

INTERGENERATIONAL VALUE CHANGE AND TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY: TOWARD THE CONSOLIDATION OF A THIRD WAVE GENERATION?

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Abstract: The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and its impact on intergenerational differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1928; Jennings, Stoker and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and mostly focused on historical events which transformed industrialized societies, identifying systematic differences in intergenerational values between pre-war and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behaviors of individuals born and raised under these new democratic regimes has been practically ignored (among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar, 2010; Tessler, 2004, and Niemi, E. Catterberg *et al.*, 1996). I argue that the Third Wave (3W) of democratization was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people's political culture. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor did it help consolidate a "3W Generation", since post-honeymoon effects constrained the development of pro-democratic orientations

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after regime change. To test these claims, I identify intergenerational differences among the 3W cohort and two older age groups after regime change in three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. I include established democracies as the control group, and compare trends in younger and established democracies among the same age groups. I use World Values Surveys (WVS) data from 1990 –the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change– and 2005-2007 –the last wave that was available–. Finally, I test the generation effects hypothesis with regression analyses.

Introduction

Over two decades after the Third Wave (3W) of democratization expanded democracy into new countries throughout Latin America, Central and Eastern Europe and South Asia, it is still unclear to what extent inter-generational value change has taken place, and how democratic the orientations of the younger generations are in comparison to those of their elders. Has a new political generation, the “Third Wave Generation”, emerged across new democracies? I believe this is a crucial component in understanding the survival and consolidation of democracy.

The American literature has extensively studied the dynamics of early political socialization and their impact in intergenerational value differences since the early 1950s (Mannheim, 1952; Jennings and Stoker, 2004; Schuman, 2011). A key finding is that the emergence of new political generations requires salient historical events that strongly affect socialization in early political life, such as the Big Wars, the Cold War and the Vietnam War. The comparative literature has also emphasized the relevance of early experiences in the formation of political attitudes, and has mostly focused on historical events that transformed industrialized societies during the pre- and post-war period, identifying

systematic differences in the intergenerational values of pre- and post-war cohorts (Inglehart, 1977; Inglehart, 1997). However, the study of early political socialization in Third Wave nations and its impact on the political attitudes and behavior of individuals born and raised under new democratic regimes has been mostly ignored. Among the very few exceptions are Catterberg and Zuasnabar (2010); Tessler (2004), and Niemi, E. Catterberg *et al.* (1996).

Generational replacement presupposes *the formative years hypothesis*, a period of openness during which political orientations are formed (Schuman, 2011). It assumes the presence of life cycle effects as people ages in the formation and dynamics of political attitudes and behavior, and identifies attitudinal fluctuation (or instability) mostly during late adolescence and early adulthood. Once formed, they tend to persist throughout people's lives (Jennings, 2004). Crucial to the formative years hypothesis is what Mannheim (1928) over half a century ago referred to as the *stratification of experience*. Although older and younger cohorts may experience the same new event, they do so differently because first experiences are not the same as those superimposed upon other earlier impressions. A fundamental implication is that "adult socio-political dispositions are strongly rooted in pre-adult experiences" (Inglehart, 1997: 41).

In addition, the formative years hypothesis is a crucial pillar to understanding the process of constructing generational memory, and identifying its potential impact on future attitudes and actions. A *generation* is formed when unique events affect people of the same birth cohort at an early stage, shaping them in distinctive ways. As Schuman (2011: 3), puts it, "Belonging to a generation endows each of us with a place in the historical process, and this, in turn, limits us to a particular range of experiences, thoughts and actions".

What main factors shape pre-adult political experiences? *Parental transmission* has been traditionally considered the most influential variable in an individual's early political socialization. Since the publication of *American Voter* (1960), the values and predispositions of parents has been shown to significantly impact political identification. However, most recent studies indicate that, although influential, it is not necessarily the prevailing factor in the development of critical socio-political orientations. Jennings conducted panel data research arriving at different conclusions, depending on which specific political orientation was analyzed. Regarding party identification, vote choice, and interest in politics, Jennings *et al.* (2009: 795) argue that "parents can have an enormous degree of influence on the political learning that takes place in pre-adulthood". Yet, in relation to social trust and civil engagement, Jennings and Stoker (2004: 355-356) conclude that their impact is much lower than expected traditionally. "Parents do appear to play a role in shaping the extent to which their children enter adulthood with trusting or distrusting dispositions, and in the extent to which they get involved in voluntary associations, both in high school and subsequently. Still, the magnitude of these family linkages are modest at best".

