Lorena Recabarren, Gerardo Maldonado

Objections to Democracy:
Non Democratic Citizens in Latin America

instituto de iberoamérica
universidad de salamanca

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Instituto de Iberoamérica

Universidad de Salamanca

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Resumen:

Considerando que el apoyo a la democracia es uno de los principales factores que determinan la consolidación de los regímenes democráticos, en este documento proponemos responder las siguientes preguntas: ¿Qué supuestos hacen relevante distinguir distintos perfiles entre quienes no apoyan a la democracia?, ¿con base en cuáles argumentos teóricos es posible diferenciar tales perfiles?, y ¿bajo qué condiciones se configuran estos perfiles diferenciados de *no demócratas*? Toda vez que América Latina se constituye en un escenario apropiado para responder estas preguntas, hemos utilizado la base de datos de Latinobarómetro 2004. En primer lugar, a partir de un análisis de clúster, construimos un indicador que nos permite distinguir cuatro perfiles en relación con los apoyos: uno democrático y otros tres no democráticos: "autoritario", "indiferente" e "incoherente". En segundo lugar, mediante el uso de modelos multivariados y variables de nivel individual, demostramos cómo cada perfil de *no demócratas* se distingue respecto del tipo de objeciones hacia la democracia que expresan los ciudadanos. Asimismo, los resultados muestran cómo estos perfiles se diferencian a través de los países, sugiriendo la existencia de factores endógenos a cada sistema político -a nivel agregado- que afectan la configuración de estos perfiles. El documento concluye con las principales implicaciones teóricas y políticas que se derivan de las evidencias recogidas.

Palabras clave:

Actitudes políticas; Legitimidad Democrática; Apoyo a la Democracia; Tipología de "no demócratas"; América Latina; Política Comparada.

Abstract:

Having in mind that support for democracy is one of the most important factors determining the consolidation of democratic regimes, in this paper we aim to answer three questions: What assumptions does make relevant to distinguish among those who do not support democracy? What are the theoretical arguments that allow a differentiation of these profiles? And, under what conditions different non-democratic citizens' profiles are constructed? Being Latin America an appropriate scenario of analysis, we use the Latinobarometro 2004 dataset. First, based on factor and cluster analyses, we develop an indicator that allows to distinguished four different profiles of citizens' attitudes toward democracy: one "democrat" and three non democratic profiles: "authoritarian", "indifferent", and "incoherent". Second, using different multivariate models with individual-level variables, we demonstrate that each one of these non democrats' profiles is accounted for different objections to democracy: either exogenous or endogenous factors at the system. The paper concludes with some theoretical and political implications drawn from the empirical examination.

Keywords:

Political Attitudes; Democratic Legitimacy; Support for Democracy; Non-Democrats tipology; Latin America; Comparative Politics.

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I. Introduction

Democracy needs democrats. Citizens' support for democracy constitutes a fundamental requisite of modern democratic regimes (Hardin, 2007; Lipset, 1959 and 1994). This legitimacy can be understood as the result of the attitude toward democracy which manifests itself as a diffuse or unconditional support for the democratic system of government (Easton, 1975). In this sense, democratic legitimacy pertains, as proposed by Gunther and Montero (2006: 48), to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. Nevertheless, not all the citizens express this set of positive attitudes toward the democratic regimen. Indeed, in many emerging and young democracies a considerable amount of people either do not give their overt support to democracy or show contradictory attitudes toward democratic and non democratic governments. This group of individuals has been normally called by the literature as "non democratic" citizens considering them as an indistinguishable group. However, as it will be shown here, there are theoretical and empirical reasons to expect the contrary: it is possible to find and analyze different kinds of profiles of non democratic citizens and to explain their differences based on diverse objections to democracy.

We aim to propose a theoretical discussion about the relevance of distinguishing among those citizens who do not support democracy, following the argument that democratic support can be analyzed as a combination of two dimensions: preference for democracy and rejection to non democracy. Using multivariate techniques (such as factor, cluster, and correspondence analyses), we identify four different citizens' profiles, three of them accounting of non democratic citizens. In sum, the research questions of this paper are: What assumptions does make relevant to distinguish among those who do not support democracy? What are the theoretical and empirical arguments that allow a differentiation of these profiles? And, under what conditions different non-democratic citizens' profiles are constructed?

This paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present the literature review about support for democracy and establish the theoretical background of the analysis of non democratic profiles. Section III briefly offers the reasons why we consider Latin America as an appropriate area of study and describes the dataset used in this paper. Section IV presents the techniques and the results of our indicator for identifying the

profiles of non democratic citizens. Section V focuses on the hypotheses, the methodology and the results regarding our argument of objections to democracy: the characteristics which differentiate the non democratic profiles. We conclude with a discussion about the results and future research possibilities.

II. Literature Review and Theoretical Background

II.1. Support for Democracy

Citizens' support for democracy constitutes a fundamental requisite of modern democratic regimes. Understood as the legitimacy of the political order (Lipset, 1959 and 1994; Hardin, 2007), the mass support given to any democracy—as the most appropriate ideal and procedure to govern a society—is an important measure of its stability, consolidation and quality (Norris, 1999a; Altman and Luna, 2007). Mass democratic values and attitudes are important for all kinds of democracy, either long-time established or young ones.

According to Easton's (1975) seminal work, political support has two dimensions: the object of support and the nature of this support. That is, it is recognized that "support is not all of a piece" (1975: 437) and that it can be displayed in two parallel dimensions. Easton establishes, at least, three different objects of political support: the regime, the institutions, and the authorities. When referring to the idea of democracy, this support can be considered "specific" (conditional) or "diffuse" (unconditional). Thus, it would be possible to have negative assessments regarding the conduct of political authorities, whilst at the same time maintain positive assessments linked directly with more general and basic aspects of the system (see also Norris, 1999a and 2006).

Diffuse or unconditional support is described as one that relates to what an object *is* or *represents* not of what it *does*.[1] This kind of support consists in a "reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will that helps members to accept or tolerate outputs to which they are opposed or the effects of which they see as damaging to their wants" (Easton, 1975: 444). Thus diffuse support is expected to be more permanent along time, and independent from the outcomes or performance in the short term: "Outputs and beneficial performance may rise and fall while this support, in the form of a generalized attachment, continues" (Easton, 1975: 444).

According to this, democratic legitimacy can be understood as the result of that attitude toward democracy which—unlike satisfaction with the performance of democracy—manifests itself as a diffuse or unconditional support for the democratic system of government. In this sense, democratic legitimacy pertains, as proposed by

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[1] What any of the objects *does* is understood here as a specific or conditional support.

Gunther and Montero (2006: 48), to citizens' beliefs that democratic politics and representative democratic institutions are the most appropriate (indeed, the only acceptable) framework for government. If this failed, if the reasons given for the worthiness of the political order are not supported and confirmed by autonomous insights *we speak of illegitimacy* (Offe, 2006: 25).

All the main theories dealing with stability and quality of democracy, which have been developing since the late 1970s along with the processes of transition to democracy, have underlined the essential role of citizens' support for democratic system. From Linz and Stepan's *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* (1978) and *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (1996) until the more recent literature on the quality of democracy (Diamond and Morlino, 2004), the literature on democratic legitimacy has considered citizens' orientations toward democracy as a principal feature of the stability and well-functioning of a democratic political regime. According to the literature of consolidation of democracy, a popular "commitment to democratic values, and support for democratic system, are necessary conditions for the consolidation of [democratic governance]" (Fuch, 1999: 127). In other words, it is only possible to talk of consolidated democracies when a widely normative and attitudinal consensus has been reached regarding the desirability of democracy in general, as well as the legitimacy of all representative institutions that have been established in the country.

This broad consensus must be shared by the vast majority of the elites of a particular political community (in the government, political parties, intellectuals, and civil society), by the grassroots of political, social, and economic organizations, as well as by a large majority of public opinion (Chu and Diamond, 1999). In addition, for this support to have a *consolidator* effect it must be unconditional, immune to the political or economic contingency, as well as to the ideological or partisan preferences (Torcal, 2008: 30). As proposed by Linz and Stepan in a simple but straightforward wording, a political community cannot be considered as a *safe consolidated democracy* until democratic norms have become "the only game in town" (1996: 5). In other words, "Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support for anti-system alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces" (Linz and Stepan, 1996: 6).

