanent (1.0)

Episode 4: It's alive!

173	> So the big question would be (1.0) which version (.) of Barack Obama would
174	↑respond?<(.) The first debate's ((full split screen of Obama at first debate on one side
	• (v)
	in suit and looking down and on the other side Obama without his jacket looking up and alert))
175	↑Sleepytime McGillicuddy? ((AUD laughs)) OR (1.0) ↑Pretty Talk Jones
173	(AOD laughs)) <u>OR (1.0)</u> The retty Talk soiles
176	((soundbite from 2 nd debate with a full screen of Obama speaking)) OB: Candy (.) what
	Governor Romney said just isn't true
177	((full screen JS with astound look on his face and to his left the same image of Romney and
1 , ,	(("
	Obama pointing at each other but with a yellow sign underneath "NOW INCLUDING THE
	DDECIDENTEN IC. ((IC. commiss. id. had had a dad a dad a daile a dad a daile a
	PRESIDENT")) JS: ((JS screaming with both hands on the desk and his eyes bulging out

	looking up from side to side)) ((AUD laughs, cheers and claps)) > IT'S ALIVE (.) IT'S
	<u>ALIVE</u> < (.)
178	((swirling all around in his chair with his mouth wide open and arms stretched out))>WOOH
	WOOH< (2.0) YES
179	PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA DECIDED TO <u>ATTEND</u> THIS DEBATE
	((AUD LAUGHS)) (1.0)
180	And the two candidates could finally have a <u>truthful substantive</u>
181	<u>discussion</u> about how much they <u>f****ing</u> hate each other ((AUD laughs))

Episode 5: Romney was sharp but ... - FI Network Example #1: Stewart talking to Romney

182	((soundbite video clip of debate)) OB: Governor, we have actually produced more
	oil.
183	MR: No, no. How much did you cut licenses and permits on federal land and
	federal
184	waters? ((video cut)) OB : we can actually make a profit MR : And production on
	private on
185	government land OB: Production is up. MR: is down. OB: No, it isn't

186	MR: Production on government land of oil is down 14 percent. OB: Governor
	MR: And production on gas
187	((CROSSTALK)) OB : It's just not true. ((video cut)) MR : You'll get your chance in
	a moment. I'm still
188	speaking. OB : Well (.) MR : And the answer is I don't believe people think
	that's the case
189	((inaudible)) MR : That wasn't the question.
190	(4.0) ((full screen with JS and to his right an image of Obama and Romney at debate talking to
	each other)) JS: ((JS with mouth open and tongue thrusting inside his cheek looking to the
	right with his arms open as the AUD say oh)) I believe you
191	((JS shifts arms right to left looking up)) meant to add mother f***er ((JS looks into
	camera)) ((AUD laughs and claps))(1.0)
192	It wasn't the question mother f^{***er} (1.0) ((full screen with video clip of Romney at
	debating speaking))
193	Romney was sharp (1.0) and drew blood.
194	((soundbite of debate with Romney speaking)) MR: He said that by now we'd have
	unemployment at 5.4 percent
195	(1.0) The difference between where it is and 5.4 percent is < 9million Americans
	without work>

196	((JS looking into camera thrusting his head back as he makes a gun shot sound)) ((AUD laughs))
	JS: ((with serious tone) that's gonna leave a mark (.) but for every point Romney
	made (.)the President(.) made more
197	((soundbite of debate OB holding microphone walking as he talks)) OB : Governor
	Romney was
198	for an assault weapons ban before he was against it ((video cut)) Governor
	Romney
199	doesn't have a five-point plan he has a one- point plan ((video cut)) The math
	doesn't
200	add up ((video cut)) I don't look at my pension it's not as big as yours ((video cut))
201	Governor (.) you're the last person who's going to get tough on China.