As stated above, in both American and comparative literature, robust studies show that *historic or period effects* during late adolescence and early adulthood may have a significant impact on the formation of an individual's most rooted beliefs. Important political events define what is salient and significant for young people as they first face the larger political world. Such events, however, are usually less important for adults, who tend to assimilate new experiences into an attitudinal framework that is already well developed, and have lived their formative years under different historical circumstances. This socialization process produces distinct cohorts or political generations

which attitudinally and behaviorally respond in a similar fashion to new political events. In other words, when a new political generation does emerge, *shared attitudes* should be identifiable among the age cohort that experienced the same events in formative years.

American literature identifies three main political generations during the XX century (Jennings and Stoker, 2004). The pre-war generation spent at least part of their pre-adult years during the Depression with nearly three fifths of the males serving in WWII; during adulthood, it experienced the post-war boom and the beginning of the cold war as adults. This generation is usually characterized as the “civic generation” because of its strong civic commitment. The post-war generation, or “baby boomers”, spent their early years during the domestic tranquility and prosperity of the 50s. However critical events such as the Civil Rights Movement, the Vietnam War and Watergate shaped their pre-adult period, and they became the “protest generation”. For Americans coming of age in the 1980s and 1990s, unlike for previous generations “history possesses little by way of defining historical moments” that could define a specific political identity.

The comparative literature shows a post-materialist shift between pre- and post-war cohorts in established democracies (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart and Welzel, 2005). The high levels of prosperity and existential security during individuals’ formative years were conducive to the emergence of the pro-democratic values that characterize post-war cohorts. Rising levels of economic and physical security led to increasingly higher levels of tolerance, trust, and mass participation among younger generations.

However, research on democratization has paid little attention to the effects of early socialization on the possible emergence of a “Third Wave Generation”. Is the youngest generation in younger democracies growing up with

orientations different from those of their elders? Are these orientations supportive of democracy? Prior research has shown mixed trends.

On the one hand, research on the trajectories of political orientations in new democracies after regime change over time uncovers a worrisome trend that calls into question both the impact of the 3W political socialization on people's democratic orientations and the emergence of new generations. On average, political participation and trust in new democracies *declined* in the years following regime change, while tolerance toward elite corruption and detachment with the law increased (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006; Catterberg & Zuasnabar, 2010; Uslaner, 2004).

There are elements peculiar to the dynamics of democratic transitions that usually affect people's expectations about the effectiveness of new administrations, ultimately leading to skepticism. During the 3W, the original belief among the publics –often reinforced by elite discourse– that democracy not only provides civil liberties but also improves economic well-being was a crucial factor in motivating these high expectations. If the economy subsequently performed poorly, disillusionment with democracy was likely. Moreover, the experience of living under an authoritarian regime engendered unrealistic expectations about democracy and democratic politics. An increasing discrepancy between expectations and reality led to democratic disillusionment, especially when some new regimes seemed incompetent. In the aftermath of the transition, a “post-honeymoon effect” took place in most 3W democracies, as the immediate need for participation receded, the euphoria of democratization wore off, and political trust eroded –particularly in cases where democratization brought severe disillusionment (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002).

Moreover, over two decades ago, authors such as Niemi *et al.* (1995) and E. Catterberg (1991) argued that, in contrast

to the “natural socialization hypothesis” usually presumed in established democracies, the inter-generational transmission of democratic values in 3W nations is uncertain: “In newer democracies, automatic transmission of democratic values from one generation to the next cannot be taken for granted ... Older generations are themselves untutored about democratic processes, and they may fail to embrace democratic values or waiver in their own commitment to them” (Niemi *et al.*, p. 465). In the Southern Cone of Latin America, an absence of democratic values among the adult population was identified from the early stages of democratization. Based on surveys conducted during the military regime and after the transition to constitutional government, E. Catterberg noted, “during the first five years of the constitutional government [responses on] many libertarian dimensions moved backward” (1991: 107-108). Not surprisingly, the emergence of a political generation is an infrequent phenomenon. In addition, for some transformative events, the main distinction might be between those who were deeply affected at any point in the life course and those born in subsequent years who had no direct experience at all (Schuman, 2011). As Tessler (2004: 188) concludes, “political generations are relatively rare”.