Although more recently developed, the literature on the quality of democracy (Altman and Pérez-Liñán, 2002; Diamond and Morlino, 2005; Hagopian, 2005; Carlin,

2006; Morlino, 2007) states that reforms with the intention to improve the quality of democracy are essential to achieve the wide and persistent legitimacy they need for consolidation (Diamond and Morlino, 2004). As it is suggested by Altman and Luna (2007) the *tonicity of the democratic muscle* of a given country does not only depends on the outcomes of the performance of institutions, but the quality of democracy life is also about the support citizens give to the *democratic game*.

In the case of advanced industrialized societies, the consolidated status of mass support for democracy has been largely confirmed. In all Western advanced democracies a vast and overwhelming majority of citizens express their overt approval for democracy as the best and always preferable political regimen of government (Dalton, 1999; Kinglemann, 1999).[2] The well-known story of political support in consolidated democracies is, on the one hand, that citizens have a general positive attitude toward democracy as an ideal and a form of governance, but, on the other hand, they are unfavourable about the current representative procedures as much as their institutions and authorities (Dalton, 2004). The emergence of these "critical citizens" (Norris 1999a) or "dissatisfied democrats" (Dalton, 1999; Lagos, 2003a) shows also that support for democracy is consolidated in terms of its unconditionality: "as citizens are criticizing the incumbents and institutions of government, they are simultaneously expressing strong support of the democratic creed" (Dalton, 2008: 252).[3]

The story regarding young democracies or countries with recent democratization process is somehow different: support for democracy has been considered as one of the most relevant, interesting and widely discussed issues. Many emerging democracies still have a significant percentage of citizens who have not been persuaded to give their support for democracy, and also this support can be very volatile—as the case of the Latin American region (Lagos, 1997 and 2003a). Nonetheless, it has been recognized that in general terms there is a global aspiration of democracy (Chu et al., 2008; Lagos, 2003b). This means that in regions as different as Africa (Bratton, 2002; Bratton and Mattes, 2001), East and South Asia (deSouza, et al. 2008; Shin and Wells, 2005), and the Arab countries (Jamal and Tessler, 2008; Tessler and Gao, 2005) the levels of support for democracy are

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[2] According to Eurobarometer 1997 information, the Western European mean of support for democracy is 75%, and, with the exception of Portugal, in 14 European countries more than 60% of the citizens prefer democracy to any other form of government (Lagos, 2003b: 474).

[3] However, the other side of the argument is that "there has been an erosion of public support for the core institutions of representative government, including parties and parliaments, in recent decades" (Norris, 1999a: 21; see also Dalton, 2004).

relatively high, and in many countries is above the theoretical threshold of 60 per cent for consolidated regimes (Diamond, 1999; Lagos, 2003b).

However, this level of democratic support cannot be considered as a triumphal achievement of consolidation in all these democracies. Generally speaking in newly democratic or hybrid regimes mass support for democracy is not consolidated as long as it is not unconditional. As it has been studied, citizens in these countries give their support for democracy based on an instrumental calculation: how much they can receive from democracy or how much satisfied they are with its performance (Bratton and Mattes, 2001; Mattes, 2002; Mishler and Rose, 1999; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2005 and 2008). It means that support for democracy can depend on fluctuations of political or economical contingencies, and partisan and ideological variations (Lagos, 2008). According to Diamond (2002a: 218) in the case of Latin America the unease with democracy is driven by the dissatisfaction with the way democracy works, with the discontent with high levels of corruption, poor economic performance, and general lack of receptivity of the political representatives.

II.2. Dimensions of Democratic Support: Toward a Distinction of Non Democratic Citizens

Most part of the academic literature about democratic legitimacy has focused on the explanations of emergence and stability of unconditional support for democracy in different regimes (Bratton, 2002; Chu and Diamond, 1999; Huneeus and Maldonado, 2003; Klingemann, 1999; Mattes and Bratton, 2007; Teorell, 2002; Torcal, 2008; Watherford, 1992). Usually this literature develops a "dichotomous" approach, dividing citizens in two relatively homogeneous groups: on the one hand, those who overtly support democracy as the best political regime (the "democrats") and, on the other, those who do not support democratic regime (the "non democrats").

However, there are at least two arguments which allow considering the group of non democrats as heterogeneous. First, there are countries where more than 50 per cent of its citizens do not prefer democracy to any other kind of regime, declaring either that in given circumstances they would prefer authoritarianism or for them the form of political regime does not make any difference. Among those who do not always support democracy it is a complex system of attitudes and beliefs, articulated in different kinds of objections to democracy. And second, this high level of non preference for democracy is coherent with the "contradictions" found in several studies about an important number of individuals

that, supporting democracy as a form of government, show values and attitudes different from the democratic ideal (UNDP 2004; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007).

Some authors have recognized the existence of an emerging consensus that democratic support is *multidimensional* (Norris, 1999a and 2006) democrats and authoritarians coexist with citizens holding mixed or ambivalent belief systems (Carlin, 2006; Carlin and Singer, 2007: 2). This is situation, in fact, is not new at all: Almond and Verba (1963) recognized decades ago the odd phenomenon that Mexicans, in terms of values and attitudes, were neither entirely democrats nor authoritarians, showing a varied systems of beliefs (Camp, 2001). However, this was not studied in depth. But only a small number of studies have directly addressed the analysis of those citizens who do not support democracy and the possible arguments which would explain this attitude. Good examples of these are the following.

Seligson and Carrion (2002) suggest the separated consideration of those citizens who place themselves in a middle point of the items they use for measuring support for the system. This middle point represents a neutral assessment of the system to which the authors called *political skepticism*. The UNDP (2004) study identifies three main orientations of Latin American citizens according to their opinions about democracy: 1) "democrat", who responds positively regarding three perspectives: delegative attitudes, preference for democracy, and support for representation institutions; 2) "non democrat", who responds negatively to the same perspectives; and 3) "ambivalent", who gives ambiguous answers. The UNDP Index of Democratic Support allows for the arranging of individuals into different categories but using a single dimension scale of support for democracy. Schedler and Sarsfield (2007) use cluster analysis and based on direct and indirect measures of support for liberal democracy in a sample of Mexican individuals – they find five different kinds of "adjectives" to democrats: liberal, tolerant, paternalist, homophobic, and excluding; and one additional category of authoritarian. However, their attention is only put on those who to a certain extent are classified as democratic citizens. Again, their distinction of democratic support is dichotomous, and they do not inquire about differences of non democratic citizens. Carlin and Singer (2007) suggest different clusters of citizens regarding the support for democracy, developing a set of profiles of supporters distinguishing among individuals who are not completely committed to the core tenets of

Dahl's (1971) *Polyarchy*. These citizens accept only one main characteristic of democracy.[4] They find, based on a dataset of twelve Latin American democracies, five clusters of individuals: democrat; hyper-presidential; pluralist autocrat; hedging autocrat, and pure autocrat.

In addition, there are studies that explain the multidimensionality of democratic support from a different perspective. These works propose a distinction of citizen support based not on a given concept of democracy—like those reviewed above—but on the concept of democratic legitimacy. Morlino and Montero (1995: 233-4) distinguished two kinds of democratic legitimacy: "diffuse legitimacy", understood as the general and abstract framework of positive attitudes toward democracy, and "legitimacy by default" recognized as the support for democracy when the alternatives of democracy are not view positively. In the same layer, Chu and Huang (2007) claim that factors shaping people's positive orientations toward democracy are not the same as those moulding people's attitudes toward authoritarian alternatives.[5] The authors find that, although both aspects are indispensable for the development of a solid attitudinal consolidation of democracy, these two sets of orientations are conceptually and empirically distinguishable. Rejection to authoritarian options does not imply necessarily support for democracy.