Episode 6: The Blunt Amendment – FI Network Example #2: Stewart talking to Romney & FI Network Example #3: Stewart talking to university students

202	JS: ((exaggerating a serious tone with frowned eyebrows)) The last person who is gonna
	get
203	tough on China is that guy ((pointing to his left)) Romney (.) ((JS turns and faces the
	image of both candidates and chuckles as he speaks))

204	I mean for God's sakes (.) Romney was assembled in Apple's Foxconn factory
	in
205	Beijing ((AUD laughs)) (.) I mean (.) that's why he is so well designed (.) ((AUD
	cheers and claps))
206	Romney (.) also (1.0) Romney had some other issues
207	((soundbite video clip of debate)) MR: I don't believe that bureaucrats in Washington
	should tell someone whether they can use contraceptives or not.
208	JS: ((JS with serious look on his face, eyebrows lowered and pushed together and slightly
	nodding his head)) Yeah (.) you should tell that to your (.) disembodied voice (.)
	that supported the
209	Blunt Amendment (.) which <u>does</u> limit choice
210	((full screen of still image of Romney and audio of Howie Carr Radio Show from February 29
	with text of what Romney said beside image)) MR: Of course I support the Blunt
	Amendment. I thought he was talking about some state
211	law that prevented people from getting contraception So I talked about
212	contraceptives and so forth so I really misunderstood the question
213	JS: ((JS looks into camera and points with pen)) $\underline{\text{Yeah}}$ (.) by the way for those of you
	let's

214	say in your dorm rooms right now filling a large tube ((brings hands closer together
	to indicate tube))
215	with water or carving an apple ((AUD laughs)) ((JS looks down)) (.) Um (1.0) ((JS
	looks up))
216	whose ears may have perked up at the mention of a ((makes quotes gesture with
	fingers))
217	blunt amendment Um (2.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS with a smirk on his face)) it has nothing
	to do with that (.) ((AUD laughs))

Episode 7: Romney recruiting women for cabinet positions

218	((JS more serious face)) Romney had some odd moments like when describing his
	efforts
219	as Governor to recruit more women(.) for cabinet positions
220	((soundbite clip from the debate)) MR: I went to a number of women's groups and
	said (.)
221	↑Can you help us find folks (.) and they brought us whole binders full of
	women.
222	((JS has his index finger on his mouth with a worried expression tapping his pen on the desk))
	JS: ((JS pauses looks down, AUD cheers, JS looks away, turns over a sheet of paper on his
	desk and taps it, AUD laughs and claps, and JS puts his hands together on top of the desk and

	looks into the camera with a smirk on his face)) Couple of things ((AUD laughs)) (1.0) One
	the woman's group was called MASSCAP (.)
223	((JS moves both hands from left to right on desk as he says)) and they approached
	Governor Romney (.)
224	((JS reverses the movement of his hands)) not the other way around (1.0) And two (.)
	my
225	guess is ((raised eyebrows)) <u>THEY(.)</u> did not refer to what they presented as (.) ((JS
	briefly closes his eyes as he says))
226	whole binders full of women ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) But perhaps referred to it as (.)
	>a
227	well organized collection of qualified resumes< But HEY (.) ((AUD laughs)) (1.0)
	((JS speaks with Italian American accent and moves like a stud sitting back with shoulders
	raised and arms open))
228	binder of women book of broads notebook of nipples whatever((AUD laughs, claps
	and cheers)) (.) whatever (.)

Episode 8: Romney's ace in the hole - FI Network Example #4: Stewart talking to Obama

229	((video clip of debate with MR talking but JS talks with normal voice)) But of course (.)
	Mitt Romney (.) still had
230	((back to studio with JS leaning forward looking into camera and pointing)) an ace in the
	hole (.)
231	>The Obama administration's confused handling consulate attack in Libya<(.)
	that killed <u>four</u> Americans
232	((soundbite of Romney speaking at debate)) MR: it was a terrorist attack and um it
	took a
233	long time to tell for that to be told to the American people. Whether there was
	some
234	misleading, or instead whether we just didn't know what happened, you have to
	ask
235	yourself why didn't we know five days later when the ambassador to the United
236	Nations went on TV to say that this was a demonstration. How could we have
	not known?
237	((JS leaning forward looking with wide eyes into the camera)) JS: ((JS lifts closed right hand
	and drops it open)) BOOM (.) Mr President (.) you just walked into a mid storm