On the other hand, some factors suggest that people may have adopted more democratic orientations, at least in some dimensions, and especially among younger age groups. The 3W of democratization, contrary to many political events that are not highly salient –or even if they are salient, erode rapidly– dramatically transformed people’s everyday lives. And although these transformations did not follow a relatively linear and stable process, they tended to have a lasting impact on the economic and political organizations of most societies. Despite differences across countries, an almost universal fact about the 3W is that it brought more openness in both formal and informal

institutional settings, greater freedom of expression and assembly as well as new exposure to independent media (see, for instance, Freedom House civil liberties and political rights indices). As Huntington pointed out in a 1997 article, “A quarter-century ago, authoritarian governments –communist politburos, military juntas, or personal dictatorships– were the rule. Today, hundreds of millions of people who previously suffered under tyrants live in freedom” (p. 3).

In this context, I argue that the 3W was a transformative experience that had a lasting impact on people’s political attitudes and behaviors. Moreover, I argue that this impact did not necessarily imply stronger pro-democratic orientations nor the consolidation of a “Third Wave Generation” since opposite effects influenced their trajectories after regime change. On one hand, socialization processes during a transition towards democracy are expected to promote the development of political attitudes and behaviors that are more democratic and pluralist, especially among those born and raised in the new institutional settings. On the other hand, post-honeymoon effects are expected to constrain this development by increasing political disillusionment and dissatisfaction. In addition, the development of generational replacement may also have brought about the weak intergenerational transmission of democratic values and the likely impact of direct experience with the dramatic political transformations across different age groups. Therefore, I expect some key pro-democratic orientations to become strengthened as the result of social interaction within the new openness and freedom, while others may weaken as the result of increasing disillusionment toward the new regimes and fragile parental diffusion. In particular, I focus on three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation. Finally, I expect that the same age groups in established democracies –where the

critical distinction among political generations is between pre- and post-war cohorts— experienced more stability (or lower attitudinal change rates) during 3W years.

To analyze these expectations, I studied the trajectories of political trust, political participation and tolerance toward diversity after regime change in both 3W democracies and established democracies. I tested the “generation effects hypothesis” with regression analysis. I used World Values Surveys (WVS) data to explore these issues from 1990 – the year that most 3W democracies experienced regime change– and 2005-2007– its last wave available.² More than 25 years after Raúl Alfonsín took office in Argentina, the temporal simultaneity between 3W democratization and the implementation of the WVS project allowed us to study the impact of political socialization in recently democratized contexts over time. This simultaneity was not merely coincidental; rather, it evidenced at the time the new openness experienced by more than 30 nations across the globe.

Trust, Tolerance, Participation and Democracy

Political trust, political tolerance and political participation are intrinsically linked to democracy.

Political trust refers to citizens’ confidence in political institutions. Trust is especially important for democratic

² The WVS has been conducted in about 80 societies in different waves of interviews between 1981 and 2005, including new and established democracies, as well as non-democratic countries. The first wave took place in 1981-83, followed by a second in 1990, a third in 1995-96, and a fourth in 2000-01. A fifth wave was conducted in 2005-07. The next wave will be complete by the end of 2012. In 1990, the WVS expanded from 21 to 45 nations, incorporating almost 20 countries undergoing transitional processes.

governments since they cannot rely on coercion to the same extent as other regimes. During periods of economic turmoil, for instance, democratic stability requires citizens to have sufficient trust in economic and political institutions to accept temporary economic hardship in return for the promise of better economic conditions at some uncertain future time.

Successful democracies are driven by high levels of trust in other people as well as in government. In a well-ordered society “everyone accepts and knows that the others accept the same principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy and are known to satisfy these principles” (Rawls, 1971: 454, in Uslaner, 2004: 2).

Tolerance is a critical value to socialize and internalize for democratic functioning and survival. As Sartori argues (2001), pluralism –the “genetic code of an open society”– presupposes and requires high doses of tolerance. While pluralism asserts that diversity and dissent are values that improve the individual and also his or her political city, those who tolerate concede that others have the right to their “wrong beliefs.” In new democracies, an underlying culture of tolerance is crucial to developing the legitimacy that enables political institutions to weather difficult times (Inglehart, 2003: 54). In particular, “tolerance or intolerance of homosexuals, although it does not overtly refer to support for democracy, provides a substantially stronger predictor of the degree to which democratic institutions exist than does any question that explicitly asks how one feels about democracy”.