In this paper, we debate neither the definition of democratic legitimacy nor the precise concept of democracy. We do not intend to discuss either the methodological validity or the reliability of the indicators trying to measure these concepts. However, we work on the boundaries of this discussion, in the sense that we expect to understand the situation where different citizens cohabit with mixed and ambivalent attitudes and values toward democracy. Regarding the previous theoretical elaboration, we recognize two things: first, any kind of indicator of individual political support has to consider the multidimensionality of this attitude and the possibility of ambiguous sorts of support. And second, this indicator has to take into consideration not only the abstract support or preference for democracy (including the beliefs as the best form of government) but also opinions about the authoritarian options. Thus in the analysis of different profiles it is necessary to differentiate two dimensions: preference for democracy over any other kind of

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[4] They analyze individual support for: political tolerance, free expression, civil liberties, and institutions and processes.
[5] See also a similar argument in Shin and Wells, 2005: 90.

regime and rejection to non democratic alternatives, either authoritarian or non-completely

democratic ones—that has been defined as delegative democracies or hybrid regimes.[6]

[6] The concept of "delegative democracy" was developed by O'Donnell (1994). Recently, some scholars have suggested that the spectrum of differentiation among political regimes goes beyond the simple distinction between democratic and authoritarian, and they have proposed the alternatives of "hybrid regimes" (Diamond 2002; Karl 1995), "illiberal democracies" (Zakaria, 1997) or "competitive authoritarianisms" (Howard and Roessler, 2006; Levitsky and Way, 2002; Schedler, 2002). These political regimes are characterized by having the (theoretical) minimum component of a democracy: relatively free and fair elections, where political options compete for public positions, but where the rather necessary characteristics of consolidated liberal democracies are not fulfilled.

III. Why Latin America? Selection Reasons and Data

This research is focused on the new Latin American democracies. All these countries have a similar historical background, but diverse current political and social trajectories, with different political cultures and institutional settings. Precisely because of this situation, the region is very appropriate for a comparative analysis: analogous previous conditions and experiences, but diverse results, where support for democracy is not the exception.

As it has been stated before, low levels of democratic legitimacy are considered as one of the main problems for the emergence and consolidation of a democracy, as much as its quality. On average, and more than two decades after democratic transitions, the great majority of Latin American countries still show relatively low and volatile levels of support for democracy, compared to those from the established advanced Western democracies as well as emerging democracies of other regions.

In Table 1 it is possible to see a great variation among countries in Latin America, Asia and Africa. In one extreme, in countries like Nigeria, Thailand, Tanzania, and Uruguay more than 80 per cent of its inhabitants manifest their preference for democracy; on the other extreme, in Mongolia and Paraguay only 40% of its population expresses the same support. Comparing regions, African mean is above 75%, meanwhile Asian and Latin American means are close to 60%.[7] Thus, democratic support in these two regions is relatively low, but in Latin America the variance among countries is larger.

Besides, in Latin America the situation is rather problematic because democratic support is not only low, but it has considerable fluctuations across time. Figure 1 shows that support for democracy oscillates between 58% in 1995, 67% in 1997, 55% in 2001, and 58% in 2008. Just between 1996 and 1998 it has been above the theoretical threshold to be considered as a consolidated democracy (Diamond, 1999). Therefore, support for democracy in Latin America is neither substantial nor unconditional.

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[7] The information of European countries also reveals great variation: the mean of support for democracy in Western countries is 75%, whilst in Eastern countries is just 55% (Lagos 2008: 474).

Table 1. Preference for Democracy in Latin America, Africa and Asia

| Region / Country	Preference for Democracy (%)*	Region / Country	Preference for Democracy (%)*
Latin America	**60**	**Africa**	**74**
Uruguay	82	Botswana	87
Venezuela	77	Tanzania	83
Costa Rica	74	Uganda	83
Dominican Rep.	74	Nigeria	81
Panama	70	Zimbabwe	78
Argentina	67	Zambia	78
El Salvador	66	Ghana	76
Chile	59	Namibia	71
Mexico	57	Malawi	67
Bolivia	54	Mali	59
Colombia	53	Lesotho	53
Honduras	52	**Asia**	**59**
Peru	51	Thailand	81
Nicaragua	50	Indonesia	73
Guatemala	50	Singapore	63
Brazil	48	Filipinas	55
Ecuador	48	Taiwan	51
Paraguay	40	South Korea	48
		Mongolia	40

Source: For Latin America: Latinobarometro 2004, for Africa: Afro barometer 2005 and for Asia: Chu & Huang 2007: 30 (with information from Asia barometer 2005-2007).
* Percentage of respondents who choose the option "Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government". D.K. and D.A. answers were codified as Missing values.

In order to analyse a broad set of countries, we use the Latinobarometro dataset of 2004. With this survey it is possible to analyse eighteen countries in the region. Also, the survey contains important questions in order to build the indicator and the test different hypotheses. The Latinobarometro2004 is based on 19,605 personal interviews, carried out between May 1st and June 29th, comprising representative samples of 1,000-1,200 cases in each country. The margin of error is between 2.8% and 4.1% (Latinobarometro 2004, Methodological Report)

Figure 1. Support for Democracy in Latin America, 1995-2008

Support for Democracy in Latin America, 1995-2008

Source: from 1995 to 2005, datasets of Latinobarometro; from 2006 to 2008: media annual reports Latinobarómetro (www.latinobarometro.org). We present the percentage of individuals agreeing with one of three statements in the question of regime preference.
Note: For 2001 the data base did not report an answer D.K.= "don't know".

IV. Identification of Non Democratic Profiles: Methods and Indicator

To be consistent with the theoretical discussion, the indicator of different profiles of non democratic citizens has to fulfil two methodological characteristics. First, it has to include more than one simple variable or question, because support for democracy ought to be analysed from a multidimensional perspective. Second, the indicator has to be constructed with different categories or profiles.[8] In that sense, the preliminary step is to identify and corroborate the two dimensions of support: preference for democracy and rejection to authoritarianism (or non democratic regimes). Without hesitation, the appropriate technique for this purpose is the confirmatory *factor analysis*. This method will provide us with, for the selected variables, the individual scores for the two dimensions.

The characteristics and codification of the selected variables are shown in Appendix I at the end of this paper. For the dimension of preference for democracy, we selected different questions about the benefits of democracy as the best system of government. The first one is the "overt support for democracy", which asks about the preference for democracy compared to other options.[9] Unlike the great majority of studies, we incorporated this variable without transforming it into a dichotomised or a continuous one maintaining its three nominal categories, as we estimate the item has a great discriminatory capacity for those who do not prefer democracy. For the dimension of rejection of authoritarianism the Latinobarometro allows us only to selected items related with rejection of military rule.

The correlation matrix of the five variables for the whole Latin American sample suggests that the associations among them are statistically significant in the expected manner. In addition, the coefficient of Cronbach-alpha—0.60, computed only for the

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[8] An indicator measuring support for democracy in a continuous manner supposes that in one extreme one should find the "democrats"—giving the most positive opinion to all the selected variables of support—and in the opposite extreme there will be located the "non democrats"—declaring the most negative opinion to the same variables. However, this makes it difficult to study the individuals located in the middle of the scheme (Carlin and Singer 2007). Using a simple factor analysis (which in its bases implies the linearity of the variables) to construct the indicator seems not to be the best methodological tool as we are working on the theoretical basis that individuals can express contradictory and mixed preferences for democracy; in other words, we aim to find non linear relationships.

[9] This item has been used in several public opinion surveys. Its theoretical background has been recognised in the arguments of the breakdown of democratic regimen's theory postulated by Juan J. Linz (1978). He made a triple distinction according to the individual alignments to the democratic system.

dichotomous variables—adds evidence of the multidimensionality structure of our data. According to the latter, we compute a factor analysis with dummy variables in order to confirm the existence of the concepts of preference for democracy and rejection of authoritarianism. The result, shown in Table 2, illustrates clearly how the four variables are divided into two different factors as predicted, with a correlation of 0.68 (and a Cronbach-alpha coefficient of 0.8). Hence, even if the preference for democracy and the rejection of authoritarianism are theoretically and empirically distinguishable, both are correlated.