238	((soundbite of Obama speaking at debate)) OB: The day after the attack, governor, I
	stood in
239	the Rose Garden and I told the American people in the world that we are going
	to find
240	out exactly what happened. That this was an act of terror and I also said that
	we're going to hunt down those who committed this crime
241	((JS looks into camera slightly swaying head from side to side)) JS: OK (.) ((JS nudges head
	to right when saying the next word)) forceful (1.0) ((JS uses right hand to make a move like
	a DJ is scratching a record))
242	remind people that killing terrorists is kind of ((next 2 words said with African
	American accent and pointing))
243	your thing ((AUD laughs, JS shakes his head up and down and closes his mouth and opens it
	with a sound and looks up to his right))
244	(2.0) But still does not fully explain ((JS looks into the camera)) the colossal
	confusion
245	fueled f**** ups that were Benghazi (1.0) ((JS looks up to his right))

Episode 9: Semantic Trap - FI Network Example #5: Stewart talking to Romney

246	JS: as long as Romney ((JS looks into camera)) doesn't inexplicably walk into
	some
247	weird nitpicky semantic <u>trap</u> that hadn't even really been <u>↑set</u> ((AUD laughs))
248	((soundbite of debate)) MR: I I think interesting the president just said something which which is that on
249	the day after the attack he went into the Rose Garden and said that this was an act of terror.
250	JS: ((JS is slightly turned to the right but looks into camera with bulging eyes)) Oh boy ((AUD laughs))
251	((soundbite of debate)) MR: You said in the Rose Garden the day after the attack, it was an act of terror.
252	OB : Please proceed governor. MR : It was not a spontaneous demonstration, is that what you're saying?
253	OB: Please proceed governor.
254	JS: ((both hands slightly lifted off the table, eyes wide open and mouth open in surprise, AUD ohs and claps)) ((in a whispering voice leaning forward and pointing JS says)) There's your first clue (1.0) ((AUD laughs))((with a more vibrant tone JS pointing and looking into the camera says)

255	When you feel you're about to spring what you Governor Romney think is the
256	<pre><checkmate debate="" moment="" of="" the=""> (.) <and debate="" opponent="" says="" to="" you="" your=""></and></checkmate></pre>
	(1.0) ((right arm stretched out in front of him moving slowly from right to left with a smile
	and a very formal tone of voice))
257	please ((reverses the movement of the hand)) (AUD laughs, claps and cheers)) (.) proceed
	(.)
258	((JS stretches out his hands in front of him)) Hold on ((JS puts his fist to his mouth)) (1.0)
	are you
259	trying to open that door (.) ((JS's tone of voice is still formal with a rise in intonation. JS's
	gestures as if he were opening a door))
260	allow me to open it (.) wider (.) >The door that <u>you</u> appear you want to <u>walk</u>
	through< ((pointing at camera))
261	(.) >But when your opponent does that you might want to take a breath and
262	wonder <iif ((image="" a="" and="" cartoon="" coyote))="" coyote<="" e.="" la="" of="" right="" road="" runner="" td="" to="" wile=""></iif>
	and the
263	road runner (1.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS points to the image to his right)) that door your
264	opponent is pointing to is merely <paint a="" on="" rock=""></paint>
265	((soundbite of debate) OB : Please proceed governor.

266	MR : I want to make sure we get that for the record because it took the president
	14 days before
267	he called the attack in Benghazi an act of terror. OB : Get the transcript.
	CROWLEY: It (.) it (.) it
268	he did in fact, sir. So let me (.) let me call it an act of terror (.) OB: Can you
	say that
269	a little louder, Candy? CROWLEY : He (.) he did call it an act of terror. He did
	as well
270	((AUD laughs, cheers and claps while JS shakes his head)) JS: ((with black voice)) ↑ Can
	you say
271	it a little louder Candy? (.) ^ Can you say it a little louder? Now, just the ladies
	↑ Can
272	the ladies say it? ((AUD laughs)) (.) Can I get a ((JS raises his hand up and looks
	up to his left and back at the camera))
273	whoa whoa? ((in a serious tone)) Please (.) Governor Romney (.) ((hand stretched out
	in front as if to let someone by)) proceed (.) ((full screen soundbite of cartoon wild coyote
	running and crashing into a wall)) ((full screen back to JS and image of both candidates pointing
	at each other on left))