Finally, *political participation* points to activity that has the intent of affecting or influencing government action. Political participation impacts governmental decisions either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy, or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who will make those policies (Verba *et al.*,

1995). In a democracy, citizens channel their demands and expectations through political participation. Very low political participation due to disillusionment and discontent (rather than exceptionally widespread political satisfaction) weakens critical pillars of communication between the citizenry and the political élite. In particular, when a feeling of hopelessness with respect to the political system dominates, inactivity is more likely than action to take place. On the other hand, if an implicit trust in democratic mechanisms to canalize people's demands prevails, the likelihood of participation increases substantially (Catterberg, 2003).

Methodological considerations

I define the 3W cohort (C3) as respondents born after 1965 in the WVS data set, in other words, people who were 25 years old or younger in 1990, the year of regime change. For analytical purposes, I distinguish those born between 1965 and 1974 from those born between 1975 and 1990, and focus the analysis on the former. Since the latter were too young to be included in the 1990 surveys, this distinction prevents us from comparing non-equivalent populations over time.

In addition to the 3W cohort, and in order to effectively identify intergenerational value change from overall attitudinal shifts, I also include two older cohorts in this study: respondents born between 1945-1964 (who were 26 to 45 years old in 1990, C2) and those between 1925-1944 (who were between 46 and 65 years old in 1990, C1). The 1901-1924 cohort is not included because given the small number of cases, the results are not statistically significant.

The WVS dataset contains much more data than that utilized in this paper, but the data and questions available for the same countries in both 1990 and 2005 reduced the

number of countries I could analyze to twenty-four: thirteen young democracies and eleven established democracies. The younger democracies are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey. Older democracies are Britain, Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, USA, and West Germany. Each national representative sample includes about 1,200 face-to-face interviews, though sample sizes vary from country to country. Most surveys were conducted in populations over eighteen, although in some surveys the age range started at fifteen.³

To estimate political trust, I use a measure of “confidence in parliament”. Other political institutions inquired about in the same battery were not available for all countries in the two waves included in this study. To measure political participation, I constructed an index that indicates the percentage of the publics that responded having engaged in at least one of the following three forms of elite-challenging activities: signing a petition, attending a lawful demonstration or joining a boycott. This participation index is a dichotomy variable: 1 indicates that the respondent participated in at least one of these three political activities, while 0 indicates that he or she did not participate in any of these actions. To estimate tolerance toward diversity, I use a battery of questions on predispositions toward different minorities (“On this list are various groups of people, could you please point out any that you would not like to have as neighbors?”). Based on these questions, I constructed a tolerance index that is the sum of opinions toward five

³ The year of regime change corresponds to the year of fieldwork in young democracies, with the exception of Argentina, where regime change took place before most 3W democracies, in December 1983. In the case of Peru, data for 1990 is not available, and in the cases of Brazil, Poland and Sweden the data sets for 1990 have limited variables. In these countries, I used 1995 data.

groups that are generally stigmatized: people of a different race, immigrants or foreign workers, homosexuals, drug addicts and people with AIDS. The tolerance index is an ordinal additive measure on a scale from 0 to 5, in which 0 indicates high *intolerance* toward diversity, while 5 indicates high *tolerance* toward diversity. In other words, the lower limit of the Index refers to respondents *explicitly* mentioning that “they would not like to have as neighbors” anyone belonging to any of the five minorities, while the upper limit refers to respondents who do not point out any group as undesirable potential neighbors. Intermediate values show ambivalent orientations toward the acceptance of minorities as likely residents of their communities.

Age Group Changes over Time in Trust, Participation and Tolerance

By identifying critical variations between the year of regime change (1990) and the latest WVS wave available (2005-2007) in both younger and established democracies, this section analyzes the extent to which generational change took place among younger and older age groups in their orientations toward trust, tolerance and participation during the 3W of democratization. I focus on the rate of change of each variable in all cohorts between 1990 and 2005-2007 to identify systematic age group differences over time. *Overall, variations in trust, participation and tolerance adopted very distinct trajectories in 3W democracies, when compared with established ones.*

Trust in parliament experienced a decrease in 3W countries, affecting all three age groups: among the younger cohorts (those born between 1945-1964 and 1965-1974) it dropped almost 40%, among the eldest it fell even further, by 45%. In twelve countries, and across all age groups,

there was a decrease in the percentage of people expressing confidence in parliament. Political trust is intrinsically unstable because is highly sensitive to governmental performance and is especially affected by post-honeymoon effects during democratization (Catterberg and Moreno, 2006). As the next section suggests, this higher sensitivity to short term factors, such as poor economic performance, constrained the generation of greater political trust despite the dramatic political transformations of the 3W. More than a decade later, a considerable, persistent decline took place. There was also a decrease in established democracies but it was significantly smaller (11%), mostly among the eldest cohort. The 1945-1964 cohort remained constant, while the variation in the youngest cohort was almost marginal.