Table 2. Analysis: Preference for democracy and Rejection to authoritarianism *.

Variable	Factor 1/ Rejection to authoritarianism	Factor 2/ Preference for democracy	Uniqueness
Democracy better system of government	-	0.5119	0.732
Democracy best for development	-	0.5115	0.732
Rejection to military government	0.7061	-	0.500
Problem solving capacity of military government	0.7025	-	0.496

Note: Only factor loads over <0.2 are shown.
*Rotated factors (promax method).

The next step is to construct the citizens' profiles. In the same vein of previous works (Carlin and Singer, 2007; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007; UNPD 2004), the best methodological technique to obtain different individual profiles of support is the *cluster analysis*. This method allows identifying different groups or clusters among observations or individuals according to their variation in different variables. The technique minimizes the difference among individuals within the same group and maximise dissimilarities between groups. The cluster analysis will group individuals in different profiles along with their similarities in the orientation toward democracy, according with two dimensions above mention.

For the cluster analysis we have used three indicators: the scores of the two factors previously obtained and the item of preference for democracy. We transformed the latter, considering its categories, into three new dummy variables (1=each category and 0=the other two) and standardized it (mean=1, and standard deviation=1) in order to facilitate the comparison with the other two items. We computed a non-hierarchical cluster

procedure of partition[10] that—unlike the normal hierarchical models of agglomeration—allows us to set the number of clusters we are interested in identifying.

With the aim of confirming that the four profiles are well adjusted to our sample, we computed other analysis with the same method specifying different solutions: two, three, and six clusters. Using the Calinski and Harabasz pseudo-F index for cluster-analysis stopping rule, we confirm that the solution of four groups is indeed the best fitting the dataset. This four-cluster solution presents the higher pseudo-F index compared to the other possibilities. In addition, we compute another cluster analysis, but this time we tried one hierarchical analysis of agglomeration[11] with average linkage for a sub-sample of the Latinobarometro dataset.[12] The dendogram derived of the analysis shows three different solutions: three, four, and six clusters. Giving the fact that hierarchical models allow another cluster stopping rules, we calculate the Duda-Hart Je(2)/Je(1) index. Presented with the Duda-Hart Je(2)/Je(1) values are assigned pseudo-T-squared values. Smaller pseudo-T-squared values indicate more distinct clustering (StataCorp., 2007: 159). Comparing the results of our sub-sample analysis, we found that the 4-cluster and the 6-cluster solutions have the smallest pseudo-T-squared values. All these results combined with the theoretical framework give us consistent arguments to accept that the four-cluster solution is the most appropriate.

The solution provides us with an indicator of different individual groups. First of all, we have to mention that the conventional variable of support for democracy has the best discriminating capacity. It is shown that each profile is dominated by one of the three possible categories: the 100% of individuals in each group choose one category. The result confirms that this question is a useful instrument distinguishing among democratic supporters. However, it cannot be taken alone as it will be demonstrated in the following analysis. Table 3 demonstrates some distinctive characteristics of each profile that are useful in order to name them. This indicator joint with the distribution of the mean of the variables used in the cluster analysis allows us the opportunity to identify four profiles of

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[10] This method of partition divides the observations into a not superimposed number of groups. The average linkage procedure (also known as arithmetic average clustering) uses the distance between two or more groups as the mean of the distances between all pairs of observations between the two groups.

[11] The hierarchical agglomeration models do not assume any particular number of groups to form. They start considering each observation as a separated group. The most proximate groups are combined, and this process continues until the whole pool of observations is assigned to one group or cluster. There are different methods of linkage: nearest-neighbor or simple method; arithmetic average clustering (the one used in this paper); and furthest-neighbor or complete method.

[12] The subsample includes only individuals from Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Mexico, and Uruguay.

citizens: "democrat", "authoritarian", "incoherent", and "indifferent", as it can be seen in Table 3.

Table 3. Profiles of Support for Democracy: 4 Clusters solution

Variables	Profiles of Support for Democracy				
	Democrat	Authoritarian	Incoherent	Indifferent	Sample Mean
Democracy best form of government	0.93	0.60	0.77	0.68	0.78
Democracy best for development	0.93	0.62	0.76	0.72	0.79
Rejection to military government	1.00	0.50	0.31	0.64	0.70
Problem solving capacity of military	1.00	0.50	0.30	0.61	0.69
"Democracy is always preferable"	1.00	0	1.00	0	0.60
"Authoritarian government can be preferable"	0	1.00	0	0	0.16
"It doesn't matter we have a democratic or non democratic gov."	0	0	0	1.00	0.22

Note: We presented the mean of each variable that we have used in the construction of the dimensions of "preference for democracy" and "rejections to authoritarianism" for each profile and for the whole sample of individuals.

The *democrat* profile is characterised by individuals who overtly prefer democracy and reject the military/authoritarian alternative as well. They also reckon almost completely that democracy is the best form of government and the best system for development. The *authoritarian* profile describes individuals who, under certain circumstances, would prefer an authoritarian government. Half of these individuals do not reject the military government. Also, in a lower proportion they think of democracy as the best form of government and for development. The profile called *incoherent* is featured with individuals who always prefer democracy but with an inconsistency: they do not reject in majority the authoritarian rule (the mean of this variable for the profile is 0.30). However, compared to the authoritarian, the incoherent has a better esteem of democracy as the best form of government, right after the democrat. Finally, the profile of *indifferent* is dominated by individuals for whom the form of government does not matter. Unlike the authoritarian, the indifferent rejects in

great proportion the authoritarian government. And compared to the incoherent, his or her appreciation of democracy as the best form of government is slightly lower.[13]

Alternatively, in Figure 2 we present the distribution of the profiles for the whole sample and for each Latin American country. At first glance, the profiles vary cross-nationally. On the one hand, not surprisingly, Costa Rica and Uruguay have the greater number of "democrats". On the other hand, the distribution of non democratic profiles differs very much across countries. For instance, Paraguay is the case with the highest number of "authoritarians"; the "indifferent" is the most relevant profile in Nicaragua; and El Salvador concentrates the largest amount of "incoherents".

Figure 2. Distribution of Citizens' Profiles in 18 Latin American Countries


Source: Authors' elaboration based on information from the Indicator constructed in this paper with data from the Latinobarometro 2004. We sort countries according to the percentage of "democrats".

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[13] In order to test whether the four-cluster solution remains the finest we replicate the distribution of profiles according to the means of the selected variables for the six-cluster solution. See the Table 4 (Appendix II) for this. It is possible to see that three profiles—democrat, authoritarian, and indifferent—maintain the same characteristics. However, it appears another possible profile of *moderate democrat* and the incoherent seems to be divided into the profile we have already described and another *radical incoherent*. We reckon this result sustains the appropriateness of the four-profile solution because this one of six-profiles does not change substantially the interpretation of the profiles' contents.

In order to classify the countries according to the distribution of profiles, we run a *correspondence analysis*.[14] With the graphic assistance of the correspondence map (see Figure 3), we can postulate a first classification of countries in four groups. The result suggests that 89.5% of the variance between profiles and countries can be explained by two axis or dimensions. Dimension 1—from left to right—seems to be dominated by the distinction between the democrat profile and the non democrat profiles (66% of the explained variance). Dimension 2—from top to bottom—distinguishes between non democrat profiles: the "authoritarians" in one extreme and the "indifferents" and "incoherents" on the other extreme (23% of the explained variance).

Figure 3. Correspondence Map for Citizens' Profiles and 18 Latin American Countries

Source: Authors' elaboration with data from Latinobarometro 2004.

We identify one group of countries characterised for relatively proportional distribution of the four profiles: Bolivia, Brazil, Peru, and, to a certain extent, Argentina

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[14] The correspondence analysis is a proper technique for the study of categorical variables and the analysis of their associational patterns, allowing a graphic visualization of the associations (Greenacre, 2005).