Episode 10: Post debate media coverage

274	JS: It was that kind of night for Romney (.) And the evidence of Obama's
	victory and
275	resurgence was everywhere post debate (.) ((full screen of MSNBC broadcast))
	<msnbc< td=""></msnbc<>
276	no longer seemed suicidal> ((AUD laughs)) ((full screen of CNN news anchor with
	technological images appearing)) (.)
277	CNN of course looked to be shooting a virtual Dick in a box video ((full screen of
	Fox News broadcast)) ((AUD laughs and cheers)) and (.) of course (.) <u>foxnews</u> well
278	((soundbite from fox news)) FOX NEWS COMMENTATORS : and the questions
	((video cut and another anchor))
279	there were eleven of them six were clearly pro Obama ((video cut change in anchor))
280	topics that we haven't really heard much about. ((video cut another anchor speaking))
	three
281	extra minutes for Obama ((video cut another speaker)) moderators in these debates
	should
282	be part of the furniture. ((video cut another speaker)) did she assist to the President
	mid sentence to fact checking ((video cut another speaker))

283	((video cut another speaker)) through the Presidential lifeline ((video cut another
	speaker)) it
284	was the worst debate moderation ((video cut another speaker)) what the heck is that
	about
285	((JS stretches out his left arm and dramatically says) JS: No no no (.) don't help them
	((AUD laughs))(.)
286	((JS rolls left hand in front of him)) just let them cry themselves to sleep ((AUD laughs))
	(.)
287	((JS in normal tone)) It's the only way they'll learn (.) We'll be right back.

Appendix C

Transcript of We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This

Transcript of Jon Stewart's Monologue October 23, 2012 – *Democalypse 2012 - We Missed NLCS Game 7 for This*

ANN: Male Announcer

JS: Jon Stewart

MR: Mitt Romney

OB: Barack Obama

BS: Bob Schieffer (the third 2012 Presidential Debate Moderator)

AUD: audience

COM: News Commentator

Episode 1: Intro to show

288	ANN ((voice off)): October twenty-third (0.5) two thousand twelve (2.0) from
	Comedy Central's world news
289	headquarters in New York (.) this is the Daily Show with Jon Stewart (10.0)
	((AUD cheers, claps))
290	JS: ((JS writing on paper at his desk)) WELCOME TO THE DAILY SHOW (.) MY
	NAME IS JON
291	STEWART WE'VE GOT A GOOD ONE FOR YOU TONIGHT (.) OUR
	GUEST (.)
292	Gerard Butler has got a new film (.) Chasing (.) Mavericks (.) It's a (.) it's a (.)
	film
293	uh following (.) Sarah Palin around (3.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS looks down shuffling
	papers in front of him then throws up hands))
294	↑Whatever happened to that lady (.) ((AUD laughs)) I don't know (1.0)

Episode 2: Weakness in foreign policy

295	Let's begin uh tonight with last night's presidential debate in ((JS says the city with
	exaggeration))

296	<boca raton=""> (.) FLORIDA (.) WHICH IS SPANISH FOR (.) RAT'S</boca>
	MOUTH (2.0) ((AUD laughs))
297	and Yiddish for (.) <heaven's room="" ♥waiting=""> (3.0) ((AUD laughs, claps and cheers))</heaven's>
	((JS fixes hair, licks hands and straightens eyebrows))
298	This is the ((JS puts up three fingers)) <u>THIRD</u> and ((JS looks up)) <thank god=""> (.) the</thank>
	final
299	debate between Barack Obama and Mitt Romney (.) >The topic foreign policy
	<u>bad</u>
300	news for President Obama (.) < because
301	((soundbite of Fox News radio transmission of Donald Trump speaking with image of Michelle
	Obama and Barack Obama walking away from a plane dating September 18)) TRUMP: in
	the history of
302	presidents of the United States he is our worst at foreign policy ((video cut))
303	((soundbite Fox News.Com image showing Peshawar, Pakistan and the commentator to the left
	speaking dating September 21)) COMMENTATOR: This is a very weak ill
	conceived foreign policy ((video cut))
304	((soundbite Fox News broadcast with Senator John McCain, former GOP Presidential
	Nominee speaking)) SEN JOHN MCCAIN: Every place you look its failure
	((video cut))