Table 1

Political Trust over Time

Trust in Parliament by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% saying they trust "quite a lot" and "a great deal"

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
Established Democracies						
Britain	47	34	41	31	34	36
Finland	41	52	29	57	30	54
France	43	30	44	25	46	33
Italy	32	32	28	31	32	35
Japan	36	31	24	21	19	11
Netherlands	50	58	52	53	57	50
Spain	40	55	37	52	30	48
Sweden	47	51	41	57	44	49
Switzerland	na	na	na	na	na	na
US	49	19	34	18	45	21
W.Germany	54	29	44	24	42	32
mean	44	39	37	37	38	37
3W Democracies						
Argentina	19	15	14	12	15	11
Brazil	40	22	34	25	29	27
Bulgaria	50	21	44	24	49	13
Chile	62	29	67	25	58	26
E.Germany	46	15	37	15	32	17
Mexico	37	21	32	28	36	27
Peru	15	5	14	9	14	6
Poland	33	13	30	11	27	11
Romania	25	18	18	17	17	17
Russia	50	20	37	18	34	22
S.Korea	44	35	32	27	25	19
Slovenia	36	18	37	18	26	13
Turkey	65	68	53	59	51	56
mean	42	23	36	22	33	20

1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

The Political Participation Index shows the overall pattern of change in participation from 1990 to 2005. In most new democracies during the years after regime change, there was a contraction of political action, a similar trend to that of political trust. The percentage of respondents who declared having signed a petition, joined a boycott or attended a rally fell equally in all age groups (on average, 11%). Despite this overall decline, there were contrasting trends at the country level. Three South American countries –Argentina, Brazil and Peru– experienced important upward shifts, yet they were offset by larger negative variations in the other 3W nations.

As with political trust, the decrease in political participation is associated with a post-honeymoon decline. The struggle for democracy motivated the organization of ordinary men and women into a variety of groups, which collectively had the effect of “aiding the assaults on the seats of power”. Post-transitional problems –especially the combination of rising aspirations of economic well-being and persisting inequality– led to declining participation rates in most 3W countries, especially in the years immediately after regime change (Inglehart and Catterberg, 2002). In established democracies on the other hand, an increase took place, especially among the youngest cohort, who experienced a 20% variation. Despite a growing body of literature which describes a decline in political activism in post-industrial societies, the findings indicate that the upward tendency of protest politics –predicted by the post-material shift hypothesis– produced a sustained, systematic increase in elite-challenging activities during the 1990-2005 period.

In younger democracies, involvement in political participation experienced a practically identical negative shift across age groups, although it was higher among C2 and C3. Therefore, life cycle effects were probably not a critical

factor in this decline. In established democracies, visible increases occurred in both the eldest and the youngest cohorts especially. In particular, C2 and C3 reached the highest inter-age group variation of all three variables. Therefore, formative years effects are evidently in play since respondents who were in their late adolescence and early adulthood underwent the most significant changes between 1990 and 2005.

Table 2**Participation over Time**

Participation Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% saying they participated in at least one elite-challenging activity

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
Established Democracies						
Britain	67	72	75	71	75	68
Finland	15	38	28	54	23	65
France	53	68	60	71	46	72
Italy	41	48	54	57	52	64
Japan	53	46	54	49	29	35
Netherlands	44	37	62	49	45	52
Spain	21	27	39	39	41	44
Sweden	64	67	82	81	78	80
Switzerland	na	na	na	na	na	na
US	69	84	71	77	51	71
W.Germany	53	39	68	55	69	60
mean	48	53	59	60	51	61
3W Democracies						
Argentina	19	22	20	35	18	38
Brazil	44	47	52	57	52	65
Bulgaria	16	10	30	19	34	16
Chile	28	23	33	23	34	23
E.Germany	70	41	83	55	82	59
Mexico	40	29	41	34	38	23
Peru	28	33	21	42	26	37
Poland	19	17	25	27	27	29
Romania						
Russia	33	26	46	19	41	16
S.Korea	30	31	35	37	49	45
Slovenia	20	23	32	34	33	34
Turkey	11	10	16	13	14	15
mean	30	26	36	33	37	33