(but this country has a bigger proportion than the others of democrats and it is located on the negative scores of Dimension 1). The second group is constituted by Paraguay and Ecuador at the left bottom of the map, meaning a strong presence of the authoritarian profile. A third group is recognized by the large amount of democrats, and this includes Costa Rica and Uruguay, and also Chile, Dominican Republic, Panama, and Venezuela, however these countries have important groups of indifferents and incoherents. The last group is formed with the cases without an important number of democrats, but where the authoritarians are not relevant either. Mexico and Nicaragua are rather associated with the indifferents; and El Salvador with the incoherents. Finally Colombia, Guatemala and Honduras tend to have similar proportions of these two profiles.

Without hesitation, the patterns of distribution and association between profiles and countries are very interesting. However, the purpose of analysing these patterns goes beyond this paper as we intent to build and present a useful indicator of non democratic profiles. In the following section, we examine the possible factors which account for the configuration of different profiles: that is, the objections to democracy that citizens of non democratic profiles raise and argue.

V. Analysis and Explanation of Non Democratic Profiles: Hypotheses and Methods

As shown by a large amount of literature, support for democracy seems to be driven by more or less clear-cut factors, while the objective to explain its rejection remains much more complicated (Carlin and Singer, 2007: 15). Tapping objections to democratic rule entails a different kind of *problematique* than measuring diffuse support for democracy: "knowing that a person has little esteem for democracy, or low level of diffuse support, is not the same as knowing what kind of objections to democratic rule he or she has, and what kind of antidemocratic political actions he or she is willing to tolerate and/or support" (Vargas Cullell, 2006: 2). Therefore, it is necessary not only to demonstrate that there are different kinds of citizens' profiles, but also—and more important—that these profiles are distinguishable and explained by different factors.

In the context of the democratic consolidation literature, a set of different hypotheses with the aim of accounting for the generation and maintenance of support for democracy has been formulated. However, in this literature there is not any sort of proposition explaining non democratic support, which is the aim of this paper. With regard to the former, we assume that explanations of democratic support can be a suitable starting point. Those hypotheses can be grouped in two kinds of explanations: *exogenous* and *endogenous* to the political system. The first ones suggest that the factors accounting for citizen support are external to the political system, whilst the second kind of explanations predicts that this support depends on the political system itself.

Among the exogenous hypotheses, it is possible to highlight first the cultural approaches, which refer to cultural traits depending on long time processes of socialization (Almond and Verba, 1963; Lerner 1958; Lipset, 1959). Thus, at the micro level, these models pose that individual's preferences of the regime would be strongly influenced by norms and values (Mattes and Bratton, 2007): the change from a traditional and communitarian (even ethnical) culture to a modern and individual one explains support for democracy. Here we use the variables of "political values", "democracy as a government by agreement", and "social conservadurism".[15] A second group of exogenous explanations refers to the socioeconomic structure. These theories sustain that individual preferences

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[15] The definition, characteristics, and coding for each variable can be found in Appendix I of this paper.

and behavior are determined by material circumstances, as socio-demographic, social class, and social structural variables (Moreno, 2001). The proposition behind these theories is that, in a first moment, economic development raises the levels of tolerance, interpersonal trust, political activism, and the defense of individual liberties (what Inglehart, 1990 and 1999, and Inglehart and Welzel, 2005; called the "post-materialist syndrome"); then, all this elevates the levels of democratic support. The selected variables for these hypotheses are: gender, age, education, and income.

Endogenous explanations are rather based on the reasoning of individuals. From this perspective, citizens' preferences and attitudes would be the result of political or economic events, and consequence of different conflictive experiences, as well as the result of institutional design factors, the evaluation of institutional performance (Mattes and Bratton 2007; Norris 1999) or the legacy of previous authoritarian regimes (Morlino, 2007; Torcal, 2008). One part of this literature proposes that the formation of democratic individual preferences depends on a rational and pragmatic evaluation of the economic government performance (Przeworski, et al. 2000). Citizens prefer democracy because it works for them and gives them greater benefits (Evans and Whitefield, 1995). In order to test the proposition we use the variables of satisfaction with national/domestic and personal economy and general approval of government. Some other scholars propose that citizens define their preferences based on "political goods": individuals defined a rational preference for democracy based on their positive evaluation of the political performance of the system. Then, support for democracy depends as much on the satisfaction with the democratic regime as the performance of certain political institutions and authorities (O'Donnell, 2004; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2005 and 2008). In that sense, we employ the variables of satisfaction with the way democracy works and the perception of reduced corruption in the government. Some other scholars suggest that, especially in newer democracies, rationality does not depend so much on economic and political goods as in the individual calculation influenced by the comparison between regimes (Mishler and Rose, 1999). No matter how satisfied people are with the economic and political performance of the government, they are eager to support democracy because it works better than its predecessors (Morlino, 2007; Torcal, 2008). Although it is an important explanation, especially for the cases of this paper, the Latinobarometro does not contain useful items to test this hypothesis.

Some authors propose that political attitudes are determined by the perception of the individual and his or her relationship with the body politic. Therefore, democratic

support would depend on the personal perception of the individual impact upon the political process, which is known as political efficacy. This concept has been theoretically and empirically studied as composed by other two latent concepts: "internal political efficacy" indicating individuals' self-perception that they are capable of understanding and competent enough to participate in political acts, and "external political efficacy", which measures expressed beliefs about political institutions, its "lack indicates the belief that the public cannot influence political outcome because government leaders and institutions are unresponsive" (Miller et al. 1980, 253). In addition, the concept of political efficacy is considered as forming part, along with other expressions of political disenchantment, of the broader phenomenon of political disaffection which would be affecting support for democracy (DiPalma, 1970; Mishler and Rose, 1997). To tap this hypothesis, we use the variables of political interest and the reported voting identification.

A group of theories propose that support for democracy is conditioned by political learning processes. In its basis these theories assume that citizens are able to extract lessons both from authoritarian and democratic governments, based on their performance (Mattes and Bratton, 2007). A successful experience of either autocracy or democracy leaves a legacy in individual preferences (Morlino, 2007). These learning processes have three forms: 1) "generational learning", where citizen support depends on the generation in which an individual has grown and socialized; 2) "lifetime learning", where people acquire information during his life and develop attitudes supporting the democratic regime; and 3) "collective learning", when a whole society experience at the same time the effect of a given period or event, and then an individual learns to support democracy no matter his generation or age (Torcal, 2008). Unfortunately, the Latinobarometro does not include useful questions allowing testing these theories.

Finally, anticipated by another proposition, some scholars suggest that cultural, structural and rational explanations are complementary. In that sense, political attitudes are fairly stable cross time, being the result of short term as much as long term. The relative importance of each of these factors is essentially an empirical question (Torcal and Montero, 2006: 12). Accordingly, our empirical analyses of the configuration of the non democratic profiles will test the results of the model including all the variables previously discussed, suggesting that attitudes of democratic support are generated by endogenous and exogenous factors to the political system at the same time, and its relevance has to be tested only through empirical analysis.

In accordance with the theoretical and empirical propositions, we propose the following hypotheses in the configuration of the non democratic profiles:[16]

1. In line with the exogenous explanations, we expect education and income to be good predictors of "democrats". In that sense, as long as the "indifferent" is the most proximate profile to "democrats", we anticipate that this individuals will be more educated than the "authoritarian" and the "incoherent". We also expect younger individuals to be either democrat or indifferent—because in general they have been socialized during the new democratic rules in the region.

2. As for the endogenous explanations, we expect that all non democratic profiles will be determined to certain extent by a level of dissatisfaction with the regime, either economic or political, but we expect a greater effect on, first, "indifferents" and then "authoritarians". Even if both profiles do not prefer democracy, they both have a larger amount of individuals rejecting the military option. In other words, their rejection should be highly based on instrumental-rational calculations.

3. With regard to the former, in the case of "authoritarians" we anticipate this profile to be influenced also by cultural factors, especially negative scores of political values. Contrary to this, we expect to find that "indifferents" are differentiated by the factors of political efficacy because of their lack of attitudinal attachment to the body politic.

4. In the case of the "incoherent" profile, we reckon the non rejection of military rule can be influenced by a deep reason, giving the fact that, even when they accept the benefits of the democracy as better form of government, they do not rule out the authoritarian alternative. We expect this profile to be accounted for cultural variables, inasmuch as evaluations of political and economical performance.

