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Titre
Wittgenstein and the Duty to Believe
Autor(es)
Sujet
Newman
Sosa
Wittgenstein
Hinge epistemology
normativity
Rule-following
Clasificación UNESCO
7201 Filosofía del Conocimiento
Fecha de publicación
2022
Éditeur
Springer
Citación
Gómez-Alonso, M. (2022). Wittgenstein and the Duty to Believe. Topoi. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11245-022-09828-8
Resumen
[EN] It is generally assumed that hinge-commitments are deprived of an epistemically normative structure, and yet, that although groundless, the acceptance of Wittgensteinian certainties is still rational. The problem comes from the intellectualist view of hinge-approvals which many recent proposals advance—one that falls short of the necessities and impossibilities pertaining to what would be the right description of how it is like to approve of hinges. I will raise the Newman-inspired worry as how to cash the abstract acceptance of principles of enquiry into real assent, as well as the question about how to extend normativity all the way back to foundations. It is my aim here to argue that ethical normativity is the only kind of normativity capable to ground the rationality of hinges. In defence of this, I will draw some consequences from Ernest Sosa’s claim that hinges about the external world are logically related to the cogito
URI
ISSN
0167-7411
DOI
10.1007/s11245-022-09828-8
Versión del editor
Aparece en las colecciones
Patrocinador
Publicación en abierto financiada por el Consorcio de Bibliotecas Universitarias de Castilla y León (BUCLE), con cargo al Programa Operativo 2014ES16RFOP009 FEDER 2014-2020 DE CASTILLA Y LEÓN, Actuación:20007-CL - Apoyo Consorcio BUCLE.