1995: wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

In sharp contrast with trust in parliament and political participation, tolerance of diversity significantly increased in younger democracies across all age groups. As the Tolerance Index shows, this positive shift in respondents expressing more acceptance toward people of different race, homosexuals, foreign workers, drug addicts or people with AIDS was similar among the three cohorts: reaching an average of 24%. All countries experienced increases within the eldest cohorts, as well as within C1 and C2, except for Slovenia and Turkey. Again, the acceptance levels were similar to those of most established democracies in two Southern Cone countries, Argentina and Brazil, and in many cases even higher.

This is a significant change, not only because it affected all countries and age groups but also because the nature that characterizes attitudes toward tolerance is usually stable. On the other hand, in established democracies, there was little overall change. The Tolerance Index remained practically constant in most nations and across age groups, largely because the rising tolerance of homosexuality was offset by a rise in the rejection of foreign workers.

Changes in tolerance toward diversity were almost marginal in both younger and established democracies. Therefore, no life cycle effects appeared to be involved in these variations either. Yet in both groups of nations, the younger generations expressed more tolerance toward others than did older generations, reaching a 14-point difference with the eldest cohort. This shift suggests that the process of intergenerational change may tend to elevate tolerance in the long run.

Table 3

Tolerance of Diversity over Time

Tolerance Index by Age Cohort in 1990 and 2005

% "tolerants"

	1925-1944 (C1)		1945-1964 (C2)		1965-1974 (C3)	
	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007	1990	2005-2007
Established Democracies						
Britain	57	58	68	76	79	73
Finland	55	54	63	68	49	73
France	65	32	75	51	82	59
Italy	43	47	58	61	61	69
Japan	na	na	na	na	na	na
Netherlands	71	73	87	80	84	84
Spain	49	75	67	80	70	79
Sweden	82	84	88	96	94	89
Switzerland	97	78	98	84	98	93
US	55	51	60	68	53	69
W.Germany	53	64	67	78	74	73
mean	63	62	73	74	75	76
3W Democracies						
Argentina	52	71	64	89	74	88
Brazil	69	66	71	74	77	79
Bulgaria	24	32	22	37	25	38
Chile	42	50	45	59	45	62
E. Germany	56	68	68	79	65	74
Mexico	21	55	34	57	31	67
Peru	38	44	38	47	42	53
Poland	22	26	32	41	43	46
Romania	17	32	23	34	33	42
Russia	14	19	18	22	21	23
S. Korea	na	na	na	na	na	na
Slovenia	41	35	38	56	35	71
Turkey	5	5	5	4	9	5
mean	33	42	38	50	42	54

1995 wave used for Sweden, Brazil, Peru, and Poland

Source: World Values Surveys

Finally, did 3W and established democracies converge during 1990 and 2005? Or, on the contrary, were differences accentuated? As previously mentioned, distinct trajectories characterized both groups in most variables. In other words, the findings identify a clear tendency toward divergence fifteen years after regime change, when the gaps in "trust" and "participation" between the two groups of countries increased. Established democracies more than doubled their levels of political trust and political participation of 3W democracies across all age groups, while the discrepancies in tolerance were still significant but smaller. The

differences between the youngest cohorts in 2005 show the magnitude of the divergence: trust in parliament was 37% versus 20%, and political participation was 61% versus 33%. Tolerance of diversity, despite its reduction, showed a 20-point difference, 76% versus 56%.

Although trust in parliament fell in both established and younger democracies, it displayed significantly different shifts, increasing the distance between 12 to 14 points across age cohorts. Political participation followed a similar pattern to that of trust in parliament, reaching a 28-point difference. Yet because there were strong variations in levels of participation among 3W nations, these differences were visibly lower in South American countries. On the other hand, differences in tolerance decreased in all age groups from 8 to 10 points. In some new democracies younger generations still show very low levels of tolerance, especially in Turkey, where less than 5% expressed high levels of tolerance.