We examine these propositions in two steps. In the first step, the dependent variable is the indicator of support for democracy recoded into a dichotomised item, where (1) is the "democrat" profiles and (0) the other profiles. We run three models of *logistic regression* for the whole sample: in the first model we used only the socio-demographic variables, in the second we test only the cultural, rational and political disaffection hypotheses variables, and in the third model we examine the complete effect of all variables. The aim of the strategy is to compare separately the influence of the explanatory

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[16] All the hypotheses and variables tested in this paper are analysed at the individual level. We decided to leave the development of a model considering the systemic and aggregated variables, as it will explained at the end of this paper, for future research.

variables in our outcome. The second step develops one model where the dependent variable is the same indicator of citizens' profile, but maintaining the four categories. We use successive *multinomial logistic regressions* with rotation in the reference category. This strategy allows us to analyse the results for each one of the profiles compared to the others.

Finally, it is necessary to mention that all the models include two additional control variables. One is the individual level of "political information" or cognitive awareness, because the understanding of the political system is a consequences of the citizen' cognitive capacities (Mattes and Bratton 2007). The other variable is the political ideology—the traditional self position in the left-right spectrum—because some have suggested that democratic preferences in Latin America depends on this factor (Lagos 2008; Seligson 2007; UNDP 2004).

V.1. Democrat vs. Non Democrat: Nothing New

The first results of logistic regression are shown in Table 5 with odd ratios and robust standard errors.[17] In general the three models seem to be well adjusted to our propositions; the majority of the coefficients behave as expected and they are statistically significant. It is necessary to mention that comparing the pseudo-R-square of each model, the model having the best prediction is Model 3 that includes exogenous as well as endogenous factors. We also tested the predictability of the model and we found that in this model more than 64% of the observations were correctly predicted by this model (see the results at the right bottom of Table 5), which is the best result compared to the others.

The results illustrate that the traditional explanations about the democratic support in contrast to non democratic support are sustained. We do not find anything different from previous works on this topic. Our results are very similar to those found by Carlin and Singer (2007), even though they worked with the profiles of support for polyarchy.

As it can be seen, democrats are better educated and better informed than non democrats. The result of age is intriguing because younger individuals tend to fall in the non democrat profile (in other words, the probability of falling in the democratic profile increases as the age of individual increases). Also interesting, rational evaluations of the

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[17] Instead of reporting the coefficients of the logistic regression, we report the *odds ratio* of each variable, because the values of the exponential terms allow deriving an easy interpretation of the effect of the explanatory variables on the dependent variables. Considering that all explanatory variables are highly related with country characteristics, we run all the models with robust standard error adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample.

economic situations are not significant in the prediction of profiles. In contrast, the variables related with rational evaluation of the political performance of the regime have a better significance. However, it is surprising that perception of corruption reduction works in the opposite expected direction: relatively the better the performance of government against corruption, the higher the probability of being non democrat.

Table 5. Models predicting Democrat Profile versus Non Democratic Profile

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Odds Ratio	Robust Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Robust Std. Err.	Odds Ratio	Robust Std. Err.
Gender	1.2965	.0380			.9831	.0411
Education	1.1498***	.0426			1.0790***	.0308
Age	1.2575***	.0342			1.2622***	.0349
Income	1.0743	.0503			1.0245	.0375
Satisfaction with domestic economy			.9583	.0327	.95589	.0321
Satisfaction with personal economy			.9309*	.0360	.94324	.0364
Government approval			1.0509	.0903	1.050*	.0874
Satisfaction with democracy			1.5202***	.1076	1.5298***	.1085
Corruption reduction perception			.7929***	.0496	.81095***	.0492
Political values			1.5897***	.2348	1.6057***	.2343
Democracy as agreements			2.0457***	.2007	2.0308***	.2159
Social conservadurism			.6381***	.0572	.63844***	.0542
Political interest			1.3136***	.0750	1.2813***	.0713
Voting			1.0073	.0723	1.0070	.0724
Political information			1.2965***	.0507	1.2414***	.0451
Political ideology			.9752	.0378	.96697	.0387
Observations	14,456		11,348		11,187	
Model Chi-squared	307.63***		929.27***		1015.47***	
Pseudo R^2	0.0161		0.0696		0.0789	
Sensitivity	23.15%		48.43%		49.37%	
Specificity	85.84%		75.09%		75.86%	
Correctly Predicted	58.79%		63.49%		64.35%	

NOTE: The table lists the odds ratio results of logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in each model is: (1) Democrat profile and (0) Non democrat profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00

In terms of norms and values, as anticipated, democrats prefer freedom and civic rights over restricting social order, they think democracy as the space of agreements and discussion, and tend to reject the statement of gender segregation. The variable of political information gives us a clue about the importance of political efficacy discriminating between profiles. Finally, the ideological right-position is not a statistical significant variable predicting democratic citizens.

We said before that these results do not give any news about the conventional analysis of democratic supporters. However, some questions remain: are these patterns also persistent when comparing the different profiles of non democratic individuals? Or, on the contrary, each non democratic profile is accounted for different factors? This is the goal of the following section.

V.2. Objections to Democracy: Beyond a Dichotomous Distinction

The next step it is to demonstrate that the differentiation of non democratic profiles is empirically worth. This can only be sustained if each one of the non democratic profiles is explained by different factors, and not all by the same—as in the previous part. Given the fact that the constructed profiles with our indicator are categories *without* a natural ordering, we analyse their differences computing successive *multinomial logistic regressions* with rotation in the reference category: one for each profile. The results of the four multinomial regressions are shown in Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9, where we report the relative risk ratio (RRR) of each explanatory variable calculated with robust standard errors.[18] In the following, we comment the results based on each one of the non democratic profiles. We characterise them along with the democratic and the other non democratic profiles.

The "authoritarian" (see Table 7) profile typifies individuals with better education than "indifferents" and "incoherents", but without any difference from "democrats"—contradicting the hypothesis that the higher the education, the higher the support for democracy. Contrary to our expectation, the probability of being "authoritarian" compared to "democrat" decreases as age increases—but the probability increases compared to the "indifferent". Also authoritarians differentiate from incoherents and democrats based on the satisfaction with democracy. Interestingly, the best factor discriminating authoritarians from any other profile is the belief that democracy is not a system of agreements, and related to democrats and indifferents they are also different on the belief that an orderly society is better valuated politically. The authoritarian is more interested and informed than the indifferent. According to our expectation, authoritarians have objections to democracy

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based on rational evaluation of the political performance of the regime and, more important, on differences in political values.

Table 6. Model predicting different Citizens' Profiles, with reference category: "Democrat"

Variables	Authoritarian		Indifferent		Incoherent	
	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.
Gender	1.0337	.04053	1.0564	.06005	.9715	.05846
Education	.9853	.02419	.8759***	.0.3584	.9260**	.02998
Age	.8460***	.02195	.6786***	.03035	.8551***	.02739
Income	1.0352	.03886	.9744	.05240	.9332*	.03396
Satisfaction with domestic economy	1.0528	.05836	1.0510	.03957	1.0372	.03372
Satisfaction with personal economy	1.0602	.06257	1.0301	.05103	1.0797	.05713
Government approval	.9331	.09459	.9383	.07562	.9828	.09129
Satisfaction with democracy	.5499***	.05831	.5404***	.02991	.8769***	.05913
Corruption reduction perception	1.2313**	.09507	1.3089***	.09281	1.1654*	.10423
Political values	.5315***	.10231	.7683*	.11769	.5899***	.08124
Democracy as agreements	.4018***	.04803	.5009***	.05711	.5920***	.06302
Social conservadurism	1.4634***	.15975	1.6514***	.13314	1.5718***	.16311
Political interest	.8579*	.06752	.5879***	.05374	.9041*	.04933
Voting	1.005	.09017	.9225	.07112	1.0538	.08385
Political information	.8405***	.03831	.7389***	.03430	.8363***	.03551
Political ideology	1.02162	.05977	.9886	.03984	1.0855**	.04152
Observations	11,187					
Pseudo R^2	0.0601					

NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00

The profile of "indifferent" (see Table 8) is well characterised by citizens who are younger, less educated, and less informed than any other profile. They are also different from democrats and incoherent based on his dissatisfaction with the way democracy works (a differentiation from democrats potentiated by the disapproval of government). As expected, this profile has better appreciation of the democratic norms and values than authoritarians and incoherents. The indifferents put objections to democracy based on rational or instrumental calculations. And more important, they are a clearly distinguishable from other profiles regarding political disaffection variables.