305	((soundbite CNN broadcast of Rep Paul Ryan, Vice Presidential Nominee, speaking on
	September 4)) PAUL RYAN: The Jimmy Carter years look like the good old days
	compared to where we are right now.
306	((video cut)) ((soundbiteFox News broadcast of Mitt Romney speaking in an interview)) MR:
	The President has communicated weakness.
307	JS: ((screaming throwing left arm out in front of him)) WEAKNESS in foreign policy
	(.)
308	((JS with bended elbow resting on desk and thumb up)) Obama is weaker than Coolidge
309	((image to JS's right changes to Obama on right and Coolidge on left)) foreign policy (.)
	weaker
310	than ((third image is added below)) ((JS with bended elbow resting on desk with thumb up and
	index finger)) Polk (.)
311	weaker than ((on top of other images is a cartoon sketch of a man holding up his hands with
	heading below, President Flinchington J. Craphispants))
312	<pre><president craphispants="" flinchington="" j.=""> ((AUD laughs and claps)) (2.0) As you</president></pre>
	know the
313	only President (.) in United States history who ever had his wallet stolen by a
314	((whispers)) baby ((AUD laughs)) (3.0) ((image changes to Obama and Romney))

315	((JS almost laughing says)) You don't hear as much about President
	Craphispants ((AUD laughs)) (2.0) ((JS with serious tone and face pointing to his right))
316	But given President Obama's foreign policy record (.) <this <u="">debate is gonna be</this>
316	But given President Obama's foreign policy record (.) <this <u="">debate is gonna be a <u>bloodbath</u>></this>

Episode 3: Romney leaning Obama

322	JS: (3.0) ((statue like with astound look on his face looking into camera then quickly shifting eyes only to his right and back at camera then looking perplexed – frowned eyebrows and
321	((video cut))It's absolutely the right thing to do, to have crippling sanctions
320	((video cut)) I felt the same as the President did ((video cut)) I supported his action there
319	President was right ((video cut))I want to underscore the same point the president made
318	drones are being used in drone strikes, and I support that entirely, and feel the
317	((soundbite of Romney at debate with heading: Democalypse 2012 and in bigger capital letters WE MISSED NLCS GAME 7 FOR THIS)) MR : I congratulate him on taking out Osama Bin Laden ((video cut))
317	

	squinting eyes - down at papers in his hands then back at camera)) ((AUD laughs, cheers and
	claps)) ↑ I think Romney is leaning <u>Obama</u>
323	((AUD laughs)) (1.0) Apparently Romney is one of this year's covenant swing
	voters
324	((with pen in left hand pointing to camera)) Look (.) ((AUD laughs)) how closely (.) did
	Mitt
325	Romney align himself (.) with what had (.) ((JS turns towards right and puts hands up
	and down then looks at camera))
326	I guess up until last night (.) been the worst foreign policy \(\bullet\) ever (.)

Episode 4: Duet on Syria

327	((JS with hands open facing each other in front of him)) Listen to these guys > <u>duet</u> on
	Syria<
328	((soundbite of debate with Romney left and Obama right)) MR: I believe that Assad must
	go. ((video cut))
329	((soundbite of Obama at debate)) OB: Assad has to go. ((video cut))
330	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: I don't want to have our military involved in
	Syria. ((video cut))

331	((soundbite of Obama at debate)) OB: For us to get more entangled militarily in Syria
	is a serious step.
332	((video cut)) ((soundbite of Romney speaking at debate)) MR: So the right course for us,
	is working through our partners
333	((video cut)) ((soundbite of Obama at debate)) OB: in consultation with our partners
	((video cut))
334	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: to identify responsible parties within Syria
	((video cut))
335	((soundbite of Obama at debate)) OB: mobilizing the moderate forces ((video cut))
336	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: organize them ((video cut))
337	((soundbite of Obama speaking at debate)) OB: helping the opposition organize ((video
	cut))
338	((soundbite of Romney speaking at debate)) MR: We do need to make sure ((video cut))
339	((soundbite of Obama speaking at debate)) OB: making absolutely certain ((video cut))
340	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: that they don't have arms ((video cut))
341	((soundbite of Obama speaking at debate)) OB: arms in ((video cut))
342	((soundbite of Romney speaking at debate)) MR: in the wrong hands ((video cut))