A “Generation Effects” Model

To test for generational effects, I estimated multivariate regressions of political trust, political participation and tolerance toward diversity in the thirteen 3W democracies included in this study. More specifically, the regressions allowed me to identify if there were distinguishable and durable age group effects on political attitudes fifteen years after democratization took place. I used the 1990-1991 and 2005-2007 waves of the World Values Surveys. As mentioned above, the former coincides with regime change in most countries, while the latter is the most recent WVS data available. As I claim in the introduction, increasing disillusionment with poor economic performance and weak generational replacement are expected to erode political

trust and political participation. On the other hand, intergenerational value change is expected to be associated with higher levels of tolerance.

To measure the dependant variables, I used the same indicators analyzed in the previous section: confidence in parliament, the political participation index and the tolerance index. To measure generational effects, I used the same age cohort variable, which distinguishes those born between 1965 and 1974 (the 3W cohort, C3), from those born between 1945 and 1965 (C2) and between 1925 and 1944 (C1). To capture the full effect of age cohort, I introduced an interaction variable ("cohort*year") that measures changes on the impact of "cohort" over time. In other words, this interaction tells us if belonging to a specific age group produced differentiated effects on trust, participation or tolerance in 1990 and 2005. Given that no direct question on economic performance is asked in the World Values Survey, in order to estimate this dimension, I used satisfaction with one's economic well being: *How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household?* For socio-demographical variables, I only included gender, given that education was not inquired about in many countries in the 1990 wave and income correlates with the self-income report. I also included a variable that identifies the different countries and a dummy variable for time to control for autocorrelation among a nation's different surveys.

Since the dependent variables are dummy and ordinal indices, I used probit (for participation) and ordered probit estimations (for trust and tolerance). To control for fluctuations on the variance across samples, I incorporated robust standard errors. I also weighed the estimations by population size for pooled analyses. An overview of the results of the multivariate analyses is shown in Table 4.

Table 4

Generation Effects Model in Thirteen 3W Democracies

Cohort Influence on Trust, Participation and Tolerance

	Trust in Parliament	Political Participation Index	Tolerance of Diversity Index
cohort	-.0975 * (.0132)	0.0723 * (.0137)	0.0929 * (.01034)
cohort*year	.0684 * (.0194)	-0.0269 * (.0061)	0.0354 * (.0047)
financial satisfaction	0.0467 * (.0029)	0.0476 * (.0038)	0.0245 * (.0029)
gender			0.0569 * (.0145)
year	-.5570 * (.0600)		
country	.0210 * (.0018)	-0.0332 *	.0576 * (.0019)
X2	977.26 *	433.2	1264.92 *
N	25,157	22,073	26,044

*p<.001

Note : Regressions produced probit and ordinal probit estimations, with robust standard errors. Estimations were weighted in order to produce a N of 1,200 for each survey.

Nations included: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, East Germany, Mexico, Peru, Poland, Turkey Romania, Russia, South Korea, Slovenia and Turkey.

Source: 1990 and 2005 World Values Survey

“Trust in Parliament” is negatively impacted by “cohort”: the younger the age group, the lower the propensity to trust. The interaction variable also affects “trust”, this means that the effect of cohort on confidence in parliament changed between 1990 and 2005. Yet, its negative coefficient implies a significant reduction on the full impact of cohort. When the two coefficients are added, their effect is almost marginal (-0.03). In terms of probabilities, the propensity to trust among respondents who said they trusted parliament “quite a bit” decreased from 27% in C1 to 22% in C3. When the full effect is considered, these probabilities are lower than 10% in both age groups. In the year of regime change, the 1965-1974 cohort expressed a smaller propensity to trust

than their elders, yet in 2005, the impact of being raised during democratization was visibly weakened. As described in the previous section, respondents aged 46 to 65 in the year of regime change experienced even a stronger decline than younger cohorts in their level of confidence—all three age groups showed remarkably low levels of trust in 2005—. In contrast, “financial satisfaction” raises the propensity to trust. Respondents who are more satisfied with their household income tend to trust parliament more: among unsatisfied respondents the probability of trusting parliament “quite a bit” is 22%; this figure rises to 31% among the financially satisfied.

Unlike trust in parliament, “Political Participation” is positively impacted by “cohort”: the younger age groups tend to participate more than the older ones. The term of interaction is also significant and presents an opposite effect. Consequently, as in the case of trust, it visibly reduces the full impact of cohort (0.045) on the propensity to be involved in at least one political activity. The probabilities of C1 and C3, among those who participated, increased from 20 to 25%. The total effect is also lower than 10% for both age groups. Put differently, in the year of regime change, C3’s propensity to participate was greater than that of the older cohort, but this difference was weakened 15 years later. As shown above, all cohorts decreased their level of participation, although to a lesser degree than they did in “trust”. As expected, financially satisfied respondents tend to participate more. The associated probabilities among those who participate are practically the same as than its effect on trust—20% and 32% among unsatisfied and satisfied respondents respectively—.