Table 7. Model predicting different Citizens' Profiles, with reference category: "Authoritarian"

Variables	Democrat		Indifferent		Incoherent	
	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.
Gender	.9673	.03793	1.0219	.06417	.9398	.05844
Education	1.0149	.02492	.8890***	.03213	.9398**	.02986
Age	1.1819***	.03067	.8021***	.03677	1.0106	.02885
Income	.9659	.03625	.9412	.04305	.9014***	.02500
Satisfaction with domestic economy	.9498	.05265	.9983	.05050	.9851	.04618
Satisfaction with personal economy	.9431	.05565	.9716	.07804	1.0183	.05271
Government approval	1.0717	.10864	1.0056	.07556	1.0533	.07847
Satisfaction with democracy	1.8183***	.19280	.9826	.07233	1.5945***	.12658
Corruption reduction perception	.8121***	.06270	1.0630	.06812	.9465	.09347
Political values	1.8811***	.36207	1.4452**	.20712	1.1097	.15857
Democracy as agreements	2.4885***	.29747	1.2467***	.09422	1.4732***	.11795
Social conservadurism	.6833***	.07459	1.1284	.10496	1.0741	.10775
Political interest	1.1655**	.09174	.6852***	.06352	1.0538	.08563
Voting	.9950	.08929	.9179	.06001	1.0486	.06534
Political information	1.1896***	.05422	.8791***	.03157	.9949	.04193
Political ideology	.9788	.05726	.9676	.03352	1.0625	.04376
Observations	11,187					
Pseudo R²	0.0601					

NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00

Finally, the "incoherent" profile (see Table 9) is the most difficult to interpret because they do not have clear cut patterns. In general terms they are somehow similar to the authoritarians, but they differentiate from them in terms of lower income and lower education, they are also rather satisfied with the democracy (which is the same case regarding the indifferents). The incoherents have interesting differences to the indifferents, who tend to be female, less educated, less interested and less informed. Interestingly, they are more on the right side of the ideological spectrum compared to the democrats and the indifferents. However, our prediction to be a profile clearly discriminated from the other non democratic profiles by rather authoritarian values is not corroborated. Nevertheless, they seem to be rather dissimilar to the democrats in that sense. They prefer democracy in principle and have good rational evaluations of its performance, economically and politically, but they do not reject a military regime and have less democratic values. This opens the opportunity to consider an additional hypothesis not stated before. Given the fact that they are less educated, they are younger and have lower income, it is possible to

reckon the interaction with cultural, structural and institutional factors in their particular countries. Probably the expectation of improving their marginal conditions leads these citizens to question the feasibility of democracy in their countries, making them very *instrumental* individuals. However, the limitation of our variables do not allow to test this hypothesis at this stage, but it is likely to be explored in a future research.

Table 8. Model predicting different Citizens' Profiles, with reference category: "Indifferent"

Variables	Democrat		Authoritarian		Incoherent	
	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.
Gender	.9465	.05376	.9785	.06144	.9196*	.04060
Education	1.1416***	.04672	1.1248***	.04065	1.0572**	.02393
Age	1.4734***	.06590	1.2466***	.05715	1.2598***	.05139
Income	1.0262	.05519	1.0624	.04859	.9577	.04216
Satisfaction with domestic economy	.9513	.03582	1.0016	.05067	.9868	.03660
Satisfaction with personal economy	.9707	.04808	1.0292	.08267	1.0481	.06630
Government approval	1.0657	.08588	.9944	.07472	1.0474	.06587
Satisfaction with democracy	1.8504***	.10242	1.0176	.07490	1.6226***	.08907
Corruption reduction perception	.7639***	.05417	.9407	.06028	.8904	.09012
Political values	1.301*	.19938	.6919**	.09915	.7678***	.05953
Democracy as agreements	1.996***	.22758	.80211***	.06062	1.1817*	.10830
Social conservadurism	.6055***	.04882	.8861	.08242	.9518	.07052
Political interest	1.7008***	.15548	1.4592***	.13525	1.5377***	.12979
Voting	1.0839	.08356	1.0893	.07121	1.1423*	.09039
Political information	1.3532***	.06281	1.1374***	.04085	1.1317**	.05613
Political ideology	1.0115	.04077	1.0333	.03580	1.0980**	.04290
Observations	11,187					
Pseudo R^2	0.0601					

NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00

Table 9. Model predicting different Citizens' Profiles, with reference category: "Incoherent"

Variables	Democrat		Authoritarian		Indifferent	
	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.	RRR	Robust Std. Err.
Gender	1.0292	.06193	1.0640	.06616	1.0873*	.04801
Education	1.0798**	.03496	1.0639*	.03380	.9458**	.02141
Age	1.1695***	.03746	.9895	.02825	.7937***	.03238
Income	1.0715*	.03899	1.1092***	.03077	1.0441	.04597
Satisfaction with domestic economy	.9641	.03134	1.015	.04758	1.0133	.03758
Satisfaction with personal economy	.9261	.04901	.9819	.05083	.9541	.06036
Government approval	1.0174	.09450	.9493	.07072	.9546	.06003
Satisfaction with democracy	1.1403*	.07690	.6271***	.04978	.6162***	.03383
Corruption reduction perception	.8580*	.07673	1.0564	.10433	1.1230	.11368
Political values	1.1064***	.23334	.9011	.12876	1.3023***	.10098
Democracy as agreements	1.6891***	.17983	.6787***	.05434	.8462*	.07755
Social conservadurism	.6361***	.06601	.9310	.09339	1.0506	.07784
Political interest	1.1060*	.06034	.9489	.07711	.6503***	.05489
Voting	.9488	.07550	.9535	.05942	.8753*	.06926
Political information	1.1956***	.05077	1.005	.04235	.8835**	.04382
Political ideology	.9212**	.03524	.9411	.03876	.9107**	.03558
Observations	11,187					
Pseudo R^2	0.0601					

NOTE: The table lists the relative risk ratio (RRR) results of multinomial logistic regression with robust standard errors (adjusted for 18 clusters according to the countries of the sample). The dependent variable in the model is the categories for each Profile. Significant levels: *p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***0.00

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VI. Discussion and Future Research

The results shown are good answers to the question stated in the beginning of this paper. We present theoretical and empirical evidence to make a distinction among different profiles of non democratic citizens. The proposed indicator of attitudes toward democracy constitutes a useful instrument for the study of these profiles, especially for countries where democracy has the real challenge to convince and justify its advantages to an important number of citizens. We demonstrated that non democratic citizens are not a homogeneous group as has been considered by the conventional dichotomous classification consequential with the simple opposition with those who do support democracy.

The profiles are distinguished as expected according to the possible combination allowed by the two dimensions of support: preference for democracy and rejection to authoritarianism. Generally speaking, authoritarians, indifferents, and incoherents are clearly distinguishable profiles based on their different objections against supporting democracy. The authoritarian profile is configured by non democratic norms and values, and their dissatisfaction with the way democracy works. The group of indifferent is easily discriminated based on structural, normative and attitudinal grounds. The incoherent profile is a rather complex group, being likely very instrumental in his support.