343	((soundbite of Obama at debate)) OB: folks who eventually could turn them against
	us ((video cut))
344	((soundbite of Romney at debate)) MR: to hurt us down the road ((video cut))
345	((soundbite of Romney to left and Obama on the right both saying at the same time)) OB &
	MR: thank you
346	JS: ((AUD laughs, claps and cheers)) ((surprised look on face – eyes bulging out and sitting
	back in his chair, eyebrows frowning)) WOW! (2.0) ((JS speak in upset tone)) MHAT
	THE HELL
347	WAS THAT? (1.0) A foreign policy (.) it appears that (.) ((JS makes circular motion
	twice with hands))
348	all that's left for the presidential race is this <u>one model</u> ((pointing to image on his
	right with both hands)) (1.0)
349	I mean at least we still get our choice of color ((JS speaks passionately)) ((AUD
	LAUGHS))
350	but >it's the same model< (3.0) WHAT THE HELL IS ROMNEY UP TO
	(.)THE
351	WHOLE DEBATE WAS A TOUR OF BIZARRE LAND (.)

Episode 5: The Afghanistan withdrawal

352	((JS leaning forward pointing with his pen to the camera)) Here's Romney on the
	Afghanistan withdrawal
353	((soundbite of debate with Romney and Obama sitting at a table with the moderator in front of
	them)) MR: Well, we're going to be finished by 2014 (.) and when I'm president
	(.) we'll make sure we bring our troops out by the end of 2014
354	((JS crosses his arms and slowly opens them as he speaks)) JS: >2014 WITHDRAWL
	DATE
355	NO \(\Lambda MATTER WHAT< (1.0) ((JS speak with a very high pitch as if he were going to
	cry))
356	((JS points to his right)) THAT'S BARACK OBAMA'S PLAN (.) ((AUD laughs))
	((in normal tone))
357	The weird part is (.) ((JS whispers)) it never used to be Romney's
358	((soundbite of C-Span June 2, 2011 broadcast of Romney)) MR: Announcing a
	withdrawal date, that was wrong ((video cut)) The Taliban men may not have
	watches but they do have calendars.
359	JS: ugh <u>CALENDARS</u> (.) I meant I meant <u>colanders</u> (.)
360	((JS speaks with Middle Eastern accent)) They have <u>colanders</u> ((AUD laughs)) (1.0)
361	And did I say the withdrawal date was wrong (.) I meant right ((AUD laughs))
	(1.0)

Episode 6: Iraq - FI Network Example #1: Stewart talking to Romney

w about Iraq?	362
debate of candidates on January 24, 2008)) DEBATE	363
rnor Romney was the war on Iraq a good idea worth	
have spent? MR: It was a right decision to go in Iraq	364
(.) I support it now	
it> (4.0) ((with left arm stretched out JS looks at wrist as if to	365
ning forward and pointing to the camera)) >NOW!<	366
We don't want another Iraq we don't want another	367
right course for us	
n tie then smiling and pointing to camera)) JS: Well I guess	368
a (.) <u>principal recognition</u> of ((speaking with lower tone of	369
We don't want another Iraq we don't want and right course for us n tie then smiling and pointing to camera)) JS: Well I g	367

370	Iraq's war is current unpopularity (.) umm But you know what? ((AUD laughs))
	(1.0)
371	Iraq and Afghanistan (.) those are yesterday's wars (.) ((JS pointing to camera))
	It's
372	tomorrow's war that counts (.)

Episode 7: Iran: FI Network Example #2: Stewart talking to Romney

373	>And if there is anything that Governor Romney is vociferous about< along
	these 18
374	months it is his <u>uncompromising belief</u> THAT IT IS TIME TO RATTLE OUR
375	SABERS AT IRAN
376	((soundbite of Romney speaking on February 22, 2012 on CNN)) MR: This is a president
	who should have instead communicated to Iran that we're prepared, that we're
	considering military options, that they are not just on the table, they are in our
	hands
377	((video cut)) ((soundbite from November 12, 2011 of Romney talking on CBS news)) MR:
	the President should have built credible threat of military action ((video cut))