Unlike “trust” and “participation”, “tolerance” is positively impacted both by “cohort” and the term of interaction. This implies, firstly, that the younger the age group to which an individual belongs, the more likely that he or she

will express high tolerance toward diversity. Secondly, it means that the full effect of cohort (0,128) was not diminished over time, on the contrary, it was reinforced fifteen years after regime change. The propensity to participate among tolerants increases from 36 to 44% when the cohort changes from C1 to C3. These probabilities tell us that age cohort affects a respondent's propensity to trust. As previously mentioned, all cohorts experienced a positive shift in their level of tolerance, although the difference between age groups increased in 2005, reaching a difference of almost 15 points between the younger and older cohorts. Financial satisfaction also increases tolerance, and shows probabilities very similar to the cohort's probabilities (38% and 46%).

Discussion

This paper raises two central questions: whether a new political generation –a “Third Wave Generation”– emerged across young democracies, and whether people born and raised after regime change were more democratic than their elders. I focused on three critical dimensions of a democratic political culture: trust, tolerance and participation.

I examined age group changes over time in these dimensions, operationalized by trust in parliament, a political participation index and a tolerance toward diversity index, in new and established democracies. I expected “3W effects” if variations were clearly stronger in countries that underwent democratization; while a more stable path was expected in countries which had had decades of continuous years of democracy by 1990. The data supported these expectations. Between regime change and 2005-2007, the publics of younger democracies experienced significant variations in their dispositions toward the three dimensions,

especially in people's levels of political participation and tolerance. Conversely, the publics of established democracies remained relatively stable, with the exception of their involvement in political activities, which experienced a visible shift.

There were also different trends in the direction of change both between the two groups of countries and within each of them. In younger democracies, trust in parliament and participation experienced important declines; trust in others also decreased, but on a smaller scale. Tolerance, however, experienced a significant positive shift. In contrast, in established democracies, trust in others and tolerance remained practically constant; political trust showed a slight decrease but participation increased substantially, especially among the youngest population. This increase in political involvement supports Inglehart and Catterberg's (2002) conclusion of over a decade ago: "Simply put, the claims that the publics of established democracies are becoming disengaged from civic life and apathetic are mistaken".

The variations experienced by younger regimes suggest that 3W effects did in fact influence the development of political attitudes during democratic transitions. However, socialization under new democratic settings did not produce higher levels of political trust and political participation on average; showing worryingly low levels fifteen years after regime change. Political erosion increased, as post-honeymoon effects linked to increasing disillusionment with economic performance set in throughout most newly democratized countries in Latin America, and Eastern and Central Europe. Weak intergenerational transmission of democratic values and the impact of direct experience with the striking transformations of regime change across all age groups might have constrained the surge of a new generation of democrats.

Nonetheless, the significant increase in tolerance does bring some hopeful signs for democratic consolidation. During the years since 1990, tolerance rose substantially in new democracies but only very slightly in established democracies. This finding suggests that democratization did in fact bring a more open society to certain extent, conducive to rising tolerance of diversity. As the generation effect models show, trust in parliament and political participation are explained by an individual's financial satisfaction, as proxy to economic performance, while cohort effects significantly diminish over time. On the other hand, tolerance is clearly affected by both economic satisfaction as well as generational effects. The probabilities obtained in the study tell us that, fifteen years after regime change, age cohort affects people's propensity to tolerate. In other words, inter-generational value change did in fact take place in this dimension. Recent studies indicate that this upward shift in tolerance after regime change may be part of a broader trend of support for values of self-expression and individual freedom, especially among younger generations in newer regimes (Siemienska, Basañez and Moreno, 2010).

Overall, the findings show that the 3W of democratization was a transformative event that had a lasting impact on people's political attitudes and actions, although not necessarily in a pro-democratic direction, increasing the divergence between older and younger regimes in critical dimensions of their political culture. Moreover, there is not enough evidence, despite some age differences that did take place, to indicate the consolidation of a 3W Generation. Yet it is clear that the publics of new democracies have gradually become more tolerant, especially among younger cohorts, converging with the publics of established democracies in this respect. This is ultimately good news for 3W democracies.

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