We have made a contribution to the theoretical discussion about the understanding of support for democracy. Contrary to previous works (Carlin and Singer, 2007; Sarsfield and Echegaray, 2005; Schedler and Sarsfield, 2007) that attempt to make a distinction among "democrats" in order to find a better indicator of democratic legitimacy, our purpose was not to discuss the conceptual definition of democracy neither to improve the measurement of democratic support. Our aim was to inquire about the differences among non democratic citizens and their objections to support democracy. From the beginning we do not assume *a priori* any ideal or conceptual form of democracy, and we do not assume this given "type" of democracy in citizens when answering the questions we use to develop the indicator of individual profiles. We suggest a distinction of citizens directly according to the concept of democratic legitimacy, understood as the belief that democracy—whatever its definition—is the best system of government in a given moment and for a given country. That allows us to study the factors influencing their configurations, the differences among them and between countries. Our results imply the necessity to nuance the

conclusions of previous works on democratic legitimacy, which has been based on a dichotomised division between democrats and non democrats.

Moreover, these results open the opportunity for several lines of future research, some of those have been mentioned before. In first place, it is necessary to analyse and explain differences between countries. It is not the same that in one case a majority of citizens object democracy derived from instrumental reasons than in another case more citizens object democracy because normative or socio-structural roots. Taking a look again at Figures 2 and 3 one interesting question occurs: Why democrat profile is higher in Costa Rica and Uruguay? Or the opposite, why is a large amount of authoritarians characteristic in Ecuador and Paraguay? Is it due to contemporary or historic performance of democracy in each country? In that sense, some analysts have recommended not to take Latin America as a consistent and appropriate region for relevant conclusion; instead the analysis should focus rather on individual countries (Lagos, 2008).

With regard to the latter, the next step is to study the effect of country specific factors on the configuration of profiles. These factors correspond also to the endogenous and exogenous classification used in this paper. Exogenous explanations, in particular socio-structural ones, have sustained that the level of poverty and inequality, the percentage of rural population and ethnic fragmentation are good predictors for the lack of support for democracy. Endogenous theories explain democratic legitimacy based on the institutional setting and the political conditions of each country. For some scholars, the relationship between and strength of the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial bodies; the State territorial structure and its (de)centralization, the electoral and the party system are important factors in the emergence and consolidation of positive attitudes toward democracy (Norris, 1999b). It has also been proposed that the particularities of the previous non democratic regime and the conditions of the democratization process configure the current system of democratic legitimacy. Some other analysts suggest that support for democracy is a consequence of elite behaviour and institutional quality: electoral administrators, campaign regulations, and party reactions—losers' consent—can shape citizen political attitudes (Anderson et al. 2005; Mattes). A multilevel analysis would take advantage of the cross-national dataset.

Finally, we expect that in future research our findings drive interesting implications of the study of charismatic leaderships, support for political parties, or social movements (Camp 2001; McAllister 2008; Norris 1999c). Knowing which profiles hide behind the broad and ambiguous tag of "non democrats", we will be able to analyse which

consequences these configurations of profiles might have for the political system in each country, connecting political attitudes with political and social behaviour.

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IX. References

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X. Appendix I. Codification of Variables.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

For the dimension of *preference for democracy*, the following questions have been selected from the Latinobarometro survey:

Overt preference for democracy	The variable is categorical. The question and coding as follows. "With which of the following statements you agree most: (1) Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government; (2) Under certain circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one; and (3) For people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non democratic government."
Democracy is the best form of government	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of government". Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and strongly disagree.
Democracy is the best for development	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? Democracy is the only system of government for the development of [country]". Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and strongly disagree.

For the dimension of *rejection to authoritarianism*, the following questions have been selected from the Latinobarometro survey:

Rejection to military government.	The variable is dichotomised. The question and coding as follows. "(0) Would support a military government if the situation got very bad; or (1) Under no circumstances would support a military government".
Problem solving capacity of military government.	The variable is dichotomised. The question and coding as follows. "According to what you know or have heard, can a military government can solve more or fewer problems than democratic government. (0) A military government can solve more problems; (1) A military government can solve fewer problems".

EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

Socio-Demographic variables:

Gender	The variable is dichotomised: (1) Women, (0) Men
Education	The variable is ordinal. We form seven categories where (1) No studies, (2) Basic education incomplete, (3) Basic education complete, (4) Secondary of technical education incomplete, (5) Secondary or technical education complete, (6) Incomplete university and (7) Complete university.
Age	The variable was categorized in different ranges, as follow: (1) 16-25 years old; (2) 26-40 years old; (3) 41-60 years old; and (4) 61 and more years old.
Income	The variable is ordinal. We used the self perception of income. The question is: "Does the salary that you receive and the total family income allow you to cover your needs in a satisfactory manner? Which of the following describes your situation:" Recoded as follow: (1) It is not sufficient, you have big problems"; (2) It is not sufficient, you have problems; (3) It is just sufficient, without major problems; (4) It is sufficient, you can save.

Economic performance evaluation variables:	
Satisfaction with domestic economy	The variable is ordinal. The question is: "In general, how would you describe the present economic situation of the country?" Recoded as follow: (1) Very bad, (2) Bad, (3) About average, (4) Good, (5) Very good.
Satisfaction with personal economy	The variable is ordinal. The question is: "In general, how would you describe your present economic situation and that of your family?" Recoded as follow: (1) Very bad, (2) Bad, (3) About average, (4) Good, and (5) Very good.
Political performance evaluation variables:	
Government approval	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "Do you approve or disapprove of the current presidential administration headed by [name of country President]?" Coded as follow: (1) disapprove, (2) don't know, and (3) approve.
Satisfaction with democracy	The variable is ordinal. The question is: "In general, would you say you are very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works is [country]?" Coded as follow: (1) Not at all satisfied, (2) Not very satisfied, (3) Fairly satisfied, and (4) Very satisfied.
Corruption reduction perception	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "How much progress do you think has been made in reducing corruption in state institutions during the last two years?" The answer coded as follow: (1) Much progress and some progress; (0) little and no progress at all.
Cultural variables:	
Political values	The variable is dichotomised. The question asks for preference for one of two statements about order and freedom in the society. The statements and coding as follows. "(1) I prefer to live in an orderly society although some freedoms may be limited, and (0) I prefer to live in a society where all right are respected, although there may be some disorder."
Democracy as agreements	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? Democracy is a form of government where things are resolved through discussion and agreement." Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and strongly disagree.
Social conservadurism	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statement? It is preferable that a woman concentrates on the home and man on his work". Coded as follow: (1) strongly agree and agree; (2) disagree and strongly disagree.
Political attitudinal variables:	
Political interest	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "How interested are you in politics?" The answers are recoded as follow: (1) very interested and fairly interested; (0) a little interested and not interested at all.
Voting	The variable is dichotomised. The question is: "If elections were held this Sunday, which party would you vote for?" The answers are recoded as follow: (1) [any political party mentioned] and blank/null vote; and (0) Would not vote and Don't know.
Political information	The variable is ordinal. The question is: "How much would you say you know about political and social events in your country?" The answers are recoded as follow: (1) Nothing, (2) Almost nothing, (3) A littler, (4) A fair amount, (5) A lot.

Political ideology	The variable is a scale we transform in ordinal. The question is: "In politics, people normally speak of 'left' and 'right'. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you place yourself?" The answers are recoded as follow: (1) left, 0-1-2; (2) centre-left, 3-4; (3) centre, 5; (4) centre-right, 6-7; (5) right, 8-9-10.

XI. Appendix II

Table 4. Optional Profiles of Support for Democracy: 6 Clusters solution

Variables	Profiles of Support for Democracy (Alternative)						
	Democrat	Moderate Democrat	Authoritarian	Incoherent	Radical Incoherent	Indifferent	Sample Mean
Democracy best form of government	1.00	0.67	0.60	0.33	1.00	0.68	0.78
Democracy best for development	1.00	0.67	0.62	0.31	1.00	0.72	0.79
Rejection to military government	1.00	0.74	0.05	0.05	0	0.64	0.70
Problem solving capacity of military	1.00	0.73	0.05	0.05	0	0.61	0.69
"Democracy is always preferable"	1.00	1.00	0	1.00	1.00	0	0.60
"Authoritarian government can be preferable"	0	0	1.00	0	0	0	0.16
"It doesn't matter we have a democratic or non democratic gov."	0	0	0	0	0	1.00	0.22

Note: We presented the mean of each variable corresponding to the dimensions of "preference for democracy" and "rejections to authoritarianism" for each profile and for the whole sample.