378	((soundbite from September 5, 2007 of Romney speaking on Fox News)) MR: when they
	see our military option in our hand, a possible blockade, a possible areal strikes.
	They recognize we mean business
379	((JS makes fist with right hand and rotates it while speaking in an upset tone)) JS: WE MEAN
380	BUSINESS MOTHER F***ER (.) ((AUD laughs)) Blockade (.) areal strikes (.)
381	((JS making gun like sounds and gestures with his fingers pointing upwards)) peeyoupeeyou
	pee peepeeyou
382	((AUD laughs)) ((looking into camera and pointing)) WE'RE GONNA GET YOU
	IRAN (.)
383	((JS hunches over with arms apart and elbows out and fists clenched – a football position))
	Brrr prediction made (.) alright (.)
384	((pointing to camera and moving hand back and forth)) <so (1.0)="" chance="" here's="" your=""></so>
	to
385	contrast Obama's appeasement through diplomacy (.) with your ((pointing at
	camera))
386	freedom through strengths
387	((soundbite of debate)) MR: It is also essential for us to understand what our
	mission is in Iran, and that is to dissuade Iran from having a nuclear weapon
	through peaceful and diplomatic means

388	((video cut)) We want a peaceful planet. We want people to be able to enjoy their
	lives and know they're going to have a bright and prosperous future not be at
	war.
389	((video cut with only Romney speaking)) I want to see peace
390	((leaning forward pointing to his right with a strange look on his face shifting his eyes)) ((AUD
	laughs)) ((in authoritative tone)) JS: Get a hair cut hippie ((AUD laughs, cheers and claps))
391	(.) GOVERNOR MITT ROMNEY APPEARS (2.0) ((AUD Laughs and cheers))
392	((JS shifts papers he's holding in his hands and looks down at them and back at camera placing
	them in front of him and looking into camera)) Governor Mitt Romney appears to have
	made the
393	calculated decision that >his bellicose and hawkish performances in the
	Republican
394	primaries would be less appreciated < <u>by</u> ((uses fingers to make quotation marks)) <u>the</u>
395	"normals" (.) ((pointing at camera)) But here's the crazy part (.) After basically
	casting off
396	what were months (.) and weeks ago his ((shaking both hands to form a ball like gesture
	to the right))
397	bedrock principles and beliefs (.) to copy ((shaking both hands to form a ball like
	gesture to the left))

398	Obama's policy positions>in a ((JS opens his arms and hands)) transparently cynical
399	appeal to moderate undecideds< (.)

Episode 8: Freaky Friday situation

40.6	
400	JS: < guess which ((hitting desk once with left fist)) quality (.) Romney chose to
	highlight>
401	(.) ((hands in ball like position)) as the difference between the ↑two men?
	(c) ((cancar and possess)) as and another section (c)
402	((soundbite of the debate)) MR: Leadership ((video cut)) We should be playing the
	leadership role ((video cut)) America must lead ((video cut)) We need strong
	leadership ((video cut)) Real leadership ((video cut)) I'd like to be that leader
403	JS: ((JS lifts his right arm with index finger pointing upward)) Follow me! (.) ((in almost
	a
404	whispering high pitched tone)) ((drops arm and points to his right)) I'll be right behind the
101	whispering ingli prened tolic)) ((drops and and points to his right)) i if be right behind the
405	President ((AUD laughs cheers and claps)) ((with his left hand JS points to camera)) I
103	Trestacht ((Aeb laughs cheefs and chaps)) ((with his left hand 35 points to camera)) T
	GOTTA SAY
406	((image to right changes to Romney and Obama facing each other)) BY THE END OF
	LAST
	LAST

407	NIGHT (.) ((frowning of eyebrows)) I was beginning to worry (.) we weren't in
	some
408	kind of freaky Friday situation where Barack Obama (.) they somehow peed in
	the
409	same fountain and switched bodies (.) Remember two weeks ago (.) when
	Romney
410	((soundbite of 1 st debate with Romney on left talking and Obama on right looking down)) Was
	the
411	one who was all <u>confident</u> (.) Staring <u>daggers</u> at Obama (.)The President was
	looking
412	at some ((inaudible)) <u>dreamland</u> that only he could see (.)Well last night it
412	
	((soundbite of
413	3 rd debate with Romney to left looking down and Obama to right talking)) was Obama
	delivering
414	the death stare while Romney suddenly found something on his podium
	incredibly
415	↑ fascinating (1.0) ((AUD laughs)) ((image of Romney and Obama to JS's right)) And
	that's not
116	all () Ohama ((all in form the site of the
416	all (.) Obama ((talking from the side of his mouth while shaking his head with a different
	accent))

417	who as we all remember was f***ing asleep during the first debate (.) was
418	((JS throwing punches in the air)) hitting Romney left and right with his zingers
419	((soundbite of debate with Romney to left and Obama to right)) OB: Well Governor Romney is right, you are
420	familiar with jobs being shipped overseas because you invested in companies that were shipping jobs overseas
421	((staring into camera while throwing a punch with his right arm)) JS: BOOM!
422	((soundbite of debate)) OB: You mentioned the Navy, for example, and that
423	we have fewer ships than we did in 1916. Well, Governor, we also have fewer horses and bayonets
424	((staring into camera while throwing a punch with his left arm)) JS: BAAM
425	((soundbite of debate)) OB: When you were asked what's the biggest geopolitical threat
426	facing America (.) you said Russia, not Al-Qaeda(.) you said Russia (.) in the 1980s
427	(.) they're now calling to ask for their foreign policy back

428	((JS with mouth open about to speak and throw another punch but instead looks at image of OB
	to his right with disapproval – squinty eyes & eyebrows frowning upwards and together)) JS:
	Naah (.)
429	well that was a little hacky (.) ((AUD laughs)) ((JS looking into camera)) I mean that
	was a
430	little roasty (.) ((in a Mafia accent with shoulders shrugged upwards)) I Wouldn't f***
	your
431	foreign policy with Margaret Thatcher's (bleep), c'mon (.) ((AUD laughs))
	Hickory
432	dickory dock ((shrugs shoulders)) your geopolitical understanding can suck my ((JS
	opens mouth to say the word but stops at the first letter)) caa ((JS laughs and looks down then
	up and his voice goes back to normal with hand near mouth to hid laughing)) ((AUD laughs
	and claps))
433	I'm sorry (.) no (.) ((pointing to left while nodding his head)) Please (.) please don't (.)
434	because than I'll do it again some night (.) ((AUD laughs)) And uh (1.0)

Episode 9: The President's professorial side: FI Network Example #3: Stewart talking to Obama

435	((JS speaks normal tone)) So the President had a good <u>night</u> (.) He must have felt
	pretty
436	confident (.) because he was letting his professorial side shine through (.)
	especially
437	when it came to one country
438	((soundbite of debate)) OB: We've created partnerships throughout the region to
	deal with extremism (.) in Somalia (.) in Yemen (.) in Pakistan
439	((JS facing image of OB to his right and shaking his head)) JS: In Pa papa (.) ((looking into
	camera
440	smiling with arms open on desk)) really? ((AUD laughs)) ((shaking head with hands down
	on desk))
441	Pakeestan (.) really? ((AUD laughs)) Suddenly you're a guy who is desperate to
	prove
442	that you once roomed with a ((JS lowers his pitch while nodding his head)) foreign
	exchange
443	student (.) Look (.) ((AUD laughs)) this is America (.) we don't use (.)

444	((using both hands to show a place to the right of his desk while looking at camera)) the
	pronunciation locally (.)
445	((hands in front of him on desk)) We don't say ((moving left hand to right and speaking with
	Spanish accent)) "México" or
446	((with French accent and shoulders shrugged upwards and right hand slightly lifted with index
	finger and middle finger touching thumb)) "France" (.) or (.) it's ((in American accent))
447	((looking into camera)) Mexico (.)France (.) and ((exaggerating the word using a less
	intelligent American accent opening his mouth wide)) Pakistan ((AUD laughs)) (1.0)

Episode 10: Conclusion to the trilogy of debates

448	All in all last night made a fine conclusion though to the trilogy of debates (.)
449	Between the two candidates (.) sincere belief in a peaceful world and their eager
450	acceptance (.) of remote control health fire drones to achieve that end (.) ((AUD laughs))
451	(1.0) We learned Mitt Romney's basically come around to >Barack Obama's position
452	on foreign policy and that Barack Obama has pretty much come around to the Bush

453	administration's policy on aggression overseas but ↑don't worry people<
454	((soundbite of MsNBC news on October 22)) COM: well the foreign policy debate of the three debates, I assume this will be the least watched of the three
455	((soundbite from Fox News)) COM: so many voters in recent polls have said that they don't care anything about foreign policy
456	((soundbite from CNN)) 1 st COM: Yes or no, does this debate matter? 2 nd COM: I don't think so
457	((with smile and opening his arms)) JS: We'll be right back.